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ABSTRACT
14 April 1892 KingChulalongkorn instituted a modern, western-hased system 
of government in Siam, involving the establishment of twelve Ministries with 
clearly defined functional responsibilities. This study is primarily con­
cerned with the early development of one of those Ministries, the Ministry 
of finance - the creation of the Ministry in the late 1880s, its legal estab­
lishment in 1892 and its emergence as an important constituent part of the 
Siamese administration by the end of King Chulalongkora' s reign in 1910. In 
addition considerable attention is paid to the various financial reforms pro­
moted by the Ministry in this period.
Chapter I examines the imperialist threat to Siam in the late nineteenth 
century and the consequent need for financial reform, and includes an analysis 
of the pre-reform system of financial administration and of the attempts at 
financial reform in the first half of the reign of King Chulalongkorn. Chapters 
II to V trace the development of the Ministry of Finance from the late 1880s 
to 1910 with particular reference to the development of budgetary control: 
in addition considerable attention is paid to specific reforms and developments - 
the appointment of a British Financial Adviser from 1896, the raising of loans 
in Europe in 1905 and 1907» the closure of the provincial gambling dens in 
the mid-1900s. Chapter VI is concerned with the currency and exchange reforms 
promoted by the Ministry of Finance in this period - principally the adoption 
of a gold-exchange standard over the period 1902 - 1908 - Chapter VII with the 
abolition of the tax farm system and the introduction of revenue collection 
by airect Government agency. Chapter VIII is a conclusion and includes a 
comparison of the development of the Siamese financial administration over the 
period 1885 - 1910 with contemporaneous financial reforms in other parts of 
Asia, particularly colonial Asia.
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7PRFFACE
The latter half of the reign of King Chulalongkorn - the years from the 
mid-l880s to 1910 - was arguably one of the most dramatic and decisive periods 
in the modern history of Thailand. On the one hand, throughout a large part 
of this period Siam was faced with the most intense diplomatic and, at times, 
military pressure from the neighbouring colonial powers - Britain in Malaya 
and Burma, and France in Indo-China. On occasions - as when in July 1893 two 
French warships forced their way up the Chao Phraya river, past Siamese defences, 
to Bangkok, an action that was later followed by a French blockade of the mouth 
of the river - the sovereignty of the Kingdom appeared to be in immediate 
danger^ ". At other times - with, for example, French troops occupying the 
eastern provincial town of Chantabun from 1893 to 1904, or with, in the 1900s, 
Britain putting considerable diplomatic pressure on Siam's position in the 
northern Malay States - the continued independence of the Kingdom remained in 
doubt. At no point in this period could it be said that the independence of 
Siam was secure. Yet to a considerable extent by astute diplomacy and by
gradually, sparingly, giving way to the major territorial demands of the
2colonial powers , Siam succeeded in surviving as an independent state during 
this most intense period of British and French imperial pressure up to the 
outbreak of war in Lurope in 1914. And the fact that Siam escaped colonial 
rule was clearly a crucial factor in the subsequent political and economic 
development of the Kingdom.
No less important for those future developments were the political and 
administrative reforms which took place within Siam in the final two decades 
of the reign of King Chulalongkorn. In April 1892 King Chulalongkorn formally
1. Anglo-Siamese and Franco-Siamese relations in this period are dealt with 
by D. G. S. Hall in his A History of South-.bast Asia 3rd* ed. London 1968,
Chapter 391 ’Britain, France and the Siamese Question1.
2. For example, in 1893 Siam renounced all her claims to territories on the 
east bank of the Mekong in favour of French claims: in 1907 she ceded the
Cambodian provinces of Battambang and Siemreap to France. In 1909 Siam trans­
ferred her sovereignty over the Siamese Malay States - Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan 
and Trengganu - to Britain.
inaugurated a new, western-based Government structure, involving the estab­
lishment of twelve Ministries with clearly defined functional responsibilities. 
The principal objective of this radical reform of the Siamese administration 
was to secure a more effective and efficient government of the whole Kingdom 
by the central authorities in Bangkok, and from the early 1890s a series of 
reforms, projects and schemes issued froii the new Ministries, programmes 
which in some cases literally changed the face of Siam - as in the construc­
tion of a railway network - and in others laid the foundations of the 
Government and administrative system and procedures of modern Thailand.
Therefore it need hardly be surprising that historians of Thailand have
in recent years been strongly attracted to this momentous period. With
regard to studies which have appeared in English, much of the earlier interest
was in Siam's relations with Britain and France^, but more recently two
studies have appeared which examine important aspects of the internal reforms
and politics of those years - David K. Wyatt's The Beginnings of Modern
Education in Thailand, 1868 - 1910, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell 1966, published
as The Politics of keform in Thailand, New Haven 1969» and Tej Bunnag's
The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1692 to 1915 s A Study of the
Creation, the Growth, the Achievements and the Implications for Modern Siam
of the Ministry of the Interior under Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, D.Phil.
thesis, Oxford 1968. The principal objective of this present study is to
provide a detailed assessment of one further important aspect of the internal
reform programme undertaken by King ChuLalongkorn and his Ministers from the
late 1880s - a consideration of the establishment and early development of
the Ministry of Finance in Siam, the specific problems that it faced and
how, confronted with severe political, administrative and economic constraints,
it attempted to solve them. It is hoped that in this way some contribution
3* For example, see : B. S. N. Murti Anglo-French Relations with Siam 1876-
1904 Ph.D. Thesis, London 1952, S. Xuto British Foreign Policy towards Siam, 
1890-1900. Ph.D. thesis, London 1956, Thamsook Numnonda The Anglo-Siamese 
Negotiations, 1900-1909 Ph.5. thesis, London 1966 and Chandran Mohandas 
Jeshurun Anglo-French Tensions on the Upper Mekong River, 1892-1902, Ph.D. thesis 
London 19^7•
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9will be made towards a more comprehensive understanding and appreciation of 
the achievements of the Siamese Government during the reign of that remarkable 
King, and of the influence of that Government's reforms - in this case speci­
fically financial reforms - on the making of modern Thailand.
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NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS
Transcription
The system of transcription employed throughout this study is tne 'General 
System of Phonetic Transcription of Thai Characters into Roman' as published 
in the Journal of the Thailand Research Society, vol. 33 pt. 1 March - November 
1941 pp. 49-53. There are two minor exceptions. First, in the case of 
personal names, whenever possible the known preferences of the individuals 
concerned and/or accepted usage have been followed: therefore King
VChulalongkorn instead of King Chulalongk9n, and Prince Devawongse instead of 
Prince ThSwawong. Second, accepted usage has also been followed in the case 
of certain Thai words which have become familiar in English; for example 
baht instead of b5t.
Chronology
From the late 1880s until 1911 the chronological system employed in 
government circles in Siam was the RattanakPsinsok, the Bangkok Era; 
r.s. + 1781 = A.D. However, the official Siamese year, which coincided with 
the Siamese financial year, ran from 1 April to 31 March. Thus r.s. 121, 
for example, would correspond to 1 April 1902 to 31 March 1903- Consequently, 
though cumbersome, the form 1902/03 has to be used to convey the exact equi­
valent of r.s. 1 2 1; similarly, 1890/91 for r.s. 109, 1909/10 for r.s. 128 
and so forth.
Coinage
The standard coin of the Siamese monetary system in the period covered 
by this study was the baht: in contemporary western writings it was usually
referred to as the 'tical1 but the Siamese term has been retained here except 
where 'tical’ appears in quotations.
Until 1909 the baht was divided into the fu'ang (8 to the baht), the 
at (64 to the baht) and the solot (128 to the baht), but at the end of the
11
reign of King Chulalongkorn a decimal system of subsidiary coins was intro 
duced, with the baht divided into 100 satang.
Abbreviations
F.F.A. Files of the Financial Adviser, (Bangkok).
J.A.S. Journal of Asian Studies.
J.S.E.A.H. Journal of South-East Asian History.
J.S.S. Journal of the Siam Society.
N.A. National Archives, (Bangkok).
P.R.O. F.O. Public Record Office (London), Foreign Office Series. 
R.F.A.B. Report of the Financial Adviser on the Budget (of the Kingdom 
of Siam).
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CHAPTER I
The Setting : towards the establishment of a modern Ministry of Finance.
1. The imperialist threat and government reform.
In a letter to Prince Damrong, the Minister of the Interior, written in 
January 1896, King Chulalongkorn explained succinctly the case for the reform 
of the government administration that had been taking place in Siam from the 
late l880s\ To the west and to the east the Kingdom was faced with European 
powers whose military strength and systems of administration were much superior 
to those of the indigenous states they had replaced, and to that of Siam itself. 
This threat to the independence of Siam could be met, the King argued, by three 
measures - by maintaining friendly diplomatic relations with the neighbouring 
colonial regimes, by possessing sufficient power to maintain the internal peace 
of the Kingdom, and finally, by improving the Kingdom’s administration so that 
it equalled that of the European regimes themselves. These points were inter­
dependent. For example, good diplomatic relations with the powers could not 
be maintained if the colonial regimes were seriously inconvenienced and annoyed 
by lawlessness in the adjoining border areas of Siam. Internal peace and sta­
bility depended in turn on the existence of orderly administration throughout 
the Kingdom. There were a further set of considerations. Under an orderly 
administration the people would have the opportunity and incentive to develop 
their agricultural and commercial interests: this in turn would increase the
Government's revenue, which in itself was essential to finance the original 
administrative improvements. And again, the ability of the Government to 
raise revenue required the creation of an effective administration throughout 
the whole Kingdom: yet the creation and maintenance of such an administration
depended on the availability of government funds.
Some of these points can be illustrated by one relatively minor, though
1. King to Prince Damrong 18 January 1896. Quoted by Tej Bunnag The Progin- 
cial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915 D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1968, 
pp. 142-143.
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relevant example - the establishment in the early 1890s of a Forestry Depart­
ment. For several decades prior to that British teak companies working in the 
Chiangmai area had been seriously inconvenienced by the unpredictable and 
arbitrary restrictions placed on their operations by the local chiefs and by 
an almost intolerable level of lawlessness and dacoity in the area. At first 
the companies had complained to the British Consul in Bangkok, then after 1884 
to a newly appointed Vice-Consul in Chiangmai itself. In the early 1890s the 
King and the General Adviser, Rolin-Jacquerayns decided to create a Forestry 
Department, capable of governing forestry operations in the north in much the 
same way as they were controlled in British Burma: indeed it was proposed that
British forestry experts would be hired to train Siamese officials in western 
forestry methods. It was hoped that the establishment of the Department would 
secure two main benefits. If the Department dealt quickly and effectively with 
the complaints of the foreign companies, it could be expected that the companies 
would no longer ask their Vice-Consul to take up each difficulty with the 
Siamese authorities in Bangkok: the danger of each irritation and annoyance
suffered by the foresters being transformed into a political issue by the 
Vice-Consul would be much reduced. Second, it was assumed that an efficient 
Forestry Department, responsible to Bangkok would greatly increase the central 
government's revenue from the forest fees and duties imposed on the companies, 
and that by a strictly enforced restriction on felling, by the introduction of
replanting programmes, the government would be able to draw revenue from the
2forests almost indefinitely .
The creation of a Forestry Department capable of efficiently and effectively
controlling forestry operations throughout the Kingdom implied a considerable
expansion in the central government's responsibilities - and expenditure.
Offices and accommodation for officials had to be constructed in the provinces:
foreign experts engaged: in the longer run, the Government had to meet the
cost of training and then maintaining a group of salaried Siamese forestry 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Prince Damrong Th5s5phiban (Provincial Administration) Bangkok 1967 
pp. 38-41.
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officials. Yet clearly the Bangkok Government's obligations could not rest 
there. Effective measures against dacoity could be taken only by the establish­
ment of permanent, effective police forces in the provinces. The freedom for 
disgruntled, independent-minded local rulers to conspire with the colonial 
powers against Bangkok, the opportunity for rapacious, oppressive local 
officials to reduce their domain to anarchy and near-rebellion, could be 
restricted only through the establishment of firm, just administration by 
government officials loyal and responsible to the central Government. And 
again, effective control of the sensitive outer provinces from Bangkok depen­
ded on the existence of good communications between the capital and the border 
areas - first the telegraph and then the railway. An expanding central and 
provincial bureaucracy could be staffed with capable officials only if there 
were sufficient general and vocational educational facilities available. A 
reduction in lawlessness throughout the Kingdom, the abolition of extra­
territorial privileges for the treaty powers, depended significantly on the 
creation of a just, efficient judiciary - and so on. In each case the 
Government found itself committed to a radical increase in its functions and 
responsibilities - and consequently, in its expenditure.
It would be valuable to underline once again the interdependence of certain 
of the measures considered by King Chulalongkorn to be essential for the main­
tenance of Siamese independence. The orderly administration of the Kingdom - 
on which the internal peace of the Kingdom depended - necessitated a consider­
able increase in government expenditure and hence revenue. That in turn 
depended on the existence of an administrative system capable of raising 
sufficient revenue from the Kingdom. Administrative reform and the ability 
of the Government to raise revenue were therefore closely connected. This 
was particularly so since under the terras of the commercial treaties signed with 
the western powers from the 1850s - beginning with the Bowring Treaty with 
Britain in 1855/56 - Siam was prevented from levying new taxes or from raising
15
the rates on existing ones^. As a result the increase in revenue had to be 
achieved through a more efficient exploitation of the existing tax structure - 
by improved methods of tax administration and collection, particularly in the 
provinces, and by the development of effective tax accounting methods by the 
Ministry of Finance itself to ensure that all revenues collected reached 
the Treasury.
It should now be evident that the Ministry of Finance, established in 1890 
as the ministry responsible for the whole of the Government's revenue and 
expenditure, was at the centre of the reform programme undertaken by King 
Chulalongkorn and his ministers. It was the responsibility of the Ministry 
to see that the revenue was sufficient to finance the schemes, projects and 
general administration of the Government, and to do this by the development 
of a system of tax collection which yielded a large revenue yet was inex­
pensive to administer, by ensuring through a detailed system of accounts and 
financial checks that all the revenues collected by various officials in the 
administration reached the Treasury, and lastly by promoting, through financial 
reform, the continued commercial development of the Kingdom. On the expendi­
ture side it was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance to draw up, in 
consultation with each ministry and department, the budget allocations of the 
entire administration, to see the budget sanctioned by the Council of Ministers 
and the King, and finally to ensure that the disbursements of each department 
from the Treasury were strictly in accordance with those allocations.
It should also be evident that the problems faced by the Ministry of 
Finance in carrying out those functions were not wholly, or even mainly, 
economic in character. They were also administrative - how to create a system
3- See Article 8 and the attached 'Tariff of Export Inland Duties to be levied 
on Articles of Trade' of the Bowring Treaty: the full text of the Treaty is 
reproduced in Manich Juj&sai King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring Bangkok 1970 
pp. 126-138. The treaty clauses were of course to apply only to the nationals 
of the treaty powers and not to the Siamese themselves. Legally the Govern­
ment was free to impose any taxes it wished on its own people. Yet clearly 
the Government was unwilling to make a distinction in this respect between 
Siamese and European and so in effect the restrictions on levying taxes also 
applied to the Siamese population.
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of financial accountability for both revenue and expenditure for the whole of 
the central and provincial bureaucracy, including the Ministry of Finance it­
self. There were political problems - how to persuade, or force each ministry 
and department to accept the interference of the Ministry of Finance over 
their budget allocations and the way in which they were used. There were 
significant cultural problems facing the Ministry - how to wean officials 
away from long accepted but now anachronistic conceptions of their functions 
and responsibilities.
2. The pre-reform administration.
The extent and complexity of those problems can be appreciated only by an 
examination of the pre-reform structure and system of administration. This 
has already been carried out at length and in considerable detail in a number 
of works . It is not intended to retrace that ground here but rather to con­
sider only those features of the pre-reform administration which have a direct 
bearing on the present study.
The basic structure of the pre-reform administration was created by King 
Trailok in the mid-fifteenth century. At the top were two ministries, the 
Mahgtthai and the KalghOm which administered the civilian and military popu­
lations respectively. Below that, on the civilian side came the four ministries 
of the Wang (Palace), Ng (Lands), Phra Khlang (Treasury) and the Nak^nbgn 
(Capital). Below them came a number of minor departments. The Government was
The major work on this subject is H. G. Quaritch Wales Ancient Siamese 
Government and Administration (London 193*0 • Useful analyses are provided 
by Fred W. Riggs Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity (Honolulu 
1966) and William J. Siffin The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and 
Development (Honolulu 1966), in both cases as an introduction to an analysis 
of the modern Thai bureaucracy, and by James N. Mosel Thai Administrative 
Behavior (in Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration William J. 
Siffin (ed.) Indiana 1959 ) - In Thai, King Chulalongkorn1s Speech"Explaining 
the Changes in the Government, first published in Bangkok in 19271 and Prince 
Damrong's Ru’ang laksana kgnpokkhr^ng prathStsaygm tge bSrgn (The Old System 
of Government in Siam) both of which are printed in Nangsg*“~gnprak$p khambanygi 
wichg phP'nthan grayatham thai (Handbook on Basic Thai Culture) Thammasat Uni-~ 
versity 1971» are particularly important. Specific aspects of pre-reform govern­
ment are covered by Wira Wimoniti Historical Patterns of Tax Adainistration in 
Thailand (Bangkok 1961) Akin Rabibhadana The Organization of Thai Society in 
the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873 (Cornell Data Paper no. 7*+ 1969) and Prince 
Dhani Nivat The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy J.S.S. vol. 36 pt. 2 
pp. 91-106.
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constructed along functional lines, with each ministry and department having
its own defined responsibilities and duties.
It would seem that from the first, the financial responsibilities of the
Phra Khlang were relatively light. In the first place the authority of the
Phra Khlang, as with each ministry at that level, extended only to the area
immediately surrounding the capital. However, towards the end of the sixteenth
century officials were appointed from the Phra Khlang to the provinces, and
5this increased the flow of revenue into the Treasury . Second, major projects 
initiated by the King - military campaigns, the construction of religious 
edifices - were carried out by means of forced labour rather than financed 
from the Treasury. As a result, the MahStthai and the KalShPm which controlled 
the corvee were more involved with such projects than was the Phra Khlang^.
The financial interests of the Phra Khlang were further reduced towards 
the end of the seventeenth century, when, in a major change in the structure 
of government, the MahStthai and the KalShPm took over territorial responsibi­
lities - the MahStthai administered the area to the north of the Capital, 
Ayudhya, the Kal&hPm that to the south. The two ministries were responsible 
for every aspect of government in their area - the organization of the corvee, 
the administration of justice, the collection of taxes. In turn this meant 
that the Phra Khlang1s control of financial matters - particularly its ability 
to secure an adequate flow of revenue into the King's Treasury - was still 
further reduced, for although the Phra Khlang's authority had never really
extended far beyond the capital, responsibility for tax collections in the
7provinces now rested firmly with the Mahatthai and the Kal&hPm .
That the Phra Khlang did not disappear altogether was due to the fact that 
from the seventeenth century it began to develop non-financial responsibilities
5- Wales op. cit. p. 215«
6. King Chulalongkorn PhrarStchadamrat nai phrabSt somdet phra chunla&h^mklao 
^haoytlhua song thalaSng phraboromarRtch51hib5.i kg.ekhai kSnpokkhr^ng phSendin 
(Speech Explaining the Changes in the Government) Bangkok 1927 pp. 5-6.
7. Wales op. cit. pp. 113-11 ^f.
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That period saw a growth in sea-borne trade between Siam and China, a trade in 
which vessels specially prepared on the instructions of the King played a pre­
dominant part. The Phra Khlang had the task of seeing that the King's ships 
were loaded with particularly exotic items such as ivory and sapanwood: fhis
it did by collecting what was known as suai - special products sent to the 
capital from distant provinces where, because of the distances involved, the 
people were unable to perform physical corvee services for the King. Simi­
larly the Phra Khlang was responsible for the distribution among the 
administration of goods received in return from China. This trade brought 
the Phra Khlang into contact with foreign merchants, and it was therefore 
natural that when increasing numbers of foreigners, including Europeans, came 
to Siam in the seventeenth century, they came under the jurisdiction of that 
Ministry. Gradually the Phra Khlang began to develop the role of a department 
of foreign affairs, and indeed it became known as the KromathS - the 
Department of the Port - though its Minister retained the title of Chao
Q
Phfaya Phra Khlang .
However, the major change in the Phra Khlang's status and functions occurred 
towards the end of the Ayudhya period. In 1733 the King, King Taisra, died,
and there then followed a brief but very violent succession struggle between
9the ex-King's brother and his second son . The Crown was won by the brother 
who became King Boromakot. One of the chief supporters of the defeated second 
son had been the Minister of the Phra Khlang, so on ascending the throne King 
Boromakot promoted one of his own group to that position, and at the same 
time transferred responsibility for administering the southern provinces from 
the KalahSm to the Phra Khlang^. This is an interesting example of the way 
in which the structure of the administration, the division of responsibilities 
and functions between the ministries, was determined principally by political
8. Wales op. cit. pp. 215-216.
9. W. A. R. Wood History of Siam (London 1926) p. 229/pp. 231-232.
10. Neon Snidvongs The Development of Siamese Relations with Britain and France 
in the Reign of Maha"Mongkut, 1851-1868 Ph.D. thesis, London 1961, p. 10.
factors, by the varying power, ambitions and connections of the ministers.
The Phra Khlang now found itself responsible for the government of the south - 
the administration of justice, the organization of the corvee, and the collec­
tion of revenue - tasks for which it was largely unprepared and unsuited. 
Overwhelmed by its new responsibilities, the Phra Khlang lost control of 
virtually all its remaining, original financial functions. The major part 
of them - the administration of the King's revenue and expenditure - was 
transferred to the Phra Khlang MahSsombat, an independent treasury also dating 
from King Trailok's reforms of the fifteenth century. The preparation of the 
royal trading ships, which had earlier been entrusted to a subordinate depart­
ment in the Phra Khlang, the Phra Khlang Sinkhg., was retained by that 
department, though the department itself became independent of the Phra Khlang. 
In fact the sole financial responsibility remaining for the Phra Khlang, apart 
from those connected with its administration of the southern provinces, was to 
check the bia wat lists - the annual payments from the King to certain govern­
ment officials. But as the Ministry’s knowledge of the financial affairs of 
the administration weakened, so even its control of the bia wat suffered"^.
During the reign of Rama I (1782-1809), the capital having by now moved 
to Bangkok, the administratiori of the southern provinces was returned to the 
KalghSm with the exception of the eastern gulf area which was retained by 
the Phra Khlang on the grounds that most of the foreigners visiting Siam 
entered the Kingdom and carried out their business in those provinces. In 
addition some of the inland provinces of the MahStthai were transferred to the
Phra Khlang: in effect the Phra Khlang became the third ministry with
12territorial responsibilities But though relieved of some of its territorial 
functions, there was little chance of the Phra Khlang regaining the limited 
control over finance which it had held in the late Ayudhya period. There was 
even less of a chance of it developing control over the flow of revenue and
11. King Chulalongkorn op. cit. pp. 6-7*
12. Neon Snidvongs op. cit. p. 16.
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expenditure into and out of the Treasury to the extent originally envisaged
in King Trailok's reforms, but never actually attained. In the first place,
the MahStthai and the KalahSm raised the revenue and controlled expenditure
in their own part of the Kingdom. Second, the Phra Khlang Sinkha, though it
lost its original function with the decline and then abolition of royal trading
in the Third and Fourth Reigns, greatly increased in importance when it
assumed responsibility for the administration of many of the Chinese-run tax
farms established during the reign of Rama III (1824-1851). It also became
responsible for the administration of the triennial Chinese poll tax. In fact,
according to Prince Damrong, by l8?2 ten separate departments were responsible
' 13for the collection of the Kingdom s revenue . The crucial point was that 
each of them maintained an independent treasury in which their tax receipts 
were held and from which they financed their administrations. The Phra Khlang 
MahSsombat which had inherited the financial responsibilities of the Phra 
Khlang towards the end of the Ayudhya period was but one of those ten depart­
ments: it was incapable of forcing the other nine to remit all their- tax
receipts to the King’s Treasury, it was incapable of controlling their 
expenditure.
In his speech explaining the changes in the government, delivered in the
late 1880s, King Chulalongkorn pointed out that
'PhrayS RStchaphakdl [the head of the Phra Khlang Mahasombat] did not 
know how much revenue would be coming in to finance the government's 
work: neither did he have the authority to demand the other depart­
ments remit all their revenue receipts to him. He could only accept 
whatever they wished to send. Therefore it must be concluded that 
the position and the functions of the Phra Khlang did not exist ... 
they had been dispersed among the other government departments. As 
a result, the revenues virtually disappeared; there was not enough 
for the administration.' 14
Indeed, according to the King, a situation was reached where the revenue 
received by the Crown for expenditure on government projects fell in absolute
13- Prince Damrong Tannin phasl 5k$n bangyang (The History of some Taxes) in 
Latthi thamniam tgngt&ng (Various Customs) Bangkok 1963 PP« 176-180.
14. King Chulalongkorn op.cit. p. 7« My emphasis.
15terms each year . With regard to the Phra Khlang itself, by the nineteenth 
century it was concerned almost solely with governing the gulf provinces - 
which of course implied control over some sources of revenue in that area - 
and with foreign affairs.
There was a further, political aspect to these developments: almost from
the beginning of the Bangkok period right through to the 1880s, control of 
many of the major ministries was retained by one family - the Bunnags1 .^
Members of that family, or close relatives, controlled the Kal&hSm from 1782 
to 1888, and the Phra Khlang from 1822 to 1885, except for the years 1865 to 
1869. In addition the family held numerous posts throughout the whole adminis­
tration, With such a powerful political and administrative position the 
Bunnags were able to divert the revenues collected under their control away 
from the King's Treasury towards their own private use. With the power of 
the King to control the revenues and expenditure of the Kingdom dissipated 
throughout the administration, each noble family could use its bureaucratic 
positions to increase its own wealth: but the Bunnags, as the dominant
bureaucratic family, were by far the most active in this respect. They reached 
their period of greatest influence between 1868 and 1873» when with King
Chulalongkorn still a minor, tihao PhrayS 31 Suriyawong, the KalShSm in the
17Fourth Reign, became Regent - King in all but name . With the Crown rela­
tively weak, the ministries were able to retain an ever increasing share of 
the revenue collected under their control and divert it away from the King's 
use. The King's reaction to this situation will be dealt with at a later stage.
The fact that the structure of the pre-reform administration, as it 
developed in the Ayudhya and early Bangkok periods, lacked a ministry capable
15* ibid p. *+2. This is a suitable point to underline one important consider­
ation. Since King Chulalongkorn was on the point of abolishing the government 
structure he was describing in this speech, some allowance must be made for 
the King's probable exaggeration of the failings of the old administration.
This consideration should be borne in mind through the whole of this section 
concerned with the pre-reform government.
16. See: D. K. Wyatt Family Politics in Nineteenth Century Thailand J.S.E.A.H. 
vol. 9 no. 2 Sept. 1968 pp. 208-228.
17. D. K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand (Yale 1969) pp. 35-62.
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of controlling the Kingdom’s revenue and expenditure, capable of placing at
the King's disposal more than a relatively small proportion of the total
revenue actually raised in the Kingdom, had a profound influence on the way
in which the administration operated.
The most obvious effect was, as noted above, that the King's ability to
finance large-scale projects was considerably limited - in fact limited to
the construction of palaces and temples, the conduct of royal and religious
18ceremonies, and the distribution of the annual bia wat payments . In order
to finance major projects other than those - for example, the construction of
forts, the sending of missions to other countries - the King was forced to
19impose extraordinary levies . For the Kings of the Ayudhya and early Bangkok 
periods, whose active administration of the Kingdom was relatively restricted 
(in both the geographical and functional sense) this was not a serious diffi­
culty. But for King Chulalongkorn, who saw the absolute necessity for 
expanding the functions and responsibilities of the central government if 
the sovereignty of the Kingdom was to be protected, this was a major problem. 
Therefore it hardly needs adding that the financial weakness of the Crown was 
a predominant reason why King Chulalongkorn wished to establish a strong and 
effective Ministry of Finance.
A corollary of the financial weakness of the King was that those ministries 
which administered the Kingdom's revenue had a considerable measure of autonomy. 
Since they were not dependent on a central treasury under the control of the 
King for their resources they were relatively free to pursue their own self- 
interested projects. There was therefore comparatively little interdependence 
or co-operation between ministries and departments, unless, of course, two 
ministries were controlled by members of one bureaucratic family. In fact
the insularity of ministries extended to the point where each had its own
20facilities for recruiting and training officials . However, not all
18. Tej Bunnag The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915 D.Phil. 
THesis, Oxford 1968 p. 21.
19« Walfcs op. cit. p. 212.
20. Siffin op. cit. p. 3^*
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ministries and departments were strategically placed to raise revenue: some
did not administer the collection of a particularly lucrative tax, or did not 
provide a service for which they could extract large payments from the popu­
lation. And of course they could not appeal to the King’s Treasury for large 
funds. As a result these departments were starved of resources and were 
incapable of carrying out their designated responsibilities effectively. This 
was the fate of, in particular, the various courts of law scattered throughout 
the administration^.
Looking at the administration as a whole, it is clear that in the absence 
of a strong finance department the resources available to any particular minis­
try or department depended almost exclusively on the ability of that agency to 
control the major sources of revenue in the Kingdom. In effect the distri­
bution of the Kingdom's resources was determined not in accordance with the 
King's view of the needs of his domains, but rather in accordance with the 
distribution of political and administrative power among the constituent parts 
of the administration. It therefore followed that the strong ministries, the
MahStthai and the KalShSm, were in a position to become stronger, to assume
control over increasing numbers of taxes and duties, and over increasing 
functions and responsibilities. By the Bangkok period these ministries had 
assumed such a wide range of duties that their administrative machinery was 
seriously over-worked. Despite the considerable resources at their disposal 
they were over-burdened with responsibilities. Conversely, the weak depart­
ments, the courts of law, for example, were in no position to prevent themselves 
becoming weaker: in time, because of insufficiency of resources they became
incapable of carrying out their duties. In the case of both strong and weak
departments the net result was the same - an inefficient and ineffective 
22administration
King Chulalongkorn's reform of the administration, initiated in the late 
1880s, was designed to abolish that system completely, to create an
21. King Chulalongkorn op. cit. pp. 21-33 / Wales op. cit. pp. 177-196.
22. King Chulalongkorn op. cit. p. 56.
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administrative structure in which each ministry and department had its own
clearly defined responsibilities and sufficient resources with which to carry
25them out . Furthermore, it was clearly intended that the allocation of 
resources between the various ministries would be determined by the govern­
ment as a whole - the King and the Council of Ministers - in accordance with 
the agreed needs of the Kingdom. For example, the funds required to promote 
educational facilities would be set aside for that purpose, simply by the 
Council of Ministers agreeing to increase the budget allocation of the Ministry 
of Public Instruction from the Treasury. An important department would not 
flounder because of its inability to develop its own sources of revenue.
The nature of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance in the re­
formed administration and the problems faced by the Ministry in fulfilling 
those responsibilities, should now be clearer. In essence each ministry was 
required to entrust its financial affairs to, in the immediate perspective, 
the Ministry of Finance and, in general, to the Government as a whole. They 
were required to depend entirely on the Ministry for their resources, to remit 
all tax receipts, fees and duties collected under their auspices to it, and 
to open for the inspection of the Ministry all aspects of their financial 
operations. Clearly such interference by the Ministry of Finance ran counter 
to the well-established financial insularity of certain ministries and depart­
ments. For virtually the whole period covered by this study, and particularly 
for the period up to 1901 or 1902, this was to prove a major problem for 
Ministers of Finance.
Turning to a consideration of the ministers and officials themselves, the 
first point to note is that in the pre-reform bureaucracy neither group received 
a regular salary, though officials above a certain level received an annual 
payment, a royal bounty from the King - the bia wat. Instead officials were 
expected to retain a portion of the revenues passing through their hands for 
their own use. In much the same way as the King was expected to protect and
23. ibid p. 57.
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support the people - either in the practical ways of patriarchal Sukhotai king­
ship, or through the performance of ritual in the tradition of Indian kingship - 
and would, in return, receive either corvee services, goods or monetary payments 
from the population, so the officials, who took their authority from the King, 
could expect to receive a portion of the tribute flowing up to the King. This 
system of payment was known as kin mu*ang - ’to eat the country'.
The origin of kin mu'ang, the development of its various practices and its
effect on the administrative behaviour of officials, at least in the provinces,
2khas been described by Prince Damrong . The concept of kin mu'ang derived 
from the office of chao mu'ang (lord of the country) or local ruler. These 
local rulers were expected to discard all attempts to make a living through 
trade or farming, and instead to devote themselves entirely to governing their 
appointed part of the Kingdom so as to maintain the peace and happiness of the 
people under their authority. In return the people were obliged to offer 
corvee services to the chao mu'ang, to provide for his personal well-being.
The Government in the capital had no need to support these local authorities, 
though it did allow the chao mu'ang to retain a portion of the revenues passing 
through their hands to meet any expenses incurred in carrying out their res­
ponsibilities, and as a form of recompense.
Over time, as the population increasingly came to use coin in the conduct 
of their business, the chao mu'ang received less support from their people in 
the form of corvee services and payment in kind. This meant that the chao 
mu'ang found it necessary to develop alternative sources of income. Because 
of their authority and position the chao mu'ang were able to bestow privileges 
on particular clients, for example assisting a local merchant by allowing him 
tax exemptions, or supporting a tax farmer by instructing the local officials 
to ensure that the population paid their taxes to him. In the case of both 
the merchant and the tax farmer, they would of course pay the chao mu'ang for 
the special privileges he was able to provide. According to Prince Damrong,
2k. Prince Damrong ThSs5phib5n (Provincial Administration) Bangkok 1967
pp. 25-26.
in time, throughout the whole bureaucracy the custom arose of officials using 
the powers of theirpositions in this way to make a living. This system of re­
compense clearly had a profound influence on the administrative behaviour 
of officials.
In the first place, officials and ministers were reluctant to work in 
those departments where the opportunities for kin mu'ang were small. Those 
officials who did work in such parts of the administration would strive to 
retain as much of the revenues which did pass through their hands as was 
possible; alternatively, in the conduct of their work they would procrastinate, 
they would create difficulties in order to force the people to pay more for a 
speedy and efficient completion of their business. Since these departments were 
precisely those which were not closely involved with the collection of the 
Kingdom's revenue - and hence were starved of resources - this was a further 
reason why their administrations were so poor. For example, the only sources
of income for the courts of law were fines, a proportion of which was retained
25by the judges, and the levying of innumerable fees on the litigants . Neither 
judges nor court officials received a salary. As a result judges tended to 
impose frequent and heavy fines; furthermore, it became common practice for 
the court to decide in favour of whichever litigant was prepared to offer the 
higher payment. Cases were prolonged by officials if it were felt that the 
parties would be willing to pay to have their case settled quickly.
Yet even in those departments where the opportunities for kin mufang were 
greater, the temptation for officials to oppress the people was usually over­
whelming. In addition, those officials who found it relatively easy to support 
themselves by kin mu'ang were almost certain to neglect those aspects of their 
responsibilities which yielded them only a small financial retur£.
Second, those departments involved in the purchase of goods for the King
25. Wales op. cit. pp. I88-I89. Wales gives a number of examples of the 
judicial fees imposed: 'Fee for four constables1/'gong beating fee'/'cost
of bamboo collars worn by plaintiff and defendant'. The accused could obtain 
more considerate treatment whilst rwaiting trial by paying a further set of 
fees to the officials of the court.
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or the Government were likely to make those purchases not on the basis of which
was the most suitable or cheapest item available, but on the basis of whichever
26item gave the department and its officials the greatest financial return .
The merchant who offered the appropriate officials the largest commission
received the order - a clear example of the way in which officials could use
their government positions to maintain their income.
Third, by and large ministers and officials would show enthusiasm only
for projects and schemes in which they had a financial interest. Were the
King to propose a measure which held little attraction for his officials, each
ministry, by intrigue and complaint would attempt to pass responsibility for
27the measure to another part of the administration . It was relatively easy 
for a department to argue that a particularly unwelcome task was not its con­
cern, since by the Bangkok period the functions and duties of the various 
departments had become so confused.
One further aspect of the kin mufang system requires attention. It can be
argued that government positions, particularly high positions, were regarded 
primarily as affording the holder an opportunity to maintain and increase|hie 
personal wealth. The administration of specific taxes or other potentially 
profitable responsibilities was allocated throughout the Government to parti­
cular people as a means by which they could support themselves - allocated to 
individuals, not to the office. This highly personalized concept of government 
office revealed itself in a number of practical ways. For example, ministers
rarely visited the ministry under their control, but instead carried out their
28administration from their own residences . The minister would visit his
ministry only in cases of emergency. This, together with the practice of
officials retaining a portion of the revenues they had collected, or using 
the authority of their positions to confer privileges on clients in return 
for financial payments, illustrates clearly that in the pre-reform
26. King Chulalongkorn op. cit. p. kO,
27. ibid pp. 56-57.
28. Prince Damrong Th5s5.phib5n p. 11.
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administrative system, no real distinction could be made between the private 
and government activities of ministers and officials. This should not be 
taken to imply that officials paid little or no attention to the obligations 
of their office. There was always the danger that if a ministry under an 
official's rule became particularly inefficient, or if his province was reduced 
to rebellion by oppression and poor administration, he would be removed either
by the King or by the bureaucratic family to which he belonged fearful of a
29weakening of the family1s position as a whole . But by and large ministers 
were more concerned with protecting and enhancing their own position, wealth 
and authority, than with notions of governmental responsibilities and obliga­
tions as such.
There was a further feature of the pre-reform administration which had a 
profound effect on administrative behaviour, and to which brief reference must 
be made - the existence of a strict bureaucratic hierarchy. The hierarchy had 
been formalized by King Trailok as part of the administrative reforms of the 
fifteenth century and an elaborate system of correlated ranks, official tiBLes 
and status marks established to indicate the exact position of an office and 
individual in the bureaucracy. An inferior was (and since thisjis still very 
much a characteristic of Thai society, is) expected to show deference in speech 
and behaviour to a superior, never questioning instructions or ideas received, 
never offering an opinion in return‘d. Were an official to receive instruc­
tions which he felt were unacceptable - if, for example, there were consider­
able practical difficulties involved in implementing the instructions - then, 
rather than pointing out the difficulties to the superior, the official would 
simply acknowledge the instructions but then, in some way, avoid carrying them 
out. Face-to-fade confrontations, or even in some cases discussions, between
29. In this context it is interesting to note that Prince Damrong was the first 
minister of the MahStthai to undertake regular inspection tours of the provinces. 
His predecessors had been forced out of the capital only when a crisis in the 
provinces, such as a rebellion or the threat of invasion, had threatened their 
sources of income or their political positions. Prince Damrong op. cit. p. 24.
30. See: James N. Mosel Thai Administrative Behavior (in Toward the Comparative 
Study of Public Administration William J. Siffin (ed.) Indiana 1959 PP- 278-331)-
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inferior and superior, were to be avoided at almost any cost. A further aspect 
of this was the belief that a superior wishing to have some task performed 
simply gave his instructions to his subordinates and assumed that the matter 
would be dealt with. For the superior problems of implementation did not
A less formal structure of relationship was that of the patron-client.
The patron-client relationship was another aspect of the kin mu’ang system, 
as for example where an official used his position to enable a client to avoid
However, such relationships were formed not only between officials and the 
people but were also very important within the bureaucracy itself. Clearly 
patron-client relationships were also hierarchical, since by the very nature 
of the relationship the patron must be of a superior status, the client of 
inferior, but at certain periods a divergence would appear between the formal
structure of titles and ranks and the informal structure of patron-client
32relationships . Informal alliances would develop between officials both 
within ministries and between them, which cut across the formal hierarchies! 
structure of the individual ministries. In this way an official could secure 
immunity from the control of his formal superior by calling on the protection 
of his patron, even though the patron were in a separate, administratively 
unconnected department. As a result patron-client relationships could subvert 
the formal structure of each ministry, and to a considerable extent bureau­
cratic decisions would come to be made on the basis of the personal relationships 
or kinship ties of the officials involved. In the reign of King Mongkut the 
hierarchy of informal patron-client relationships was very much under the 
control of the Bunnag family, and indeed their influence in this respect
3 1 • ibid pp. 281-282.
32. For a thorough analysis see: Akin Rabibhadana The Organization of Thai 
Society in the Early Bangkok Period 1782-1873 (Cornell Data ^aper no. 74 
1969) esp. chaps 5-7 •
• 31arise
corvee obligations to another authority in return for some financial payment.
extended back into It was a corner-stone
33. ibid p. 147.
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of their power: by manipulating these alliances they were able to influence
the administration, to undermine the formal hierarchy of the Government through 
which the monarchy expected to operate.
It would be valuable at this point to return to the original aim of this 
section - to place this brief analysis of the pre-reform administration in the 
context of the government reforms of King Chulalongkorn, and more specifically, 
the place of the Ministry of Finance in those reforms. First, it should now 
be evident that the structure and bureaucratic methods of the pre-reform 
administration were incompatible with the efficient, effective and just govern­
ment of the whole Kingdom - it should now be clear why reform was essential.
An administrative structure with no strong central financial agency was 
unlikely to be able to mobilize and distribute the Kingdom's resources in such 
a way as to make possible the most effective government of the whole country 
from the capital. A judicial system in which judges and court officials made 
their living by priziig; payments from litigants could hardly be just. A system 
wnereby bureaucratic decisions were influenced by informal patron-client 
relationships, where the division of functions between ministries was severely 
confused, could hardly be efficient. Justice, efficiency and effectiveness of 
administration were to be achieved, in essence, in two ways. First, by a 
reform of the government structure, by the creation of a functionally- 
differentiated administration. Second, by the development of a bureaucracy 
in which officials had no personal financial interest in the outcome of their 
administrative decisions, where they were responsive to the criteria of 
efficiency and the concept of responsibility to the Government and the people.
Second, the importance of the Ministry of Finance in the reformed adminis­
tration created by King Chulalongkorn should now also be evident. Of greatest 
importance, the Ministry was to be the strong central financial agency, receiving 
into the Government Treasury all the revenues raised in the Kingdom, disbursing 
funds from it to all the component parts of the administration in accordance 
with the agteed allocations laid down by the Government and set out in the 
budget. In addition, the Ministry was to establish and maintain a system
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whereby all officials were paid salaries commensurate with their responsibili­
ties and grade, and sufficient to make it no longer necessary for them to 
resort to kin mu1ang; this was also to involve the promulgation and enforce­
ment of regulations to ensure the accountability of all monies passing through 
the administration, whether as revenue or expenditure. The analysis of the 
pre-reform administration above underlines the difficulties that were faced 
by the Ministry of Finance in this respect, particularly since at the time it 
was encouraging the emergence of western financial ethics throughout the 
bureaucracy, such ethics were by no means fully accepted within the Ministry 
itself. Concepts of administrative and financial propriety developed over a 
period of *400 years from the time of King Trailok were unlikely to be swept 
aside or even greatly modified in the space of two or three decades.
3. Financial reform in the early part of the Fifth Reign.
Some of the points made above can be demonstrated by a review of King 
Chulalongkorn1s first attempts at financial reform, undertaken at the end of 
the Regency period and in the first years after his accession to full authority. 
Such a review will also provide the necessary introduction to the major re­
forms of the second half of his reign, which are the principal concerns of 
this study.
In the five years of the Regency - 1868 to 1873 - the King, and indeed 
the royal family as a whole, suffered a considerable loss of political and 
financial power at the hands of the Bunnags. In fact, towards the end of the 
Fourth Reign Chao PhrayS SI Suriyawong, the future Regent, had already trans­
ferred the administration of the spirit tax farms - and hence the revenues -
3*4away from the Privy Purse Department to his own ministry, the KalahSm .
During the Regency period itself the Bunnags carried out a number of dubious 
financial operations'^ which had the effect of reducing still further the
3*f. D. K. Wyatt The Beginnings of Modern Education in Thailand 1868-1910 
Ph.D. thesis, Cornell 1966, p. 76 fn. *f*+.
35« D. K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand p. *43
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flow of revenues to the King and his family: indeed several princes found
themselves in severe financial difficulties"^. The financial reforms initi­
ated by the King towards the end of the Regency period were primarily an 
attempt to restore the financial, and in turn political, power of the Crown.
In June 1873 the King issued a royal edict 'Pertaining to the Financial 
37Department' . It was an uninhibited, almost reckless assault on what the 
King saw as the inadequacies of the existing financial system - the control of 
the Bunnagffamily over sources of revenue (and the power which that control 
gave them over the informal structure of patron-client relationships in the 
bureaucracy), the retention of tax receipts within ministries and departments 
and the consequent starvation of the King's Treasury and Privy Purse, the 
inefficiencies and injustices of an administration based on kin mu'ang.
The edict created the Finance Office (the HP Ratsad&k^nphiphat), a depart­
ment controlled by the King and independent of the existing government
structure: significantly it was situated within the walls of the Grand
38Palace . The Kingdom's tax farmers were directed to remit their payments 
to the new department, the aim being to deprive the ministries of a major 
source of revenue and instead to deflect the flow of funds directly into the 
King's Treasury. At the same time strict regulations were drawn up to check 
the worst inefficiencies of the tax farming system. For example, each pro­
spective farmer had to show proof of his financial resources and produce 
suitable guarantors willing to support his application. The bids for the 
farms were to be secret, the contract going to whichever farmer bid the 
highest. It was also decreed that were a farmer to fail to pay his instal­
ments to the Finance Office for two consecutive months, then the contract had 
to be reauctioned, the defaulting farmer being made responsible for any loss 
suffered by the Government as a result of the reauction. These, and numerous
36. ibid p. 5 3.
37- An English translation of the edict appeared in Siam Repository vol. 4 
April 1874 pp. I83-I89.
38. Siam Repository vol. 4 January 1874 p. 17.
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similar regulations were designed to ensure that the Treasury received some­
thing like the full value of the revenue from the tax farmers, who were 
notorious in their attempts to defraud the Government. Furthermore, an 
elaborate system of accounts and financial cross-checks was established to 
ensure that neither the tax farmers nor the officials in the Finance Office 
itself had the opportunity to retain some of the funds in their care for 
their own use.
Finally, the edict included a series of regulations governing the work of 
officials employed in the Finance Office. They were to work regular hours - 
from 10.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. They were forbidden to conduct government 
business in their own homes or indeed in any other place except the Finance 
Office. Officials were to appoint tax farmers solely on the basis of whoever 
offered the Government most for the contract: accepting fees, presents, com­
mission or payment of any kind, and granting special privileges or assistance 
to any client were strictly forbidden. Furthermore it was made clear that 
'the revenue is for the benefit of the State, and not for the benefit of any 
particular individual'. Finally, officials employed in the Finance Office
were to receive salaries so making them financially independent of the actual
39conduct of government business . The Finance Office was, therefore, the
first Siamese government department to attempt to develop western methods of
administrative behaviour.
In mid-l874 the newly-established Council of State held a series of meetings
Z|0to consider further reform of the financial administration . As a result, an
additional edict was issued requesting ministries and departments to budget
their expenditures in consultation with the Finance Office and to apply to
41the Office for permission for any unusual expenditures 
39- Siam Repository vol. 4 April 1874 pp. 183-189.
*t0. Siam Repository vol. 4 October 1874 pp. 471-472. The Council of State was 
established by King Chulalongkorn in May 1874: it was composed of twenty senior
government officials and members of the royal family and was to act as the advi­
sory body for the Government on matters of state. D. K. Wyatt The Politics of 
Reform in Thailand p. 54.
41. D. K. Wyatt op. cit. p. 54.
One further administrative reform of this period should be noted. The 
Finance Office was the embryo of the Ministry of Finance established almost 
twenty years later. It was with the creation of the new Ministry that the 
various treasuries, the Phra Khlang Mah&sombat, the Phra Khlang SinkhS and 
the remaining financial divisions of the Phra Khlang itself were brought to­
gether. A major step towards this was taken in 1875 when the foreign affairs 
aspects of the work of the Phra Khlang, which had in fact dominated the 
Ministry from at least the early Bangkok period, were extracted from the
Ministry to form a separate department. In 1885 this became the Department
42of Foreign Affairs with Prince Devawongse as its head
These financial reforms, though revolutionary in intent, were far from 
revolutionary in effect. In the first place the regulations for officials 
working in the Finance Office ironically did not apply to Prince MahSmalS, 
an elderly uncle of the King and head of the Phra Khlang MahSsombat, who had 
been instrumental in the establishment of the new department and was its 
director. He also held a senior position in the Ministry of the Palace where,
of course, the old administrative methods were firmly entrenched. Therefore
Prince Mah5mala was allowed to continue to conduct his administration in the 
established manner - he continued to work from his own residence and to receive 
commissions and fees. His officials in the Finance Office, however, were 
expected to comply with the new administrative regulations. Understandably 
the new financial and administrative practices maintained only a tenuous 
existence in the new department: old and new existed side-by-side, undis-
turbed until the major reforms of the 1890s
Second, the development of the Finance Office was hampered by a shortage 
of qualified and able officials. Indeed the shortage was so acute that the 
King feared that the new department would fail to survive. Therefore in 1874 
one of the major functions of the Finance Office, inspecting the revenue and
42. Prince Danmong ThSs5phib5n pp. 11-12.
43• Prince Damrong op. cit. p. 11.
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expenditure accounts of the administration, was transferred to yet another new
44department, the Audit Office . This too was independent of the existing 
administration and situated within the walls of the Grand Palace. In fact it 
was even more firmly under the control of the King than was the Finance Office: 
Prince Devawongse, Prince NarSt and Prince Sommot all found employment there.
The King himself spent a part of each day working in the Audit Office. Un­
doubtedly it was run with an efficiency unrivalled in the government of that 
time. Eventually the Audit Office, because of its proximity to the King and 
the effectiveness of its administration, began to attract other responsibili­
ties, often far removed from its original duties, in the manner characteristic 
of the pre-reform bureaucracy. In time the Audit Office became the Royal
45Secretariat, with the task of checking accounts only one of its many duties .
But the major reason why the financial reforms initiated by King 
Chulalongkorn in the early 1870s failed to achieve the radical effect sought 
by the King, was that control of the Kingdom's sources of revenue remained to 
a considerable extent in the hands of the noble bureaucratic families, prin­
cipally the Bunnags. These families saw to it that not all tax farms remitted
46their payments in full to the Finance Office , though sufficient revenue was 
received by the Office to avert the bankruptcy that had threatened the royal 
family during the Regency period. In early 1875 the King found it necessary 
to defend the financial reforms initiated by himself and the Council of State.
He pointed out that the Government was merely taking steps to ensure that it 
received the full value of the revenues to which it was entitled, and that 
such revenues were spe^t wisely. The only people who could object to the 
reforms were those who had been dishonestly diverting the revenues into their 
own pockets. The King emphasized that unless the Government received sufficient
44. The department was actually called by the English words 'Audit Office'.
45* Prince Damrong Phraprawat somdet phrachao boromawongthoe kromphrayS thlwa- 
-wong warSpakan (Biography of Prince Devawongse) Bangkok 1925 pp» 12-15•
46. Wira Wimoniti Historical Patterns of Tax Administration in Thailand 
Bangkok 1961 pp. 112-114.
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funds it would be incapable of maintaining expenditure on such vital projects 
as the development of communications and other reforms which would benefit
inthe people as a whole . Yet the King's explanation could not disguise the 
fact that the reforms severely threatened the sources of income of the bureau­
cratic families, a point brought home when in l8?4 the Minister of Lands, a
member of the Privy Council and a .nephew of Chao PhrayS SI Suriyawong, was
48dismissed from office on the grounds that he had misused government funds 
Opposition to the King's reforms reached a climax in the so-called Front
hoPalace Incident of December 1874 to February 1875 • On the night of 28
December 1874, a fire broke out near the gunpowder warehouse within the walls 
of the Grand Palace. The troops of the Second King, fully armed, sought an 
entrance to the Palace, offering their assistance in putting out the hlaze.
They were refused admittance. The Second King then fled and sought refuge in 
the British Consulate: there he was assured by the acting Consul that British
aid - in fact a gunboat - was on its way from Hong Kong. This outside assis­
tance failed to materialize. After considerable negotiation a compromise was 
reached between King Chulalongkorn and his Second King. The forces of the 
Second King were reduced to a maximum of 200 men: in return he was granted a
larger proportion of the revenues of the Kingdom, an indication that the Second
King and his supporters had been motivated in their attempted coup by, at least 
in part, a fear that the newly established Finance Office threatened their 
sources of income.
The Front Palace Incident brought the King's political and financial reforms 
to an abrupt halt: indeed the King was so shaken by the strength of opposition
to his measures that he began to purchase property abroad in case in the future
50he should need to abdicate and go into exile . Yet the financial reforms of 
the early 1870s left an important legacy. The establishment of the Finance
47* K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand p. 57- 
48. ibid p. 56.
49* For a much fuller description and analysis of the Front Palace Incident 
and of this period as a whole, see D. K. Wyatt ibid pp. 35-62.
50. D. K. Wyatt - ibid p. 6l.
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Office and the Audit Office, and their development of accounting and auditing 
procedures signalled the determination of the King to assume firm control over 
the revenues of the Kingdom; though success was limited in the early 1870s 
for the rest of that decade and into the l880s the King maintained the pressure 
in this respect with a series of edicts encouraging tax farmers and tax offi­
cials to remit tax receipts in full to the Treasury^1. And though the new 
administrative methods introduced with the establishment of the Finance Office 
in 1873 never really took root in that department, they were nurtured and 
developed in the Audit Office/Royal Secretariat in the late 1870s and early 
l880s by Prince Devawongse, Prince NarSt and Prince Sommot. When, in 1885, 
Prince Devawongse was promoted to head of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
he introduced into his new department reformed methods of accounting and 
correspondence: he was the first Siamese minister to work regular office
hours and to receive only a government salary"^.
As the King's brothers rose to positions of authority within the bureau­
cracy in the l880s, so the power of the Bunnag family began to decline. The 
ex-Regent died in January l883i and in 1385 and 1888 respectively his brother, 
the Phra Khlang, and his eldest son, the KalShSm, retired. That, coupled with
the death of the Second King in August 1885, allowed the King to embark on his
53second and principal period of reform
Yet it is important to note that though death removed serious political 
opposition to the King's reforms, it could not of course by itself seriously 
diminish the resilience of many of the bureaucratic attitudes and methods 
practiced by the noble families, attitudes and methods which had become deeply 
ingrained in the administration. In the late 1880s, within a few years of 
the waning of the power of the Bunnags, King Chulalongkorn began to refashion
51. A significant proportion of the documents concerned with finance in the 
earlier part of the Fifth Reign (up to 1885) held in the National Library is 
comprised of such edicts. For example chotmHihgt r.5 163/2 and 35/39*
52. Prince Damrong Th5s5phib5.n p. 12/ Biography of Prince Devawongse p. 20. 
53» D. K. Wyatt op. cit. pp. 84-85.
the structure of his Government, to create twelve functionally differentiated 
ministries, including a Ministry of Finance whose responsibility for financial 
matters was clearly defined and, in theory at least, unchallenged by other 
government departments. But to infuse that structure with the philosophy and 
ethos of new administrative methods - to overcome the established tendencies 
for ministries to covet their financial independence, to wean salaried offi­
cials away from the practices associated with kin mufang, to encourage 
co-operation between the ministries on financial matters so as to ensure 
the most effective use of the Kingdom's resources - these were to prove some 
of the major problems yet to be faced.
4. The structure of the study.
Having provided a background to the establishment and development of the 
Ministry of Finance in the second half of the reign of King Chulalongkorn, 
it would be as well at this point to outline briefly the organization of the 
main part of the study. The following four chapters trace the chronological 
development of the Ministry of Finance between 1885 and 1910, with an emphasis 
on the evolution of the Ministry as an influential department within the 
Government, the growth of its control over the Government's finances, and 
its response to the various financial problems of the Government. The 
succeeding two chapters are concerned with two particularly important classes 
of reform undertaken by the Ministry over the same period - Chapter VI with 
exchange and currency reform, Chapter VII with the abolition of the tax 
farming system, with special reference to the most important farm, the 
opium monopoly.
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CHAPTER II
The early years of the Ministry of Finance : 
its establishment and collapse, 1885 - 1896.
In 1885 Prince MahSmSIS, the effective head of the HO RatsadSkfrnphiphat -
the Finance Office - since its establishment in the early 1870s, retired; he
was succeeded first by his nephew Prince Chakkraphatdiphong and then, when ill
vhealth prevented Prince Chakkraphat from playing an active part in government 
by another of King Chulalongkorn1s brothers, Prince NarSthip Praphanphong1.
It was Prince NarSthip, at that timeybnly in his mid-20s who was to guide the 
establishment of the Ministry of Finance and the introduction of the first 
financial reforms of the second reform period.
1. Prelude to the establishment of the Ministry of Finance : The Finance
Office and revenue, 1885 - l890»
Until the establishment of the Ministry of Finance in October 1890,
Prince NarSthip was simply the head of the Finance Office, and as such his 
principal responsibility was to ensure that the revenues collected by the 
various ministries and departments were remitted in full to the Government 
Treasury. In the raid-l880s many, if not most of the taxes raised in the 
Kingdom remained under the control of departments other than the Finance Office. 
However, in 1886 an undertaking was obtained from the minister of the KalShSm,
VChao PhrayS Surawong Waiyawat, the eldest son of the ex-Regent, that in future 
all revenues collected under his administration would be forwarded in full to 
the Finance Office, and furthermore that the auctions for all tax farms attri­
buted to the KalShSm would be supervised by Prince NarSthip's department^.
Over the following two or three years Prince NarSthip appointed groups of
1. D. K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand pp. 85-87/p. 93 fn. 16.
2. RStchasakunwong (Royal Genealogy) Bangkok 1969*
3. Chao PhrayS Rattanab<*din to King, 1886. N.A.Kh. lV3* In fact it appears 
that the KalShSm had been remitting its opium revenue to the Finance Office 
since 1884/85 (Accounts of opium revenue for Bangkok and Frovinces collected 
by the KalShSra and remitted to the Finance Office 188V85-1890/91 N.A.Kh. l^ f. 
lkA).
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officials to the Finance Office, each group being responsible for the revenues 
received by the Treasury from a particular Ministry: they were responsible
for exerting pressure on that Ministry not to fall into arrears, for checking
is evident that with the waning of the power of the Bunnag family in the
1880s the Finance Office under Prince NarSthip was in a much stronger position
to increase the proportion of revenues reaching the Treasury than it had been
under Prince MahSmSlS in the early 1870s when the Bunnags were at the height
of their power. In this context it is important to note that already in 1885
the King's brothers held the positions of Ministers of the Capital, of the
Palace, of Foreign Affairs and of Finance^. All the same it is interesting
to remember that when, in 1886 the KalShSm agreed to remit its revenues to the
Treasury, it was still under the control of a Bunnag.
In the late l880s Prince NarSthip also introduced a series of measures
designed to strengthen the Government's control of, and increase its revenue
7from, the three main tax farms - the spirit, gambling and opium monopolies .
The Government was particularly concerned about the opium farm.
In the first place it was the most profitable of the three main monopolies
g
for the Government: in 1889/90 it yielded 2.0 m. baht , approximately 15 per
cent of the Government's total revenue. More importantly, by the late 1880s 
the administration of the opium monopoly had become so complex and demanding 
that only syndicates of the richest Chinese had the capital resources and 
business skills to bid for the contracts. In fact by that time a considerable 
proportion of the opium sales in the Kingdom were controlled by one syndicate;
4. Correspondence in N.A.Kh. 14/3*
5. Prince NarSthip to King, 11 February 1892, N.A.Kh. 1/5.
6. D. K. Wyatt op. cit. pp. 86-87.
7. In 1892/93i the first year for which there are adequate figures, these
farms (including the lottery farm) contributed 7-5 m. baht to the Treasury out 
of a total revenue of 15-3 m. baht (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 22).
8. Accounts of opium revenue for Bangkok and Provinces collected by the 
KalahOm and remitted to the Finance Office I884/85-I89O/9I N.A.Kh. l4*lk/4.
monies received and for preparing revenue accounts . In 1888 six officials
were appointed to check the overall flow of revenues into It
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in I89O an additional syndicate was formed merely to administer the retail
g .sales in Bangkok's 1,200-odd opium shops •
This heavy concentration of power had two main consequences, both damaging 
to the Government’s interest10. As the wealth and power of the opium farmers 
grew, so paradoxically their position became more precarious. The profits to 
be made from the farm, the patronage associated with the position of opium 
farmer, encouraged intense rivalry between the syndicates competing for con­
trol of the monopoly, rivalry heightened by the fact that each syndicate was 
based on a particular Chinese secret society11. Since the Government was 
largely dependent on the one sydicate for a considerable part of its opium 
revenue, the financial collapse of that syndicate as a result of the machina­
tions of its rivals could almost completely destroy the Government's revenue 
from that source. Second, and as an alternative, it was possible that with 
relatively few syndicates bidding for the opium contract, the farmers, instead 
of competing for the monopoly, would come to some prior agreement among them­
selves to allow ea£h of them to hold the contract in turn, and in this way 
they would be able to reduce the price of the farm - the Government's revenue - 
and increase their own profits.
The King was so concerned about the vulnerability of the Government to the 
machinations of the opium syndicates and the instability and precariousness of 
the opium revenue that in 1889 he established a committee under the chairman­
ship of Prince Devawongse and including Prince Narlthip and Chao PhrayS.
12Rattanab9din to examine the structure and operations of the opium monopoly 
After considering various new structures for the monopoly, the committee 
proposed that it be divided into several regions, with a separate fanner in
9« G. William Skinner Chinese Society in Thailand Ithaca, 1957» P» 121.
10. The following description of the operations of the opium monopoly is 
intended merely to illustrate briefly a few of the measures taken by the 
Government in the late l880s to increase the flow of revenue into the Treasury. 
A detailed analysis of the tax farm system - and in particular the opium mono­
poly - is reserved for Chapter VII.
11. G. William Skinner op. cit. p. l^ K).
12. Joint letter from the committee to King, h Jan u a r y  1890 N.A.Kh. l^*lk/l. 
Chao PhrayS Rattanabqdin was the Minister of the MahStthai.
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each region. In this way the number of syndicates capable of bidding for a 
section of the opium monopoly would be increased and it was hoped that this 
would result in an increase in the total amount bid for the whole monopoly, 
as well as an improvement in the stability of the farms. The committee pro­
duced one further major recommendation: from the time the opium monopoly had
been established at the beginning of the reign of King Mongkut'1'^ , the farmers
had been allowed to prepare the raw opium for sale themselves, though their
14supplies of the raw drug were imported by the Government . The committee
suggested that in future the Government would take over asome of the preparation
of raw opium for sale to the farmers. The hope was that this tighter control
over the distribution of legal prepared opium in the Kingdom would enable
the authorities to deal much more effedtively with a flourishing trade in
illegal opium that was damaging the farmers' sales, and hence the Government's 
15opium revenue
The report of Prince Devawongse's committee formed the basis for a 
'Supplementary Law relating to the Opium Monopoly' which came into operation 
in April 1890^. Under this law, responsibility for the monopoly, which had 
been entrusted to the KalShCm since the Fourth Reign, passed to the Ministry 
of Finance - a clear example of the way in which, in the late l880s, the 
major ministries of the pre-reform administration were abandoning their con­
trol over the Kingdom's revenues to a centralized finance department. The 
first auctions using the provisions of the new law were held in late March 
1890: they resulted in a substantial increase in the Government's revenue
13. Prince Damrong Tamri5n ph5sl Sk^n bSngyang (The History of some Taxes) in 
Latthi thamniam t5ngtlng (Various Customsj Bangkok 1963 PP- 143-264. TamnSn 
phSsIfin (History of the Opium Tax) pp. 233-243-
14. Williamson to Prince Mahit, 20 March 1902 F.aF.A. 6/2.
15- The opium monopoly was greatly affected by illicit trading in this period. 
Large-scale Chinese immigration into Siam in the later nineteenth century, 
coupled with a considerable expansion in the coastal trade between the Kingdom 
and the Straits Settlements led to almost uncontrollable opium smuggling.
16. 'Supplementary Law relating to the Opium Monopoly' 1890 F.F.A. 6/1.
N.A.Kh. 2/1.
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17from the monopoly
Prince NarSthip's measures with regard to the spirit and gambling farms
can be dealt with more briefly. In 1888 the Government closed every small
gambling den in Bangkok Province - some 277 premises - and reduced the number
l8of larger dens from 126 to 67 • By 1893 only 16 dens remained in the area
of the capital. Over the same period the authorities introduced strict regu­
lations for the remaining establishments, governing their hours of opening,
19their siting within the city and the forms of gambling allowed within them . 
These changes were carried through without casing a fall in the revenue from 
gambling - quite the reverse. Improved methods of administration, tighter 
control of the operations of the den managers, allied to the fact that increased 
business at the remaining dens more than compensated for the revenue lost by
the closure of the smaller ones, ensured a considerable increase in revenue
20for the Government from this source
With respect to the administration of the Kingdom's spirit farmers, Prince
NarSthip took action in three areas. First, by an 'Internal Taxation Law' in
1886 and an 'Excise Law' in 1887 he codified and restated the current legis-
21lation governing the leasing out of the spirit farm contracts : it was an
attempt to enforce the law as it stood - an attempt to curb the worst violations
17* Notes on the 1890 opium monopoly auction attached to the Accounts of opium 
revenue for Bangkok and Provinces collected by the KalShOm and remitted to the 
Finance Office l88*f/85-l890/$l N.A.Kh. 14. lk/4. In 1890 the estimated total 
opium revenue - including the Government's profit from the importation and pre­
paration of opium - was put at 2.68 m. baht p.a.: in the mid-l880s the opium 
revenue had averaged 1 .6  m. baht p.a.
18. Prince Damrong Ru'ang tamnSn kSnloekb^nbia lae loek huai (The Abolition 
of Gambling Dens and the Huai Lottery) Prachura phongsSwadSn no. 17 Bankok I960, 
pp. 37-45.
19. ibid p. 37/pp. 41-42. Prince NarSthip to King, 13 November 1891 N.A.Kh.
14. lkh/lCg). (The suffix (g) is added to distinguish this series of files 
from those concerned with the spirit monopoly. In both cases the series is 
denoted by 14. lkh but the 'kh' is, in Thai, a different letter.)
20. Unfortunately no figures are available for the Bangkok area alone, nor for 
the period prior to 1892. However, between 1892 and 1896, when no more dens 
were closed, the revenue from all the dens in the Kingdom rose from 1.8 m. baht 
to 2.9 m. baht and this in a period when the increases in revenue from the 
other main monopolies were relatively small. (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 22)
21. An outline of the 1886 and 1887 Laws can be gathered from scattered 
references in N.A.Kh. l4.1kh/l-39«
22of the monopoly regulations by the farmers . Second, from 1889 provincial
authorities were instructed to carry out raids against illicit stills in their
23area : production from these stills was, at that time, a major threat to
the business of the spirit farmers and hence to the expansion of the Government's
spirit revenue. Finally, also in 1889, responsibility for collecting the
import duty on foreign spirits - until that point entrusted to the spirit
24fanners - was transferred to officials of the Customs Department • This was 
an early portent of one of the most important financial reforms of the period - 
the gradual abolition of the system of tax farming and the introduction of tax 
collection by government officials.
Prince RarSthip's measures to increase the flow of revenue into the 
Treasury - involving both the introduction of stricter control over the opium, 
spirit and gambling monopolies, and the imposition of more effective pressure 
on the other ministries and departments to yield up their full revenue receipts - 
had a considerable, almost startling degree of success. In 1886 there was a
sudden doubling of Treasury receipts over the figure for 1885, and the new
25level was maintained for the remainder of the decade . By 1890 the Government 
Treasury was assured of a much greater and more reliable flow of funds than 
had ever before been the case. With the establishment of the Ministry of 
Finance in I89O, attention was to be focused on the problems of distributing
22. Again this is a subject which will be considered in detail in Chapter VII.
23. Instructions to provincial governors from the King, December 1889 N.A.Kh. 
l4.1kh/2.
24. PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon TamnSn sunlakSk^n (History of the Customs Department) 
Bangkok 1939 p. 96/p. 118. However, according to PhrayS Anuman, the import duty 
on foreign spirits remained attributed to the farmers until 19 0 1; between 1889 
and 1901 the duty was apparently collected by the Customs Department, passed to 
the appropriate farmer who then made the agreed payment to the Treasury along 
with his other payments in connection with the farm.
25* The following figures are given by Wira Wimoniti (Historical Patterns of 
Tax Administration in Thailand p. 114) :
Treasury Revenue Receipts 1882-1889 (m. baht).
1882 6.92 1886 13.65 The break at 1885-I886 appears to be very sudden,
1883 7«39 1887 12.09 yet figures of the same order of magnitude were
1884 6.03 1888 13»65 quoted by Prince NarSthip to King (17 March 1893
1585 6.08 1559 12.02 N.A.Kh. 3/1 ). 1886 was the year in which the
KalShSm agreed to remit all its revenue receipts 
to the Finance Office.
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those resources throughout the administration - on the problems of controlling 
Government expenditure.
2. The establishment of the Ministry of Finance, 1890.
It was also in the late 1880s that Prince NarSthip began reorganizing 
the various financial departments of the Government - gathering the financial 
functions of the administration into a rapidly expanding Finance Office all 
in preparation for the establishment of the Ministry of Finance. The re­
organization reached fruition in October 1890 when, with the promulgation of
an 'Act concerning the functions of the Ministry of Finance', the Ministry
26finally came into being . In the words of the Act, the Ministry was to be 
responsible for
'receiving, disbursing and maintaining the whole income and treasure 
of the Government, for maintaining accounts, and for collecting the 
taxes throughout the whole Kingdom' 27 •
The Ministry was divided into thirteen departments (krom) which in turn 
fell into three groups. First there were five administrative departments :
1. Krom Phra Khlang K15ng : the Central Office - responsible for the overall
administration of the Ministry and the preparation of budgets.
2. Krom S5rab5.nchl : Accounts Department - responsible for the actual
receipt and disbursement of monies to and from the Treasury in accor­
dance with the budget estimates as well as the compilation of accounts.
3 . Krom Truat : Investigation Department - responsible for investigating
accounts, tax collections, and the general work of the Ministry.
k. Krom Kep : Treasury - the department actually responsible for the storing
of the Government’s cash and wealth.
5« Krom Phra Khlang Khangthl : the Privy Purse Department
Then there were five taxation departments :
6. Krom Suai : Capitation Tax Department - to administer the various poll
26. 'Act concerning the functions of the Ministry of Finance' 7 October 1890 
N.A.Kh. 1/5. The Act is quoted in full in Wichai Prasangsit Prawatsanphak^n 
(History of Taxation) Bangkok, 1971» PP» 305-313•
27. ibid. Clause 1.
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taxes levied in the Kingdom including the triennial Chinese poll tax.
7. Krom Sanph5k$n : Taxation Department - responsible for taxes which 
involved some form of licencing system principally the spirit, gambling 
and opium monopolies.
8. Krom SanphSsl : Taxation Department - responsible for taxes on goods 
where a fixed proportion of the value of the good was taken in tax, for 
example, the inland transit duties.
9. Kron Thl Din : Land Tax Department.
10. Krom Sunlak5k$n : Customs Department.
Finally there were three production departments :
11. Krom Kras5psithik5n : the Mint.
12. Krom K&nphimbat : Printing Department - for printing forms, instructions
and notifications, but not currency notes.
13. Krom RStchaphatsadu : a purchasing and sales department.
The Act went through ea£h of the thirteen departments of the Ministry, 
carefully outlining the number of senior officials in each department, their 
rank and their exact responsibilities. Furthermore, the officials of the 
Ministry were instructed that if in their opinion their superior made an error 
they were to bring it to his attention; if the Minister himself was at fault
then his subordinates had to place the matter before the King. Senior offi­
cials were assured that their Minister would be unable to dismiss them without
23the prior sanction of the King . Such exhortations and assurances represented
a clear break with the practices of the traditional bureaucracy.
This principal Act was rapidly followed by a number of smaller pieces of
legislation dealing in more detail with the responsibilities and duties of
the constituent departments of the Ministry. For example, that same month,
29October 1890, saw the promulgation of a 'Privy Purse Department Act' . The 
Act was principally sin attempt to define clearly a distinction between the 
finances of the King and the finances of the Kingdom. Such a distinction was
28. ibid. Sections and 5»
29. "Privy Purse Department Act' 20 October I89O N.A.Kh. 9» 1/1-
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strictly meaningless in the old government system - the King was 'Lord of Life' 
and, in theory at least, every object in his domain was his personal possession. 
There was therefore no restriction on the King's ability to draw money from the 
treasury and to use it as he wished. However, at some point either in the late 
Ayudhya or early Bangkok period, the King decided to maintain a separate 
smaller fund, adjacent to the Throne Room, from which he could make disburse­
ments on anything or to anyone he wished, without letting other officials know. 
Rama 111 greatly increased the size of this treasury and in the following reign 
the Phra Khlang KhangthI or Privy Purse Treasury was created. As the impor­
tance of this separate account for the expenditure of the King grew, so a 
distinction between the finances of the King and the finances of the Government 
gradually developed. For example, in the Fourth Reign a number of residences 
were constructed for members of the royal family; the construction was 
financed by the Phra Khlang Killingthi and as a result the residences were con-
30sidered not the property of the Government but the property of their occupants. 
The Privy Purse Act of I89O developed the distinction a little further.
Prior to 1890 the Privy Purse, like virtually all departments in the 
administration, had attributed to it a number of tax farms and other sources 
of revenue; revenue receipts were sent in to the department where a varying 
amount was retained for the personal use of the King, the remainder being 
remitted to the Treasury. This was of course the standard practice in the 
traditional bureaucracy. The 1890 Act stipulated that in future sill revenues 
received by the Privy Purse, including rent on property owned by the King and 
interest and profit on his financial transactions, were to be remitted in full 
to the Treasury^". In return, each year the Privy Purse would be allotted 
15 per cent of the total revenue of the Government. Furthermore, since the 
Privy Purse was now a department within the Ministry of Finance, it was
30. Prawat samnaknggn Phra Khlang KhcLngthl (History of the Privy Purse 
Department) by the officials of the Department. Bangkok 196?1 pp- 13-15•
31• It appears that this would apply only to rent and interest earned on 
capital attributed to the Privy Purse. The King and the royal family had 
considerable investments abroad and it is unlikely that the income from those 
came under provisions of this Act.
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required to maintain accounts of all its transactions and to submit those 
accounts each month for examination by the Accounts Department of the Ministry. 
Indeed, if any of the activities of the Privy Purse directly involved the 
finances of the Government, the Department had to work through the Minister 
of Finance himself. Only for strictly private matters - for example if the
King were to give money to a member of his family - was the Privy Purse
32independent of the Ministry. The Act came into force in April 1891
33Then, in December 1890, an Act for the Krom Kep was promulgated .
Since the department was responsible for storing the Government's revenues and 
treasure, and therefore the department's officials were constantly handling 
vast sums of money, the Act was primarily concerned with establishing rigid 
standards of financial propriety. It was strongly emphasized that since offi­
cials now received a government salary they were strictly forbidden to accept 
any unofficial remuneration in the course of their work. At the same time a 
long list of regulations was compiled, covering virtually every financial 
transaction possible within the department; the object was to ensure that all
monies were accounted for at all times so that officials would find it extremely
3kdifficult to divert the revenues into their own pockets . Similar regulations 
were created for each department of the Ministry"^.
3» The beginning and failure of budgetary control, 1890 - l893»
The establishment of the essential structure and responsibilities of the 
Ministry of Finance in I89O enabled Prince Narathip to proceed with the major 
task of framing a budget of the Government's revenue and expenditure. The
32. 'Privy Purse Department Act' 20 October I89O, N.A.Kh. 9« 1/1.
33- 'Krom Kep Act' 13 December 1890, N.A.Kh. 2/2.
34. For example : 'When an official of the Krom Kep receives gold, precious 
stones of any description, gold or silver ornaments brought to the Department 
by an official from the Krom S5rab5nchl, he must give the Krom S5rab5nchi a 
signed, sealed receipt for each item'/'When an official receives or disburses 
cash, desposits it in the Treasury or withdraws it, he must immediately note 
the transaction in the accounts. At the end of each day, all accounts must be 
checked and closed.'
35- Prince Narathip to King, 20 November I89O N.A.Kh. 1/5.
49
first attempt to produce a comprehensive budget appears to have been made
towards the end of 1891 in preparation for the inauguration of the reformed
structure of government the following April, the beginning of the Siamese
year^. Certainly the Ministry of Finance at least proved capable of
compiling accounts of the principal heads of revenue and expenditure, as
well as revenue and expenditure totals for the year 1892/931 though it
would be extremely difficult, in fact impossible, to estimate how accurate
37the Ministry's figures were . Yet it would seem that this first budget 
was not compiled mnd implemented without producing considerable friction and 
argument between the Ministers, and particularly between the Ministers and 
Prince NarSthip.
At the root of these conflicts was the fact that the Council of Ministers, 
legally inaugurated in April 1892, was unwilling or perhaps unable to devise 
procedures for resolving inter-ministerial disputes and for arriving at an 
agreed set of governmental priorities. To a considerable extent the disunity 
of the Council derived from the fact that in mid-1892 the King withdrew from 
the immediate daily affairs of government, hoping to pass the burden of 
administration to his Ministers, leaving himself responsible only for the 
direction of the broad outlines of Government policy. In the following few 
months he spent an increasing amount of time at K9 Si Chang, his island in
7 O
the Gulf of Siam . The removal of the King's steadying influence and 
experience proved fatal. Sir Henry Norman, who was in Bangkok at this time, 
described the activities of the Council of Ministers in the year 1892/93
36. Prince NarSthip to King, 11 December 1891 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
37* There exists in the National Archives no record of the discussions that 
went into the production of this budget, nor indeed a copy of the budget 
itself. However, a detailed statement of Government revenue and expenditure 
for the period from 1892/93 was published in the R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 22-23- 
But of course it is a statement of actual revenue and expenditure in that 
period, not of the budget estimates.
38. Sir Henry Norman Urgency in Siam Contemporary Review LXIV (1893) p- 738. 
For the general internal political situation in the early 1890s see Chapter 4 
of D. K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand.
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as
'a nine months' carnival of intrigues and jealousies, followed 
by a three months' nightmare of cabals and recriminations' 39
In such an atmosphere it was clearly very difficult for the Ministry of
Finance to fulfill its principal responsibility - to work in consultation
with the other Ministries in imposing control over the total level of
Government expenditure and over the allocation of that expenditure between
the various Ministries and departments.
However, Prince NarSthip's response to this situation undoubtedly made
the task of his Ministry even more difficult, if not impossible. First, in
deciding the expenditure allocations of the Government his attitude was to
AOrefuse any new or unusual outlay . As long as total expenditure was covered
by the year's revenue he was not over-concerned about its distribution among
the Ministries. For example, when in early 1892 the commander of the army,
Chao PhrayS Surasakmontrl presented a request for new equipment and uniforms
for his troops, the request was refused out of hand by Prince Nar&thip with
the comment that
'nowadays the whole world has stopped using weapons of war and 
has taken to the pen instead' Al
Perhaps in the circumstances such blunt, indiscriminate tactics on the part of
Prince NarSthip were the only means by which some basic control over the total
level of expenditure could be maintained. But inevitably those same tactics
strengthened the determination of Ministers to escape or subvert the control
of the Ministry of Finance.
39- Sir Henry Norman The Peoples and Politics of the Far East London 1895 
p. A51* At this point it is important to note that for the period up to 
I896-I897 the documentary evidence is rather scanty and disorganized, reflec­
ting partly the underdeveloped nature of administrative procedures and partly 
the later virtual collapse of the Government. For this reason, for this period 
one has to rely to some considerable extent on Norman's book, though as Wyatt 
points out (op. cit. p. 95 fn. 18 ) many of the specific opinions he offers are 
questionable. On the other hand, the available documentary evidence does 
support his general picture.
AO. W. A. Graham Siam vol. 1 p. 33$.
Al. D. K. Wyatt op. cit. p. 96/Prince NarSthip to King, 26 April 1892 N.A.Kh. 
1/9. It should be added that Prince Narathip was a leading Siamese literary 
figure.
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Ministers could achieve this either by ignoring the expenditure estimates
completely, or by retaining some of the revenues still collected under their
administration instead of remitting them in full to the Ministry of Finance.
Indeed, in this period, the early 1890s, the practice developed of ministries
holding a proportion of their funds in the Bangkok branch of the Hongkong and
42Shanghai Bank, out of si®ht of the Ministry of Finance . The retention of 
revenues was, of course, a prominent feature of the pre-reform administration, 
but it is important to note that its existence in the 1890s was more a reflec­
tion of the clumsiness and, as the Ministers saw it, the injustice of Prince 
^arSthip's methods of financial control, rather than an attempt by Ministers 
and senior officials to enrich themselves. The attempts to avoid the budge­
tary control of the Ministry of Finance in turn strengthened Prince NarSthip*s 
determination, for in the period after I89O the Minister attempted with increa­
sing steadfastness to ensure that the full proceeds of the taxes levied in the
43Kingdom were forwarded to the Treasury . In 1891 he circulated a memorandum 
to each department stating that any official found holding back the revenues
44in his care would be severely punished , and in June I892 the King himself 
wrote to the Council of Ministers urging each Minister to forward all the 
revenues collected under their authority to the Treasury, in accordance with
43the revenue estimates .
Second, in a situation where almost every Ministry had a list of projects
46which it was eager to see implemented , but where those projects were fre­
quently frustrated either because the Minister concerned lacked sufficient
42. W. A. Graham op. cit. p. 338.
43» In a letter to the King on 28 January 1893 (N.A.Kh. 20. 1/lZ) Prince
NarSthip referred to 'imminent' legislation forbidding government departments 
from maintaining secret accounts at the Bangkok banks. No such legislation 
appeared.
44. Prince NarSthip to King, 30 July 1891 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
45. King to Council of Ministers, 28 June 1892 N.A.Kh. 5« 1/3•
46. See for example the numerous educational schemes put forward by Prince
Damrong as Minister of Public Instruction, 1889-1892: D. K. Wyatt op. cit.
chapter 5-
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bnpolitical weight in the Council , or because of the parsimonious attitudes
of the Ministry of Finance, it became a matter of annoyance for Ministers that
the Ministry of Finance itself always seemed to have adequate resources for
its schemes. There was little or no evidence that Prince NarSthip was willing
to impose the same standards of financial austerity on his own Ministry that
he was imposing on those of his colleagues.
Three of Prince NarSthip's reforms in particular stood out as objects of
controversy, and perhaps envy. First there was a proposal for the introduction
of a Government paper currency, a proposal that involved the ordering of some
484 million specially printed notes from Europe in late lo90 . Second, Prince
NarSthip, as part of a series of measures designed to improve the efficiency
of the Royal Mint, proposed ordering expensive modern baht-minting and COpper-
49coin minting machinery from Europe to replace the existing dilapidated
equipment which had been installed over thirty years previously^. Finally,
the Minister embarked on a series of tax reforms, including the introduction
of more systematic and effective procedures for the collection of the triennial
51Chinese poll-tax (due in 18 9 1) and more importantly the introduction of 
measures designed to reduce the Government's reliance on the tax farmer for 
its revenue and to increase the proportion of revenue collected directly by 
Government officials^. The 'Inland Transit Duties Act' of 1893» which codi­
fied and simplified the mass of duties levied on goods in transit in the
47- Note the contrast of the limited achievements of the Ministry of Public 
Instruction under a weak Minister 1892-1897- D- K. Wyatt op. cit. chapter 6.
48. Prince NarSthip to King, 1 November 1890 N.A.Kh. 11. 1/1.
49- Prince NarSthip to PhrayS MahS YSthS, 6 January 1893 N.A.Kh. 10. 1/1 : 
Prince NarSthip to King, 17 November 1891 N.A.Kh. lO/l.
50. R. S. Le May The Coinage of Siam The Siam Society, 1932 p. 85.
51. For example, the police forces of the capital were reorganized so that 
all coolies working in Bangkok could be traced and taxed; in addition, new 
certificates of taxation and wrist seals were produced. (Prince NarSthip to 
King, 5 June 1891/15 July 1891 N.A.Kh. 13. 1/1)
52. Report of Prince Devawongse's committee, 11 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 5- 2/1.
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Kingdom , contained provisions for the collection of at least some of those
54duties by officials from the Krom Sanphasl . According to Wira Wimoniti,
this was the first legislation that supported the collection of revenue
55directly by the Government . However, whilst Prince NarSthip remained 
Minister these proposals were more a declaration of intent than an actual 
achievement"^, though ironically they were to play an important part in the 
crisis which led to Prince NarSthip's resignation in early 1893*
Inevitably the tax reforms too involved an increase in Government expen­
diture, in this case principally to pay the salaries of the large numbers of 
new officials appointed to carry out the tax collections and supervisions. 
Indeed in the few years following the establishment of the Ministry in 1890, 
Prince NarSthip made an almost constant series of new appointments to all
departments under his authority. In December I89I additional officials were
57engaged to work on the budget ; still more were recruited the following
month"^. The staff of the Customs Department was increased in March 1892"^;
60new appointments were made to the Accounts Department in late 1892 . Without
doubt at that time each Ministry was involved in expanding its staff in pre­
paration for the increase in Government functions and responsibilities, but 
it is unlikely that any Ministry matched that of the Ministry of Finance. It 
appeals that in just the two years April 1890 to April 1892 the number of
53
53- 'Inland Transit Duties Act1 F.F.A. 9/1 N.A.Kh. 14. 2k/19«
54. PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon History of the Customs Department pp. 44-46.
55* Wira Wimoniti Historical Patterns of Tax Administration in Thailand p^ L19- 
Presumably Wimoniti is referring to the modern period - post Third Reign.
56. The only significant example of the abolition of a tax farm and the intro­
duction of collection by officials in this period which I have been able to 
find concerned the 'Boat, Shop and House Tax' for the Bangkok area which aame 
under direct Government control in l893« (Correspondence in N.A.Kh. 14. 2k/8 
and Report of Prince Devawongse's committee 11 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 5- 2/1).
57- Prince NarSthip to King, 11 December 1891 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
58. Prince NarSthip to King, 23 January 1892 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
59- Prince NarSthip to King, 31 March 1892 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
60. Prince NarSthip to King, 22 December 1892 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
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officials employed in the Ministry of Finance virtually doubled : over the
same period it is almost certain that the expenditure of the Ministry increased 
by at least a similar amount^.
It hardly requires notifag that the three main reform proposals of Prince 
Narathip - involving the Mint, taxation and the introduction of a Government 
paper currency - would have been of considerable benefit to the Kingdom. The 
increased revenue resulting from the tax reforms, the encouragement to trade 
resulting from the introduction of paper notes and a guaranteed supply of 
silver baht from the Mint would, within a very short space of time, more than 
have repaid the initial expenditure. But again that was not the point at 
issue. At a time when the Council of Ministers was incapable of agreeing on 
an order of priorities for Government expenditure, and indeed when the Council 
appears to have abandoned its attempts to reach such an agreement, when the 
budget allocation of each Ministry depended almost exclusively on its 
Minister’s political ability to secure his wishes amongst the 'carnival of 
intrigues and jealousies' in the Council, there *as inevitable resentment at 
the success of any Minister who was able to finance the projects of his depart­
ment. Yet the resentment against Prince NarSthip was particularly strong, 
partly because as Minister of Finance he was striving to control the Kingdom's 
revenue resources, and therefore, by implication, was moving towards a position 
of considerable influence over the expenditure of the other Ministries, and 
partly because there was a strong suspicion that not only was Prince NarSthip
61. It is extremely difficult to give accurate figures for the number of offi­
cials employed in the Ministry, particularly for this early period. The 
Government Gazette (RStchakitchSnubSksS) periodically published lists of the 
officials in each Ministry, but comparisons over time are difficult, partly 
because the definition of what was a sufficiently important position to be in­
cluded in the Gazette changed, and partly because in any one year one official 
could hold several posts. However, the issue for 20 April I89O (vol.7 pp.32-34) 
lists some 70 positions in the Finance Office; the issue for 5 June 1892 (vol. 9 
pp. 62-65) gave 134 posts in the Ministry of Finance on 1 April 1892.
62. Again it is virtually impossible to supply figures for this early period 
since there are no published figures for the expenditure of individual Minis­
tries prior to 1893/93- However, some indication of the inflation in the 
Ministry's expenditure in the early 1890s can be gathered from the fact that 
in 1892/93 its accountable expenditure was O .763 m. baht, but the following 
year, under a new Minister, it was cut to 0.308 m. baht. The figure for 1892/93 
was not reached again until 1897/98. (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 24-25.)
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capable of securing virtually all the required budget allocations for his 
proposals, but moreover that he was being extravagant in his budget demands.
If. The resignation of Prince NarSthip, March 1893«
The conflict between Prince NarSthip and the other Ministers came to a 
head in 1893• In late February and early March of that year Prince NarSthip 
submitted to the King the detailed expenditure estimates of every Ministry, 
including those of the Ministry of Finance itself, for the year 1893/94^.
It was Prince NarSthip’s hope that in that year a considerable proportion of 
the revenue - apart from that derived from the njajor spirit, gambling and opium 
monopolies - would be collected by officials rather than farmed out: conse­
quently in the estimates for his own Ministry he allowed for a substantial
increase - in some cases a doubling - in the expenditure of the revenue depart-
64ments, particularly the Krom SanphSsI and Krom SanphSk^n . However, because 
officials employed in the revenue departments would take some time to become 
proficient in the collection of taxes, Prince NarSthip estimated that in 
1893/94 the revenue collected by those departments would in £act be lower 
than the amount received from the tax farmers the previous year. Though there 
appears to have been support in the Council for Prince NarSthip*s basic pro­
posals, there were strong objections that his actual estimates were extravagant, 
and demands that he greatly reduce the allocations of his revenue departments. 
But the Minister agreed in the first instance to an insignificant reduction of 
only 1,600 baht in the budget for the Krom SanphSsl^. In order to break the 
deadlock the King appointed a committee headed by Prince Devawongse and con­
taining Prince Damrong, Prince PhSnuphanwong, Prince Narit and Prince Svasti^° 
to examine the budget estimates of the Krom SanphSsl and Krom SanphSk$n. The 
committee found Prince NarSthip*s estimates for the two departments extravagant,
63- Correspondence contained in N.A.Kh. 5- 1/4.
64. Report of Prince Devawongse*s committee, 11 March l893» N.A.Kh. 2/1.
65- ibid.
66. PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon Phraprawat phraworawongthoe phra ong chao 
phrPmphong athirSt (Biography of Prince PhrPm) in History of the Customs 
Department p. ii.
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and by reorganizing the responsibilities of the departments, including trans-
67ferring certain of their functions to other parts of the administration , 
they were able to impose large cuts in the estimates. The budget for the 
Krom Sanphasl and the Customs Departments alone was cut by more than
ft 8100,000 baht .
But that was not the end of the matter. Whilst examining the accounts of 
the revenue departments the committee uncovered considerable extravagance and 
mismanagement in other sections of Prince Narathip’s Ministry, and with the
approval of the Council of Ministers proceeded to examine in detail the accounts
69of the Central Office, the Accounts Department, the Treasury and the Mint .
As a result of these investigations the committee recommended a number of minor
amendments to the structure of the Ministry of Finance, with the objects of
strengthening the audit and accounts procedures of the Ministry and of reducing
the number of officials employed there.
The committee then went on to examine two specific reforms promoted by
Prince Nar£thip, the reorganization of the Mint and the introduction of a
paper currency. They suggested that the plan to import new machinery to mint
copper coins be abandoned, though they were agreed on the necessity for new
baht producing machinery. It was also suggested that the number of staff at
the Mint be reduced. The committee proposed that Prince Narathip's paper
currency scheme be dropped. It was felt that unless the success of the scheme
could be guaranteed - that the public would have confidence in the notes and
that the Government would be able to maintain the convertibility of the issue -
Siam would suffer a severe loss of face, as well as a considerable financial
70loss, were the scheme to fail . There was also the point that as the Hongkong 
and Shanghai Bank already had notes in circulation, there was less urgency
67. For example, the collection of certain land taxes was transferred to the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
68. Report of Prince Devawongse’s committee, 11 March 1893» N.A.Kh. 2/1.
69. Report of Prince Devawongse's committee, 17 March 1893, N.A.Kh. 2/2.
70. ibid.
for the Government to proceed with its scheme
Yet there was a more disturbing aspect to this matter. In its investi­
gations Prince Devawongse's committee came across numerous serious discrepancies 
in the accounts of particular departments. For example, the committee could
not make the accounts of the opium revenue balance for any month in the year 
721892/93 • These discrepancies could not be explained simply in terms of
administrative incompetence or in terms of defective accounting procedures.
The committee became increasingly convinced that large-scale misappropriation
of the Government's revenue was taking place within the Ministry of Finance -
and that Prince NarSthip was involved in it.
One of the most serious of the misappropriations concerned the fu£ds of
the Privy Purse. In the early 1890s the head of the Privy Purse Department
had been unable to carry out his work, apparently because of ill-health, and
responsibility for the running of the Department had passed to his superior,
73Prince NarSthip . Prince NarSthip was confident that in time he would be
made Director of the Privy Purse Department in his own right (whilst retaining
the position of Minister of Finance) and so he gave instructions for the
accounts of the various departments of the Ministry to be transferred to the
7kPrivy Purse . In effect the Privy Purse Department was being made the main 
administrative unit for the whole Ministry. As a result there was a danger 
that the distinction between the finances of the King and the finances of the 
Government would be lost. In addition, as Minister of Finance Prince NarSthip 
was responsible for the private accounts of the wives and children of the King 
at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Bangkok; these accounts were usually held 
in trust in the names of Prince Narathip and Prince Sommot, the King's secre­
tary. It was alleged that Prince NarSthip had mislead Prince Sommot and on
71. The Bank's notes had been issued from 1889 (Prince Devawongse to J. R. M. 
Smith - manager of the Bangkok branch - 31 December 1888. Records of the 
Bangkok branch of the H.S.B.C., held in the Bank in Bangkok.)
72. Report of Prince Devawongse's committee, 11 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 5« 2/1•
73. King to Prince Sommot, 21 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 3/1*
7k» Prince Devawongse to King, 20 March 1893 N.A.K-i. 3/l»
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his own initiative had withdrawn money from those accounts, though it was never
75stated to what use he had put the money
The anger of the Council of Ministers engulfed Prince Narathip. He was
subjected to a constant stream of accusations and insults which on 16 March 1893
✓culminated in a demand from the Minister of Agriculture, Chao PhrayS
76Surasakmontrl, that he be dismissed from his post . On that occasion Prince 
NarSthip was saved by the intervention of Prince Devawongse, but then, within 
a few days as Prince Devawongse continued his investigation into the affairs 
of the Ministry of Finance he too became convinced that the Minister was guilty 
of financial malpractices. On 20 March he wrote to the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank instructing them not to allow Prince NarSthip to draw on any of the
77accounts in his name unless prior permission had been given by Prince Sommot 
That same day he wrote to the King calling for Prince Narathip1s dismissal 
for, he argued, to allow him simply to resign would constitute insufficient
78punishment
79In two letters to the King Prince Narathip strongly denied that he was 
guilty of any malpractice, arguing that the discrepancies discovered in the 
accounts of his Ministry had arisen without his knowledge or involvement. He 
also argued, with some justification, that the charges of extravagance were in 
part unfounded since all the Ministry's expenditure had, in theory at least, 
been approved by the Council of Ministers and the King himself. In addition 
Prince NarSthip drew attention to the achievements of the Ministry under his 
direction, particularly its success in increasing the flow of revenues into 
the Treasury. But he also asked the King for permission to resign, not, he 
emphasized, as an admission of guilt, but simply because resignation was the 
only way for him to escape from the hostility of the other Ministers.
7 5. ibid.
76. Prince NarSthip to King, 17 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 3/1 •
77« Prince Devawongse to Browne (B.S.B.C.), 20 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 3/1 •
78. Prince Devawongse to King, 20 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 3/1 •
79- Prince NarSthip to King, 17 March/19 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 3/1.
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His request was granted: he was saved the ignominy of dismissal. On
21 March 1893 Prince Narit, who had been Minister of Public Works since 1889,
became Minister of Finance; at the same time Prince Sommot became Director
goof the Privy Purse Department . Prince Narathip never again held a minis­
terial position^.
The resignation of Prince NarSthip in 1893 leaves one important question: 
was he forced to resign primarily because of his alleged financial malpractices 
or because since 1890 he had, through his budget policies, attracted the enmity 
of the other Ministers to the extent that his removal was widely desired ? 
Certainly the Ministers, and in particular Prince Devawongse, expressed outrage 
at Prince Narathip's alleged malpractices, but on balance the evidence suggests 
that the Minister's dubious financial dealings were merely the immediate cause 
of his downfall, not the fundamental factor behind his dismissal. In this 
respect it is important to note that the Minister who demanded the resignation 
of Prince NarSthip at the meeting of the Council on 16 March 1893, Chao PhrayS 
Surasakraontrl, had, as commander of the army, been refused a request for an
82increased budget allocation by the Minister of Finance in early 1892 
Revenge may have been uppermost in the mind of the Minister of Agriculture in
March 1893* Furthermore it is significant, and indeed ironic, that within a
✓few months Chao PhrayS Surasakmontrl himself was accused of the unauthorized 
use of his Ministry's funds, and yet was allowed to clear his name and retain
83his position . This would strongly suggest that in the circumstances of the
time it was extremely unlikely that a Minister would be dismissed solely for
84financial malpractices
However one important distinction between the cases of Prince NarSthip
\/and Chao PhrayS SurasakmontrT must be noted. Prince Narathip was Minister of
80. King to Prince NarSthip, 21 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 3/1-
81. RStchasakunwong (Royal Genealogy) Bangkok 1969-
82. See p. So
83. D. K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand p. 296.
84. This is the view accepted by D. K. Wyatt, ibid.
60
Finance, the head of a newly established Ministry, part of whose responsibili­
ties was to introduce and promote western-orientated concepts of financial 
propriety. It is therefore possible that when the accusations of financial 
malpractice were made against the Minister, the King and the Council took a 
much sterner view of the matter than would normally have been the case.
5« Prince Narit as Minister of Finance, 1893 ~ I89**.
The resignation of Prince Narathip pushed the Council of Ministers
further along the path from disorder to complete disintegration. By the time
the crisis with France, which had been gathering momentum with a series of
border incidents in early 18931 finally broke in July 1893 » the Council of
Ministers was incapable of effective and rational administration. It was to
a significant extent through the adroit diplomacy of Prince Devawongse,
working independently of the Council, that the sovereignty of Siam was
preserved, though at considerable cost. Siam was forced to cede the whole
of her territory on the left bank of the Mekong, including Luang Prabang,
withdraw her forces to a distance of 25 km. from the west bank, evacuate the
provinces of Battambang and Siemrap and to pay an indemnity of 3 francs.
In addition the French were to occupy Chantabun until Siam evacuated the
85left bank of the Mekong .
The territorial losses suffered by Siam, coupled with the collapse of 
the Council of Ministers, brought the King to the point of a complete physical 
and nervous breakdown which effectively removed him from the administration
85. D. G. E. Hall A History of South-East Asia 3rd. ed. (London 1968) 
pp. 679-701.
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of the Kingdom . Inevitably the machinery of government almost ceased to
function and indeed, after August 1893 the Council of Ministers no longer 
87met . Certain Ministries were able to survive this collapse and continue 
reforms and projects begun in the earlier period - notably the Ministry of 
the Interior which pressed ahead with its reorganization of the provincial 
administration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which had to deal with 
the French crisis and its aftermath. The relative vitality of those Ministries 
was, however, merely a reflection of the resourcefulness and independence of 
their Ministers, Prince Damrong and Prince Devawongse. But those Ministries 
which lacked an energetic Minister and where there was little or no reform 
momentum (and this included the Ministry of Finance) slipped into inactivity 
and apathy, for the King had neither the physical or mental strength, nor it 
seems the interest to encourage and support their work.
But in the years immediately following the collapse of the Council the 
Ministry of Finance had to bear a further handicap, a legacy of the years 
prior to 1893* It was not simply that the Ministry had to contend with the
86. In November 1893 Scott, the British Minister in Bangkok, informed the 
Foreign Office that in the previous 4 months the King had lost 3 stones in 
weight and had abandoned all interest in life. (Scott to Lord Rosebery, 24 
November 1893 Tele. 109 P.R.O. F.O. 69/150.) In June 1894 he reported that 
the ^ing, now at K9 Si Chang, had a high fever and that it was believed that 
death was imminent. (Scott to Earl of Kimberley, 21 June 1894 Tele. 43 P.R.O. 
F.O. 69/153.) r
There is also some evidence on this point from Robert Morant, the tutor to the 
Crown Prince, who was dismissed from his post in early 1894. On his return to 
London he wrote a 'Memorandum on the Present Political Situation in Siam. The 
Misleading Nature of the Current Reports thereon and the Grave Condition of Her 
Internal Affairs' July 1894, which he submitted to the Foreign Office (P.R.O. 
F.O. 17/1223 China File). Because of the circumstances surrounding his depar­
ture from Siam, Morant certainly cannot be regarded as an independent observer, 
(and in this context it is important to note that he was Sir Henry Norman's 
principal informant - see p.So fn.3*? ), but he was, one would imagine, almost the 
only foreigner to see the King regularly at this time. He wrote that in August 
1893 the King 'was as nearly as possible imbecile ... though it is at the same 
time incorrect to suppose that he is or has been in a condition of pronounced 
active insanity.' Though he had since improved, Morant suggested that 'he has 
lost all will-power and all initiative, is a prey to perpetual despondency, 
and also entirely "possessed" by the spirit of distrust and suspicion of every­
one who approaches him.' These were certainly the symptoms of acute depression.
See also : D. K. Wyatt op. cit. pp. 95-96/Sir Henry Norman op. cit. pp. 435-
439/451-453.
87. Sir Henry Norman op. cit. pp. 451-452.
stigma attached to the scandal of Prince NarSthip's resignation: more impor­
tantly it had to overcome the antagonism and resentment felt by the other
Ministries at its earlier attempts to impose some measure of control over
their financial affairs. Clearly there could be no question of the Ministry
tackling that crucial problem until the King had returned to the centre of the
Government and until the Council of Ministers had been resurrected and was 
operating in a conciliatory manner. As a result for the short period for which 
Prince Narit was Minister of Finance, March 1893 to December 1894, the Ministry 
was almost dormant.
A skeleton set of revenue and expenditure estimates for 1893/94 prepared 
by Prince Narathip and of course amended by Prince Devawongse's committee was 
inherited by Prince Narit, but there is no indication that the Ministries 
attempted to abide by those estimates or that Prince ^arit attempted to enforce 
them. The Ministry of Finance prepared a very rough budget for 1894/95 and
despite the difficulties involved in convening a meeting of the Ministers to
88consider the estimates and the King's indisposition, it appears to have been 
discussed and sanctioned. Unfortunately the 1894/95 budget appears to have
been inoperative, for some Ministries seem to have been without approved funds
89for that year . Inevitably those Ministries were forced to work outside the 
budget, to finance their administrations by retaining a proportion of the
revenues collected under their auspices and by maintaining undisclosed accounts
90at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank . It would not be an exaggeration to suggest 
that in the period whilst Prince Narit was Minister of Finance the Ministry 
exerted practically no control over the finances of the Government.
88. King to Prince Narit, 27 February 1894 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/4.
89. Even the Ministry of the Palace complained to the King that it had received 
little or no funds from the Treasury (Official in the Ministry to King, 26 
November 1894 N.A.Kh. 5» 1/4.).
90. W. A. Graham Siam vol. 1 p. 338. This situation was well reflected in the 
statements of actual accountable Government expenditure. Total expenditure fell 
from 18.17 m- baht in 1893/94 to 12.*48 m. baht in l894/95« More significantly, 
the accountable expenditure of the important Ministry of the Interior was, at
0.205 nu baht the lowest of all the Ministries in 1894/95 save the Ministry of 
Justice (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 24). The implication is that to a considerable 
extent Prince Damrong's Ministry was financing its work outside the budget - 
from its own sources of revenue.
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The Ministry's weakness revealed itself in another way. In March l893i
when the accounts of the Ministry were under investigation by Prince Devawongse's
committee, the contracts for the opium farms came up for re-sale, but in the
91confusion no auctions were held for many of the principal farms . A short
Vtime later two tax farmers, Phra PhakdIphatarSk?}n and Phra CharoenrStchathQn, 
asked the Ministry of Finance for the contract to administer the opium monopoly
for virtually the whole Kingdom, undertaking to increase considerably the
92 93Government's opium revenue . The Ministry agreed . Indeed it appears that
it was willing to go further and transfer control over virtually all aspects
Vof the monopoly's operations to Phra Phakdl and Phra Charoen, for the farmers
94were allowed to buy the Government's stock of raw and prepared opium . In 
effect from mid-l893 Government control of the activities of the opium farmers 
was reduced to periodic inspections of their accounts by the Krom SarabSnchl.
It would seem that this abrogation of responsibility by the Ministry of Finance - 
against the recommendations of the 1889 committee on the opium monopoly and 
against the stipulations of the I89O opium law - arose from the fact that the 
Ministry, shaken by a severe internal crisis within three years of its estab­
lishment, feared that in the future it could prove incapable of efficiently 
administering the monopoly. Phra Phakdl and Phra Charoen's offer was regarded 
as the only effective way of maintaining the Government's revenue from opium. 
Alternatively it is possible that the Ministry, its administrative machinery 
in ruins, simply lost control of the situation.
Indeed in the otherwise rather barren period of Prince Narit's tenure of 
the Ministry of Finance only two positive features stand out. First there was 
a significant change in the structure of the Ministry. In November 1893 the 
Privy Purse Department was removed from the Ministry and placed in the 
Krasuang Murath5th$n, the Ministry of the Privy Seal. Prince Sommc^/ was
91. Prince NarSthip to MQm chao SawSt (Director of the Krom SanphSk^n) 20 March 
1893 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/lX).
92. Phra Phakdl to King, undated N.A.Kh. Ik. Ik/11.
93- Prince NarSthip to Prince Sommot, 21 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/10.
94. Prince NarSthip to Mqm chao SawSt, 20 March 1&93 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/10.
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confirmed as Director of the Department. The Privy Purse was still required
to submit all its accounts to the Ministry of Finance and to remit all its
profits to the Treasury, but in future it was to do so in the same manner and
under the same conditions as any other Ministry or department not under the
95direct control of the Ministry of Finance . There seems little doubt that
the removal of the Privy Purse Department from the Ministry of Finance was
prompted by Prince Narathip's interference in the private accounts of the
department but it is important to note that, almost incidentally, the transfer
completed the separation of the finances of King and Government.
Second, Prince Narit, like Prince NarSthip, was anxious to increase the
proportion of revenue collected directly by officials. Though Prince NarSthip1s
extravagant budget allocations from the Krom SanphSsI and Krom 5anphSk$n had
sparked off the crisis which had eventually led to his resignation, the committee
which had investigated the Ministry's accounts in 1893 bad still been prepared
96to sanction a significant increase in the budgets of those departments . The
result was that whereas in 1892/93 the Krom SanphSsI alone had collected
971.6 m. baht, that figure was virtually doubled the following year . The 
department also became responsible for the overall administration of the
Chinese poll-tax collection in 1894, a year in which a record number of Chinese
98were taxed Indeed it was one of the more favourable features of Prince 
Narit's period at the Ministry that despite the virtual collapse of budget and
accounting procedures the value of the revenue flowing into the Treasury was
99maintained , though it must be added that it is likely that this was achieved
95* Prince Sommot to King, 5 November 1893 N.A.Kh. 9* 1/1 enclosing copies of 
amendments to the 1890 Privy Purse Act. Also Prawat samnakngSn Phra Khlang 
KhSngthl (History of the Privy Purse Department) by officials of the Department, 
Bangkok 1967 p. 17•
96. Report of Prince Devawongse's committee, 11 March 1893 N.A.Kh. 5* 2/1.
97* Prince Narit to King, 23 ^anuary 1894 N.A.Kh. 14. 2/2.
98. Prince Narit to King, 4 June 1894 N.A.Kh. 13- 1/5- Accounts in N.A.Kh.1 3 .
1/5.
99* Total Government Revenue 1892/93-1894/95 (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 22).
1892/93 15*37 m. baht"
1893/94 17.38 m. baht
1894/95 17*33 m. baht
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less by the efforts of the Ministry of Finance itself and more by the fact
that the Kingdom was enjoying a trade boom after q quite pronounced depression
100in the first years of the decade
In the latter half of 1894 the King's physical and mental health improved,
though even at the end of the year it could not be said that his recovery was
coraplete^^ Yet there were some indications thqt an attempt would soon be made
to reorganize the administration and to repair the damage caused by the inter-
102nal and external crises of 1892-1893 • It was in that context that at the
end of December 1894 Prince Narit was transferred to the Ministry of War^°^ 
and Prince Sirithat SangkSt became Minister of Finance, his first ministerial 
appointment. He was the third Minister to be appointed to the Ministry in the 
four years since its establishment.
6. Prince Sirithat SangkSt as Minister of Finance 1894 - 1896.
Prince Sirithat was to remain At the Ministry for only a relatively short 
length of time, less than two years, but in that time he made a determined
effort to revive the Ministry from the collapse of 1893 and to overcome the
inactivity and lethargy which had taken hold under Prince Narit. As has been 
shown, a major failure of Prince Narit's term of office had been the Ministry's 
virtual relinquishment of control over the operations of the opium monopoly 
and it is significant that one of Prince Sirithat's first concerns on his 
appointment was to attempt to regain that control.
100. Total Value of Imports and Exports (m. baht) 1890-1894.
I890 5575! 1B93 86.65
lSgL 33.37 lH94 69.57
1892 32.52
From: James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 Stanford 1971 
Appendix C.
101. de Bunsen to Bertie. Private letter. 16 Decamber 1894 P.R.O. F.O. 69/153*
102. In September 1894 Rolin Jacquemyns, the General Adviser, wrote to the King 
outlining a series of urgently needed administrative, and particularly judicial 
reforms: the suggestions met with the King's general approval (Scott to -Sari 
of Kimberley, 20 October 1894 and enclosures. £Rp. F.O. 69/153).
103. Phraprawat somdet chaofS kromphrayS naritsarSnuwattiwong (Biography of 
Prince Narit) in Banthu'k ru'ang khwSmrfl tSngtSng (Corresnondence between nrince 
Narit and PhrayS AnumSn 1936-1943, 5 vols, Bangkok 1963) vol. 2 pp. 1-39» P* 21.
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By 1895 relations between the Government and the Phra Phakdl/Phra Charoen 
syndicate which had controlled virtually all opium sales in the Kingdom since 
mid-l893, were very poor indeed. For example, in 1894 the syndicate had asked 
the Ministry of Finance for permission to increase the retail selling price of 
opium on the grounds that there had been an increase in the price of the impor­
ted drug: the Ministry was so slow in reaching a decision that the syndicate
proceeded with the increase without waiting for a reply, at which point the
Ministry instituted legal proceedings against the farmers for breach of the 
104opium laws . Such disputes held considerable dangers for the Government for
with the opium monopoly accounting for 15 per cent of its total revenue it was
at a considerable disadvantage with regard to a syndicate which controlled such
a high proportion of the Kingdom's opium sales.
In mid-l895 Prince Sirithat held discussions with the King on a possible
reform of the structure and operations of the opium monopoly. They decided
that once again the monopoly would be divided into smaller, individual farms
105thereby reducing the power of each farmer . They also agreed that in order
to reassert the Government's control over the legal supplies of opium in the
Kingdom, the Customs Department would be made responsible for the purchase and
importation of raw opium and its distribution in strictly regulated amounts to
the farmers^^. The farmers would retain the right to prepare the raw opium.
In January 1896 Prince Sirithat prepared a new set of regulations for the
107opium monopoly , putting into effect the revised structure of the monopoly 
agreed the previous year. In addition the opportunity was taken to reissue 
earlier opium monopoly legislation, particularly regulations governing the 
transfer of the contract from one farmer to his successor, for it had been
104. Phra Phakdl to King, May 1894 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/11.
105. Prince Sirithat to King, 1? May 1895/King to Prince Sirithat, 18 May 1895* 
N.A.Kh. I4rlk/ll-
106. PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon Phraprawat phraworawongthoe phra ong chao phrSmphong 
athirSt (Biography of Prince PhrPm) in History of the Customs Department
pp. iv-viii.
107. Opium Regulations 1896: enclosed in Prince Sirithat to King, 10 January
1896. N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/ll.
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found that such transfers were the occasion for the most serious conflicts
between the syndicates for control of the famms, and were the occasion for
the most serious violations of the law.
The auctions for the 1896/9? - 1898/99 contracts were held in March 189^^.
Significantly, at the termination of their contract Phra Phakdl and Phra Charoen
attempted to damage the monopoly for their successors by flooding the market
with cheap opium, but the strict enforcement of Prince Sirithat's regulations
appears to hage thwarted the scheme. For the first few months of their contracts
109the legal sales of the new farmers were low , but as the cheap opium cleared 
the retail market they began to revive and the monopoly remained intact - at 
least for the time being^^.
But perhaps the most important and forthright measure of Prince Sirithat's 
short term as Minister of Finance concerned his attempts to create a revenue 
and expenditure budget for the whole Government. To compile the budget, guide 
its passage through the Council of Ministers and to present it to the King 
remained one of the central, as yet unfulfilled functions of the Ministry.
Yet the fate of Prince Narathip1s earlier attempts to establish budgetary 
control stood as a warning. And even if it were argued that in the early 
1890s unusual conditions had prevailed - that the Council had had insufficient 
time to create accepted procedures for the conduct of Government business, that 
Prince NarSthip had clumsily antagonized his colleagues - there was surely 
little doubt that even in the calmer atmosphere of the mid-l890s it would be 
a major task for Prince Sirithat to persuade each Ministry and department to 
co-operate under his guidance in producing a set of budget estimates - and 
abide by them.
During the opening months of 1895 Prince Sirithat held discussions with 
some of the Ministers over their estimates for the coming year, but by 15 March,
108. Phra Phibun PhatanSk^n to King, undated, N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/11.
109. Prince Mahit to King, 20 November 1901 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/23.
110. The section above is simply intended to demonstrate one aspect of Prince 
Sirithat's attempts to restore the administrative effectiveness of the Ministry 
of Finance. A detailed analysis of the problems of the opium monopoly, and the 
response of the Ministry to them, is reserved for Chapter VII.
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the date by which the Ministry of Finance was expected to submit the full esti­
mates to the King, the discussions were far from complete'*’^ .  It appears that 
the King was unwilling to approve any of the estimates submitted to him until 
he had seen the full budget; as a result those Ministries which had submitted 
their estimates on time suffered by being unable to draw money from the Treasury
on the basis of those estimates. They could not even draw their allocation
112to pay the salaries of their officials . In fact it was not until October
1895 that the full estimates were sent to the King for his approval - over
six months behind schedule'*''*'^ . The King immediately sanctioned the budget but
he was clearly disturbed that it had taken so long to compile. He suggested
to Prince Sirithat that if his officials began work immediately on the budget
for the coming year, beginning in April 1896, then perhaps the estimates would
be completed on time^^.
Prince Sirithat immediately wrote to each of the Ministers asking them to
submit their preliminary expenditure estimates to his Ministry by not later
than 15 December 18951 but by that date only the Royal Secretariat, the Privy
115Purse Department and the Police Department had complied with the request .
The estimates of the Ministry of Finance itself were not completed until late
December 1895"^^• In January 1896 Prince Sirithat sent warning letters to the
remaining Ministries but only the Ministry of Agriculture responded by sub-
117mitting its preliminary estimates . By March of that year the situation had
improved slightly with estimates being received from the Ministry of the Capital
ll8and the Ministry of Public Works , but still nothing from the Ministries of
111. Prince Sirithat to King, 15 March 1895 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/4.
112. Prince Sirithat to King, 19 May 1895 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/4.
115. Council of Ministers to King, 6 October 1895 N.A.Kh. 5» 1/4.
114. King to Prince Sirithat, 15 October 1895 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/4.
115. Prince Sirithat to Prince Somraot, 24 January 1896 N.A.Kh. 5» l/5»
116. List attached to: Prince Mahit to King, 23 September 1896 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5*
117. Prince Sirithat to Prince Sommot, 24 January 1896 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/5-
118. Prince Sirithat to King, 3 March 1896 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5•
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Prince Damrong, Prince Devawongse or Prince Narit. With the new year imminent
the King allowed Prince Sirithat to present to the Council of Ministers those
119estimates which had been received and at the same time he wrote strongly
worded letters to those Ministers who had failed to comply with the requests
120of the Ministry of Finance . In fact by 1 April 1896 only the expenditure
allocations of the Royal Secretariat, the Privy Purse, the Ministry of the
Palace and the Ministry of Finance had been sanctioned. Most of the remaining
important budgets were approved by the end of May, but even so by the time
Prince Sirithat left the Ministry in August 1896 the estimates of the Ministry
of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had still not been presented to the
121Council of Ministers . In short, Prince Sirithat, like Prince NarSthip, 
failed to establish the procedures and administrative mechanisms of budgetary 
control.
There were obvious dangers in such a situation. The period 1892-I896 had
seen an unprecedented expansion in the value of the Government's revenue and 
122expenditure , but those same years had also seen a tendency for each Ministry 
to expect and even demand extravagant expenditure allocations, with little or 
no regard for the requirements of the Government as a whole. Ministers had 
consistently failed to co-operate with each other in producing a universally 
accepted order of priorities for Government expenditure, but rather their main 
objective had been to see the budget sanctioned by the King as rapidly as
possible so that they could proceed to draw the allowances for their Ministries
123from the Treasury . As a result, the Ministry of Finance in order to produce
119* King to Prince Sirithat, 20 March 1896 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5-
120. King to Prince Sirithat, 22 April 1896 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/2.
121. List attached to: Prince Mahit to King, 23 September 1896 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5-
122. Government revenue rose from 13-37 m. baht in 1892/93 to 20.64 m. baht in 
1896/97- Over the same period, expenditure increased from 14.91 m. baht to 
18.48 m. baht (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 22-25).
123- The ideas expressed in this paragraph are taken from an unsigned, undated 
memorandum included in the file concerned with the 1896/97 budget (N.A.Kh. 5- 
1/5). The author is difficult to determine, but it was probably either Prince 
Sirithat or his successor Prince Mahit. The important point to note, however, 
is that a very prominent person in the Government fully recognized the failure 
of budgetary procedures to develop, the implications of that failure, and the 
urgent need for reform.
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the primary requirement of a set of estimates - a revenue surplus - had been 
forced to cut the preliminary estimates of the Ministries almost indiscrimina­
tely. Inevitably some potentially important projects were ignored in the 
scramble for budget allowances, some relatively unimportant proposals were 
financed. In short it appears that there was a continual, considerable rais- 
allocation of Government resources. By 1896 there was a further danger: unless
the Ministries co-operated in compiling the budget estimates there was a like­
lihood that it would become impossible to achieve even the limited objective 
of holding down total expenditure below total revenue, for with budget pro­
cedures so haphazard and indiscriminate, the Ministries had every incentive to 
ignore Prince Sirithat's requests and to attempt to work outside the budget.
7. 1896 : a new Minister of Finance and the appointment of a Financial Adviser.
The most prominent characteristic of the Ministry of Finance in the period 
from its establishment in 1890 until 1896 was its instability. Those six years 
alone had seen three Ministers. Inevitably instability led to weakness, par­
ticularly weakness of budgetary control. In this context it is important to 
remember that the Ministry of Finance was created largely by the amalgamation 
of existing finance departments scattered throughout the administration: unlike,
say, the Ministry of the Interior it was not an established Ministry which 
merely had to amend its functions and responsibilities to accord with the 
requirements of the reformed government structure. The Ministry of Finance 
had to create its functions, impose its role on the Ministries to a much 
greater extent than any of the other principal departments of government. Per­
haps it was simply asking too much for the Ministry of Finance to develop its 
role, to develop as an effective and influential component of the administration 
in the politically and administratively unstable conditions that existed in the 
first half of the 1890s, for it has to be borne in mind that to a considerable 
extent the instability and weakness of the Ministry between 1890 and 1896 
reflected, as well as contributed to, the instability and weakness of the 
Government as a whole. In other words an influential Ministry of Finance could
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exist only in a stable political environment, just as a stable political environ­
ment - with the Ministries working effectively in co-operation with each other - 
depended on the existence of a strong, well administered Ministry of Finance.
Both depended to a considerable extent on firm leadership from the head of the 
Government and it is significant that the gradual return of the King to effec­
tive power coincided with Prince Sirithat's term as Minister of Finance.
Therefore it is not surprising that 1896, which Baw the King reassume his 
dominant position in the administration, should also have seen both a large-
scale reorganization of ministerial positions which brought the most able of
124the King's brothers into prominence and important changes at the Ministry 
of Finance.
The first concerned the appointment of a European Financial Adviser. As
far back as April 1890 Prince Narathip had suggested to the King that in view
of the deficiency of financial expertise in the Government a European adviser
125should be appointed , but at the time nothing came of the proposal. The
matter was revived in late 1894 or early 1895 by the General Adviser, Rolin
Jacquemyns, who argued that a European adviser was needed to assist in the
reform of the administrative methods and procedures of the Ministry of
Finance and to organize the publication of the Government's annual budget,
which would be indispensable in establishing Siamese financial credit in the 
126world . He made it clear that the adviser
' ... should be appointed not as a member of the Government, invested
with such share of the executive power as only belongs to a responsible
Minister of Finance, but as an adviser or a councillor, whose sugges­
tions or advice may or not be sanctioned by Your Majesty.' 127
The King approved Rolin Jacquemyns' proposal (though apparently there was
128opposition from some Ministers) , and instructed the General Adviser to find 
a suitable man for the post.
124. D. K. Wyatt op. cit. p. 100.
125. Prince NarSthip to King, 2k April I89O N.A.Kh. 1/5•
126. Rolin Jacquemyns to King, 15 February 1896 (enclosed in de Bunsen to Lord 
Salisbury, 20 February 1896 P.R.O. F.O. 69/169).
12 7. ibid.
128. de Bunsen to Lord Salisbury, 28 February 1896 P.R.O. F.O. 628 Box 18 No.242.
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Rolin Jacquemyns immediately wrote to Lord Cromer in Egypt: prior to his
appointment to Siam Rolin Jacquemyns had been employed in the Egyptian adminis- 
129tration . Lord Cromer suggested Alfred Mitchell-Innes, a 31 year-old British
130official who had been in Cairo since 1891 . There, in late 1895, the matter
rested, since the Foreign Office, which had to approve Mitchell-Innes1 release 
to the Siamese Government was unwilling to let the appointment proceed for 
fear that it would jeopardize Anglo-French negotiations over Siam, then in 
progress1^1. However with the signing of the Anglo-French agreement guaran­
teeing the independence of the Chao Phraya valley in January 1896, the political
obstacles on the British side to the appointment were removed. The following
132month the King approved the engagement of Mitchell-Innes and the first
133Financial Adviser arrived in Bangkok in June 1896 .
The second major change at the Ministry of Finance in 1896 occurred in 
August when, as part of the general change in ministerial positions, Prince 
Sirithat was transferred to the Ministry of the Privy Seal and Prince Mahit 
RStchaharithai, who had been Minister of the Palace since 1887, became 
Minister of Finance. It was to be an important appointment, for Prince 
Mahit was to remain at the Ministry for almost ten years giving to it the 
continuity and stability which it had so far so seriously lacked.
129- Christian ie Saint-Hubert Rolin Jacquemyns (Chao Phya Aphay Raja) and the
Belgian Legal Advisers in Siam at the turn of the Century J.S.S. July 1963
pp. 18 1-190.
130. Foreign Office List 1931»
131. Lord Cromer to de Bunsen, 31 December 1893 P«R«0. Cromer ^apers vol. 8
F.O. 633.
132. King to Rolin Jacquemyns, 16 February 1896 (enclosed in de Bunsen to 
Lord Salisbury, 18 February 1896 P.R.O. F.O. 69/169)•
1 3 3. Prince Sirithat to King, 15 August 1896 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
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CHAPTER III
The creation of an effective Ministry of Finance, 1896 - 1902.
Prince Mahit's terra as Minister of Finance was so long and constituted
such an important period in the history of the Ministry that it will be dealt 
with over two chapters, the first covering the period from August 1896 until 
the middle of 1902, the second the years from 1902 until Prince Mjhit's resig­
nation in May 1906. The earlier period was dominated by Prince Mahit's attempts
to establish the Ministry of Finance as an effective and influential government 
department, and it will be argued that by 1902 his efforts had been rewarded 
by a reasonable degree of success. After 1902 the Ministry was concerned with 
major financial reforms - including exchange and currency changes and the 
raising of a sterling loan in Europe - and with the prospect of substantial 
budget deficits.
1. The development of budgetary control.
On his appointment as Minister of Finance in 1896 Prince Mahit took as 
his immediate and most important task the necessity to establish effective 
budgetary procedures for controlling the expenditures of the whde administration, 
for there could be little doubt that the Ministry's clumsy and largely unsuccess­
ful attempts to regulate the finances of the Government in the early 1890s had 
proved to be its most serious and disrupting failure. Prince nahit inherited 
from Prince Sirithat the incomplete estimates for the year then in progress, 
1896/971. The Minister suggested to the King that since the year was already 
half over those budget allocations which had been sanctioned should be allowed 
to stand, whilst those Ministries which were still without approved estimates 
(notably the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of the Capital) would have to 
abide by their allocation for the previous year, 1895/96, though slight amend­
ments could be allowed for urgently needed projects. In effect those Ministries
1. Prince Mahit to King, 23 September 1896/12 October 1896, with attached 
accounts and lists. N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5-
were to be made to suffer for their failure to abide by the Government's budget 
procedures. The rapidly completed budget for 1896/97 was sanctioned by the
pKing on 13 October 1896 .
The following year, 1897/98, gave Prince Mahit his first real opportunity 
to improve the effectiveness of the Ministry's budget procedures. In fact 
there was considerable pressure on the Ministry to have the budget completed 
on time - by April 1897 - since in that month the King was scheduled to leave 
Bangkok on his first visit to Europe and Prince Mahit was to form part of the 
royal entourage. In late 1896 the Ministry of Finance despatched the standard 
request to each Ministry and department that they submit their preliminary 
estimates to the Ministry by 15 December, and it appears that the majority of 
Ministries complied with the request''*. In January 1897 Prince Mahit followed 
this up with a letter to each department asking that in future they submit 
detailed accounts of their current expenditure along with the preliminary 
estimates for the coming year . Prince Mahit explained that it was important 
that his Ministry have accurate, up-to-date information on the actual expendi­
ture of each department when it came to assess that department's future 
expenditure demands: in particular it was important that the Ministry of
Finance should have clear evidence that a department had been able to exhaust 
its budget allocation for one year before it even considered discussing an 
increased estimate for the following one. Two months later Prince Mahit des­
patched accountants from the K$n& SSrabSnchl division of the Ministry to each 
department in the administration to insimct the finance officials there in the
accounting and auditing methods which the Ministry of Finance wished to see
5introduced throughout the government . The Minister's aim was to sweep away 
the multiplicity of accounting systems used by the various Ministries and
2. King to Prince Mahit, 13 October 1896 N.A.Kh. 5» 1/5-✓3. King to Chao PhrayS ThSwStwongwiwat, 12 December 1896 N.A.Kh. 5« 1/2.
if. Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, 16 January 1897 N.A.Kh. l/l8. (Similar
letters were sent to the head of each department.)
5. Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, 18 March 1897 N.A.Kh. 1/18. (Again,
similar letters were sent to the head of each department.)
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and departments and to replace them with a uniform set of accounting procedures. 
In this way it would become possible for the Ministry of Finance to ascertain 
more speedily and more accurately the actual financial position of each indi­
vidual Ministry and department.
In February 1897 the King lent his weight in support of Prince Mahit*s 
measures when in a letter to the Minister, a letter which he wished to see 
circulated in the Council, the King strongly ei^phasized the responsibilities 
and functions of the Ministry of Finance^. It was by far the most forceful 
statement of the Ministry's role since its establishment in 1890.
*1. The Minister of Finance has full authority and full responsi­
bility in all matters directly or indirectly concerning the 
Ministry of Finance.
2. The Minister of Finance has the authority to issue regulations 
and instructions to other ministries on matters concerning the 
Ministry of Finance: all ministries must obey those instructions
and regulations.
3. When the Minister of Finance thinks it necess ry to investigate 
any financial matter in another m$nistry or in the provinces, 
matters which concern the Ministry of Finance, then he has the 
authority to make that investigation - to call for accounts and 
records - without obstruction
k. With regard to all the officials who are involved in the com­
piling of accounts, right down to the clerks who receive the 
accounts, the Ministry of Finance has the responsibility to 
examine their knowledge and their methods, and of deciding 
whether they are adequate for their posts or not.' 7
There is little doubt that the King's instructions referred principally 
to the Ministry of Finance's responsibility for compiling the budget.
Prince Mahit's measures and the King's intervention had a noticeable 
effect. On 20 March 1897 Prince Mahit could report to the King that the 
Ministry of Finance was ready to present the full budget to the Council of
g
Ministers for discussion . The discussions took place throughout late March 
and early April 1897- The Council was faced with a familiar problem - total 
preliminary expenditure estimates exceeded by a considerable margin the 
Ministry of Finance's estimate of the Government's revenue for the coming year.
6. King to Prince Mahit, 1** February 1897 N.A.Kh. 1/18.
7 . ibid.
8. Prince Mahit to King, 20 March 1897 N.A.Kh. 1/5-
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Yet it appears that partly because the King agreed to a reduction in the
9budget allocation of the Privy Purse Department - thereby setting an example 
which he undoubtedly expected to be followed - and partly because Prince 
Mahit submitted to the Council a list of proposals as to how Government expendi­
ture could be held down‘d, agreement as to which projects should be postponed,
reduced or abandoned altogether appears to have been reached fairly rapidly^.
12The budget for 1897/98 was sanctioned by the King on 6 April and the following 
day the royal party left Bangkok for Europe^.
In the absence of Prince Mahit, Prince Narit became acting Minister of 
Finance whilst continuing to hold his position as Minister of War. Prince 
Narit, a noticeably apathetic Minister in his own right in l893-l89*N was if 
anything even more inactive in 1897• Very few documents from the Ministry of 
Finance for the period of Prince Mahit's absence exist, and even those few show 
Prince Naritfs main concern to have been to defer any decision - no matter how 
small - until the King had returned from Europe.
Immediately on his arrival back in Bangkok on l6th December 1897^ Prince 
Mahit was again deeply involved in work on the budget. He was angered to find 
that despite the success of the previous year in having the budget completed 
virtually on time, and despite the fact that at the beginning of November 1897 
each Ministry and province had been reminded that they had to submit their pre­
liminary estimates to the Ministry of Finance by 15 December^, the Ministries
$. King to Prince Sommot, 20 March 1897 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5*
10. Prince Mahit to King, 20 March 1897 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/5-
11. Unfortunately there exists no record of the Ministry of Finance's examina­
tion of the preliminary estimates in early 1897 » nor of the discussions of the 
Council of Ministers in March and April. In fact it is not until 1901/02 that 
there exists any detailed record of the budget discussions. This means that 
for the period 1897/98-1901/02 there is no direct evidence as to the pace and 
extent to which the budget regulations introduced by the Ministry of Finance 
became effective. On the other hand the fact that the Ministry reissued its 
budget regulations virtually every year would seem to indicate that any success 
it achieved in establishing effective and accepted budget procedures was rela­
tively slow in coming.
12. King to Prince Mahit, 6 April 1897 N.A.Kh. 5« 1/5-
13. PhrayS SI SahathSp Raya fhang sadet phrar5tchadamnoen praphat prathSt
yurgp r.s. 116 (The King's Visit to Europe in 1897) Bangkok n.d.
1^. PhrayS ST SahathSp op. cit.
15. Prince Mahit to King, 1 February 1898 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/5.
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were again late in submitting their budget requests. By the middle of January
1898 no estimates had been received from the Ministries of Public Works,
Public Instruction, the Capital, the Palace and War: nor from 13 provinces.
A warning letter was sent to each offending Ministry and province by the King^.
Only the Ministry of War and five provinces responded immediately. On 27
January 1898 Prince Mahit wrote to the King complaining of the persistent
17failure of some departments to respond to his requests and instructions . On
2 February the King wrote again to each of the relevant Ministers and officials -
including Prince Damrong, who was responsible for the expenditure estimates of
the provinces - pointing out that it needed only one Ministry to ignore the
deadlines imposed by the Ministry of Finance and the whole of the budget process
was seriously disrupted"^.
By 15 March all the preliminary expenditure estimates had been examined
by the Ministry of Finance and the Minister was ready to submit the full budget
to the Council of Ministers; but as Prince Mahit confessed to the King, he
19faced the budget discussions with little enthusiasm . It was not simply that 
the Minister was disquieted by the necessity to force the Ministries to submit 
their preliminary estimates on schedule. Prince Mahit's concern went deeper 
than that: he was disturbed by the spirit in which the Ministries compiled
their expenditure requests and consequently by the criteria by which the esti­
mates were examined by his Ministry and approved by the Council of Ministers. 
Prince Mahit argued that the Council approached the discussions with no basic 
agreement as to the priorities for Government expenditure, no consensus as to
what constituted a legitimate demand from a department for an increased expendi­
ture allocation. As a result the discussions - if that v:as the word - had a 
tendency to degenerate into a series of drawn-out and almost useless disputes 
over relatively unimportant items of expenditure. He argued that &iven an
16. Mitchell-Innes to King, 19 January 1898 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
17. Prince Mahit to King, 27 January 1898 N.A.Kh. 5« 1/5*
18. King to various Ministers, 2 February 1898 N.A.Kh. 5» 1/5*
19. Prince Mahit to King,15 March 1898 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/7.
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agreed set of guide-lines for the presentation of expenditure estimates by 
the Ministries the budget discussions by the Council of Ministers could be com­
pleted in -two or three days.
The Minister enlarged on his fears in a further letter to the King on 19 
20March 1898 . According to the calculations of the Ministry of Finance, the
estimated revenue for 1898/99 was 26.0 m. baht. The total of preliminary 
expenditure allocations demanded by the Ministries for the same year came to
29.^5 m. baht: therefore 3-^5 baht had to be cut from the expenditure
demands if a budget deficit were to be avoided. The problem had two aspects.
On the one hand, in a situation where Government expenditure as a whole was 
rising rapidly as a result of the expansion in the administration’s functions 
and responsibilities, it was extremely difficult for the Ministry of Finance 
in the time available to it to spot those expenditure demands submitted to it 
which were either unjustified or extravagant. Yet, Prince Mahit continued, an 
examination of the actual expenditure of the Ministries over the past few years, 
compared with their expenditure estimates in those years, revealed that most 
Ministries had a tendency to request and obtain an expenditure allocation con­
siderably in excess of that which they were capable of using. At the end of 
each year they were left with unspent funds. In short, the projected budget 
deficit for 1898/99 was more apparent than real. The problem facing the 
Ministry of Finance was how to persuade the Ministries to submit expenditure 
demands which reflected accurately their spending capacities rather than im­
practicable notions of what they would wish to spend, for it was only in this 
way that the Ministry could avoid the difficult and inefficient task of making 
large cuts in the preliminary estimates, and could avoid the time-consuming and 
virtually fruitless disputes in the Council over certain budget items.
Prince Mahit argued that it was the Ministries’ tendency to submit inflated 
salary estimates which was causing the Ministry of Finance by far the most 
serious difficulty. There were no regulations governing the number of officials 
in each department: there were no salary scales. As a result some Ministries
20. Prince Mahit to King, 19 March 1898 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/8.
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were seriously over-staffed whilst others could not obtain sufficient offi­
cials; some officials received more than adequate salaries, many were seriously 
underpaid. The Ministry of Finance found that when it came to examine the 
preliminary expenditure estimates of the Ministries, it was faced with innumer­
able demands for increases in salaries and positions; to eatamine each demand 
in detail was impossible, with the result that the estimates were rejected or 
approved on almost an ad hoc basis. Inevitably, Prince Mahit admitted, some 
unjustified demands had been passed, some justified demands refused. The solu­
tion was clear: to establish a standard system whereby all officials were paid
the same salary for the same responsibilities, and where the same number of 
officials would be appointed to do the same volume and class of work in every 
department of the administration. In this way disputes over salaries and posi­
tions could be settled speedily and fairly by reference to the standard 
regulations. In effect matters concerning the appointment of additional offi­
cials to a particular department or increases in salaries would be removed 
from the preliminary examinations of the Ministry of Finance and from the 
budget discussions of the Council of Ministers. The Ministry and the Council 
would be able to devote their time to the more important expenditure estimates, 
such as those for railway construction and irrigation projects.
Prince Mahit recommended that a committee be established to determine, in 
consultation with the appropriate Ministers and heads of department, the respon­
sibilities and functions of each department in the administration, the number 
of officials required to carry out those functions, and the salaries they were 
to receive. The committee's decisions, once approved, could not be amended 
except where the responsibilities of a department changed or where an increase 
in the cost of living necessitated an increase in salaries, in which case the 
increase would be made to apply throughout the whole government service. Prince 
Mahit also suggested that whereas it had been common practice to reward an able 
official by increasing his salary, leaving him doing the same work for more 
money, in future his salary, responsibilities and grade should all be increased 
so as to maintain the standard responsibility/salary ratios. Similarly, Prince
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Mahit argued, incompetent officials should be demoted; the practice of leaving 
an inefficient official in his post but of appointing an assistant to him who 
in fact took over the burden of the position was extravagant and should be 
discontinued.
The Minister also included in his letter to the King a few general sugges­
tions concerning the Government's expenditure estimates: that expenditure
sanctioned under one head could not be transferred by the Ministries to another 
head; that the individual Ministries would not be allowed to maintain separate 
reserve funds to meet unexpected items of expenditure but rather that all such 
reserves would be held in a single account controlled by the Ministry of 
Finance^.
Prince Mahit's letter was read to the Council of Ministers on 26 March
22I89S . The Ministers were in basic agreement with his recommendations though
there were some reservations, particularly from Prince Damrong. Most of Prince
Damrong's arguments concerned alleged practical difficulties to be expected in
the implementation of Prince Mahit's recommendations, but the Minister of the
Interior did have one particularly important misgiving; he appears to have
been concerned that Prince Mahit's proposals gave too much authority to the
Ministry of Finance. In folding down Government expenditure, he argued,
'... we must not get into the position where a head of department 
would be able to say - because the Ministry of Finance is unlikely 
to allow me the necessary funds, therefore I am unable to carry 
out ray projects.' 23
Prince Damrong's remark suggests that within the Council there was still 
uneasiness over the prospect of the development of a particularly strong 
Ministry of Finance.
Prince Mahit met each of Prince Damrong's objections in turn, and in par­
ticular he impressed on the Council the real objective of his proposals :
21. Prince Mahit to King, 19 March 1898 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/8.
22. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers. 26 March 1898 
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/8.
2 3. ibid.
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’My real wish is this: to have the budget discussions completed
speedily, to have new major items of expenditure discussed, as to 
whether we should proceed with them or not, whether we can afford 
to proceed with them or not. For the fact is that we are faced 
with a situation of rapidly increasing expenditure which cannot all 
be covered by revenue: therefore there has to be discussion and
decision as to the order of priorities for expenditure. 1 2k
The Council of Ministers gave general approval to the proposals of the
Minister of Finance.
The King then followed up these discussions by asking the Financial Adviser
25Mitchell-Innes, for his views on the process by which the budget was compiled
The Adviser had a number of important recommendations to make, all of which
complemented his Minister’s earlier proposals. Mitchell-Innes suggested that
at the end of each financial year (31 March) the expenditure allocations of that
year should be annulled in order to prevent Ministries carrying over funds from
26one year to the next . Clearly the objective once again was to enable the 
Ministry of Finance to ascertain accurately the expenditure allocation available 
to each Ministry within each year. He also drew the King's attention to the 
fact that often funds allocated for one Ministry were in fact spend on behalf 
of another: for example the navy frequently lent ships to other departments,
yet the cost of maintaining the vessels was always attributed solely to the navy 
It was such inaccuracies in the estimates which made it very difficult for the 
Ministry of Finance to obtain a realistic picture of the actual allocation of 
Government expenditure. Finally the Adviser criticized the way in which the 
Council of Ministers approached their discussions on the budget. He pointed 
out that the Ministers usually began by examining and reducing the more vital
allocations instead of looking at and cutting minor items first. In addition
he advised that in future the funds for railway construction be provided from 
the accumulated surpluses of former years; in this way one of the most impor­
tant items in the budget would no longer by vulnerable to cutp by the Council
2k. ibid.
25» Mitchell-Innes to Prince Sommot, 30 Mar£h 1898 N.A. b.2kh/k2k.
26. Mitchell-Innes to King, 30 March 1898 N.A. b.2kh/k2k. According to Prince
Mahit such a regulation was already in operation. King to Rolin Jacquemyns,
30 March 1898 N.A. b.2kh/k2k.
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27of Ministers .
Meanwhile the Ministry of Finance and the Council of Ministers were
engaged in the final stages of the preparation of the budget for 1898/99? the
28completed estimates were sent to the King on 20 April 1898 and the budget
29was sanctioned three days later
In the long struggle of the Ministry of Finance to create and maintain 
efficient and effective procedures for the allocation of the Government1s ex­
penditure, the period from December 1898 until June 1899» which saw the comple­
tion of the budget for 1899/1900, was to prove crucial. At the beginning of 
this period the Ministry of Finance was faced again with what must now have 
seemed like an almost insoluble problem - the inability, or perhaps in view of 
the apparent uneasiness within the Government over Prince Mahitfs increasing 
influence, the unwillingness of the Ministries to submit their preliminary 
budget estimates to the Ministry of Finance on time. On 31 December 1898, 15 
days after the estimates were supposed to have been in, the Ministry had still 
not heard from over half the Ministries (including the Ministries of the Palace, 
Foreign Affairs, the Interior, the Capital and Public Works) and from ten 
provinces^0. The King felt that the time had come to deliver his most severe 
rebuke to the offending Ministers and officials. In a long letter to each 
Minister he pointed out that the raising and spending of the Kingdom’s revenues 
was no longer a matter which affected the King alone: it now affected every
27• Mitchell-Innes to King, 3 April 1898 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/10.
28. Prince Mahit to King, 20 April 1898 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/8.
29* King to Prince Mahit, 23 April 1898 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/8. Once again it is 
extremely unfortunate that the Archives contain no records of the budget dis­
cussions of the Council, for undoubtedly such records would provide useful 
illustrations of those problems faced by the Ministry of Finance mentioned by 
Prince Mahit in his letters to the King. Yet the evidence which is available 
does support the Minister's argument. In 1898/99 the Government had 29*13 m. 
baht at its disposal (Prince Mahit to King, 20 April 1898 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/8. This 
sum included revenue returns for the year, plus unspent funds from 1897/98). 
Since the Ministries had originally requested 29*^5 m. baht, presumably this 
meant that few expenditure cuts were necessary: in fact the expenditure esti­
mate for 1898/99 was put at 28.7 m* baht. The interesting point is that actual 
expenditure in 1898/99 was only 23*78 m. baht (R.F.A.B. 1903/O^f p. 25) which 
tends to support Prince Mahit's argument that the Ministries were asking for 
more funds than they were capable of spending.
30. Mitchell-Innes to King, 31 Decembei .^898 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/8.
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Siamese . Since the responsibilities of the administration were now much
greater than they had been in the past the failure to allocate sufficient funds
to any Ministry, or the faSLure to allocate the funds wisely, could severely
damage the effectiveness of the Government: ultimately it could even threaten
the stability and independence of the Kingdom. The King continued :
1 ... I do not want you to regard, to consider without thinking, 
these strict budget regulations as simply a ceremony or simply an 
import from the west. It is true that they come from the west, but 
we are using them because they will bring stability and certainty 
[to the Government's finances]. Do not think that we are merely 
adopting the outer forms of such procedures, just so that we can 
give the impression that all [our finances] are in order, that all 
is beautiful. These regulations must really be applied.’ 32
The King made it very clear that he never again wished to hear that the 
Ministries were late in preparing and submitting their estimates, and to empha­
size his point he instructed each Minister to inform him directly, immediately 
they had presented their expenditure requests to the Ministry of Finance. As 
was to be expected the Ministries responded quickly to the King’s reproaches,
and by mid-January 1899 the Ministry of Finance had received sufficient pre-
33liminary estimates for it to be able to begin work on the final budget .
In this task the Ministry was assisted for the first time by the presence 
of a European Controller-General, Charles James Rivett-Carnac, who had arrived 
in Bangkok in early December 1898 . In examining the preliminary estimates
as they were submitted to the Ministry Rivett-Carnac was struck, as Prince 
Mahit himself had been the previous year, by the number of requests for lavish 
increases in salaries and official positions, requests which, he argued, the 
Ministry was unable to consider in detail yet which if sanctioned would within 
a few years bring the Treasury to bankruptcy^. To meet this problem Rivett- 
Carnac took up his Minister's March 1898 proposal for the establishment of a 
committee to investigate the salary and functions of every official in the 
administration. In January 1899 the King approved Prince Mahit/Rivett-Carnac's
2*1 . King to various Ministers, 1 January 1899 N.A.Kh. 5« 1/8.
3 2. ibid.
33« Correspondence from various Ministers to King, early January 1899 
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/8.
34. Bangkok Times, 3 December 1898.
35* Memorandum, Rivett-Carnac, 28 December 1898 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/8.
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proposal and the committee was able to begin work the following month.
The Committee on Establishments, as it was called, contained three per- 
menent members: Prince ^arit (now Minister of Public Work^, M9111 Chao AlangkSn
(a senior official in the Ministry of Finance), and Rivett-Carnac; for the 
period during which a Ministry was under investigation the appropriate Minister 
was appointed an ex-officio member of the Committee. It was decided to look 
first at the Ministry of Justice: since the Ministry had a relatively effi­
cient administration it was hoped that the investigation would be straight­
forward and therefore that the Committee would get off to an impressive start 
37to its work . The Committee met on six occasions in February and March 1899 
and their extremely detailed enquiries involved them in visits not only to the 
Ministry of Justice but also to the courts and prisons under the authority of 
the Ministry. The Minister of Justice, Prince Ratburi Direkkrit, had requested 
salaries for 552 officials in his estimates for 1899/1900: the Committee re­
duced that figure to *t69i but partly because most of the positions rejected 
were those of low-grade officials, and partly because the Committee agreed to 
increase the salaries of some senior officials, the allocation for salaries 
for 1899/1900 was reduced only slightly, from 6^5 »2^0 baht to 628,82** baht^. 
Therefore the Committee did not secure an immediate, substantial reduction in 
the expenditure estimates. In fact that was not its aim. As Rivrtt-Carnac 
argued, the object was to bring effective control to bear on increases in 
salaries and positions where none had existed before, to
* ... in future prevent the indiscriminate raising of a man's pay 
without proportionate increase in his work and responsibility.' 39
The Committee achieved another objective. For the first time Prince
Mahit's wish that some of the routine expenditure estimates be removed from the
direct responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and from the budget discussions
of the Council of Ministers was put into effect.
36. King to Prince Mahit, 3 January 1899 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/8.
37* Prince Mahit to King, 13 February 1899 N.A. b.2kh. 1/35-
38. Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 12 December 1899» N.A.Kh. 7/1.
39- Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac, 28 December 1898 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/8. My emphasis.
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Unfortunately the Committee on Establishments, after a promising, ener­
getic beginning to its labours, soon lost momentum, mainly because Prince Narit 
and M(?m Chao AlangkSn were frequently absent on other business. By June 1899
0the work of the Committee was at a standstill . Only after Rivett-Carnac had
sought an audience with the King did the Committee resume its meetings, but
41even then, on the insistence of Prince Narit, it met only once a week . Four
meetings in June and July 1899 saw the Committee complete its investigations
42of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs . The investigation of the next Ministry,
the Ministry of the Interior, was almost perfunctory: it concerned only the
Ministry in Bangkok and not the provincial administration, it was attended not
by Prince Damrong, who was on an inspection tour of the provinces, but by his
43deputy, Phraya SI SahathSp, and it lasted only 95 minutes . The superfici­
ality of the examination of one of the major Ministries is most strange, and 
on the evidence available inexplicable. Finally, over the period September to
December 1899 the Committee held four meetings to examine the responsibilities
44and salaries of the officials in the Ministry of Finance itself . The Commit­
tee made a large number of amendments to the Ministry's estimates for 1899/1900, 
cutting the staff of, in particular, the Central Office (from 53 to 34) and 
the Krom Kep (43 to 25)1 but at the same time approving a lar&e increase in 
the number of officials employed in the Customs Department (564 to 620). Over­
all the number of officials allowed for in the estimates was reduced from 864 
to 862, the salary allocation increased from 562,188 baht to 581,028 baht^. 
There the investigations of the Committee came to a halt until 1901. From
43. Prince Sommot to Rivett-Carnac, 1 July 1899 N.A.Kh. 7/1.
41. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Sommot, 4 July 1899 N.A.Kh. 7/1*
42. Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 4 January 1900
N.A.Kh. 7/1.
43- Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 1 February 1900 
N.A.Kh. 7/4.
44. vFor these meetings the Committee consisted of Prince Narit, Prince Mahit, 
M^m Chao Plya Phakdl and Rivett-Carnac, all of whom worked, or had worked in 
the Ministry under investigation.
45* Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 7 March 1900
N.A.Kh. 7/5.
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December 1899 to March 1900 the Committee drew up its reports on the Ministries 
of Justice, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and Finance, submitted them to 
Prince Mahit who in turn presented them to the King. The essential point to 
note is that in presenting the reports to the King, Prince Mahit asked per­
mission to use the Committee's recommendations as to the number of officials 
and their salary allocation for each Ministry in the budget for 1899/1900, and
in all future budgets until such time as the King himself approved any amend- 
46ment . In effect, the Ministry of Finance had removed from its immediate 
concern, though not of course from its ultimate responsibility, the problems 
connected with the salary allocations of those Ministries.
At about the same time as the Committee on Establishments had begun its 
work, Prince Mahit had begun his examination and amendment of the remaining 
preliminary expenditure estimates for 1899/1900. There can be little doubt 
that the Minister found this task a considerable strain. In either February 
or Mar£h 1899 he wrote a long letter to the King detailing the problems faced 
by the Ministry of Finance in compiling accurate and realistic expenditure 
budgets, complaining of the apparent inability of the Ministries to co-operate
47fully with him in the revision and presentation of their expenditure demands 
He noted that it had been found necessary for the King to intervene forcefully 
in order to persuade the Ministries to abide by the budget regulations: the
King’s intervention implied the failure of the Ministry of Finance. In fact 
this letter, like many letters from Prince Mahit to the King in this period, 
had two almost contradictory themes. On the one hand there was unraistakeable 
despair and dejection, protestations by the Minister of his unworthiness for 
the position he held. Not for the first or last time, Prince Mahit declared 
his willingness, almost eagerness, to leave the Ministry of Finance if and when 
the King could find a replacement for him. There is no reason to doubt the 
Minister's sincerity in this letter: it underlines most forcefully how daunting
the problems facing the Ministry of Finance must have appeared to Prince Mahit, 
how demanding the responsibilities of the position he held. Yet on the other
46. Reports noted above: N.A.Kh. 7/1» 4, 5-
47. Prince fo&hit to King, undated. N.A.Kh. 1/11.
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hand, in the same letter, there was an equally unraistakeable determination that 
whilst he remained as Minister of Finance he would strive to establish and main­
tain the effectiveness of his Ministry’s budget procedures. It is clear that 
the King was influenced more by the Minister's energy and determination than 
he was by the expression of discouragement, for there is no evidence that 
^rince Mahit's resignation was seriously contemplated by the King at this time. 
The total expenditure requests of the Ministries for 1899/1900 came to
38.5 m. baht, but the Ministry was able to cut this immediately to 33-*$ m. baht.
l±%T$e estimated revenue for 1899/1900 was 30.42 m. baht . Rivett-Carnac argued 
that although the Treasury reserves - the accumulated budget surpluses of 
previous years - could easily cover the projected deficit of 3-06 m. baht, the 
Ministry should still make sufficient cuts in the estimates to produce a budget
Zf9surplus . First of all, he pointed out, it was evident that the Ministries
were finding it impossible to use the full amount of their budget allocations,
let alone the value of their preliminary expenditure requests. Second, he
argued, sooner or later Siam would have to raise a loan in Europe in order to
continue construction of the Kingdom's railway system. In raising such a loan
the Government would be required to publish its budget and a statement of its
financial position: if the budget showed a probable deficit for whatever
reason, then, argued Rivett-Carnac, the European investing public would be very
reluctant to take up the loan on any byt the most stringent terms.
Rivett-Carnac outlined in detail where he thought the cuts should be made:
50a cut of 2.57 m. baht from the army and navy estimates , a reduction of
1 .0  m. baht in the allocation for railway construction - in the hope that the 
Government would soon make the decision to continue construction by means of
48. Prince Mahit to King, 11 April 1899 N.A.Kh. 5* l/ll.
49- Memorandum upon the budget estimates for r.s. 118, Rivett-Carnac, 25 March 
1899 N.A.Kh. 5. l/ll.
50. 'The real defence of Siam', Rivett-Carnac argued, 'lies in the improvement 
of her Administration and in the rapid development of her resources, and all 
our efforts should now be entirely devoted to those objects: when those objects
have been attained, and no sooner, we can afford to expend more money in secu­
ring the increased efficiency and mobility of our Array and Navy.' Memorandum 
25 March 1899 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/Ll-
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a loan - and a number of smaller cuts in various minor public works programmes. 
In addition a small immediate saving was to be secured as a result of the King's 
decision to accept an annual fixed allocation of 6.0 m. baht for the Privy 
Purse and the Ministry of the Palace, instead of the 15 per cent of Government 
revenue which had been the case since 1890. According to Rivett-Carnac these 
reductions would give a total expenditure estimate of 29*52 ta. baht, a slight 
budget surplus of O .89 m. baht.
Prince Mahit accepted the proposed cuts put forward by Rivett-Carnac, 
though he recognized that inevitably some departments could object to thenr^.
But as the Minister argued to the King, if the Ministries wished to have their 
estimates discussed more thoroughly and fairly, they would have to learn to
submit them on time. The complete estimates for 1899/1900 were discussed by
52the Council of Ministers in late April and early May 1899 • the Ministers
slightly amended the estimates as prepared by Rivett-Carnac and Prince Mahit,
bringing the estimate for total expenditure up to 30.11 m. baht^. The budget
5 ifwas sanctioned by the King on 5 June
The Ministry of Finance completed its work on the 1899/1900 budget in a 
reasonably optimistic mood. In the first place Rivett-Carnac, now Financial 
Adviser, in a memorandum which in form fore-shadowed the Report of the Financial 
Adviser on the Budget which were to be published from 1901/02, drew an en­
couraging picture of the Kingdom's financial position‘d. First, the Government 
had very substantial cash reserves, more than 23•6 m. baht in Bangkok and
51. Prince Mahit to King, 11 April 1899 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/Ll*
52. Again, regrettably no record of the discussions could be found in the
National Archive.
53. Prince Mahit to King, 15 May 1899 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/11.
5*f. King to Prince Mahit, 5 June 1899 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/11.
55- Memorandum. Financial Position of the Kingdom, 25 March 1899 Rivett-Carnac.
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/11. It would appear that this memorandum was originally intended
for publication. According to Greville, the British Minister, the King was
reluctant to publish the budget (with the Adviser's Report) because he disliked 
advertising the fact that the Government obtained a sizeable proportion of its 
revenue from opium, liquor and gambling, and also because he feared that once 
the French were aware of the read extent of the Kingdom's recent progress, 
they would increase their pressure on the Eastern provinces. (Greville to 
Bertie, 28 September l899i Private P.R.O. F.O. 69/197)-
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Singapore alone. From an administrative point of view, such large reserves 
«ere perhaps unsatisfactory, for their existence suggested once again the 
failure of the Ministries to use all their budget allocations and hence under­
lined the defects of the budget procedures. But financially it was a 
considerable achievement, particularly once it was recognized that at the same
time as the Government had been building up these reserves, Government expendi-
56ture itself had been increasing at a quite outstanding rate . Rivett-Carnac 
pointed out that over the period 1891/92 - 1898/99 the Government had spent 
entirely out of current revenue 14.41 m. baht on railway construction alone.
But in mid-l899 there were a number of other encouraging signs for the 
Ministry. The Committee on Establishments had at last begun work, though as 
noted above, it was soon to lose some of its early enthusiasm. More important]] 
there were indications that the Ministry of Finance had almost achieved its 
major objective - the establishment of a system of relatively efficient and 
effective budget procedures. The King's outburst in January 1899 had, it was 
hoped, at last convinced the Ministers of the importance of submitting their 
preliminary expenditure estimates to the Ministry of Finance on time. In addi­
tion, despite Prince Mahit's pessimism, it does appear that the Ministries were 
beginning to co-operate more freely with the Ministry of Finance in amending 
and revising their estimates, and that the Council of Ministers in their budget 
discussions were concerning themselves much more with the major expenditure 
items. The principal evidence for this is that there were no longer any seriou
complaints from Prince Mahit to the King about a lack of co-operation from the
57Ministries over the budget . There is also some small numerical evidence of 
improvement: whereas in 1898/99 the Ministries had been unable to spend
5.0 m. baht of the funds allocated to them, in 1899/1900 this was reduced to
s83.0 m. baht . This suggests that the Government was now capable of producing
56. Government expenditure rose from 14.91 m. baht in 1892/93 to 23-78 m. baht 
in 1898/99 R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 24-25-
57. It must be admitted that with no records in the Archives of the meetings 
at the Ministry of Finance at which the preliminary estimates were discussed 
and amended in consultation with the Ministry involved, evidence on this point 
is somewhat slight.
58. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 25.
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a more accurate set of final expenditure estimates. But the evidence is sparse. 
It would perhaps be nearer the truth to suggest that by 1899 there were indica­
tions that even if the Ministries were not yet willingly accepting the strong 
influence of the Ministry of Finance over their budget allocations, the force 
with which Prince Mahit, supported by the King, was emphasizing the Ministry's 
authority and responsibility in the compilation of the budget, was at least 
beginning to make itself felt.
There was a further important aspect of the Ministry's attempts to improve 
the efficiency of its budgetary procedures - the development of a more effective 
and comprehensive system of audit and account. Clearly there was little bene­
fit to be gained if the Ministry of Finance, having persuaded the Ministries to 
co-operate in compiling accurate ahd realistic expenditure estimates, were then 
to impose no check on their actual expenditure. As Rivett-Carnac was engaged 
from India to be Controller-General (even though within two months of his 
arrival in December 1898 he had been appointed Financial Adviser) it was one 
of his major responsibilities to reform the administration's audit and accoun­
ting methods. From 1899 the Ministry produced, quite literally, scores of 
regulations covering every conceivable financial transaction within the bureau­
cracy - regulations governing the compilation and presentation of accounts, 
regulations outlining the conditions upon which officials could draw salaries, 
sick leave rules, regulations governing the transfer of funds from one budget
item to another, regulations governing the disbursement and accounting of
59travelling expenses . In almost every case the regulations were based on 
similar regulations then in use in the British administration in India: indeed
their introduction in Siam represented a determined attempt by the Ministry of 
Finance to impose western concepts of financial accountability into the Siamese 
bureaucracy. It is impossible to gauge with any degree of accuracy the effec­
tiveness of the regulations^0, yet there are some indications that they achieved 
at least some small degree of success. In the first place the Ministry of
59- A large number of these regulations are filed under Kh. 2 and F.F.A. 29- 
Each set of regulations was printed in book-form and distributed to the appro­
priate parts of the administration.
60. The evidence does not exist to make a detailed examination of this aspect 
of the Ministrv's work nossible.
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Finance constantly impressed on the Ministries their obligation to account for
61all their expenditure and sources of funds . Second, Rivett-Carnac made
occasional references to an improvement in the Government's audit and accoun- 
62ting methods . Lastly, it is possible that the fact that from the late 1890s 
the Ministries were spending a higher proportion of their allocations was due 
as much to the Ministries' realization that they would be liable to audit by 
the Ministry of Finance as to the administration's ability to compile accurate
and realistic expenditure estimates in the first place. The dearth of evidence
63on this very important aspect of the Ministry's work is unfortunate ,
The budget for the following year, 1900/01, was prepared without ^ny
serious complications. Indeed it would appear that the Ministry of Finance
found sufficient time to examine the estimates in more detail than had ever
64before been the case , and still have the budget sanctioned by the King by 
1 April^. It was the first time that the budget had been completed for the 
beginning of the Siamese year.
The improvement was maintained in 1901/02. For that year, for the first 
time, Prince Mahit's budget memoranda and correspondence were mainly concerned, 
indeed almost exclusively concerned, with the problems of the allocation of 
the Government's revenue resources - with the examinations and discussions as 
to which budget items should be cut or deferred. There was a strong contrast 
with the situation in the late 1890s when the Ministry's work had been dominated
61. For example, in the reports on the budget discussions for 1901/02 (N.A.Kh. 
5. 1/14) it is noticeable that Mr. Florio, the head of the Accounts Department 
of the Ministry, invariably called upon Ministers to account for particular 
items of expenditure in their budget for the previous year.
62. R.F.A.B. 1901/02 p. 18.
63- The effectiveness of the Ministry of Finance's audit procedures in this 
period is further considered in Chapter VIII, pp. 3*8
6k. Prince Mahit to King, 21 March 1900 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/11.
65» King to Prince Mahit, 1 April 1900 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/11. It is interesting to 
note that actual Government expenditure in 1900/01 was 31-8*+ m. baht (R.F.A.B. 
1903/04 p. 25) compared with the estimate of 32.66 m. baht (Prince Mahit to 
King, 30 March 1900 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/11)» a difference of O .82 m. baht. This com­
pares with the figures for unspent funds of 5-0 m. baht in 1898/99 and 3»0 m. 
baht in 1899/1900. Once again this suggests that the administration was now 
capable of producing more accurate and realistic estimates, and that the 
Ministry's accounting reforms were having some effect.
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by the problems of budget procedures - the problems of persuading the Ministries
66and departments to abide by the Government’s budget regulations
Perhaps the most significant feature of the budget discussions which took
place in March 1901 was that, at least on the evidence available, there were
very few serious disputes between the Ministry of Finance and the various
Ministries and departments of the administration over where the amendments in
the preliminary estimates should be made, and this despite the fact that in
order to secure a budget surplus, a cut of 13-0 m. baht had to be made in the
6*7Ministries' original expenditure demands . The virtual absence of serious
68disagreement can be explained by a number of possible factors . First, though
the Ministry of Finance proposed very large cuts in some estimates - a request
from the Ministry of Public Works for 5*24 m. baht for railway construction
was reduced to 2.0 m. baht - in fact both Prince Mahit and Rivett-Carnac were
willing to discuss any item thoroughly and to accede to any budget request if
69the Minister's case was strong enough and foreefully put . Second, it was 
common practice for the Ministry, whilst opposing a particular item in the 
estimates, to add the qualification that if during the year the appropriate 
Ministry should find itself with unspent funds, then after applying to the 
Ministry of Finance for permission those funds could be transferred to the 
rejected item.
Third, Prince Mahit and Rivett-Carnac refused to discuss requests for 
increases in salaries or increases in staff: in the event of such requests
being made, the Minister was simply referred to the recommendations of the
66. 1901/02 was also the first year for which the Archives contain records of
the discussions between the Ministry of Finance and the other Ministries over 
the preliminary expenditure estimates. Therefore some allowance has to be made 
for the fact that to some extent the changing nature of the Ministry's problems
concerning the budget may simply reflect the appearance of this additional form
of research material. However, the basic point - that after 1900-1901 the 
Ministry was much less concerned with problems of budget procedures - still 
stands.
67* Report on discussion of budget estimates of Ministry of War, 26 March 1901 
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/14.
68. The following points are taken from the reports of the budget discussions
held in March-April 1901 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/14.
69- For example, the Ministry accepted most of the navy's budget requests after 
the head of the navy had put up considerable opposition to some proposed cuts.
Committee on Establishments. Yet at the same time Prince Mahit left the 
Ministers a way out. Under the terms upon which the Committee had been set up 
the Ministers were allowed to apply to the King at any time for a revision of
ftthe Committee s recommendations: that option remained open. But in addition,
in April 1900 the Ministry of Finance had been given permission by the King to
decide any minor requests for revision itself, without reference to the 
70throne . As a result, when during the budget discussions in March 1901 a
Minister was particularly intractable over a specific salary or staff item
which the Ministry of Finance was reluctant to approve and still more reluctant
71to discuss at length , the Minister was asked to accept the Ministry1s recom­
mendation for the time being, and then to submit another request at a later 
date: in effect the Ministry of Finance gave an undertaking to reconsider the
issue once the work on the budget was completed.
However, the Committee on Establishments remained the corner-stone of the 
Ministry’s procedures for dealing with requests for increases in staff and 
salaries. It was therefore significant that the Committee recommenced its
investigations in February 1901. The General Adviser's Department was examined
72 73on 28 February 1901 , the Ministry of Public Works the following month ,
7k 75the navy in September 1901 , and the army in December , the Committee appro­
ving large increases in salaries and men for the last two departments. In 
1902 the Committee once again came to a standstill, and once again the princi­
pal cause was the frequent absences of Prince Narit. The chairman argued that
93
70. Memorandum. The Baap-Pleeang-Plaang, or Proposition Statement for the 
Revision of Existing Establishments. Rivett-Carnac 11 April 1901 N.A.Kh. 5-1/13*
71. For example, the Ministry of Justice strongly opposed the proposal of the 
Ministry of Finance to cut its requests for increases in funds to finance the 
appointment of more judges.
72. Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 5 April 1901
N.A.Kh. 7/7.
73• Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 26 August 1901
N.A.Kh. 7/7.
74. Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 5 December 1901
N.A.Kh. 7/7.
75« Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 15 March 1902
N.A.Kh. 7/7.
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his duties as Minister of Public Works left him with little time for the 
76Committee , though Prince Mahit suspected that Prince Narit's lack of enthu­
siasm reflected his anger with the high budget allocations demanded by the
77next Ministry to be investigated - the Ministry of Agriculture . In December
1902, after Rivett-Carnac had threatened to resign from the Committee unless
78 VPrince Narit were replaced , Prince Chan-ftaburl, the Controller-General, was 
79appointed chairman . The Committee limped on for several years, finally 
concluding its work in January 1905 with an investigation of the Ministry of 
War80.
The Committee on Establishments could hardly have fulfilled the hopes
placed in it by Prince Mahit and Rivett-Carnac on its inauguration in l899i
though in the absence of detailed records it is difficult if not impossible to
8lgauge its achievements and failures with any real accuracy . Only on one 
point can it be said that the Committee's success was clear: it enabled the
Ministry of Finance to prevent the budget discussions from being swamped by 
innumerable requests for increases in staff and salaries - it brought stabilit; 
to that area of the budget. The importance of that achievement is first evi­
dent in the records of the discussions over the 1901/02 budget.
The fourth possible reason why there were few serious disputes between 
the Ministry of Finance and the Ministries during the 1901/02 budget discus­
sions is that the Ministry reduced some of its own preliminary estimates: 
there could be no grounds on this occasion for the complaint that the Ministry 
was using its privileged position to protect its own budget. Finally, it has
76. Prince Narit to Rivett-Carnac, 3 September 1902 N.A.Kh. 7/9-
77- Prince Mahit to King, 10 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 7/9 •
78. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Sommot, 9 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 7/9-
79- King to Prince Mahit, 17 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 7/9*
80. Report of Committee: attached to Prince Mahit to King, 16 March 1905
N.A.Kh. 7/9.
81. For example, there is no detailed information available on the recommenda 
tions of the Committee, only accounts of the overall changes recommended for 
each department. Neither is there any detailed evidence on the subsequent 
requests of the Ministries to have the recommendations of the Committee 
revised.
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to be remembered that the discussions did not represent the final word on the 
budget. The completed budget still had to be approved by the Council of 
Ministers, and it was usual for some small amendments to be made to the expen­
diture estimates at that stage. Then it had to be sanctioned by the King. In 
other words there was still an opportunity - provided by the Government's
budget procedures - for the Ministers to appeal against the earlier judgement
32of the Ministry of Finance
O7
The 1901/02 budget was submitted to the King on 19 April 1901 , and
84sanctioned on 27th April
In 1901, as always, the Ministry attempted to estimate for a small revenue 
surplus but at the last moment its calculations were upset by news that the 
arbitrator appointed to settle a dispute between the Government and the original 
contractor for the Bangkok-Korat railway, Murray Campbell, had decided against 
the Siamese Government and had awarded the contractor compensation of £161,000
Qr
or 2.8 m. baht . As a result, for the first time the budget provided for a
revenue deficit - of 2.5 m. baht - the deficit being covered from the Treasury
reserve. A projected deficit at that point was particularly unfortunate since
in 1901/02 the Government had decided to introduce an important innovation -
the publication of the budget estimates, coupled with a report by the Financial
Adviser. Since one of the major objectives of publication was to bring to the
notice of Europe the recent financial and administrative progress of Siam as
a prelude to the raising of a European loan the deficit was an unhappy, though
by no means disastrous, accident.
Rivett-Carnac presented his report to Prince Mahit for publication on 18 
86April 1901 . The actual content of the report calls for little comment since
82. The effectiveness of the budget procedures of the Ministry of Finance in 
this period - the extent to which the Ministry was successful in controlling 
the actual expenditures of the Ministries, is further considered in Chapter VIII
pp. 3 1 33t+.
83. Prince Mahit to King, 19 April 1901 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/14.
84. King to Prince Mahit, 27 April 1901 N.A.Kh. 5» 1/14.
85. R.F.A.B. 1901/02 p. 2 .
86. R.F.A.B. 1901/02 p. 1.
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the Financial Adviser restricted himself largely to a detailed, somewhat dry
description and analysis of each principal head of revenue and expenditure.
Only occasionally did Rivett-Carnac introduce a more personal note - for example
when he called once again for the Kingdom's railways to be constructed by means 
87of a European loan . And as was to be expected, his conclusion was suitably 
laudatory :
1 ... the Government is in a remarkably strong financial position.
The Revenues are showing themselves to be elastic and they are being 
rapidly got under better control. The expenditure, also, is being 
more and more devoted to improvements in the Administration of the 
Government with a view to the safety, convenience, and happiness of 
the people, while the audit and control of the disbursements by the 
Financial Department is becoming r6al and effective. 1 88
The Report of the Financial Adviser on the Budget was primarily an exercis*
in public relations, directed principally towards the Eiropeans both in Bangkok
and in Europe itself. It is significant that copies of the report were sent
,89to the foreign representatives in Bangkok, to all the Siamese missions abroad
90and to Dr. Morrison, the Far East correspondent of the Times . In September
1901 the Times published a long and by and large favourable report on the
91recent progress of Siam
There is little need to consider in detail the preparation of the budget 
for 1902/03 for the relative ease with which the estimates were compiled merely 
confirms the comparative stability and effectiveness of the budget procedures 
attained in the previous two or three years. Similarly Rivett-Carnac's second 
budget report, though it contains little of especial note, does, by its detaile 
analysis of every revenue and expenditure head, project an air of confidence 
in the relative effectiveness of the Ministry's control otfer the finances of 
the Government, a confidence which contrasts strongly with the fragility
87. R.F.A.B. 1901/02 p. 16 .
88. ibid p. 1 8 .
89. Memorandum: The publication of the budget. Rivett-Carnac. undated 
N.A.Kh. 5- 1/1^.
90. Memorandum: Communication of Financial Statement to Dr. Morrison, the 
Times correspondent. Rivett-Carnac, 18 April 1901 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
91. The Times 7 September 1901.
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of the Ministry in budgetary matters in the middle and late 1890s. However, 
this view must be balanced by a further consideration. Though between 1896 
and 1902 there occurred a considerable strengthening of the budget, accounts 
and audit procedures of the Ministry of Finance, great care must be taken not 
to exaggerate the actual effectiveness of the Ministry’s control over the 
finances of the administration by the end of this period. In 1902, and even 
in 1910, some aspects of the Ministry's financial control remained weak, 
occasionally very weak. This is a complex consideration, involving as it 
does not only the actual budget, accounts and audit work of the Ministry of 
Finance but also the Ministry's responsibilities - and in some cases absenee 
of responsibility - for other areas of the Government's financial administratio 
A more balanced assessment of the development of the financial control of the 
Ministry of Finance in these years must therefore be held over until the con­
cluding chapter.
•^f the actual preparation of the 1902/03 budget calls for little comment,
its content was of considerable significance. In its budget discussions with
the Ministries that year, the Ministry of Finance found some difficulty in
92reducing the expenditure estimates so as to secure a revenue surplus . Indeed 
it was found necessary to meet a 3-5 baht allocation for railway constructio
by drawing 1.5 m. baht from the Treasury reserves, the remaining 2.0 m. baht
93being covered by current revenue . Thus for the first time the Ministry of 
Finance used the reserves built up in the late 1890s to avoid a budget deficit 
This was the first clear indication of what was to prove to be the Ministry's 
major budgetary problem after 1902: in future, with the rate of increase in
Government revenue slowing down, yet legitimate requests for larger expenditure 
allocations increasing at an unprecedented rate, the administration had to 
decide its fundamental order of priorities for the allocation of its scarce
92. Prince Mahit to King, 10 April 1902 N.A.Kh. 5» 1/15-
93. R.F.A.B. 1902/03 p- 1* In fact the 1.5 m. baht was taken from a special 
reserve fund for public works projects,a fund formed from a revenue surplus in 
1900/0 1.
94. This is leaving out of account 1901/02 when the reserves were used to pay 
compensation to Murray Campbell.
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revenue resources. It was a decision which, as the 1900s progressed, became 
increasingly hard to make.
2. The Ministry of Finance and the Government's revenue collections : the
establishment of the Bangkok Revenue Department and the Provincial Revenue
Department, 1898 - 1899»
One of the most noticeable features of the work of the Ministry of Finance
iii compiling the budgets between 1896 and 1902 was that the Ministry concerned
itself almost exclusively with the expenditure side of the Government's accounts.
Revenue considerations were of course not ignored in this period. For example
Prince Mahit had his share of difficulties with the major tax farms, principally
95the spirit monopoly . In addition, ;as has already been noted, numerous finan­
cial regulations were issued in this period to govern the flow of revenue from
96the various parts of the Kingdom into the Treasury in Bangkok . Yet it is 
significant that in all his budget correspondence with the King between 1896 
and 1902, Prince Mahit invariably took the figure for estimated revenue for 
the particular year involved as given and gave all his attention to the diffi­
culties attendant on the compilation and presentation of accurate expenditure 
estimates. Such apparent prejudice against the revenue aspects of its work
ran counter to the provisions of the I89O Act establishing the Ministry of 
97Finance , yet it was a prejudice that was apparent not only in connection with 
the Ministry's budgetary work but could also be seen in a policy developed in 
the late 1890s, principally by Prince Mahit, to divest the Ministry of Finance 
of the responsibility for actually collecting the Kingdom's revenue.
This policy was developed over a number of stages. First, in 1896, the 
Government introduced a distinction between the administration of financial 
and the administration of fiscal matters in the provinces - or at least in
95. In 1900 the Bangkok spirit farmer ran into severe financial difficulties 
and the Ministry of Finance was forced to re-auction the contract the following 
year. Prince Mahit to King, 13 July 1900/2^ February 1901 N.A.Kh. 1^ -. lkh/20.
96. See pp. Ho-
97- The first clause of the 1890 Act stated that the Ministry was to be respon­
sible for, among other things, 'collecting the taxes throughout the whole 
Kingdom'.
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those areas of the Kingdom where the thSsaphibUn system was in force . In the 
early 1890s it was inevitable that as Prince Damrong pushed ahead with the 
creation of an effective system of provincial administration, the relatively 
weak Ministry of Finance had been unable to exert much influence outside the 
capital. For example, it was common practice for the superintendent commis­
sioners (khgluang th5s5.phib5.n) to spend funds first and then request the 
approval of the Ministry of Finance afterwards. The measures taken in 1896 
were designed to halt such practices and to improve the control of the Ministry 
of Finance over provincial expenditure: this was achwed by moving the finan­
cial commissioners (the khSluang khlang) from the Ministry of the Interior to 
the Ministry of Finance. From 1896 the khaluang th5sgiphib5n had to go for their 
funds to the khaluang khlang, the representatives of the Ministry of Finance.
At the same time the Ministry of the Interior assumed responsibility for fiscal 
matters in the provinces. Since the superintendent commissioners had in fact 
already begun to take over the collection of taxes from the local nobility and 
from the tax farmers, this did little more than confirm an existing arrangement. 
The second stage in the development of this policy occurred in July 1898
when W. A. Graham, who held the post of adviser to the accounts department in
99the Ministry of the Capital , wrote to Prince Mahit on the question of the
100collection of taxes in Bangkok Province . Graham pointed out that during the 
few months in which he had been employed in the Ministry of the Capital the 
Ministry had taken over the collection of a number of those taxes'^-, and he 
expected that before long all revenue raised in the Province would be collected
98. Tej Bunnag The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915 D.Phil. 
thesis, Oxford 1968 pp. 187-139*
99- Prince Mahit to King, 21 July 1§98 N.A.Kh. 14. 2/3. W. A. Graham, an 
Englishman, held a number of positions in the Siamese service in this period, 
including in the 1900s the post of Siamese Adviser to the State of Kelantan.
He was also the author of perhaps the best contemporary reference book on the 
Kingdom, Siam: A Handbook of Practical, Commercial and Political Information,
first published in 19 12.
100. Memorandum: Remarks on the Khana. W. A. Graham, July 1898 N.A.Kh. 14. 2/3.
101. Graham specifically referred to the Ministry of the Capital assuming res­
ponsibility for the collection of fishery taxes in Bangkok Province: in fact 
in that same month, July 1898, it was intended to transfer responsibility for 
the collection of several garden and orchard taxes in the Province to the 
Ministry of the Capital. Prince Mahit to King, 21 July 1898 N.A.Kh. 14. 2/3.
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by the Ministry, with the exception of the revenue from the tax farms which as 
always would remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance. The diffi­
culty was that the Ministry of the Capital had no separate division of officials 
concerned solely with tax collections: as a result the collections were in­
efficient - no checks were imposed on the officials actually engaged in 
collecting the taxes, little or no planning went into the organization of the 
tax collections themselves. Therefore Graham suggested a revenue office should 
be established in the Ministry of the Capital, responsible for the collection 
of taxes in Bangkok Province - that is those taxes already collected by officials 
from the Ministry, or those to be transferred to the Ministry in the future.
He ventured to suggest that he be made head of the new department.
i 102Graham's proposal was welcomed by the King and Prince Mahit . The
103Krom Sanph£k$n Nai, or Bangkok Revenue Department , began work on 1 November
1898, and by the following year it was able to undertake the collection of
104some eight different land taxes . At the same time Graham instituted much 
stricter methods of tax assessment, tax collection and audit: attempts were
made to have tax arrears paid off and steps were taken to ensure that local 
officials, principally village headmen, by whom the taxes were actually collec­
ted, were paid adequate salaries or allowed adequate commission. If Graham's 
annual reports are believed most of these measures achieved some success.
The establishment of the Bangkok Revenue Department - concerned primarily 
with the collection of taxes on the land - within the Ministry of the Capital 
inevitably prompted a scheme for the creation of a similar department for the 
provinces. By 1899 the situation with regard to the collection of land taxes 
in the provinces was extremely confusing. According to the 1896 decision con­
firming the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior for fiscal matters
102. Prince Mahit to King, 21 July 1898/King to Prince Mahit, 29 July 1^98 
N.A.Kh. 14. 2/3- However, the King made it clear that the appointment of Graham 
as head of the department was to be regarded as a temporary measure to last ] 
until a Siamese official could be trained for the post.
103. Krom Sanphak^n Nai translates literally as 'Inner Revenue Department' but 
'Bangkok Revenue Department' would be the more accurate, explicit title as long 
as it is remembered that 'Bangkok' refers to the Province, not just the City.
104. Second Annual Report of the Bangkok Revenue Department r.s. 118 N . A . K h .
14. 1/3.
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in the provinces, logically the taxes should have been entrusted to Prince 
Damrong's officials. However, it appears that the collection of land taxes
105in the provinces - or at least the most important of those taxes, the khanSt -
remained the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, for in 1897 Pfeince
Mahit's Ministry had taken over the principal functions of the Ministry of
Agriculture, now the Department of Agriculture within the Ministry of Finance0 .^
However, the Ministry did not^  or perhaps could notake its responsibility for
the collection of the khan5 very seriously: the methods of land registration
and assessment, the system of tax collection remained as grossly inefficient
107as apparently they had been under the old Ministry of Agriculture . In 
March 1899 Rivett-Carnac proposed to Prince Mahit that the Ministry's respon­
sibility for the administration of the land in the provinces - which involved 
not only the taxation of land but also its assessment and registration - be 
transferred to the Ministry of the Interior: he argued that the administration
of the land could be carried out more efficiently and effectively by officials 
in Prince Damrong's Ministry for those officials, from Prince Damrong himself
down, had a far greater knowledge of conditions in the provinces than any
103official attached to a more exclusively Bangkok-based Ministry
109Prince Mahit supported the Adviser1s proposals , but Prince Damrong was
less enthusiastic: it was clear that if the Ministry of the Interior was to be
responsible for both the administration of the land in the provinces and the
collection of land revenues, and if, unlike the Ministry of Finance, it was to
take those responsibilities seriously, then it would involve the provincial
bureaucracy in a considerable increase in work^^. The matter was discussed
111between Prince Mahit, Prince Damrong and Rivett-Carnac in late July 1899 *
105. Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac, 18 March 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/2.
106. Prince Mahit to King, 50 March 1897 N.A.K.S. 1/5-
107. Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac, 18 March 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/2.
108. ibid.
109. Prince Mahit to King, 29 June 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/2.
110. Prince Damrong to King, 18 July 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/2.
111. Prince Mahit to King, 28 July 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/2.
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and eventually a compromise was reached. The Ministry of Agriculture was re­
x' 112established with Chao Phraya ThSwStwongwiwat as Minister . The Ministry was
to be responsible for the settlement of land throughout the Kingdom, but res­
ponsibility for the collection of land taxes in the provinces was to be
entrusted to the Ministry of the Interior until such time as the Ministry
113of Agriculture felt able to take over that function . Therefore in late 
1899 the Krom SanphSk^n N^k, the Provincial Revenue Department, was established 
within the Ministry of the Interior.
In 1900 the responsibilities of the Bangkok and Provincial Revenue Depart­
ments were extended to cover the administration of the collection of the Chinese 
114poll tax , though their parent Ministries appear to have been responsible for 
the tax since at least the mid-l890s. In the 1900s increasing numbers of taxes 
were collected by both departments, in most cases taxes not connected with the 
land at all - capitation taxes, gambling fees, pawnbroker licences, fees to 
slaughter pigs^^.
Therefore by the early years of the century the Ministry of Finance had 
absolved itself of responsibility for the actual collection of taxes within 
the Kingdom: in fact as early as 1897 the tax collecting divisions of the
Ministry, the Krom Suai, Krom Sanphasl, Krom SanphSk^n, were being broken up"^^.
112. King to Prince Mahit, 2 September 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/2.
113. Prince Damrong to King, 9 September 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/4.
114. Prince Damrong to King, 4 May 1900 N.A.Kh. 13. 1/6.
115. Accounts of the Provincial Revenue Department r.s. 121-133 (190^03-1914/15) 
F.F.A. 5/1: Report of the Bangkok Revenue Department r.s. 126 (1907/08) N.A.Kh.
14. 1/7: Prince Damrong Ru'ang tamnSn kSnloekb^nbia lae loek huai (The Abolition
of Gambling Dens and the Huai Lottery) Bangkok 19&0 p. *48.
The total amount of revenue collected by the Provincial Revenue Department 
rose from 8.113 m. baht in 1902/03 to 18.559 m. baht in 1910/11 (Accounts of 
the Department r.s. 121-133)- In this last year the Department was collecting 
about 30# of the total revenue raised by the Government. The Bangkok Revenue 
Department collected less - 0.702 m. baht in 1899/1900 (Report of the Department 
r.s. 126) rising to 2.641 m. baht in 1908/09 (Chao PhrayS. YoramarSt to King,
1 December 1909 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/7).
116. Prince Mahit to King, 30 March 1897 N.A.K.S. 1/3- After 1900 the only 
revenue collecting agency within the Ministry was the Customs Department, of 
course collecting taxes outside the Kingdom - on foreign trade - though from 
1898 it was also responsible for the collection of inland transit duties around 
Bangkok, a responsibility which previously had been entrusted to the Krom 
SanphSsi. Indeed, in the late 1890s the Krom SanphSsi was absorbed into the 
Customs Department (PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon TamnSn SunlakSk^n (History of the 
Customs Department) Bangkok 1939» pp- *+6-J+8T!
The establishment of the ^angkok and Provincial Revenue Departments in 1898 
and 1899 simply confirmed that, at least in the immediate future, the Ministry 
of Finance would not be responsible for the administration of tax collections.
As far as the flow of revenue was concerned, the Ministry's principal res­
ponsibilities were to ensure, by the development of an effective system of 
accounts and audit, that all the tax receipts from taxes collected by officials 
in other Ministries were remitted in full to the Treasury, and to administer
Ithe Kingdom s tax farms.
There were basically two factors behind this development. First it is 
clear that Prince Mahit almost from the moment he was appointed Minister of 
Finance wished to absolve his Ministry of responsibility for the actual collec-
Ition of the Kingdom s tax revenue: his enthusiastic advocacy of the establish­
ment of the new regenue departments is well documented. And it is not difficult 
to follow the Minister’s probable thinking behind this policy. In the late 
1890s the Ministry of Finance was struggling with the problems of controlling 
the expenditure budgets of the administration: Prince Mahit did not want his
Ministry's effectiveness in that respect hampered by additional major responsi­
bilities, responsibilities which in any case it would have found difficult to 
fulfill.
This leads to the second and more fundamental factor. From its establish­
ment in 1892 the Ministry of the Interior under Prince Damrong had been growing 
in effectiveness and influence: as a part of that process the Ministry had
taken over some of the provincial responsibilities - for justice, education, 
forestry - of the Bangkok-based Ministries. The confirmation of the responsi­
bility of the Ministry of the Interior for fiscal matters in the provinces in 
1896, and the establishment of the Provincial Revenue Department in 18991 were 
merely another aspect of that process. In fact it is possible to see these 
developments as in the tradition of the pre-reform administration - a powerful 
Ministry attracting to itself increasing numbers of functions originally attri­
buted to other parts of the administration, and in so doing blurring the 
functional differentiation of the Government structure. Indeed the emergence
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of a dominating Ministry of the Interior, embracing territorial and functional, 
responsibilities was to cause considerable problems for the Ministry of Finance 
in the later 1900s when the principal tax farms were abolished and the collec­
tion of those taxes passed to direct Government control.
There was a further, more general factor behind the bias of the Ministry 
of Finance in this period towards the expenditure side of the Government's 
finances. Briefly, the Ministry had to accept the Kingdom's tax structure as 
given, for the rates of tax levied in Siam were effectively frozen by the com­
mercial treaties signed with the powers from the 1850s. There was very little 
room for re-negotiation of the tax rates and as a result the Government was 
able to increase the amount of revenue raised in the Kingdom only by working 
the existing tax structure more thoroughly and efficiently. Because it already 
had officials in the field, that was essentially a task for the Ministry of 
the Interior, and to a much lesser extent the Ministry of the Capital.
From the late 1890s the Bangkok and Provincial Revenue Departments, under
the Ministries of the Capital and the Interior, carried through a number of
major reforms in the Kingdom's fiscal administration. Strictly speaking these
subsequent developments lie outside the scope of this present study where the
117primary concern is with the work of just the Ministry of Finance . On the 
other hand the actual establishment of the two revenue departments outside the 
Ministry of Finance in 1898 and 1899 had a considerable influence on the deve­
lopment of the Ministry in the 1900s and consequently is of substantial interest 
in the present context: having virtually no direct control over the actual
collection of the Government's internal tax income (at least until 1915) 
inevitably weakened the control of the Ministry of Finance over the expendi­
ture of the administration - over the distribution of the Kingdom's tax income - 
and weakened the authority of the Ministry within the Government as a whole. 
Again this is a complex point on which a balanced assessment must wait until 
the concluding chapter.
117- There are a number of references to the work of the Provincial Revenue 
Department between 1899 and 1915 in Tej Bunnag's The Provincial Administration 
of Siam from 1892 to 1915 D.Phil.thesis, Oxford 19(28, especially pp. 153-154/ 
219-221.
3. The Financial Advisers t Mitchell-Innes and Rivett-Carnac.
Some brief references have been made in the earlier sections of this 
chapter to the activities of Mitchell-Innes and Rivett-Carnac between 1896 and 
1902. Their work and influence in Siam in this period must now be considered 
in more detail.
Mitchell-Innes was Financial Adviser from June 1896 to January 1899- 
During that period he was involved in work on the budget, on the signing of a 
^and Tax Agreement with Britain and a reduction in the number of inland transit
ll8
duties, and on a proposal to raise a loan in4Europe . Even so his influence 
on the Ministry of Finance and on the Siamese Government as a whole was in 
fact quite limited. First, he had very little opportunity to be influential 
within the Ministry. Since Mitchell-Innes was the first European Financial 
Adviser to be appointed he could rely on neither tradition nor precedent to 
give his position authority and substance: neither was he assisted by the
fact that within a year of his arrival in Siam Prince Mahit left on an extended 
tour of Birope, leaving Prince Narit as the apathetic acting Minister of 
Finance. But having said that, there can be little doubt that the major 
obstacle to the evolution of the influence and authority of Mitchell-Innes as 
Financial Adtiser lay in the personality and character of the man himself. He 
was strangely unsuited to the position he held. At best it could be said that 
he had a distressing ignorance of the social and cultural attitudes and con­
ventions of the Siamese - at worst he displayed, to Siamese eyes, an almost 
unbelievable arrogance.
Within two months of his arrival in Bangkok, Mitchell-Innes had undertaken 
a detailed examination of the fiscal and financial administration of the Kingdom,
even going to the trouble of making an inspection tour of the inner provinces.
119In September 1896 he submitted two reports on his findings to Prince Mahit 
Both reports consisted of almost unrelieved criticism: most importantly,
II8 . The Land T^x Agreement and the proposal, to raise a loan will be considered 
in Chapter IV.
119- Report on the Financial System of Siam, Mitchell-Innes, 6 September 1896 
N.A.Kh. 17. 3/1- Memorandum, Mitchell-Innes, undated (but mid-1896) N.A.Kh.l/l6.
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Mitchell-Innes underlined the current weakness of the Ministry of Finance :
’There does not exist a Ministry of Finance in the proper sense of 
the word; that is to say, a Department which directs and controls 
the finances of the country ... the revenue is collected partly by 
one Ministry, partly by another, while the local Treasuries are 
practically independent of the Ministry of Finance. This Ministry 
is indeed little more than an office for the receipt of portions 
of the Revenue and the payment of salaries. 1 120
This told Prince Mahit and the King little that they did not already know.
In fact, as the King informed the Adviser, it was precisely in order to assist
in the reform of the financial administration,to sweep away its worst abuses,
that the Government had engaged a European, who, it was hoped, would have the
121ability, expertise and ideas to make reform possible . But Mitchell-Innes 
was noticeably lacking in constructive ideas: he offered none but the most
general recommendations. And to make matters worse, the way in which he presen­
ted many of his criticisms betrayed his ignorance of local conditions and his 
unawareness of Siamese sensibilities. For example he ended one of his early 
reports as follows :
'I cannot close this report without a few remarks on a question 
vitally affecting the administration of this country. I mean the 
absence of a feeling of personal responsibility on the part of the 
public servants. It is not so mucfc due to defects in the system 
of administration as to the wrong and harmful spirit which pervades 
the Government service. Each official thinks he has done his whole 
duty if he gives orders to his subordinates, while these in turn 
pass them on to their inferiors. But no one appears to think that 
it is his duty to do a thing himself, or to see that his order is 
carried out ... It is no doubt very pleasant to sit on a chair and
give commands, but it is not the way to govern.
I cannot help thinking that this evil is due in a great measure 
to a feeling that it is undignified for a man in high position to 
work himself personally. Nothing can be more false than this idea.
It can never be undignified for uny man, prince, nobleman or 
commoner to do the duty that is entrusted to him, and it can never
be undignified for him to look and see that his subordinates
do theirs.' 122
This conceited exposition of the Victorian concept of an official's obli­
gations, responsibilities and duties left absolutely no room for a recognition 
of the subtle ramifications and implications of the hierarchical structure of
120. Report on the Financial System of Siam, Mitchell-Innes, 6 September 1896 
N.A.Kh. 17. 3A-
121. King to Mitchell-Innes, 8 September 1896 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
122. Memorandum, Mitchell-Innes, undated N.A.Kh. 1/16.
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Siamese society. Again there can be little doubt that the King and Prince
Mahit acknowledged the element of justice in the Adviser’s remarks: it was
a frequent complaint of the Minister that the officials in his Ministry showed
123little conscientiousness in their work . Yet the fact that Mitchell-Innes 
demonstrated so little awareness of the deep-seated social ajjd cultural factors 
which shaped the behaviour of officials, and perhaps more importantly, the 
fact that he delivered his criticisms in such an abrasive, condescending 
manner, must have jarred the sensibilities of the King and Prince Mahit.
Mitchell-Innes was warned of the dangers of his approach - though the 
warning came not from within Siam but from Lord Cromer in Egypt. Whilst agree­
ing with most of the Financial Adviser's diagnosis of the ills of the Siamese 
fiscal and financial administration, Lord Cromer advised Mitchell-Innes to 
show more restraint :
1 ... in every country - and more especially in a country where 
the reformer is an alien, and the political aspect of financial 
questions should be very carefully weighed - you cannot afford to 
alienate all the upper classes. Whatever the arguments may be,
I should advise moderation and as much respect as possible to 
vested interests in cases where you have to deal with an abuse 
of privilege.' 12*f
This rather gentle warning from his distinguished mentor failed to have
any appreciable effect on Mitchell-Innes. The following year, 1897» during
the King's visit to Europe, he undertook a campaign to reform the operations
of the Mint, a campaign which included demands for the dismissal of the Mint's
Director, PhrayS Phiphit PhBkhaisawan. The inefficiency of the Mint had been
125a recurrent problem for the Ministry of Finance since the early 1890s , and
indeed in early 1897 Prince Mahit had acknowledged that many of the Mint's prob­
lems arose from the fact that the Director was an old man prone to long absences
126from his work on account of ill health . Furthermore PhrayS Phiphit was 
123* Prince Mahit to King, undated, N.A.Kh. £. 1/11.
12*f. Lord Cromer to Mitchell-Innes, 22 December 1896. Cromer Papers vol. 8 
pp. 78-82 P.R.O. F.O. 633- It would appear from this letter that Mitchell-Innes 
sent Lord Cromer a copy of, at least, his 'Report on the Financial System of Siam
125« Chapter II p.
126. Prince Mahit to King, 30 March 1897 N.A.K.S. 1/3.
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unable to devote even his limited energies solely to the Mint, for he was also 
Director of the Krom Kep. Yet though he recognized Phraya Phiphit's inade­
quacies Prince Mahit also acknowledged that the Director had served the King 
loyally for many years and that such loyalty could not, should not, be simply
ignored. He therefore proposed to the King that PhrayS Phiphit give up his
127post at the Krom Kep but remain as Director of the Mint . It was a pragmatic
solution: in acknowledging Phraya Phiphit's age and loyalty, tradition was
respected; in reducing his responsibilities, efficiency was partly gratified.
It ws doubtful whether Mitchell-Innes was fully aware of his Minister's
attitude towards Phraya Phiphit. In mid-1897 be began to urge Prince Narit,
the acting Minister, to instruct the Director to increase the output of the
Mint, but although Prince Narit saw Phraya Phiphit, no definite action appears 
128to have been taken . Mitchell-Innes, suspecting that Prince Narit was not
being sufficiently firm with the Director, then wrote to the Queen, the head
129of the Government in the absence of the King . After describing in detail
the inefficiencies of Phraya Phiphit, he concluded :
'This alone is sufficient to show his utter incompetence and in 
my opinion he ought not to remain at the head of the Mint. He is 
an old man and it is time that he should retire with a suitable 
pension.' 130
This was followed by a reprimanding letter to Prince Narit :
'I cannot help thinking that in your desire to avoid trouble and 
to avoid giving pain to an old aad trusted servant of the King, 
you are losing from sight the real interests of the country.' 13 1
In view of these two letters alone, there can really be little surprise
that Mitchell-Innes did not stay in Siam beyond the three years of his initial
contract. First, he had written to the Queen directly instead of through his
superior, Prince Narit. Second, he appeared to have lost sight of the fact
that he was an adviser to an independent Government - he was no longer in Cairo.
12 7. ibid.
128. Mitchell-Innes to Queen, 8 September 1897 N.A.Kh. 10/2.
129. ibid.
130. ibid.
131. Mitchell-Innes to Prince Narit, 15 September 1897 N.A.Kh. 10/2.
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Finally, in a society where personal relationships were, and are, of primary 
importance, he had called for the dismissal of an old and respected official.
The demand could only have appeared offensive to the Queen, the more so since 
it had come from a foreigner. Furthermore, Mitchell-Innes' error was compounded 
by the fact that earlier in that year Prince Mahit had attempted to solve the 
problem of the declining competence of PhrayS Phiphit without seriously offen­
ding the conventions of Siamese society. The Queen replied politely but 
vaguely to Mitchell-Innes, suggesting that his proposals, 'which you have kindly
and dutifully given' would be carefully considered by the Kinfe on his return 
132from Europe
In January 1898, with the King and Prince Mahit now back in Bangkok, 
Mitchell-Innes resumed his criticisms by expressing discontent with the work 
of none other than the Minister of Finance himself. It appears that at first 
Mitchell-Innes wrote to Prince Mahit severely criticizing the administrative 
system of the Ministry, though he offered no satisfactory recommendations for 
reform. The Minister, who had received numerous similar letters in the past 
from the Financial Adviser, did not bother to reply, whereupon Mitchell-Innes
turned on the Minister himself. Within a few days a copy of Mitchell-Innes'
133complaints was in the hands of Prince Mahit . The Minister now had an oppor­
tunity to express what was clearly a long-felt dissatisfaction with the work 
of Mitchell-Innes in Siam. In writing to the King Prince Mahit acknowledged 
that many of the criticisms which Mitchell-Innes had made of the Ministry's
administrative system were justified: but, he added, it was clear that strenu-
134ous efforts were being made to secure improvements . However, these recent
132. Queen to Mitchell-Innes, 18 September 1897 N.A.Kh. 10/2. As far as 
Mitchell-Innes was concerned, that was the end of the matter. However, PhrayS 
Phiphit's health continued to decline and in December 1898 Prince Mahit sugges­
ted to the King that the time had come for the Director to resign (Prince Mahit 
to King, 10 December 1898 N.A.Kh. 20. 1/21) which PhrayS Phiphit did (Prince 
Mahit to King, 17 January 1899 N.A.Kh. 10/3).
133» The National Archives contain no record of Mitchell-Innes' criticisms: in
fact the only references to the matter are contained in Prince Mahit's letter 
to the King, 20 January 1898 (N.A.Kh. 1/16) and even there the references are 
rather oblique. It appears that the Adviser wrote originally to either the King 
or Rolin Jacquemyns: in any event, the King and Prince Mahit soon had copies
of the letter.
134. Prince Mahit to King, 20 January 1898 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
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improvements - and further contemplated reforms - owed little or nothing to 
Mitchell-Innes. According to Prince Mahit, it was the Financial Adviser's prac­
tice to rush around picking on relatively trivial points, and then raise them as 
major issues: as a result, officials who were concentrating their time on one
particular matter were being annoyed by an incessant stream of superficial 
interruptions from the Financial Adviser. He was also in the habit of weighing 
down the Minister with letters on these rather slight matters. In addition, 
^rince Mahit informed the King, Mitchell-Innes never committed himself firmly to 
one opinion but constantly altered his suggestions and recommendations.
Prince Mahit's criticisms did not end there. Mitchell-Innes1 sole pre-
135scription for reform was to dismiss incompetent officials . Prince Mahit
pointed out to the King that he could not accept this, not because he held any
particular respect for such officials, but rather because he recognized the
loyalty in most of them. Such loyalty could not be discounted without causing
136considerable unrest in the bureaucracy . There was also the point that the 
Government had too few sufficiently competent officials as it was without indul­
ging in a major rationalization of the administration. Furthermore, though 
Mitchell-Innes may have wished to sweep away all that was sub-standard and 
inferior in the Government and the Kingdom, Prince Mahit argued that the 
Siamese people could not accept dramatic changes. The oppressive policy which 
Mitchell-Innes1 recommendations implied may possibly have been viable in Egypt, 
he continued, but it was wholly out of place in Siam where reform was more 
selective and gradual. It was the Financial Adviser's failure to realize the 
restrictions under which the Siamese reform programme was working that made 
most of his ideas inappropriate in Siam, and eventually caused Prince Mahit to 
despair of ever receiving any useful advice from him. The Minister informed 
the King that no-one in the administration held any respect for Mitchell-Innes, 
not even Europeans such as W. A. Graham.
135* There had been a clear illustration of this in 1897 with the demands of 
Mitchell-Innes for the dismissal of PhrayS Phiphit.
136. Again the case of Phraya Phiphit provides a good illustration. In early 
1897 Prince Mahit had merely reduced the responsibilities of the official, and 
it was not until the Director's health was really poor, late 1898, that he sug­
gested that he resign.
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The unmistakable implication of Prince Mahit's letter to the King was that 
Mitchell-Innes would have to leave Siam: but the Minister suggested a possible
alternative :
'Your Majesty would allow me to resign as Minister of Finance, and 
Mitchell-Innes would be given the authority to manage matters to 
his own satisfaction for a specified period of time. If he succeeds 
in administering the Ministry with some order, then when I return 
to my position, I will follow the methods and regulations worked 
out by the Adviser.' 137
By making this proposal Prince Mahit was strengthening his demand for the
dismissal of Mitchell-Innes. There was almost no possibility that the King
would agree to the appointment of the Adviser as de facto Minister of Finance:
such an appointment would have had severe internal and external repercussions:
there would, for example, have been strong opposition from the French to the
appointment of an Englishman to such an important position in the Siamese
Government. Yet it would be misleading to suggest that Prince Mahit was merely
engaged in an elaborate bluff: the Minister assured the King that he was
acting in all seriousness, and emphasized this by insisting that if the King
were able to find another position for him in the Government, he would be
138pleased to leave the Ministry. And as noted above , on several occasions in 
the early years of his long term as Minister of Finance Prince Mahit informed 
the King, apparently quite sincerely, that he had neither the ability or ex­
pertise to continue at the Ministry, and expressed the hope that the King would 
allow him to resign. If Prince Mahit was bluffing - and it is almost certain 
that in fact that was the major factor behind the proposal - then it is possible 
that the Minister would not have regretted to have seen the bluff called.
Prince Mahit remained as Minister of Finance. In April 1898 the King 
instructed Rolin Jacquemyns to see Mitchell-Innes, apparently in order to in­
form him that the Government was unwilling to extend his contract as Financial 
139Adviser . Mitchell-Innes then saw Prince Mahit and told him that on
137- Prince Mahit to King, 20 January 1898 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
138. See p. Sfe
139- Prince Mahit to King, April 1898 N.A.Kh. 1/16. There is no evidence in 
the National Archives as to the exact nature of the King's instructions to Rolin 
Jacquemyns, nor as to the details of the conversation between the General 
Adviser and Mitchell-Innes.
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completion of his home-leave - due in the middle of that year - he would not 
be returning to Siam. The conversation between the two men was friendly, 
Mitchell-Innes even agreeing to help the Siamese Government to find his 
replacement.
The exact course of events then becomes unclear. Mitchell-Innes left for 
Europe in mid-1898 and was involved in discussions with the Foreign Office in 
London over the abolition of the Schedule attached to the Supplementary Agree­
ment of 1856^^. Then in late 1898 the King learnt from Rolin Jacquemyns, who 
was then in Brussels, that Mitchell-Innes had been persuaded by Lord Cromer to
delay his departure from the Siamese service^^. On 31 October 1898 Mitchell-
142Innes left London to return to Bangkok . It appears that on this voyage,
possibly having called in at Egypt, he made his final decision not to continue
143his position in Siam, and to return to Lord Cromer's administration . He
reached Bangkok in late 1898, but after a stay of only a tfew weeks he officially
ceased to be Financial Adviser on 31 January l899i and finally left Siam on
1442 February to take up his new post as Under-Secretary for Finance in Cairo
In view of their experience with Mitchell-Innes, it is perhaps rather
surprising that the Siamese Government persisted with the post of Financial
Adviser. On the other hand, the dispute had been with the man rather than
with his position: to Prince Mahit at least, the Ministry still needed the
145experience and expertise of a European finance official
mo. Mitchell-Innes to Gosselin, 24 September 1898 P.R.O. F.O. 69/185- These 
discussions eventually led to the Land Tax Agreement of 1900, to be considered 
in Chapter IV.
141. Rolin Jacquemyns to King, 16 October 1898 N.A. b. 2. kh/424.
142. Siamese Minister in London to Prince Devawongse, 31 October 1898 N.A. 
b. 2. kh. 1/3 5-
143- Prince Devawongse to Rolin Jacquemyns, November 1898 Telegram N.A. 
b. 2. kh/424.
144. Greville to Lord Salisbury, 2 February 1899 Desp. 4 P.R.O. F.O. 69/195- 
Mitchell-Innes subsequently went to the British Embassy in Washington - where 
he was Charge d1Affair for a short period - and then to the Embassy in Monte 
Video. He retired in 1919 and died in 1950 Foreign Office List 1951-
145- Prince Mahit to King, 24 April 1898 N.A.Kh. 1/16.
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In May 1898 the Siamese Government had applied to the Government of India
through the British Minister in Bangkok for the loan of a finance officer to
146be Accountant and Controller-General in Siam for a period of two years . His 
duties in Siam would be to introduce a system of audit and account based upon 
the procedures in use in India, and to instruct Siamese officials in the details
and the operations of that system. The Government of India put forward four
1A7 1*43candidates , from whom Charles James Rivett-Carnac was chosen by Bangkok
On the confirmation of his appointment, Rivett-Carnac wrote to Prince Damrong
outlining the general nature of the reforms and measures he would propose upon
149his arrival in Siam . The letter created a favourable impression in Bangkok,
partly because most of Rivett-Carnac’s proposals coincided with the Ministry
150of Finance's own ideas , partly because the letter suggested, at least to
151Prince Mahit, a man of considerable enthusiasm and drive , and partly because, 
in marked contrast to Mitchell-Innes, Rivett-Carnac had produced a series of 
precise, practical recommendations for reform. Indeed so favourable was the 
initial impression created by Rivett-Carnac that it appears that even before he
arrived in Siam the Government was regarding him as the successor to Mitche^J-
152Innes as Financial Adviser .
146. Greville to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
12 May 1898 P.R.O. F.O. 69/18 5.
147. Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Greville 
11 July I898 P.R.O. F.O. 69/I85.
148. Greville to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
3 September 1898 P.R.O. F.O. 69/18 5. It appears that Rivett-Carnac was selected 
solely on the grounds that he was the most highly experienced candidate. Born 
in 1853 (interview #ith Mr. D. C. Rivett-Carnac, 18 January 1971)1 Rivett-Carnac 
had joined the Financial Department of the Government of India in May 1872. He 
held a series of accountant positions throughout India until November 1895 when 
he was transferred to Burma, becoming Deputy Auditor General in April 1898.
This was the position he held when he applied for the post in Siam. The India 
List and the India Office List 1905*
149* Rivett-Carnac (Rangoon) to Prince Damrong, 23 September 1898 N.A. b. 2. 
kh. 1/3 5-
150. Prince Mahit to King, 15 October 1898 N.A. b. 2. kh. 1/35-
1 5 1. ibid.
152. Prince Devawongse to King, 23 November 1898 N.A. b. 2. kh/424.
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15"5Rivett-Carnac reached Bangkok on 3 December 1898 and immediately began
work. According to Greville, the British Minister, within a few weeks of his
154arrival he had gained the confidence of even the King to a remarkable degree .
On 8 January 1899 Rivett-Carnac submitted a memorandum to the Minister of
155Finance on the future reform programme of the Ministry . The programme, and
more especially its manner of presentation, are worthy of note :
'Although I have only been in Siam for little more than a month, I 
can clearly see that, in regard to Finance, we have an enormous 
Programme of work before us, a Programme that will probably take 
several years to carry through, The task will be a Herculean one ... ' 156
Then the programme, a list of ten points ranging from the preparation of 
rules to govern the granting of pensions to officials, through the establish­
ment of a proper and thorough check of the revenu^ to the abandonment of the
asilver standard for the baht and the issue of^gold currency. Once again, in 
contrast to Mitchell-Innes, Rivett-Carnac did not indulge in a detailed criti­
cism of the Siamese financial and fiscal administration but instead produced 
a series of practical recommendations for reform. The fact that the Government 
would find it difficult to accept some of the proposals in the near future - 
for example, a proposal for the establishment of a National Bank - was relatively 
unimportant. The crucial point was that in this early correspondence, and 
particularly in this memorandum, Rivett-Carnac had shown that he could use his
considerable financial knowledge and experience to make practical recommenda-
157tions for the modernization of the Siamese financial administration .
There was a further significant feature of Rivett-Carnac's January 1899
153- Bangkok Times, 3 December 1898.
154. Greville to Gosselin, 4 January 1899 Private P.R.O. F.O. 69/195* In this 
respect it is important to note that Rivett-Carnac was significantly older and 
more experienced than his predecessor. In fact he was the same age as the King 
(46 in 1899) and had spent 26 years in the Indian Service. Mitchell-Innes had 
been 32 on his arrival in Siam.
155* Memorandum, Rivett-Carnac, 8 January 1899 N.A.Kh. l/l8.
156. ibid.
157* This point can be illustrated by a small but significant example. The 
large majority of financial regulations issued by the Ministry of Finance at 
the turn of the century were drawn up by Rivett-Carnac. In carrying out this 
detailed and lengthy task his intimate knowledge of the regulations in force 
in British India would have been invaluable.
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memorandum that should be mentioned: it demonstrated his considerable enthu­
siasm for the tasks faced by the Ministry of Finance, his confidence that the 
problems would be solved. The opening paragraph of the memorandum, with its 
statement that 'we have an enormous Programme of work before us' makes it 
clear that Rivett-Carnac relished the challenge of his new post.
The favourable impression created by Rivett-Carnac within the first few 
weeks of his arrival in Siam was confirmed when Mitchell-Innes left Bangkok in 
February 1899J immediately Rivett-Carnac was appointed Financial Adviser, 
though he retained his position of Controller-General as well. Later that same 
month the Siamese Government asked the Government of India to extend his ori-
1 r O
ginal contract to stay in Siam from two years to five : the Government of
159India approved in June 1899 •
Certain aspects of Rivett-Carnac's work in the Ministry of Finance - on 
the compilation of the budgets, on the Committee on Establishments, on the 
preparation and issue of financial regulations - have been considered in the 
first section of this chapter: his role in the raising of Siam's first loan
in Europe, and in the currency and exchange reforms of the 1900s will be covered 
in later chapters. However, at this point it would be useful to refer very 
briefly to Rivett-Carnac's interest in Siam's political situation, for this 
aspect of his activities was to bring him into conflict with people both within 
the Siamese Government and within the British Legation in Bangkok, and this in 
turn affected his influence as Financial Adviser.
Within a few months of his arrival in Siam Rivett-Carnac was regarding 
himself as the successor to Rolin Jacquemyns as General Adviser^0. Rolin 
Jacquemyns had first arrived in Siam in 1892"*"^ , but by the end of the decade
158. Greville to Lord Salisbury, 28 February 1899* Despatch 13 P.R.O. F.O.69/195-
159- Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Greville 
14 June 1899 P.R.O. F.O. 69/202.
160. Indeed, in 1902, after the death of Rolin Jacquemyns, Rivett-Carnac told 
the British Minister that the King had entrusted to him 'the more important 
duties that now fall to the lot of the General Adviser', but that 'it is con­
sidered politically undesirable that I should be publicly appointed as General 
Adviser.' (Rivett-Carnac to Tower, 18 April 1902 P.R.O. F.O. 69/228).
161. Christian de Saint-Hubert Rolin Jacquemyns (Chao Phya Aphay Raja) and the 
Belgian Legal Advisers in Siam at the Turn of the Century J.S.S. vol. 53 July 
1965 pp. 18 1-190.
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worn out by his labours and by the climate, his health was extremely poor.
From 1899 he found it necessary to leave Siam at the beginning of every hot
162season . The incapacity and absence of the General Adviser gave Rivett-Carnac
an opportunity to intervene in political issues. This the Financial. Adviser
did on numerous occasions - a letter to the Foreign Editor of 'The Times' in
December 1899 on the French threat to Siam1^, a memorandum to the King on the
164same question in February 1902 , and meetings and discussions with the
British Minister, Prince Damrong and Prince Devawongse on the Anglo-Siamese 
negotiations over the appointment of advisers to Trengganu and Kelantan, also 
in 1902165.
At first the British Legation was pleased that Rivett-Carnac, having ap­
parently gained the confidence of the King, was likely to be in a strong 
position to influence the Siamese Government in the interests of Britain^^. 
Indeed, at the request of Rivett-Carnac, Greville sought and obtained the per­
mission of the Foreign Office for the Financial Adviser to give his advice to
167the Siamese Government on matters unconnected with finance . However, within 
a few months Greville had revised his earlier opinion sis to Rivett-Carnac's 
usefulness as a political adviser, arguing that he was altogether too indiscreet 
By 1902 Greville's successor, Tower, took an even stronger view of the Financial 
Adviser :
'Though I am personally on the best of terms with him, and have the 
highest admiration for his energy and ability, I cannot but feel that 
his impetuous and often tactless methods, and particularly his inabi­
lity to be reticent on any subject which interests him, combine to
162. Stringer to Lord Salisbury, 11 April 1900 Desp. 27 P.R.O. F.O. 69/207.
163. Rivett-Carnac to Valentine Chirol, 14 December 1899 • Enclosed in Greville 
to Lord Salisbury, 16 December 1899 Desp. Ill P.R.O. F.O. 69/197*
164. Great Britain, France and Siam. Minute by the Financial Adviser upon the 
present political situation, Rivett-Carnac, 13 February 1902. Rivett-Carnac 
to King, 14 February 1902 N.A. b. 2. kh/39*
16 5. Tower to Lord Landdowne, 24 narch 1902, Private. Lord Lansdowne's Private 
Papers, P.R.O. F.O. 800/142.
166. Greville to Lord Salisbury, 30 January 1899 Tele. 2 P.R.O. F.O. 69/198.
16 7. Lord Salisbury to Greville, 31 January 1899 Tele. 3 P-R.O. F.O. 69/198.
168. Greville to Gosselin, 22 May l899» Private P.R.O. F.O. 69/196.
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make the prospect of his being made General Adviser anything but 
an encouraging one.’ 169
Not surprisingly, the attitude of British Ministers in Bangkok was 
echoed in the Foreign Office in London: in April 1902, on receipt of a memo­
randum by the Financial Adviser on the possibility of a renegotiation of the 
1896 Anglo-French Convention on Siam, Lord Lansdowne wrote to Lord Curzon 
in India :
'I should like to call your attention to a somewhat inflated a£d 
ill-judged paper which has lately been produced by Rivett-Carnac.
It does not seem to me that his position as financial adviser 
justified him in writing official essays as to the international 
relations of Siam. Could you not put a little water into his 
wine ?' 170
The attitude of the Siamese Government to Rivett-Carnac's political
interests was more complex. On the one hand there is evidence that some of
the Adviser's political memoranda were produced with the knowledge and perhaps
T 171encouragement of at least Rolin °acquemyns and that his advice on general
matters was, indeed, sometimes sought. But there could be no question of the
Siamese Government approving the de jure or de facto appointment of Rivett-
Carnac as General Adviser. The fact that he was British - that fact alone -
ruled out the possibility of the Government allowing him to take an active
172part in any negotiations which involved the principal European powers 
On the other hand, those Ministers upon whose interests Rivett-Carnac most 
frequently trespassed, Prince Damrong and, particularly, Prince Devawongse, 
were not disposed to take a kindly attitude towards Rivett-Carnac's political 
interests. Indeed in 1902 Prince Damrong and Prince Devawongse appear to 
have withheld from the Financial Adviser documents concerning the Siamese 
Malay States, documents which apparently the King had given Rivett-Carnac
J,69» Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 10 March 1902, Private. Lord Lansdowne's Private 
Papers. P.R.O. F.O. 800/142.
170. Lord Lansdowne to Lord Curzon, 10 April 1902, Private. Lord Lansdowne's 
Private Papers. P.R.O. F.O. 800/145-
171. Greville to Lord Salisbury, 16 December 18991 Desp. Ill P.R.O. F.O. 69/197-
172. Indeed it is interesting to note that the Siamese Government chose as 
Rolin Jacquemyns' successor an American, Edward Strobel: at that time the 
united States had few political interests in Siam.
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permission to see . Relations between Rivett-Carnac and Prince Devawongse
were not improved when the Financial Adviser complained strongly to the King
that Prince Devawongse was being obstructive in the negotiations over the
Siamese Malay States, and then went on to advocate that the Minister of Foreign
174Affairs be dismissed
Therefore, in general, Rivett-Carnac was disliked by the British for 
his tactlessness and impetuosity, and to some extent distrusted on the Siamese 
side for his political interests. This ensured two points; first that 
Rivett-Carnac did not act in Siam as sin arm of the British Government, pro­
tecting British political and financial interests; second, it meant 
opposition within the Siamese Government to a number of Rivett-Carnac's schemes, 
including some of his finsmcial proposals, opposition from, in particular,
Prince Devawongse.
173* Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 24 March 1902, Private. Lord Lansdowne's Private 
Papers P.R.O. F.O. 800/142. Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 30 March 1902, Desp. 65 
P.R.O. F.O. 69/228.
174. Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 30 ^arch 1902, Desp. 65 P.R.O. F.O. 69/228.
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CHAPTER IV
The effective Ministry in operation : financial stringency, 1902 - 1906.
The last four years of Prince Mahit*s term as Minister of Finance - 1902 
to 1906 - were filled with major financial reforms and developments - among them 
the establishment of a Paper Currency Department, the adoption and operation 
of a gold-exchange mechanism for the baht, the collapse of important tax farms 
and the beginning of direct Government administration of those revenue sources, 
the emergence of the problem of substantial budget deficits, the raising of 
Siam’s first loan in Europe, and a reduction in the amount of Government revenue 
derived from the gambling dens. In order to clarify the themes and events of 
this period it is proposed to reserve discussion of the currency and exchange, 
and tax farm developments, to Chapters VI and VII where, as noted at the end 
of the first chapter, those special topics will be considered for the whole of 
the period covered by this study. The present chapter will - again in line 
with the general structure of the study noted in Chapter I - concentrate on 
those themes which illustrate the chronological development of the Ministry of 
Finance as an influential department of Government, the relationship of the 
Ministry and its Minister with the rest of the administration. For the period 
1902-1906 this means primarily examining the Government’s budgetary problems 
and the related issue of the raising of a loan in Europe.
1. Budget stringency and the first European loan, 1902 - 1906.
Before considering in detail the debate which occurred within the Siamese 
Government from late 1902 to late 1904 over the raising of a loan in Europe, 
it is important to make two preliminary points. First, that the objective of 
such a loan was to finance the construction of the Siamese railway system and 
in particular a line from Bangkok to Chiangmai. Work on the first major line 
in the Kingdom - from the capital due north to Ayudhya and then north-east to 
Korat - had begun in the early 1890s, the Bangkok-Ayudhya section being opened
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1 2in March 1897 » the Ayudhya-Korat portion in December 1900 . In addition con­
tinuation of the line due north from Ayudhya towards Chiangmai was commenced 
in mid-1898^. In this early period construction was financed solely from 
current revenue - 14.4 m. baht in the seven years l892/93“l898/99 alone\ That 
figure represented approximately 10 per cent of all Government expenditure over 
the same period. Clearly there were serious disadvantages in investing such a 
high proportion of the Government's current revenue resources in railway con­
struction: for one thing, were the demands on the available revenue to increase
subst anti sully it was unavoidable that either other equally important Government 
projects would have to be postponed or abandoned, or some cuts imposed on the 
railway programme itself.
Second, the issue of the European loan could not be separated from the 
issue of Siam's political, relations with the European powers. In this context 
it is important to note that this period - and more particularly the years 
I895-I898 - saw the European powers engaged in a scramble for concessions in
China, a scramble that appeared to be merely a prelude to what seemed the
5inevitable disintegration of the Middle Kingdom . In this onslaught the offer­
ing of loans to the Chinese Government by the powers and the granting of 
concessions to Europeans to construct railways in China played an essential 
part. Between 1895 and 1898 China borrowed £47*82 m. from Britain, France, 
Germany and Russia on particularly onerous terms: the loans were secured on
the customs revenue and the likin and salt tax revenues of certain provinces: 
furthermore, because the loans were long-term loans at relatively high rates 
of interest, the Chinese Government was contracted to repay £102.36 m. in 
interest and capital repayments. The spate of railway concessions begai in
1 . Report on the Traffic of the ^agara Ra.jasima Railway r.s. 116 (1897/98).
2. Report on the Traffic of the Royal Siamese State Railway r.s. 119 (1900/Q1)•
3* Moss Blundell (British Engineer) to Bertie, 15 July 1898 P.R.O. F.O. 69/18 5*
4. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 PP. 24-25*
5- Except where otherwise noted, this paragraph is based on: John K. Fairbank,
Edwin 0. Reischaur, Albert M. Craig East Asia The Modern Transformation London 
1965 pp* ^8-475 •
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1896 when the Russo-Chinese Bank was allowed to undertake construction of a 
line across Manchuria. In 1899 the British and Chinese Corporation (formed 
the previous year by the Hongkong and Shanghai Dank and Jardine Matheson) 
obtained a contract to complete the Tientsin-Mukden-Newchwang railway^. These 
concessions which gave the bank or corporation involved a considerable economic 
interest in the area in which the line was being constructed, in effect divided 
the country into spheres of influence for the powers. They, allied with the 
loans, were undoubtedly the major tools of the imperialist encroachment.
The Siamese Government was almost certainly aware of these developments
in China: it could hardly be encouraged by them. In this respect it is worth
noting that the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, a leading bank in the floating of
7Chinese loans, indeed, virtually the Chinese Government's banker , was also 
the principal bank in Siam. Such considerations weighed heavily with the 
Siamese Ministers.
The first definite proposal for the raising of a European loan by Siam
g
appears to have been made by Mitchell-Innes in December 1897 • The following 
year the proposal was discussed by the Council of Ministers and as a result 
Prince Mahit was instructed to make enquiries in Europe as to the terras and
Qconditions upon which a loan could be raised . In February 1899 the British
Minister reported to London that the Siamese Government had decided to raise
a loan of between £3.0 m. and £5-0 m.^ However, the report was premature.
On 28 August 1899 the 'Bangkok Times' announced that the Government had decided
to postpone its proposal to raise a loan in Europe, and instead to continue
railway construction out of current revenue. The King told Rivett-Carnac that 
though he personally had been in favour of the loan, his opinion had not
6. Maurice Collis Wayfoong The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
London 1965 p« 72/p. 120.
7. ibid p. 76.
8. Memorandum on the negotiation of a loan. Mitchell-Innes, 28 December
1897 F.F.A. 25/21.
9- Chaloem Yongbunkoet NgoenkTl khrangrSek kh$ng prathgtthai(Thailand's First 
Loan) W5.ras5n KrombanchlklSng May 196>1 pp. 43-51»
10. Greville to Lord Salisbury, 27 February 1899 Desp. 12 P.R.O. F.O. 69/195.
prevailed in the Government : it would seem likely that the opposition within
the Council to the proposal came from Ministers who feared the political com­
plications of a foreign loan, for it was precisely those fears which divided
the Ministers and prevented the Council from coming to a decision when the issue
12was revived in the early 1900s . In 1899 there were also practical conside­
rations: the Government had not yet published its budget and statement of
accounts, a measure which Mitchell-Innes regarded as essential if European
1investors were to be made aware of Siam s recent financial, commercial and
15administrative progress, and were thereby to be attracted by a Siamese loan . 
There was also the important point made by Rivett-Carnac at about this time 
that Siam could not raise a sterling loan whilst the baht remained on the 
silver standard, for with a depreciating currency the burden of interest and 
capital repayments would increase enormously over the number of years envi­
saged in a loan contract"*"^ .
For two or three years after the August 1899 decision to postpone the 
raising of a loan in Europe, the Government was able to continue financing 
railway construction from current revenue without serious difficulty. In April 
1900 a start was made on the Bangkok-Petchaburi line1 ,^ and in May 1902 work 
was begun on the Lopburi-Paknampo portion of the northern railway‘d. This was
a substantial programme: by 1900/01, the Government was investing 3 .5 m. baht
17-p.a. in railway construction, more than double the figure for the early l890s .
However, in the budget for 1902/03 there were the first serious signs that this 
high level of expenditure from current revenue could no longer continue: in
11. Greville to Lord Salisbury, 30 August 1899 Desp. 82 P.R.O. F.O. 69/196-
12. Unfortunately there is no record in the National Archives of the discussion 
which led to the decision to postpone the raising of a loan.
13. Memorandum on the negotiation of a loan. Mitchell-Innes, 28 December 1897 
F.F.A. 25/21.
14. Note: Object of, and Reasons for Establishing a Gold Standard for Siam. 
Rivett-Carnac, 9 September 1899 F.F.A. 23/1-
15. Report ofi the Traffic of the Royal Siamese State Railway r.s. 122 (1903/04)
16. Report on the Traffic of the Royal Siamese State Railway r.s. 124 (1903/06)
17. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 24-25-
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the estimates for that year only 2.0 m. baht of the 3-5 rn. baht allocation for
railway construction could be covered from the revenues, and the balance had
18
to be met from the Treasury reserves . Furthermore, in his report on the
budget, produced in mid-1902, Rivett-Carnac announced that it was planned that
the railway construction allocation would be cut to 3*0 m. baht in 1903/04 and
192.0 m. baht in 1904/05 • It was clear that the policy of construction from
current revenue was being surrendered: it was finally condemned by events in
July 1902.
On 25 July 1902 a rebellion broke out in the northern town of Phrae, a 
rebellion led by some 30 to 40 Shan bandits who seized the town, occupied
20Government offices, and murdered approximately 20 Siamese provincial officials 
Immediately troops were despatched from Fhitsanulok and Nak<?n Sawan to the 
north, but communications were poor and it took three weeks for the Government 
to muster sufficient strength in the area to quell the rebellion: Government
troops reoccupied Phrae on 14 August. Though the Shan rebellion was a relati­
vely limited affair, it greatly disturbed the Government in Bangkok, for it 
demonstrated the comparative ineffectiveness of the Central Government's admini­
stration in that more distant part of the Kingdom and the consequent vulnerabi­
lity of that area to the encroachments of the Colonial Powers. In this respect 
one of the most disturbing features of the rebellion for the Siamese Government 
was that it appeared that the British and French Consuls in nearby Nan had taken 
a very close interest in the uprising, and indeed may even have been involved in 
its instigation. Therefore the Shan rebellion had a considerable effect on the 
policies of the Bangkok Government: in particular it forced the Government to
undertake two major programmes of expenditure, the first involving a large-scale
21modernization of the army - including the introduction of conscription - and
18. R.F.A.B. 1902/03 p. 14.
19. ibid.
20. This reference to the Shan rebellion of 1902 is taken from a detailed ana­
lysis of the causes, course and consequences of the incident by Tej Bunnag 
Khabot ngiao mu'ang phrde r.s. 121 (The 1902 Shan Rebellion at Phrae) in 
SangkhomsSt parithat vol. 6 (Sept. 1968) pp. 6?-80.
21. W. A. Graham Siam London 1924 vol. 1 p. 315*
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the second involving a complete revision of its programme of railway construc­
tion. On 21 August 1902, exactly one week after the collapse of the rebellion, 
the King wrote to Prince Mahit informing him that it had been decided to push 
ahead as quickly as possible with the construction of the northern line as far
as Uttaradit, the most northerly part of the line before it ran into the hills,
22and only some 30 miles south of Phrae . A programme of construction was laid
down which called for a virtual doubling of the funds allocated to the Railway
Department each year: it appeared to make a European loan unavoidable.
Between August and December 1902 the Ministry of Finance prepared the
ground for the raising of the loan. Rivett-Carnac produced a memorandum on the
more technical aspects of the matter in which he outlined the loan conditions
23to which the Kingdom could agree : in addition the Adviser saw the 3ritish
Minister in an attempt to push his personal scheme for the Siamese loan to be
24shared between Britain and France . Lastly, Prince Mahit had enquiries made
at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in London as to the possible terms upon which
25Siam would be able to raise a loan . On 18 December 1902 the Minister wrote 
to the King reviewing these developments, and suggesting that Rivett-Carnac be 
allowed to return to Europe to make tentative enquiries in person, though he 
emphasized that the Financial Adviser would be under the supervision of the
26Siamese Minister in Paris . Copies of Prince Mahit's letter and Rivett-Carnac'e
August memorandum were sent by the King to all the senior Ministers for their 
27views : the King implied that he was in favour of the loan.
Over the following few months - from December 1902 to March 1903 - the 
Siamese Government engaged in a detailed, though often repetitious, internal 
debate over the probable advantages and disadvantages of raising a loan in
22. Prince Mahit to King, 18 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 25/1.
23- Memorandum, Lopburi-Paknampo-Uttaradit Railway loan. Rivett-Carnac,
28 August 1902, N.A.Kh. 25/1.
24. Archer to Lord Lansdowne, 27 August 1902 Desp. 155 P.R.O. F.O. 69/230.
25- Prince Mahit to King, 18 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 25/1-
26. ibid.
27. King to Prince Damrong, 20 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 25/3.
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Europe. A considerable number of Ministers and senior officials took part in 
the debate - Prince Mahit, Prince Devawongse, Prince Narit (the Minister of 
Public Works), Herr Gehrts (the German Director of the Railway Department) and 
finally PhrayS Suriyanuwat (the Siamese Minister in Paris).
These participants soon divided into two distinct groups, those who were 
opposed, or at least sceptical towards the raising of a foreign loan, and those 
who clearly favoured it. Undoubtedly the leader of the first group was Prince 
Devawongse. The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the Government's 
direct financial return from its investment in railway construction had up to
23
that point been disappointingly low - about 3 per cent p.a. . The Government 
was almost certain to pay at least 5 per cent p.a. interest on any loan in 
Europe, therefore the loan/northern railway project would involve the Govern­
ment in a direct financial loss, a loss which would have to be made good from 
other sources of revenue if the Kingdom was to avoid defaulting on its foreign 
loan. But Prince Devawongse was not opposed to the raising of a loan in 
Europe per se: if a loan could be obtained on terms sufficiently favourable
to ensure the Siamese Government a direct financial profit from the scheme, 
then he approved. But if such terms could not he found Prince Devawongse wished 
the Government to attempt to raise the loan within Siam, even though he realized 
that an internal loan could be raised only with a relatively high rate of 
interest.
Prince Devawongse's reservations with regard to the wisdom of raising a 
foreign loan reflected his apprehension at the prospect of the Kingdom being 
indebted to European capitalists: he feared the possibility of the Government
defaulting on its loan and the opportunity that that failure would provide for 
the powers to intervene in Siam's internal affairs. In short he saw a European 
loan as a possible threat to Siamese independence. In addition he was insistent 
that in any negotiations with European financiers the Government should make a 
point of offering the loan to as many institutions as possible: this would
ensure that no European power could suspect that Siam was offering her loan to
28. Prince Devawongse to King, 24 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 25/3.
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a particular country for political rather than financial reasons, as well as
guarantee that the Kingdom was aware of the best possible financial terms
available. In this respect it is significant that Prince Devawongse, though
he agreed with Prince Mahit's suggestion that Rivett-Carnac be allowed to return
to Europe to make tentative enquiries for the raising of a loan, was adamant
that the Adviser work under the instructions of, and be responsible to, the
Siamese Minister in Paris, PhrayS Suriya. The fact was that Prince Devawongse
had heard that in a recent interview with a French journalist, Rivett-Carnac
had apparently said that the Siamese Government would float the whole of the
29proposed loan in London . It was possible that the journalist had misunder­
stood the Financial Adviser's remarks: but the effect of the incident was to
strengthen the Minister's distrust of Rivett-Carnac, to strengthen his deter­
mination to prevent the Adviser from playing a serious part in any negotiations 
which could take place.
Prince Defawongse's misgivings as to the financial aspect of the loan/ 
northern railway proposals were shared, and developed, by Prince Narit and 
Gehrts. They too were concerned about the low direct profitability from the 
construction of the Siamese railway system, which, Gehrts estimated, was un-
30likely to exceed 5 per cent pa. even under the most favourable circumstances 
Of course it was true that the railways would promote the commercial develop­
ment of those parts of the Kingdom through which they ran, and for this reason, 
argued the Director, the direct financial return from railway construction 
could not be regarded as the sole, or even principal benefit derived from such 
an investment. Even so it was important not to construct the railways too far 
ahead of the immediate commercial requirements of the Kingdom.
' ... it is my opinion that the railways of this country ought not 
to be built too quickly. The spending of an average of 3*5 m. [baht] 
yearly as done in the years 117 [1898/99] to 120 [1901/02] is in 
general quite sufficient for the effective development of the 
country and will ensure a better financial result than the spending 
of larger sums.' 31
29- ibid.
30. Gehrts to Prince Narit, 20 January 1903 N.A.Kh. 25/3*
3 1 . ibid.
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The point of Gehrts1 argument was that if the Government was willing to 
accept a slower rate of construction and was prepared to terminate the line 
well south of Chiangmai, then assuming that the Railway Department was still 
allocated 3*5 m- baht p.a. from the revenue for the coming six years, it would 
be possible to continue the programme of railway construction without resorting
to a European loan. Prince Narit supported this argument, and added the point
that even with a loan the northern railway would take five years to complete.
Which was better, he asked - to delay one year or to become indebted to
32European financiers ?
Finally in this group there was Phraya Suriya in Paris. He too was con­
cerned about the low direct return from the investment in the Siamese railways, 
and he argued that in the circumstances the Government would be better advised
to invest the proceeds of a European loan in the establishment of a National
33Bank specializing in agricultural loans . Indeed, PhrayS Suriya suggested, 
the development of agricultural credit would act as a greater stimulus to 
cultivation - with all the subsequent benefits for the Government's revenue - 
than would the construction of the railways.
There was at least one major flaw in the arguments of Prince Devawongse,
Prince Narit, Gehrts and PhrayS SuriyS. In late 1902 the Government had decided 
for political reasons to push ahead with the construction of the northern rail­
way as quickly as possible: the Ministers and officials above had then
concentrated their attention on the commercial considerations attendant on con­
structing that line by means of a European loan. Indeed, PhrayS Suriya's 
suggestion that the proposed loan be used to establish a National Bank indicated 
the extent to which, within a matter of six months, some officials had lost 
sight of the original issue. In fairness PhrayS SuriyS recognized this contra­
diction. In writing to Prince Devawongse in March 1903 he concluded :
'Of course, if this railway policy is a political or strategical one 
then it must be carried out with all speed regardless of loss. And 
it does appear to be more of that than of a commercial nature.' 34
32. Prince Narit to King, 2 February 1903 N.A.Kh. 25/3-
33* PhrayS Suriya to Prince Devawongse, 13 March 1903 F.F.A. 25/2.
34. ibid. My emphasis.
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Indeed each of this group appear to have recognized that their arguments 
lost much of their validity if it was accepted that the construction of the 
northern railway was a political rather than a commercial enterprise.
The most forceful proponent of the European loan was without doubt Prince 
Mahit. However, in early 1903 his arguments were mainly defensive, countering 
the arguments of those sceptical of the measure. First, he pointed out that 
the benefits to be derived from the creation of a railway network linking the 
capital with the outer provinces were much broader than that suggested by 
narrow calculations of financial return: the political and commercial advan­
tages of improved communications - the incentive to the development of trade 
(and the subsequent increase in the Government's revenue), the establishment
of more effective administration in the areas of the Kingdom furthest from
33Bangkok - all had to be taken into account . Second, he rejected Prince 
Devawongse's proposal for an internal loan: such a loan would be too expen­
sive, and would in any case be taken up largely by European banks in Bangkok. 
Third, Prince Mahit argued that it was no longer possible to continue financing 
railway construction from current revenue, even at the pre-1902 level of 3-5 m. 
baht p.a., since the Ministry of Finance was now faced with mounting demands 
for funds for other important projects - the modernization of the army and the 
reconstruction and improvement of administration in the north in the wake of 
the Shan rebellion, to name just two . Indeed, as noted above, in the budget 
for 1902/03 the Ministry had been able to maintain the 3*5 m. baht allocation 
for railway construction only by drawing 1 .5  m. baht from the reserves: that
budget had been drawn up before the outbreak of the Shan rebellion, before the 
August 1902 decision to increase expenditure on railway construction so as to 
complete the northern line as far as Uttaradit as rapidly as possible. In short 
the choice was not between constructing the line quickly from a loan or slowly 
from current revenue (as Prince Narit had argued): it was between constructing
the line from a loan or abandoning the whole project. Finally, the Minister 
dealt with what was clearly the basic fear troubling Prince Devawongse, and
35- Prince Mahit to King, 25 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 25/1. 
36. Prince Mahit to King, 5 February 1903 N.A.Kh. 25/3-
p o s s i b l y  P r in c e  N a r i t  a s  w e l l  -  th e  f e a r  th a t  a  E u ro p e an  lo a n  co u ld  t h r e a t e n
Siam ese s o v e r e i g n t y .  I t  w as t r u e ,  he a rg u e d , t h a t  a  f o r e i g n  lo a n  b ro u gh t w ith
it some dangers as well as many advantages for the borrower, but there was
clearly no absolute standard that dictated whether a loan was advisable or not.
The Governm ent had to  make a d e c i s i o n  b ase d  on i t s  a sse ssm e n t o f  th e  s i t u a t i o n
f a c i n g  S ia m . I n  t h a t  r e s p e c t ,  P r in c e  M ahit c o n tin u e d , i t  had to  be remembered
that there would be considerable dangers in delaying making a decision if the
37capital was urgently required . That danger was a curtailment of the Govern­
ment 's reform programme - a development which in itself would undermine the 
Government's attempts to maintain its independence.
At the same time as these arguments for and against the -^ropean loan were 
being drawn in Bangkok, as the opposing sides in the Council of Ministers were 
forming, the Government began its initial enquiries in Europe as to the terms 
upon which a loan could be raised. On 14 January 1903 Prince Mahit wrote to 
PhrayS SuriyS in Paris, outlining the conditions which the Government would 
accept on a loan of £1.0 m. and suggesting to the Minister that he attempt to
38find a reputable financier willing to assist in the raising of the loan . 
Phraya SuriyS was informed that he was also to be assisted by Rivett-Carnac, 
though the Minister was assured that only he would be responsible for the main 
negotiations and would have the authority to conclude any agreement. In 
February 1903 the Financial Adviser left Bangkok for Europe, a journey made
n e c e s s a r y  b y th e  i l l - h e a l t h  o f  M rs. R iv e t t - C a r n a c  who w as i n  u rg e n t need o f  a
39r e s t  from  th e S iam e se c lim a te  . B e fo r e  l e a v i n g  Siam  R iv e t t - C a r n a c  s t r o n g l y
im p lie d  to  th e  B r i t i s h  M i n i s t e r  t h a t  h e , th e  A d v i s e r ,  w ould be n e g o t ia t in g  th e
40loan on behalf of Siam : he hinted that he would like an interview with Lord
41
Lansdowne when he re a c h e d  London . A t an in t e r v i e w  a t  th e  F o r e ig n  O f f i c e  h e lc  
37* i b i d .
38. Prince ^ahit to Phraya SuriyS 14 January 1903 N .A .K h . 25/3-
39* Prince Mahit to King, 25 December 1902 N .A .K h . 25/1-
40. P a g e t t o  L o rd  Lansdow ne, 2 F e b ru a r y  1903 D e sp . 9 P .R .O . F .O . 69/245-
41. P a g e t to  L a n g le y ,  11 F e b r u a r y  1903 P r i v a t e  P .R .O . F .O . 69/245-
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in late March 1903 - though not with the Foreign Secretary - Rivett-Carnac sug­
gested that when the time came for the Siamese Government to raise her European
loan he, though he had to
1 ... make a show of inviting international competition ... would
do his utmost to secure that it should be actually placed in 
London.' 42
In August 1902 Rivett-Carnac had argued for the loan to be split between 
London and Paris. Prince Devawongse and Prince Mahit were wise to entrust res­
ponsibility for the loan negotiations to PhrayS SuriyS.
However, in April 1903 the Government decided to postpone its decision on
a European loan. The previous month the French Chamber of Deputies had refused
43to ratify the Franco-Siamese treaty of 1902 , and with Franco-Siamese relations
under some strain it was felt by PhrayS SuriyS that a Siamese loan would receive
44little support in Paris : yet it was feared that if the Siamese Government
turned to Britain for the whole of her loan this would only aggravate the dis­
cord between Bangkok and Paris, making any future settlement even more difficult. 
On 24 April 1903 Prince Mahit telegraphed to Rivett-Carnac in London informing 
him that he was considering raising an internal loan of 20.0 m. baht under-
45written by the European banks in Bangkok . The Adviser immediately telegraphed
back his opposition to the proposal, pointing out that with the exchange value
of the baht not yet at its highest point, with a baht loan the Government would
lose heavily when it came to make its interest and capital repayments to its
46European creditors with baht of a higher exchange value . But negative criti­
cism from the Financial Adviser was of no assistance: to Prince Mahit - at that
point engaged in putting final touches to the 1903/04 budget estimates - it was
42. Memorandum, Interview with Mr. Rivett-Carnac. Campbell, 23 March 1903 
P.R.O. F.O. 69/250.
43» PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 16 March 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3* The 
1902 Agreement limited the right of registration for French subjects who were 
Asian. This 'registration' issue was finally settled in 1904. Rong Syamananda 
A History of Thailand Bangkok 1971 p- 151•
44. PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 21 March 1903 F.F.A. 25/2.
45- Prince Mahit to Rivett-Carnac, 24 April 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3•
46. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 25 April 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3»
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clear that the Government desperately needed to raise additional funds from 
somewhere
Though the revenue estimates for 1903/04 were encouraging - an estimated 
collection of 45*54 m. baht compared with an estimate of 39*00 m. baht in
431902/03 - it was clear that the increase in revenue would be insufficient to
xrover the Government's expenditure demands. That year Prince Mahit was faced
with the problem of finding funds for three major projects - the modernization
of the army (which involved an estimate of 3*74 m. baht in 1903/04 - 3r times
49the amount actually ppent on the army in 1898/99 )» the maintenance of forces
in the north, including the costs of putting down the Shan rebellion, and the
construction of the line to Uttaradit. The first two items could be covered
by the expansion in the revenue: the third - railway construction - could not.
The Railway Department had requested 6.0 m. baht in 1903/04 to continue its
work on the northern railway: it should not be forgotten that despite the
split within the Council over the raising of a European loan the Government
was still pushing ahead as rapidly as possible with construction of the line
to Uttaradit. Prince Mahit could find only 1.5 m. baht out of current revenue
50for the Railway Department . The Minister telegraphed to Rivett-Carnac: how
51should the 4.5 m* baht deficit be covered ?
52Rivett-Carnac replied on 1 May 1903 • The most advisable course would be
to meet the projected deficit from the Treasury reserves: Prince Mahit was
53reluctant to draw further from the reserves . The Government could sell some
47* Prince Mahit to Rivett-Carnac, 28 April 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3*
48. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 20.
49- R.F.A.B. 1901/02 p. 22: R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 21.
50. Prince Mahit to King, 4 May 1903 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/18.
51. Prince Mahit to Rivett-Carnac, 28 April 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3*
52. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 1 May 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3*
53* Prince Mahit to Rivett-Carnac, 30 ^ay 1903 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/3* From June
1902 to June 1903 the baht reserves of the Ministry of Finance fell from 9*3 m.
to 3*7 m. (Bi-annual reports from Prince Mahit to King regarding the size of 
the Treasury reserves, N.A.Kh. 7/8). As will be explained later, such a large 
drop in the reserves threatened the ability of the Ministry to satisfy the 
demands of the banks for baht in connection with the financing of the foreign 
trade of the Kingdom.
of its European investments: the Minister was reluctant to do that as well.
The Government could, after all, raise an internal loan, but, the Adviser 
warned, only as a last resort: but now it was learnt that the local branches
of the European banks would decline to underwrite such a loan. The only 
feasible alternative was a European loan. In mid-June Rivett-Carnac tele­
graphed to Prince Mahit that the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered
Bank were willing to underwrite a Siamese loan of £1.0 m. at 5 per cent and
54o9 or 90 nett, once the market was favourable .
On 7 July 1903 Prince Mahit wrote a long and very important letter to the
55King, reviewing the budget situation facing the Ministry of Finance . Most 
of the arguments advanced by the Minister in this letter were not new: the 
force with which they were put most certainly was. Prince Mahit began by em­
phasizing that the Government was already committed to investing heavily in 
several public works projects. 19*6 m. baht was required to construct the line 
to Uttaradit: to complete the line to Chiangmai would require a further 14.83 m
baht. In addition, a Dutch irrigation expert, van der Heide - engaged by the 
Siamese Government in 1902 - had just submitted his proposals for the develop­
ment of irrigation facilities in the Chao Phraya valley^. The Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture were at that moment considering the 
establishment of an enlarged Irrigation Department and the hiring of further 
irrigation engineers from abroad. The department would require substantial 
funds - 5*5 ffl. baht p.a. from 1906/07 - if van der Heide's proposals were to 
be implemented. There could be absolutely no question of the Government finding 
each year the high level of resources required for those two projects, simply 
from its current revenue.
Prince Mahit's fear was that faced with such a situation the Council of
Ministers, instead of deciding to proceed with the raising of a European loan,
would repeatedly postpone making a decision until the public works projects 
were abandoned.
54. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 17 June 1903/24 June 1903 Tele.N.A.Kh.25/3.
55. Prince Mahit to King, 7 July 1903 N.A.Kh. 25/3-
56. van der Heide General Report on Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam
Valley Bangkok, 1903.
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'If we wait [in proceeding with the public works projects] until 
we have the funds, then I must ask how many more eras will we 
wait: and then finally, where will the money come fro© ? ...
I feel that in this matter, our mistake is that we hesitate: we
do not make a quick, definite decision. In this situation ... 
we will eventually collapse into confusion and disarray.' 57
Prince Mahit then outlined the terms offered by the London banks and 
reported by Rivett-Carnac. The effective rate of interest was a little over 
6 per cent p.a., which compared favourably with the terras obtained by China, 
Japan and Turkey in recent loans. All the same, the Minister admitted, the 
Government could expect at best a direct capital return of only 4 per cent p.a. 
from the investment of the proceeds of the loan in railway construction. Yet 
an immediate financial loss could be avoided: according to van der Heide, the
irrigation schemes which he proposed - by charging the farmers for the use of 
irri ;ation water and by the sale of land newly opened up by the irrigation 
works - would give a capital return of 10 per cent p.a. Prince Mahit suggested 
that if a portion of the European loan, on which the Government would be paying 
approximately 6 per cent p.a., were to be invested in van der Heide's schemes, 
the net profit of almost 4 per cent p.a. could be used to cover the loss from 
the construction of the northern railway.
But the Minister of Finance always returned to his central argument: if
there was any further delay in raising the loan in Europe, then the Ministries 
of Public Works and Agriculture would have to be instructed to abandon - or at 
least severely curtail - their railway construction and irrigation schemes.
The Ministry of Finance was already finding it necessary to use the reserves to 
keep the first of those projects in motion, and yet if the current rate of ex­
penditure was continued without the support of a loan, the Treasury would be 
bankrupt in 1904/05. Of that the Minister was convinced.
It was an impassioned letter. Prince Mahit's annoyance, his frustration 
with the pedantic, leisurely and frequently irrelevant debate on the loan being 
carried on by the Ministers, was overwhelmingly clear. With considerable force, 
yet only slight exaggeration, he had demonstrated the seriousness of the Govern­
ment’s financial position. Remarkably, the letter appears to have had little 
immediate effect on the attitudes of Prince Mahit's colleagues.
57• Prince Mahit to King, 7 July 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/3-
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The reply to Prince Mahit came from Prince Devawongse . It was a disap­
pointing letter, devoted largely to restatements of earlier points, and to 
relatively trivial criticisms of Prince Mahit's numerical calculations. There 
were, however, one or two points of interest. First, Prince Devawongse had 
examined van der Heide's report in some detail: the Dutchman's proposals envi­
saged the construction of a system of irrigation canals in the Central Plain,
the principal aim being to ensure an optimum supply of irrigation water in the
59Chao Phraya valley each year . However, the cost of van der Heide's proposals 
was very high: the full programme was estimated to cost 47-0 m. baht spread
over twelve years, though there was a less ambitious scheme which was to cost
28.0 m. baht. Yet the engineer estimated that the value of the rice crop lost 
during a year in which the supply of rainwater was very poor was more than the 
full cost of his programme^0: it followed that within a matter of a few years
the revenue which the Government could have lost through a series of poor har­
vests would more than cover the cost of the investment. Prince Devawongse 
still thought the cost of the programme very high: in addition he was sceptical
whether the Government's return from its investment - particularly from the 
sale of irrigation water and newly irrigated land that was envisaged by van der 
Heide - would be as good as the engineer's report had suggested and as Prince 
Mahit had accepted. In short, the Minister argued that rather than commit 
itself to an expensive programme of irrigation works, the Government should 
proceed only with those projects which were certain to provide a substantial 
direct financial return. The irrigation report should be abandoned and van 
der Heide himself replaced. Prince Devawongse's views at this point were impor­
tant, not simply because they meant the rejection of Prince Mahit's idea that 
the return from the investments in irrigation could be used to cover the loss
58. Prince Devawongse to King, 18 July 1903 N.A.Kh. 25/3»
59- For a detailed examination of van der Heide's proposals see: James C.Ingrar
Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 Stanford 1971* pp« 81-83/196-202. For a 
more general discussion of irrigation projects in the Lower Menam Valley see: 
Leslie E. Small Historical Devdopment of the Greater Chao Phya Water Control 
Project: An Economic Perspective J.S.S. vol. 61 January 1973 PP» l-2*f.
60. van der Heide General Report on Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam
Valley p. U 7 .
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on the construction of the northern railway, but more particularly because they 
were the first clear indication of v/hat was to be the Siamese Government's 
attitude in that period to large-scale irrigation programmes and van der Heide's 
irrigation report.
Second, Prince Devawongse suggested that Prince Mahit had not seriously 
considered the alternative to raising a loan in Europe - a less ambitious public 
works programme. He proposed that the Government construct a limited railway 
system, limited to lines which would be financially profitable, though other 
outlying areas of the Kingdom would be served by road and track. Again it 
appears that Prince Devawongse would not really recognize that the northern 
railway was being built as rapidly as possible primarily for political and 
administrative reasons. In general, at no point in his letter did Prince 
Devawongse demonstrate that he had really grasped the essential argument being 
put forward by the Minister of Finance, nor that he was fully responsive to the 
urgency with which it was being made.
Prince Mahit replied quickly to Prince Devawongse*s criticisms^. He was 
prepared to give way in only one area: he would accept a reduction in the 
Government's irrigation programme to a scheme which would cost only 24.0 m. baht 
spread over six years: he was even prepared to postpone a decision on the irri­
gation proposals altogether, and devote the whole of the proposed European loan 
to railway construction. The crucial point, the point he had repeatedly empha­
sized, was that a European loan was urgently required if the Government was to 
maintain its policy of constructing as rapidly as possible the northern line 
as far as Uttaradit.
Prince Mahit's letter exhausted the debate in Bangkok. The Minister had 
already made his strongest plea for the loan in his earlier letter to the King 
on 7 July. All the arguments had been made - and restated. It was evident 
that the Council of Ministers was seriously, virtually irreconcilably, split 
over the question of the foreign loan, and that the drawn-out debate was doing 
little to shake Prince Mahit and Prince Devawongse and their supporters from 
their respective positions. The Council of Ministers met on 13 August 1903.
Prince Mahit to King, 28 July 1903 N.A.Kh. 25/3*
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Prince Devawongse had two contributions to make: first, he attacked Prince
Mahit, arguing that the Minister of Finance had published inadequate accounts 
of the Government's financial position, so that it was impossible to obtain any
62reliable figures as to the size of the reserves . Second, he argued that
1 ... whilst the revenues of the Government are still sufficieht 
to meet [the Government's] needs, I do not think it would be 
appropriate ... to rush out and borrow money from abroad as is 
being proposed here.' 63
It was true thgt the Ministry of Finance had been able to budget for a 
small revenue surplus for 1903/04: but as Prince Devawongse failed to acknow­
ledge, that surplus had been achieved only by allowing the Railway Department 
1.5 m. baht from current revenue in that year, instead of the 6.0 m. baht 
requested. The Minister of Foreign Affairs could not, or would not, grasp that 
simple fact of the Government's budget situation. However, the influence of 
Prince Devawongse in the Council was sufficient to prevent the Government 
reaching a decision: it appears that the King, in the absence of agreement, 
ordered the appointment of a committee of Ministers to examine the various
public works projects of the Government and to consider how they were to be 
64financed . A decision on the loan and on van der Heide's report was postponed.
Yet at the same time it was decided to continue with the rapid construction of
the line to Uttaradit. The allocation of 6.0 m. baht to the Railway Department
65was retained, 4.5 baht coming from the Treasury reserves . A further
3.0 m. baht was to be drawn from the reserves to cover part of the army's 
expenditure.^
62. P r in c e  M ah it t o  K in g , 14 A u g u st 1903/ P r in c e  D evaw ongse to  K in g , 24 A u gu st  
1903 N .A .K h . 5- 1/19.
63- Prince Devawongse to King, 24 August 1903 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/19-
64. Unfortunately, the only source of information on this meeting of the Council 
is Prince Devawongse's letter to the King (24 August 1903 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/19)- Nor 
is there any further information on the committee, apart from a reference in 
June 1904 (Note by King, 10 June 1904 N.A.Kh. 25/7) which stated that the com­
mittee comprised Prince Mahit, Prince Devawongse, Prince Damrong, Prince Narit 
and 6hao PhrayS Th5w5t, and that then - June 1904 - it had not completed its 
work. In view of the composition of the committee it is unlikely that its dis­
cussions differed greatly in content from the debate in which those Ministers 
had been engaged since December 1902.
65. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 1 2 .
66. Williamson to Rivett-Carnac, 29 August 1903 Tele. F . F . A .  25/2.
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To appreciate the full consequences of the decisions taken at the meeting
of the Council in August 1903 it is necessary to refer briefly to a related
issue - the management of the Kingdom's exchange mechanism. In November 1902
67Siam had abandoned the silver standard and adopted a gold-exchange standard
Under the new exchange mechanism one of the principal obligations of the
Ministry of Finance was to ensure that the Treasury always held sufficient
reserves of baht coin to meet all the demands of the Bangkok banks in connection
with the financing of the trade of the Kingdom. Were the Ministry to fail in
that obligation, the Kingdom's trade could grind to a halt. In November 1903
Rivett-Carnac, now returned from leave in Europe, submitted a long memorandum
68to Prince Mahit on the Government's cash reserves . He argued that the Govern­
ment could not allow its reserves to fall below 22.0 m. baht without endangering 
trade. In November 1903 they were down to 18.0 m. baht, and the 4.5 m. baht 
set aside for railway construction in 1903/04 had still to be withdrawn. It 
was possible, Rivett-Carnac argued, that by March 1904 the cash balances could 
be as low as 12 .0 m. baht.
The consequences were therefore clear. The more the Ministry of Finance, 
in the absence of a European loan, drew on the Treasury reserves to cover the 
cost of the railway construction programme, the greater the threat to its abi­
lity to secure sufficient baht to support the foreign trade of the Kingdom. 
Therefore, if the Council of Ministers failed to reach a decision with regard 
to the loan the possibility was that either the railway construction programme 
would have to be cut or the Treasury would be bankrupted - or both. And then 
that the foreign trade of the Kingdom would be severely disrupted.
In order to prevent further dramatic falls in the level of cash reserves 
Rivett-Carnac recommended a series of relatively drastic measures: first, that
there be no increased allocations above those already sanctioned in the budget - 
in particular, he noted, no additional expenditure on irrigation :
'Before we can think of a great Irrigation Scheme, we must provide 
funds for the strategic Railways which are essential if the out­
lying Provinces are to be properly governed. Those railways must
6?* This reform will be covered in some detail in Chapter VI.
68. Memorandum by the Financial Adviser upon the Cash Balances of the Govern­
ment. Rivett-Carnac, 25 November 1903 F.F.A. 30/6.
be constructed out of borrowed capital and I am altogether averse
to borrowing money for Irrigation at present, in addition to money
for Railway Construction. Such a course would be rash in the extreme.' 69
It will be evident from an earlier section that this was not the blow that
caused the rejection of van der Heide's proposals. There had been relatively
little enthusiasm for the report from Prince Devawongse and the Council of
Ministers, and even Prince Mahit had eventually been prepared to support only
a limited scheme. The report had been effectively shelved in August 1903: the
following November Rivett-Carnac was merely restating and agreeing with that 
70earlier decision .
Second, the Financial Adviser recommended that in future all expenditure
on the armed forces be met entirely from current revenue. Finally, he wanted
impressed on all Ministers the need for strict control over their budgets. It
was forceful advice, bluntly put. But the important point to note is that the
previous July Prince Mahit had presented the same general argument, perhaps
even more strongly, and yet had failed to convince the Council of the seriousness
of the financial situation. Rivett-Carnac's memorandum had no more success.
71Prince Mahit again wrote to the King in December 1903 • The Minister's
immediate object was to obtain the King's approval for the withdrawal of a 
further 3-4 m. baht from the Treasury to cover the projected budget deficit for 
1903/04: but his principal aim was to draw the attention of the King once again
to the dangers of the Government's financial position, particularly the alarming 
rate at which the reserves were disappearing. The King called a meeting of
senior Ministers, Prince Damrong, Prince Devawongse and Prince Mahit, though
72for reasons which are not clear the Minister of Finance was unable to attend
73The withdrawal of the additional funds from the Treasury was approved , but 
again a definite impression was given that on the wider issue the Ministers
69. ibid. My emphasis.
70. This is an important point which will be taken up in the final chapter: it 
shows that the Siamese Ministers, not the Financial Adviser, were responsible 
for the rejection of van der Heide's schemes.
71. Prince Mahit to King, 19 December 1903 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/21.
72. Prince Sommot to Prince Mahit, 16 January 1904 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/21.
73* King to Prince Mahit, 26 January 1904 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/21.
139
w ere s t i l l  f a i l i n g  t o  ack n o w led ge th e  f u l l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  c a s e  b e in g  pu t 
b y P r in c e  M a h it .
But the issue was now moving towards its climax. In May 1904 Prince Mahit
was working on the budget estimates for 1904/05. Revenue for the year was
estimated at 47-5 m. baht, but because of heavy demands for resources from, in
74p a r t i c u l a r ,  th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  th e  I n t e r i o r  , and th e arm y and th e n a v y , t o t a l
expenditure for 1904/05 was put at 57-389 m. baht - a projected deficit of 
759.889 m. baht . Prince Mahit was forced to cover the deficit in the only way 
open to him. In 1904/05 the full expenditure allocation of the Railway Depart­
ment - 6.0 m. baht - and the total cost of constructing a new arsenal for the 
army - 3-9 baht - were to be met from the reserves. This implied a drop of 
almost one half in the Government's cash reserves over the year. If during 
that year, the Minister warned, the Government was faced with a sudden crisis - 
the collapse of a major tax farm, an unexpected call for further expenditure - 
they would be in very serious financial trouble. One immediate consequence
would be that the Government would be unable to satisfy the demands of the 
76banks for baht . The budget estimates, the withdrawals from the Treasury,
the reduction in the size of the reserves by virtually one half, were sanctioned
77by the King without apparent comment .
Tie argument was repeated by Prince Mahit in a further letter to the King 
on 8 June 1904 . By 31 March 1905 the reserves would be down to 10.0 m. baht:
Rivett-Carnac regarded 22.0 ra. baht as the minimum safe level for the Government's 
cash reserves. Furthermore, if the Government maintained its current level of 
expenditure - its railway expenditure - the reserves would disappear altogether 
in 1906 or 1907. There was absolutely no alternative, he urged, but to raise
74. The allocation bf the Ministry of the Interior in 1904/05 was 10.988 m.
baht compared with an actual expenditure of 6.588 m. baht in 1903/04. R.F.A.B.
1905/06 p. 18 .
75. Prince Mahit to King, 9 May 1904 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/22.
76. ibid.
77. K in g  to  P r in c e  M a h it, 17 May 1904 N .A .K h . 5- 1/22.
78. P r in c e  M ah it to  K in g , 8 Ju n e  1904 N.A.Kh. 25/7.
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a loan in Europe. On receiving this latest letter from his Minister of Finance
the King wrote to Prince Damrong asking him whether the committee established
in August 1903 to look into the financing of the Kingdom’s public works projects
79had completed its investigations . Prince Damrong replied that it had not: 
in fact Prince Damrong argued that the whole issue, in effect the issue as to 
whether to raise a European loan or not, could not be separated from the ques-
80tion of Siam's political relations with the European Powers . Therefore it 
was felt that the opinion of the General Adviser, Edward Strobel, should be
81sought. The King agreed, and all the relevant documents were sent to Strobel
The decision to refer the matter to the General Adviser was taken not only, 
or perhaps not even primarily because it was felt that the European loan was a 
political issue. Rather it was an attempt to break the deadlock in the Council 
of Ministers, between Prince Mahit, who favoured the loan, and Prince Devawongse 
and Prince Narit who opposed it. The disagreement between these groups concer­
ned not simply the teirr.c upon which a loan could be raised, despite the fact
that much of their debate had centred around a delicate balancing of the possible 
direct financial return from the railway and irrigation projects against the 
effective rate of interest on a loan. It was essentially a disagreement between 
those who regarded a loan as the only means by which the Government's reform 
programme could be continued without inviting financial eollapse, and those who 
regarded it as a dangerous intrusion of foreign interests, a serious threat to 
Siamese sovereignty.
The inability of the Council of Ministers to reach a decision was a matter 
for considerable concern. Given the reform programme which the Government had 
set itself - in particular the rapid construction of the northern railway and 
the modernization of the array - and the financial constraints which it had 
accepted - the required level of cash balances - Prince Mahit's casey/as unanswer­
able. Yet despite js^ lmost two years of virtually constant argument, the Council
79. Note by Ming, 10 June 1904 N.A.Kh. 25/7-
80. Prince Damrong to King, 17 June 1904 N.A.Kh. 25/7 •
81. King to Prince Damrong, 22 June 1904 N.A.Kh. 25/7*
of Ministers as a whole remained unconvinced. The Minister of Finance lacked 
sufficient political influence to overcome the opposition of the cautious pro­
minent members of the Council,despite the fact that the King himself appears 
to have favoured the European loan. Indecision implied that no loan would be 
raised - and probable financial collapse. Therefore, at the suggestion of 
Prince Damrong, the Government appealed outside its own circle, to a foreign 
adviser. Strobel's major qualification in the circumstances was that he was 
impartial: he was an American (and in this period American banks were too
intent on developing the home market to interest themselves in a Siamese loan), 
and he was not attached to the Ministry of Finance. In contrast, the only other 
outsiders to whom the Council could have turned, Rivett-Carnac and his successor, 
Williamson, were British (and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank was a major conten­
der for the loan) and were employed in the Ministry of Finance.
82Strobel submitted his report on 25 October 1904 . First he pointed out
that when the matter of the loan had first been raised - in late 1902 - it had 
been possible to argue that the northern railway could be constructed from 
current revenue, though of course with a European loan construction would have 
been quicker. By 1904 the financial situation had radically altered: the
Government had run into a series of budget deficits, and was finding it impos­
sible to procure sufficient funds from current revenue to finance its public 
works projects - witness the fact that in 1904/05 the entire allocation for 
railway construction had had to be covered from the reserves. Therefore a loan 
was now essential if the Government was to continue with the construction of 
the northern railway. Second, Strobel referred to Rivett-Carnac1s November 1903 
memorandum advocating a minimum cash reserve of 22.0 ra. baht, and the fact that 
in October 1904 the reserves stood at 16.2 m. baht: he therefore suggested
that a European loan was also essential in order to restore the cask balances 
to their minimum safe level. Third, the General Adviser had a word of encourage­
ment for those who feared the political dangers of raising a loan in Europe :
82. Memorandum by the General Adviser on the Question of the Loan. Strobel,
25 October 1904 N.A.Kh. 25/5-
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'The states which become involved in serious difficulties are 
those ... which borrow money with great recklessness, spend it 
with great recklessness and thereby become exposed to the inter­
vention of foreign powers on behalf of their subjects who have 
loaned money and are unable to obtain any settlement. If, 
however, loans are made only because absolutely necessary and 
well within the capacity of the country to meet its obligations 
and with a proper financial administration, there is no danger 
resulting from a foreign loan; and it is only on the assumption 
that these conditions exist (as I believe they do) in Siam that 
I proceed to discuss the question.' 83
Finally, Strobel suggested, the Council of Ministers should reach a decision 
quickly, 'since the question has been discussed from every possible point of 
view.'
Within a few days Strobel's memorandum was supported by one from the
Financial Adviser, who was now Williamson.
' ... the loan has now become an absolute necessity, as the drain 
from the reserves which has been taking place for the last seven 
months has already weakened it very considerably, and if this is 
allowed to continue much longer, the financial administration of 
the Government will be in serious danger.' 84
This was plain speaking from both Strobel and Williamson, made more effec­
tive by the fact that neither of them was prone to exaggeration. But their 
argument was not new: Prince Mahit had been making exactly the same points to
his colleagues, with equal emphasis, for over a year.
85The Council of Ministers met on 18 November 1904 . From the outset the
King made it clear that they were there to make a decision, and that he wanted 
that decision to be one in favour of the loan. However, Prince Narit attempted 
to argue that it would be preferable to build the northern line slowly out of 
current revenue, but the argument was dismissed by Prince Mahit. The meeting 
was dominated by the King who argued that the need to raise the loan had been
established beyond doubt, and that conditions were now favourable for negotia-
86ting that loan • Prince Devawongse, from whom some opposition could have been
8 3. ibid.
84. Memorandum, Proposed Loan for Railway Construction, Williamson, 1 November 
1904 F.F.A. 25/2.
85. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 18 November 1904 
N.A.Kh. 25/8.
86. About this time - late 1904 - Siam and France reached a partial settlement 
of their political differences (D.G.E. Hall A History of South-East Asia London 
1968 pp. 699-700) and the way was open for the floating of at least part of the 
loan in Paris. There was now no danger of Anglo-French rivalry for the Siamese 
loan ruining a political settlement between Paris and Bangkok.
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expected, merely sought assurances from the Minister of Finance that Siam would 
be able to meet all the interest and capital repayments on the loan, and then 
agreed with the decision being sought by the King. In short, the King, streng­
thened by the memorandum from Strobel, broke the deadlock in the Council. At 
the end of the meeting Prince Mahit and Prince Devawongse were made responsible
for the raising of the loan.
Before briefly considering the actual negotiation of the 1905 loan, some 
reference should be made to Rivett-Carnac's departure from Siam, for as noted
above, by late 1904 he was no longer Financial Adviser. During Rivett-Carnac's
87leave in Europe in 1903» his wife had become seriously ill and by the time the
Adviser was due to return to Bangkok, in September 1903* it was clear that she
88had not long to live . Rivett-Carnac sailed for Siam alone at the beginning
of October on the understanding that he would return to Europe immediately his
89wife's condition warranted it . There could be no question of him continuing 
as Financial Adviser for more than a few months, and therefore on his return
to Bangkok Rivett-Carnac sought to ensure himself another post in the Siamese
Government - a post in Europe. He had a rather grandiose image of what that 
post could be. First he would be a financial agent for the Government in 
Europe - administering the Government's foreign investments, inviting tenders
for the supply of goods for the Ministries in Siam, organizing the payment of
90interest charges on the proposed loan • Second, he saw himself as a public
relations agent for the Siamese Government in Europe - writing anonymous letters
to the press about Siam, cultivating the interest of M.P.s, newspaper editors,
businessmen, in Siamese affairs in an attempt to encourage British public support
91for Siam in her disputes with the French . In order to execute that role, 
Rivett-Carnac argued, it was necessary that he be allowed complete access to
87. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Sommot, 27 March 1903 Tele. N.A. b. 2kh/to.
88. Correspondence between Rivett-Carnac and Prince Sommot, September 1903 
N.A. b. 2kh/40.
89. ibid.
90. Memorandum upon the Financial Work of the Siamese Government in Europe,
30 November 1903, Rivett-Carnac N.A.Kh. 1/37.
9 1. ibid.
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the papers dealing with the Kingdom's political relations with the European
92Powers • Such a suggestion was anathema to the Government, and in particular 
to Prince Devawongse. For Rivett-Carnac to spread intimate details of the 
latest Franco-Siamese negotiations all over the British press would be disas­
trous. However, the Government was prepared to employ Rivett-Carnac in the
93former role . In January 1904 the Financial Adviser left Siam to take up his
9I4.appointment as Financial Agent in Europe : it was understood that all commu­
nications he addressed to the press had to be cleared first with PhrayS SuriyS, 
and that in any statements he made on political matters he was to make it clear
that he was expressing merely his own opinion. It was also agreed that the
95Government could call him back to Siam for two months each year . His succes­
sor in Bangkok was V. J. F. Williamson, an officer who had been transferred 
from the Financial Department of the Government of India to Siam in May 1900
to assist in the Controller-General's Office, and to organize the establish-
96ment of the Paper Currency Department • He had been acting Financial Adviser
during Rivett-Carnac's absence in Europe in 1903*
As it turned out, despite being transferred to London, Rivett-Carnac
played a very small role in the actual negotiation of the European loan. The
97negotiations were entrusted to PhrayS Suriya in Paris . By early 1905* when 
the negotiations could begin in earnest, the principal competitor for the 
loan was a partnership of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Banque de
92. Memorandum. Press Campaign by the Financial Agent in Europe for H.S.M.G. 
Rivett-Carnac, 2 December 1903 N.A.Kh. 1/37*
93* Memorandum. Conversation between Prince Mahit and Mr. Rivett-Carnac 
regarding the appointment of the latter as Financial Agent in Europe. Rivett- 
Carnac, 12 January 1904 N.A.Kh. 1/37*
94. Paget to Lord Lansdowne, 16 January 1904 Desp. 5 P*R*0. F.O. 69/254.
95* Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac, 12 January 1904 N.A.Kh. 1/37-
96. Stringer to Lord Salisbury, 27 February 1900 Desp. 17 P.R.O. F.O. 69/206.
Walter James Franklin Williamson had joined the Indian Service in June 1888,
his first post being with the Burma Police. He then held various appointments 
in Hyderabad and Madras as a finance officer. In June 1896 he was promoted to 
Assistant Accountant-General in Madras, and this was the post he held when he 
was engaged by the Siamese Government. India Office List 1928.
97- Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 18 November 1904 
N.A.Kh. 25/8.
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L’Indo Chine . However, Phraya SuriyS began by throwing open the loan to as 
many European countries as possible, inviting offers from banks in Belgium, 
Switzerland, Holland, Denmark and Germany. The response was discouraging.
Each bank required either the customs revenue or the already-completed section
99of the railway as security . Rivett-Carnac then approached the Hongkong and 
100Shanghai Bank but the London bank offered only 92 nett at 5 per cent p.a.
though with no security^'*’.
On 30 January 1905 Phraya SuriyS wrote to Axel Johnson, the Siamese Consul
102ih. Stockholm, and asked him for his assistance • Johnson had been involved 
in earlier preliminary enquiries. The Consul immediately contacted a business 
associate, K. A. Wallenberg, a prominent Stockholm banker who had been involved 
in floating many public loans in Scandinavia, and the three men - Phraya SuriyS, 
Johnson and Wallenberg - met in Paris on 13 February and immediately began nego­
tiations with the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Banque de L'Indo Chine, 
now in partnership. Within three days agreement had been reached. The banks 
offered 90} nett at 4} per cent p.a.: it was understood that the Danish
Landtmanna Bank, of which Wallenberg was a director, would underwrite a small
part of the loan. Phraya SuriyS immediately telegraphed to Bangkok, asking
103permission to close the negotiations with those terms • He also telegraphed
to the Siamese Consul in Berlin enquiring whether the German banks were willing
to improve on their earlier offers, but the Germans turned down this last oppor-
104tunity to participate in the loan
98. In June 1904 PhrayS SuriyS had asked the £aris bank whether it was now 
willing to consider underwriting a Siamese loan. The bank consulted its Govern­
ment and decided to share the loan with the H.S.B. (Beckett to Lord Lansdowne,
4 October 1904 Desp. 57 P.R.O. F.O. 69/255). The London bank, after consulting 
the Foreign Office (Ewen Cameron to Campbell, 10 June 1904 P.R.O. F.O. 69/260) 
accepted the arrangement (Beckett to Lord Lansdowne, 4 October 1904 Desp. 57 
P.R.O. F.O. 69/255).
99• PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 23 March 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
100 Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 10 March 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/6.
101. PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 28 February 1905 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/5*
102. Axel Johnson to Prince Devawongse, 18 April 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
103. PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 16 February 1905 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/5*
104. PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 23 March 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
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Prince Mahit favoured acceptance of the terms offered . PhrayS SuriyS
was on the spot and if he felt that the best possible terms had been obtained,
then his judgement had to be accepted. The King agreed, but suggested that
despite the urgency the Council of Ministers would have to be consulted^-0^ .
The Council met on 27 February. Prince Devawongse reported that he had recently
received a visit from the Belgian Minister in Bangkok who had informed him that
a syndicate of Brussels banks wished to tender for the loan. But Prince Mahit
and the King were determined not to allow any difficulties to intrude at this
late stage - no one could improve on the terms before them. It was agreed to
107send a telegram of acceptance to PhrayS SuriyS
The final details of the loan contract were negotiated in London by PhrayS
108Suriya and Rivett-Carnac: the negotiations were completed on 9 March 1905
109and the contract signed ten days later • The loan was for £1.0 m., bearing
interest at 4j per cent p.a. and issued at 95i» It could be redeemed by the
Siamese Qovemment after ten years, but had to be repaid after not more than
40: the loan was secured on the general credit of the Kingdom. The loan was
issued on 24 March 1905* and within one hour the lists were closed^^, the
issue being over-subscribed eight times11 .^
'The credit of Siam has been instantaneously and firmly esta­
blished and has proved to be much better than that of any other 
Asian Power, •
112boasted Rivett-Carnac • Certainly no one could deny that Siam, with her first
105* Prince Mahit to King, 25 February 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
106. King to Prince Mahit, 26 February 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
107- Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 27 February 1905 N.A.Kh. 
25/8. Despite his raising the matter of the offer from the Belgium banks, there 
is no suggestion that Prince Devawongse was attempting to delay the signing of 
the loan contract: the Minister appears to have accepted at the Council meeting
in November 1904 that the loan would be raised. However, the determination of
the King and Prince Mahit to have the matter settled in February 1905 is very 
clear.
108. PhrayS Suriya to Prince Devawongse, 9 March 1905 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/5•
109. Axel Johnson to Prince Devawongse, 18 April 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
110.Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 24 March 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5»
111. R.F.A.B. 1905/06 p. 7.
Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 24 March 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/5*
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European loan had obtained remarkably favourable terms . Several minor 
factors contributed to the success of the 1905 loan. First, a relatively small 
sum had been borrowed, and hence the probability of Siam defaulting on her pay­
ments was correspondingly reduced. This in turn encouraged the confidence of 
European investors in the issue. Second, the London and Paris banks had agreed 
to reduce the rate of interest from 5 per cent p.a. to 4j per cent p.a. through
11 iffear, unwarranted fear as it turned out, of German competition for the loan • 
Third, in early March 1905 the British Government reduced Bank Bate from 3 per 
cent to 2j per cent and this made Siamese stock that much more attractive to 
London investors when it was issued^’1'*. Fourth, in mid-1905 political relations 
between Siam and the major European Powers were more settled than they had been 
for several years: undoubtedly that influenced European confidence in a
Siamese loan.
But there can be little doubt that the principal reason why Siam was able
to obtain such favourable terms on her first loan was because, as Prince Mahit
himself put it :
'the careful financial administration of the past few years and
the policy of publishing an annual statement of the budget figures,
have not been without their effect on financial circles in Europe.' 116
The awareness by European investors of the recent progress in Siam's 
financial administration also explains to a considerable extent why the loan 
contract contained no stipulations for specific security. The banks and inves­
tors were confident that Siam would meet all the charges on the loan, and
113
113* In 1904 and 1905 Japan raised three large loans in Europe, on terms 
ranging from 93i (gross) at 6 per cent to 90 at 4£ per cent: all three were
secured on either the customs revenue or the tobacco monopoly revenues. Ad­
mittedly, all were relatively short-term loans, raised to finance the war 
with Russia (T. F. M. Adams A Financial History of Modern Japan Tokyo 1964 
p. 4*6) so perhaps the comparison with the Siamese loan is unfair. But the 
most recent Chinese loan had been issued at 91 and 5 par cent p.a. (Phraya 
Suriya to Prince Devawongse, 28 February 1905 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/5)I Siam's 
loan, 95j at 4j per cent p.a., with no special security, could certainly 
stand comparison with that.
114. Memorandum. Siamese Loan of £1.0 m. Campbell 9 March 1905 P.R.O. F.O. 
69/269. The banks had originally intended to offer Siam 8? or 88 nett at 
5 per cent (Beckett to Lord Lansdowne, 4 October 1904 Desp. 57 P.R.O. F.O.
69/255).
115* Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 10 March 1905 N.A.Kh. 25/6. 
116. Prince Mahit to Rivett-Carnac, 4 way 1905 F.F.A. 25/2.
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confident that the loan would be used wisely
In this context it is important to note that the employment by the Siamese 
Government of a European Financial Adviser, a man who, if one judged solely 
from his published report on the budget held considerable influence in Siam, 
probably did much to reassure European investors of the safety of their invest­
ment. Nor should the influence in Europe of the frequent reports in ’The Times' 
by that paper's Peking correspondent on the current progress of the Kingdom be 
under-estimated, nor that of such favourable books as the one by Cecil Carte*18. 
Perhaps Siam's affairs were not so unknown in Europe as apparently her Govern­
ment sometimes thought they were.
The success of the loan was regarded as a personal triumph for PhrayS. 
SuriyS. In April 1905 he returned to Bangkok at the end of his term as Siamese
Minister in Paris, and was presented with the First Class Order of Merit and
119a 'magnificent' residence by the King : in addition the Council of Ministers
voted him **0,000 baht in recognition of his services in Paris. In June 1905»
in a re-shuffle of ministerial posts following the resignation of the Minister
120of the Palace, he replaced Prince Narit as Minister of Public Works . Within
a year he was Minister of Finance.
The full proceeds of the 1905 loan came to £905*000, which was equivalent 
121to 14.5 m. baht . Immediately, the 6.0 m. baht drawn from the reserves to 
meet the expenditure budget of the Railway Department in 1904/05 was repaid to 
the Treasury: in retrospect the Ministry of Finance had borrowed from the
122 areserves in 1904 in anticipation of the European loan . A further 5*3 m. baht
117* It is significant that although there was no legal obligation for the 
Government to make provisions for the repayment of the loan until 1911» it was 
nevertheless decided to establish a sinking fund immediately - In 1905 - using 
the profits from the railway (R.F.A.B. 1905/06 pp. 7-8)* The Government was 
ensuring its ability to honour its obligations with regard to the repayment 
of the loan.
118. A. Cecil Carter (ed.) The Kingdom of Siam New York 1904.
119. Bangkok Times, 1 June 1906.
120. Bangkok Times, 15 June 1905-
121. R.F.A.B. 1905/06 p. 7.
122. Prince Mahit to King, 17 May 1905 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/24. The funds drawn from 
the reserves in 1904 to cover the cost of the army arsenal were not repaid.
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was set aside for railway construction in 1905/06 so that in that year none of
the expenditure of the Railway Department was covered by current revenue. The
remaining proceeds of the loan were invested in Prussian and Egyptian stock
until they were required1,2^ .
There was little of particular note in the budget estimates for 1905/06.
In sending the estimates to the King, Prince Mahit expressed some concern that
the Government's revenue could suffer, partly because the prospects for the
year's rice harvest were poor, and partly because a number of the major tax
124farmers had bid dangerously high for their contracts : even so the Ministry
confidently estimated revenue for the year at 53*0 m. baht, an increase of
5*5 baht on the estimate for 1904/05. Expenditure was estimated at 52.87 m.
125baht, the major increase again being for the army . The estimates were
126approved by the Council on 20 nay 1905 without discussion or comment
However, the compilation of the budget for the following year - 1906/07 - 
brought familiar problems. Revenue was estimated at 54.7 a* baht, expenditure 
at 54.43m.baht, only a very slight increase over the figures for 1905/06. The 
Bailway Department was allocated 7*25 a. baht, though no part of this sum could 
be met from current revenue: at the same time, after the large allocations to
the Department in 190V05 and 1905/06, only 5*8 m. baht was left from the pro­
ceeds of the 1905 loan. Once again the Ministry of Finance was forced to call
on the Treasury reserves to cover the expenditure of the Government's major
127public works project • Already in 1905 the Government's caAbalances had
suffered further serious depletions when the ^angkok Government had made special
128loans to Kelantan, Kedah and Perils . In April 1906 Prince Mahit wrote to
the King arguing that within a year the Government would have to raise a further
129loan ; but this was a problem for the Minister's successor.
123* Prince Mahit to Rivett-Carnac, 11 May 1905 Tele. F.F.A. 25/2.
124. See Chapter VII.
125» Prince Mahit to King, 17 May 1905 N.A.Kh. 5« 1/24.
126. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 20 May 1905 N.A.Kh.5*1/9^
127. Prince Mahit to King, 18 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/25*
128. R.F.A.B. 1906/07 p. t-
129. Prince Mahit to King, 18 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/25-
2. Revenue and the closure of the gambling dens.
The budgetary difficulties faced by the Ministry of Finance in the period
1902 to 1906 were essentially on the expenditure side. The same had been true
in the early years of Prince Mahit's term as Minister - from 1896 to 1902 -
though, as was described in Chapter III, in that earlier period the Ministry's
problem been essentially that of persuading the other departments of the
Government to abide by the procedures laid down for the compilation of the
130expenditure budgets . From 1902 the problem was that the Government wished 
to finance a series of major projects which were beyond its immediate means.
The Ministry of Finance could maintain reasonable control over the allocations 
of the Ministries and departments: it could not provide sufficient funds to
finance all their expenditure programmes.
From 1902 until 1905 the Ministry of Finance never had cause to be serious­
ly concerned about the stability of the revenue. There was, it is true, 
increasing uneasiness over the financial precariousness of some of the major 
tax farms, but the Ministry did not have to face the actual collapse of one
of the 1890s the Government had enjoyed a very rapid growth in its revenue, 
partly as a result of improved administration and improved methods of tax 
collection, partly as a result of an increase in the prosperity of the people. 
This rapid growth continued into the following decade. Between 1902/03 and 
1906/07 Government revenue increased from 39*15 ». baht to 57*01 a . baht, an
130. In his budget letters to the King after 1902, it is remarkable how little 
Prince Mahit referred to problems of procedure in the compilation of the esti­
mates. Indeed, in submitting the 1906/07 budget, the Minister went so far as 
to acknowledge the co-operation and understanding of the Ministers in discus­
sing and compiling the estimates (Prince Mahit to King, 18 April 1906 N.A.Kh.
5* 1/25)* Tbe only serious difficulty experienced by the Ministry in this 
respect appears to have been the familiar one of the Ministries submitting 
their preliminary estimates behind schedule, with the result that the Ministry 
submitted the completed budget a month or two after the beginning of the new 
year. Prince Mahit made periodic attempts to overcome these delays - princi­
pally by introducing new methods by which the preliminary estimates were 
submitted to the Ministry, and new forms for the estimates - but success was 
slight (Prince Mahit to King, k May 1903 N.A.Kh. 5* l/l8: 18 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 
5* 1/25). Eventually the annual tardiness in the completion of the budget 
appears to have become accepted as unavoidable.
of its principal sources of revenue until From the second half
131* See Chapter VII.
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increase of 17*36 m. baht in the space of only four years . That was the 
situation facing the Ministry of Finance - a continuing rapid expansion in reve­
nue, but an even greater increase in Government expenditure. It was against 
that background that the Ministry took steps to abolish one of the Kingdom's 
principal sources of revenue - the gambling farms.
The policy of closing the gambling dens had been initiated by Prince 
NarSthip in the late l880s: however, the closures ordered by Prince Narathip
had all been concentrated in the Bangkok area. It was not until mid-1898 that 
attention was directed towards the dens outside the capital: in May of that
year Prince Damrong and Prince Mahit decided to abolish all the provincial
gambling farms where the revenue was small, or where the existence of the dens
133was found to be encouraging crime • At the same time the regulations which
had been framed for the Bangkok dens since 1888 - concerning such matters as
the forms of gambling allowed, the hours for which the dens could remain open,
and the restriction of gambling to licenced dens - were extended to the pro- 
134winces . A t  the annual meetings of the Provincial Governors in Bangkok in 
1899^^ and 1900^^ the Governors proposed the closure of additional dens in
137their areas: the Ministry of Finance accepted most of the proposed closures.
In fact, the effect of the Government's gambling den policy from the late 
1880s to 1901-02 was simply to bring gambling under greater control - to restrict
132. Taking the 20 years 1892/93 to 1911/12, the Government's revenue increased 
as follows :
1892/93 15.37m. baht 1906/07 57-Olm. baht Source: R.F.A.B. Series
1896/97 20.64 m. baht 1911/12 61.49 m. baht
1901/02 36.15 m. baht
Therefore the major increase in revenue took place in the decade 1896/97-1906/07» 
and within that period the years 1901/02-1906/07* The dramatic reduction in the 
rate of increase in the revenue receipts did not occur until after the resigna­
tion of Prince Mahit in 1906.
133* Prince Mahit to King, 11 May 1898 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/8(g).
134. Prince Damrong Ru'ang tamn&n k&nloekbftnbia lae loek huai (The Abolition of
Gambling Dens and the Huai Lottery) Bangkok i960 p. 47*
135* Prince Mahit to King, 21 December 1899 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/12(g).
136. Prince Mahit to King, 12 Oecember 1900 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/13 (&)•
137* la Fact, Prince Mahit accepted virtually all the proposed closures up to 
1899/1900, but considerably less after that date, for fear of the effect on 
the revenue.
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legal gambling to a relatively few, strictly regulated establishments. This 
had two related consequences. First, it assured the Government of a higher 
proportion of the full value of its gambling revenue: indeed, the revenue from
l-zggambling increased from 1.832 m. baht in 1892/93 to 5*244 m. baht in 1900/01. 
Therefore tighter control over the Kingdom's gambling dens did not lead to a 
reduction in the Government's dependence on that morally reprehensible source 
of revenue - quite the opposite. Second, there is very little evidence that 
the restrictionist policy pursued up to 1901 actually reduced the amount of 
legal gambling carried on in the Kingdom, though judging by the preambles to 
its gambling legislation the Government was very concerned about the moral 
effects of such activity on the Chinese and Siamese populations: indeed the
high level of Chinese immigration during this period - that alone - would have 
implied an increase in the amount of gambling. At the same time it was clear 
that at some point the restrictionist policy would begin to bite - that the 
continued closure of gambling dens would lead to a reduction in the Government's 
revenue, and in the level of legal gambling. In the early 1900s Prince Mahit 
felt that that point had been reached.
In August 1903 Prince Damrong proposed to the King that the Government 
should consider reducing, if not abolishing, all the provincial gambling farms^ 
This proposal was discussed by Prince Damrong with Prince Mahit over a period
liiQof 15 months until finally, on 15 December 1904, they presented their views
141to the Council of Ministers . As was to be expected, Prince Mahit's major 
fear concerned the difficulty of finding alternative sources of revenue to com­
pensate for the loss of income from the provincial gambling dens - approximately
4.0 m. baht p.a. In reply Prince Damrong proposed that the alternative revenue 
could be raised principally through an increase in the rates of land tax. In 
fact the Minister of the Interior wished to see the Bangkok dens closed at the
138. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 22-23.
139* Prince Damrong to King, 4 August 1903 N.A.Kh. 14. Ikh/l8(g).
1^0. Prince Damrong to Prince Sommot, 13 February 1904/King to Prince Damrong,
14 February 1904 N.A.Kh. 14. Ikh/l8(g).
141. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 15 December 1904 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ikh/l8(g).
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same time as those in the provinces, otherwise, he argued, all the gamblers and 
criminals in the Kingdom would flock to the capital once the provincial dens 
disappeared. The loss of revenue involved in closing the Bangkok dens - approxi­
mately 3*0 m. baht p.a. - would be made good, Prince Damrong suggested, princi­
pally by an increase in import duties, an increase which would have to be 
negotiated with the Treaty Powers.
Prince Mahit was very reluctant to agree to the Closure of the Bangkok dens. 
The sudden removal of all opportunities for legal gambling in the Kingdom would 
be certain to disturb, in particular, the Chinese population and could even lead 
to riots. Furthermore, were it to be decreed that in future only the Chinese 
were to be allowed to gamble, the effect would be to turn Bangkok into a Chinese 
city overnight. Prince Mahit's caution had an effect: the Council of Ministers
decided to defer a decision on the Bangkok dens but to proceed with the aboli-
lii2tion of those in the provinces
Immediately Prince Damrong instructed F. C. Giles, the head of the 
Provincial Revenue Department, to prepare detailed proposals for raising addi­
tional revenue from the land tax to replace that to be lost by the abolition
l l f3of the provincial dens • In this the Siamese Government was to take advantage
of the provisions of a Land Tax Agreement signed with Britain in 1900. Under
this agreement Britain had agreed to the abolition of the 'Schedule of Taxes
on Garden-Ground, Plantations, or Other Lands' which was attached to the
Supplementary Agreement drawn up with Sir Harry Parkes in May 1856. According
to the treaty signed with Sir John Bowring in 1855» British subjects purchasing
or renting real property in Siam were to 'be subject to the same taxation that
ILLis levied on Siamese subjects' • Similar clauses existed in each of the com­
mercial treaties signed by Siam. The agreement signed with Parkes repeated the 
assurance over equal taxation, but then went one stage further in insuring
142. ibid.
143- Memorandum containing proposals as to the manner in which revenue can be 
raised to supply the deficiency which will be caused by the abolition of gamb­
ling in the Provinces, F. C. Giles 7 January 1905 F.F.A. 2/Z N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/
18(g).
144. Article 4 of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1855-
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that British subjects would not be vulnerable to the introduction of high land
taxes: the attached schedule stipulated the exact rates of taxation to be
levied on the various trees, crops and types of land covered in the original 
145treaty clause . Though the Schedule appeared only in the agreement with
Britain, the other Powers benefitted from its provisions by virtue of most-
146favoured-nation clauses in their own treaties with Siam
From the Siamese point of view the Schedule was clearly iniquitous. First,
it was obsolete: in the 40 years following the signing of the agreement the
value of silver baht in which the tax was assessed had fallen more than 100 per
cent, whilst the value of agricultural products had increased by some 300 per
cent: as a result the real value of the revenue raised from the land had been
147dramatically reduced . Furthermore, as the Schedule allowed for an assessment 
of the number of trees liable for tax only once in each reign, inevitably, with 
the current reign in its fourth decade, some people were being taxed for trees 
or crops which no longer existed, whilst new plantations escaped taxation alto­
gether. Second, and more importantly, the Schedule froze the level and structure
of land taxation in Siam, preventing the Government from raising what it felt
148was a justifiable proportion of its revenue from the land
Negotiations with Britain over the abolition of the Schedule were begun in
mid-1898, negotiations i$ which both Mitchell-Innes and Rivett-Carnac played an 
149important role . Eventually the British Government agreed to the abrogation 
of the Schedule in return for an alternative assurance that British subjects 
would not be vulnerable to high rates of land taxation: at the suggestion of
145. For example: 'Mango trees: one fuang per tree p.a. (section^): Pineapples:
one fuang per 1,000 plants p.a. (section 2)'.
146. In effect the tax restrictions also applied to the Siamese population: see 
Chapter I, p.iff fn. 3
147. Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac 31 August 1899, N.A.Kh. 14/21. According to 
Rivett-Carnac, in many instances by 1899 the tax on fruit trees represented 
less than 156 of the profit to the owner.
148. Rivett-Carnac pointed out that whereas in Burma the revenue derived from 
the land was approximately 27*0 m. rupees p.a., in Siam it was equivalent to 
just over 2.0 m. rupees p.a. (Memorandum, 31 August 1899 N.A.Kh. 14/21).
149. Memorandum on the subject of increased taxation, Mitchell-Innes, 21 May 1898 
N.A.Kh. 17. 3/2. Memorandum, Rivett-Carnac, 31 August 1899 N.A.Kh. 14/21.
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Rivett-Carnac the Siamese Government gave an undertaking that in no case would
150the taxation on land in the Kingdom exceed that on similar land in Burma .
The agreement was signed in September 19001^.
In 1905 Giles proposed that the freedom allowed by the 1900 agreement be 
used to sweep away the existing land tax system in the Kingdom. In future the 
land would be divided into six classes according to the fertility of the soil, 
the price of rice in local markets, the ease of communications with the market, 
and distance from the rice mills. The rates of taxation would rise from a mini­
mum of 24 atts per rmi (the maximum rate under the old system) to 1 baht per
152rai, with approximately half the land in the Kingdom taxed at the top rate 
Giles estimated that under the new system the land tax would raise 6.2 m. baht 
p.a., an increase of 3*7 m. baht p.a. on the yield from the existing land tax 
structure.
Giles' proposals for the land tax and the related issue of the Government's
policy towards the abolition of the Kingdom's gambling dens were discussed by
the relevant Ministers in late 1904 and early 1905^*, culminating at a meeting
held at the Ministry of Finance on 14 January 1905 attended by the Ministers
of Finance, the Interior, the Capital and Agriculture, by Giles, and Lawson,
154the Bangkok Commissioner of Police • It was decided to close the remaining 
dens in the Kingdom gradually, over a period of three years. In 1905/06 all 
the provincial dens which yielded less than 50,OCX) baht in 1904/05 were to dis­
appear: the remaining provincial dens would be closed in 1906/07. the Bangkok
dens were to be abolished in 1907/08. At the suggestion of Prince Damrong the 
closure of the Bangkok dens was to be linked to an application to the Treaty 
Powers for a renegotiation of the restrictions on the taxation of the Kingdom's
150. Memorandum, Rivett-Carnac 31 August 1899 N.A.Kh. 14/21.
151. Archtor to Lord Salisbury, 22 September 1900 Desp. 63 P.R.O. F.O. 69/208. 
There was one small amendment to the safeguard proposed by Rivett-Carnac: taxa­
tion on land in Siam was not to exceed that levied on similar land in Lower 
Burma, the reason being that the tax rates in Lower Burma were uniform, those 
in Upper Burma were not.
152. Giles, Memorandum, 7 January 1905 F.F.A. 2/2 N.A.Kh. I4.1kh/18(g).
153* Prince Mahit to King, 9 January 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/18(g).
154. Prince Mahit to King, 16 January 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ikh/I8(g).
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foreign trade: in that way, if the Powers refused to allow an increase in the
duties they, not the Siamese Government, would be responsible for the continued
existence of the Bangkok gambling dens. Prince Damrong was convinced that this
moral lever would be effective. Finally the meeting approved the tax increases
designed to cover the losses resulting from the abolition of the provincial
dens in 1905/06 and 1906/07 - principally the reorganization of the land tax,
but also increases in the rates of capitation tax in Chumpqn, Nakqn Sritammarat
and Puket, and the reform of the Fishery Tax1^ .  Two days later the scheme was
passed by a full meeting of the Council of Ministers^*. Time was short: within
three months the first stage of closing the smaller provincial dens would come
into operation. On 18 January 1905 Strobel was instructed to prepare for the
157negotiations with the Treaty Powers •
In 1905/06 all save 22 provincial farms were closed, and the number of
158Bangkok dens reduced to 13 • In many provinces the closure of the gambling
dens was cause for several days of public celebration, often led by the
159Provincial Governor . Messages were received from anti-gambling leagues and 
from missionary societies throughout the world^^. The last of the provincial
dens were closed, as planned, during the year 1906/07.
Inevitably the Government's revenue from gambling dropped dramatically, 
from a peak of 6.87 m. baht in 1904/05 to 3*60 m. baht in 1906/07. But as was 
intended, the loss was easily covered by the increases in the revenue from the 
land tax and fishery taxes: revenue from that head, which had stood at 3*81 m.
baht in 1901/02 and 4.72 m. baht in 1905/06, jumped to 8.37 m* baht in 1906/07 
and then to 8.56 m. baht in 1907/08^^. By reducing its revenue from gambling)
15 5. ibid.
156. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 16 January 1905 N.A.Kh. 
14. Ikh/l8(g).
157* King to Prince Devawongse, 18 January 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/18(g).
158. Prince Damrong Ru'ang tamnSn kSnloekb^nbia lae loek huai (Tbs Abolition of 
Gambling Dens and the Huai Lottery) Bangkok, I960 pp. 49-50.
159* Prince Damrong to Prince Sommot 27 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/18(g).
160. Hamilton King (U;S. Minister in Bangkok) to Prince Devawongse, 20 April 1905
N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/18(g).
161. R.F.A.B. Series.
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by making good that loss by increasing its revenue from the land, the Government 
had achieved an important objective: it had begun to lessen its dependence on
what the Government itself regarded as a particularly obnoxious source of reve­
nue. It had begun to remove a social evil without damaging the revenue. There 
remained the 13 farms in the capital.
By late 1905 Strobel was prepared to approach the Powers officially with
162the request for a renegotiation of the Commercial Treaties . The General 
Adviser thought that the Siamese case would be strengthened if the Powers were 
informed that the Government intended to use the proposed increase in import 
duties not simply to close the Bangkok dens but also to abolish certain inland 
transit duties and export taxes which were considered harmful to trade. In 
January 1906 each of the Powers was informed of the Siamese Government's pro­
posals and given the obligatory 12 months' notice of the Government's intention 
to renegotiate the Treaties1^.  Strobel then left for the United States on 
leave with the intention of visiting each of the major European capitals on 
his way back to Bangkok, and of taking up the negotiations in earnest on his 
actual return to Siam1^ .  In reply to the Siamese note the French Government 
made it clear from the beginning that they wou&d require a substantial quid pro
quo for a renegotiation of their commercial treaty with the Kingdom: it was
l65suggested that Siam might consider making some concessions over Battambong •
The French reply was almost certainly echoed in private by the other Powers.
When the official Siamese note was received in London in February 1906, the 
Foreign Office quickly prepared a list of possible quid pro quo - the granting 
to British subjects of the right to hold land in the Chiangmai area, the dred­
ging of the bar at the mouth of the Chao PhraylRiver, the erection of buoys
162. Strobel to Prince Devawongse, 4 December 1905 N.A.Kh. 17. 3/6.
16 3. Enclosed with: Strobel to Prince Devawongse, 4 December 1905 N.A.Kh.17.3/6.
164. Strobel to Prince Devawongse, 4 December 1905 N.A.Kh. 17. 3/6.
165* Memorandum of a conversation hetween the Siamese Minister in Paris and 
M. Boissonnas (French Foreign Ministry), 22 February 1906. Enclosed with Prince 
Devawongse to Prince Sommot, 12 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 17. 3/6. Under the terms of 
her 1893 Agreement with France, Siam was required to remove all her forces from 
the Cambodian Province of Battambong. Thereafteethe French Government frequently 
applied diplomatic pressure to Siam to abandon all her claims to sovereignty 
over the Province: this Siam did in 1907.
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and markers along the Siamese coast, and an undertaking not to increase
. , .. 166 export duties •
But the Siamese proposals were never put to the Powers. When Strobel
visited London in January 1907 there is no record of the matter being discussed
l67at least officially . However, when the Adviser returned to Bangkok he sug­
gested to the British Minister that perhaps an agreement allowing for an increai
in the Kingdom's import duties could be worked into a larger agreement by which
168the Siamese Malay States would be transferred to Britain . It would appear 
that when the Siamese Government realized that each of the Powers would demand 
substantial concessions from Siam in return for a renegotiation of the commer­
cial treaties, it was decided to abandon the strategy arrived at in early 190^' 
It was not simply that each individual concession made by Siam would, when taker 
together, have implied a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Kingdom: pez
haps more importantly, agreement with each Power - the careful balancing of quid 
pro quo against quid pro quo - had to be reached at approximately the same time, 
and by 1907/08, when the Bangkok dens were to be closed. It was clearly an 
impossible task. Instead, Britain and Siam came to an agreement over the trans­
fer of the Siamese Malay States in 1909 that involved no concessions over the 
import tariff. Similarly, in 19071 Siam surrendered the Cambodian Provinces of 
Battambong and Siemrap to France, but in return for the abandonment by France
of her claims for extra-territorial jurisdiction over her Asiatic subjects, not
170for concessions with regard to the commercial treaty •
The failuirto renegotiate an increase in import duties meant, of course, 
that the Bangkok dens remained open after 1907/08. The point had been put 
firmly by Williamson a few years earlier :
166. Minute attached to: Raja Nuprabrandh (Siamese Minister in London) to Sir 
Edward Grey, 5 February 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 371/131*
167. Memorandum, Conversation with Mr. Strobel. Malay Peninsula Railway. 
Campbell, 16 January 1907 P.R.O. F.O. 371/385-
168. Strobel to Paget, 1 July 1907 P.R.O. F.O. 371/331.
169. None of the records in Bangkok, in the National Archives, the Ministry of 
Finance, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offer an explanation as to why 
the Government made no attempt to renegotiate the commercial treaties as 
originally intended.
170. D. G. E. Hall A History of South-East Asia London 1968 pp. 700-701.
'State regulated gambling is, doubtless indefensible on moral 
and other grounds, but the practical administrator has to take 
facts as he finds them ••• The question in Siam is entirely one 
of ways and means, and the Government, having once put its hand 
to the plough in the matter of progress on modern lines, cannot 
afford for merely sentimental considerations, to cripple the 
administration by voluntarily surrendering so large a portion 
of its annual income as the abolition of the Gambling Farms 
would entail.' 17 1
- a severely practical view, and clearly one shared by Prince Mahit.
However, it was only a matter of a few years before the Siamese Government
found 'the ways and means' to complete the reform initiated by Prince NarSthip
in the late 1880s, and although this is a matter outside the immediate scope
of this chapter, it would be as well to consider it briefly here. In January
1909 when the Bangkok gambling farms for 1909/10 came up for auction, their
172number wgs reduced from 13 to 11, and then in 1910/11, to 9* Even so the
173Government managed to maintain the level of its revenue from gambling ,
largely because as other tax farms were abolished - the spirit and opium farms
as well as the other dens - the tax farm syndicates were forced to compete for
174an increasingly smaller number of gambling dens • In 1911/12 the number of
175dens was cut to five. According to W. A. Graham, at about this time an
informal anti-gambling league was formed in Siam to press the Government for
the final abolition of the gambling farms in the Kingdom, and for the abolition
of the important farmed lottery the 'Huai'1^ .  In 1913/14 and 1914/15 there 
were large budget surpluses, amounting to almost 20.0 m. baht, and the
171. R.F.A.B. 1904/05 p. 7*
172. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 30 January 1909/22 February 1910 N.A.Kh. 14. 
2kh/10.
173* The revenue from gambling was 3*07 m* baht in 1908/ 09, and 3*43 m* baht 
in 1910A 1.
174. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 3 March 1910 N.A.Kh. 14. 2kh/l0.
175* Prince Damrong Ru'jang tamn&n k&nloekb$nbia lae loek huai p. 51*
176. W. A. Graham Siam vol. 1 London 1924 p. 340. Although the Huai was an 
important source of revenue (yielding 3*06 m. baht in 1910/1 1 ) no mention has 
been made of it until this point, principally because for the period covered 
by this study, it operated without causing the Ministry of Finance any serious 
problems. For a detailed study of the Huai see: B. 0. Cartwright The Huey 
Lottery in, The Siam Society 50th Anniversary Commemorative Publication, Bangkok ; 
1954 vol. 1 1904-1929 pp* 131-149* The article is based on Prince Damrong's 
work noted above: Ru'ang tamn&n k&nloekb$nbia lae loek huai (The Abolition of 
Gambling Dens and the Huai Lottery) Bangkok i960.
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Government took the opportunity to use the large increase in its reserves to
177abolish the lottery in April 1916 . The remaining Bangkok gambling dens were
finally closed in April 1917^^.
3. The resignation of Prince Mahit, May 1906: the 'Book Club1.
179Prince Mahit resigned as Minister of Finance at the end of May 1906 .
In the earlier part of that year his health had become very poor - partly as 
the result of his having to deal with a major crisis in the operations of the 
opium monopoly In 1903 - and he was forced to seek leave of absence from the
v'Ministry. Prince Chanthaburl, the Controller- General, became acting Minister 
180of Finance , and indeed it was he who had carried out most of the work on
l8lthe compilation of the 1906/07 budget • Therefore the official announcement
182in mid-1906 that Prince Mahit had resigned for reasons of ill-health was
not unexpected. Yet it was suggested at the time - principally by the Bangkok 
™  183Times - that Prince Mahit had found it necessary to resign on account of his 
interest in a business enterprise known as the 'Book Club1.
The 'Book Club' - it was actually called the 'Book Club' in Siamese - was
18 Ufounded by Prince Mahit in October 190*f: it was in fact a bank . It would
appear that Prince Mahit'6 principal objective in establishing the 'Book dub' 
was to attempt to break the European monopoly of banking institutions in Siam. 
It is perhaps significant that the plans for the bank began to take shape in
177. R.F.A.B. 1916A7 p. 5 .
178. R.F.A.B. 1917/18 P* 3- In fact the growth of revenue from other sources 
covered the revenue lost by the abolition of the remaining farms, and there was 
no need to use the reserves.
179* Bangkok Times, 29 May 1906.
180. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Chanthaburl, 31 March 1906 F.F.A. 1/2.
181. Prince Mahit to King, 18 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 5- 1/25.
182. Bangkok Times, 6 June 1906.
183. Bangkok Times, 29 May 1906.
lSlf. Unless otherwise noted, the whole of this section is based on an official 
publication of the bank, now known as the 'Siam Commercial Bank' Thlralu'k 
wanpoet samnakngSn yai thariRkhSLnthaiphS.nitchamkat (A Commemorative Volume on 
the opening of a new head office for the Siam Commercial Bank) August 1971.
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mid-1903, only some six months after the Ministry and the European banks had 
been in dispute over the way in which the Government had abandoned the silver
18sstandard . The bank was called the 'Book Club* for several reasons: first,
Prince Mahit feared that the Siamese population, unfamiliar with banking insti­
tutions, would be reluctant to deposit their money in a business calling itself 
a bank: they would be amused and intrigued by a 'Book Club'. Second, the
Europeans in Siam would assume that the enterprise was some form of public 
library: therefore, were the 'Book Club' to fail the managers of the enterprise
would suffer relatively slight embarrassment and would be able at some point in
186the future to revive the bank, undoubtedly under yet another guise
The 'Book Club' began business on 4 October 1904 in a building belonging 
to the Privy Purse Department. The bank was under the administration of Prince 
Mahit, though it would appear that at this early stage the general public were 
unaware of the very close involvement of the Minister of Finance with the new 
enterprise^^. It was a success. In early 1906 Prince Mahit decided that it 
was safe to remove the facade of the 'Book Club' title, and to reveal the true 
character of the business. In April of that year the 'Book Club' was formed 
into a company, and some 3*000 shares were issued in order to raise more capital: 
almost 600 shares were purchased by two European banks, the Deutsche Asiatische 
Bank and the Danish Landtmanna Bank, of which K. A. Wallenberg, the Stockholm 
banker who had assisted PhrayS SuriyS in the final negotiations of the 1903 
loan was a director. Then Prince Mahit appointed a committee of seven - inclu­
ding three European employees of the German and Danish shareholders - to adminis­
ter the daily business of the bank from April 1906. From that date the 'Book
Club' was recognized as a banking institution mainly concerned with advancing
188capital on land mortgages, but also involved in exchange business
I85. See Chapter VI.
186• As far as the European community was concerned, the ruse was unsuccessful.
On 3 October 1904 the Bangkok Times reported that the 'Book Club' was 'a general 
commission agency, a bank and other things'. The newspaper was, however, mis­
led by the name in another 6ense: on 16 February 1906 it informed its readers
that 'Book Club' was a corruption of a Pali word I
187. Bangkok Times, 3 October 1904.
188. Paget to Sir Edward Grey, 14 May 1906, Tele. 4 P.R.O. F.O. 371A32.
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It was at that point that Prince Mahit ran into difficulties. According
to the British Minister, Paget, the Minister of Finance used his official posi-
189tion to support his new bank against the established European banks . For
example, an undue proportion of the Governments business was given
to the 'Book Club': in addition, many of the Government's accounts at the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank were transferred to the
Siamese Bank. It was also alleged by Paget that Prince Mahit used his influence
to persuade the more important local customers of the European banks, such as
the opium farmer and wealthy Chinese rice-millers, to move their accounts to
the 'Book Club'. The Foreign Office in London felt that these were insufficient
grounds for an official complaint, for it was argued that the Siamese Government
190were free to place their banking business with any institution they liked •
But a private complaint was made by Paget to the Assistant General Adviser,
Westengard. The next the British Minister heard was that the whole matter had
been laid before the King by Prince Devawongse, that Prince Mahit had denied
all accusations of malpractice, but faced with an unsympathetic Council
191of Ministers, had resigned . In a letter to Paget, Westengard added the view
that Prince Mahit had resigned in order 'to shield the Government from any
192annoyance or difficulty* •
It is extremely unlikely that Prince Mahit was forced to resign because 
of this controversy involving the 'Book Club'. It was hardly a serious matter: 
even if Paget's accusations were justified, this was certainly not malpractice
on a large scale. However, it is possible that Prince Mahit's opponents in the
Council used the embarrassment caused by the British Minister's allegations as 
a lever to force the resignation of the Minister of Finance: in other words,
that the 'scandal* was the immediate cause but not the fundamental factor 
behind Prince Mahit's departure. Undoubtedly in mid-1906 the Minister had
189. Paget to Sir Edward Grey, 15 May 1906 Desp. 30 P.R.Oi? F.O. 371/132.
190. Minute attached to: Paget to Sir Edward Grey, 15 May 1906 Desp. 30 P.R.O. 
F.O. 371A32.
191. Paget to Sir Edward Grey, 30 May 1906 Desp. 3*f P.R.O. F.O. 371/132.
192. Westengard to Paget, 1 June 1906. Enclosed with: Beckett to Sir Edward
Grey, 12 June 1906 Desp. 37 P.R.O. F.O. 371/132.
163
opponents in the Council - perhaps Prince Devawongse, resentful of Prince Mahit' 
success in floating the European loan, following their forceful debate on the 
issue between 1902 and 1904. But the record gives no suggestion as to who those 
opponents might have been, or even whether there was such a move against Prince 
Mahit in 1906.
On balance the available evidence suggests that Prince Mahit resigned 
simply because of poor health. The ten years at the Ministry had been years 
of considerable achievement, but they had also placed a tremendous strain on 
the Minister, particularly since even from his first days at the Ministry his 
general health had been suspect. The struggle in the late 1890s and early 
1900s to force the Ministries to accept the pre-eminence of the Ministry of 
Finance in budgetary matters, the decision to abandon the silver standard in 
late 1902 and the subsequent responsibility of administering a goii-exchange 
mechanism, the exhausting debate over the European loan from 1902, the crisis 
in the opium and spirit farms in 1903 and 1906, were ohly the major demanding 
problems which he had had to face. The small controversy over the 'Book Club* 
was but the final difficulty which, coming as it did only a month or two after 
his enforced absence from the Ministry on sick leave, persuaded Prince Mahit 
that the time had come to step down.
He lived just long enough to see the 'Book Club' complete its transforma­
tion into a bank. On 30 January 1907 the 'Book Club' received a Royal Charter 
and became the Siam Commercial Bank, the first indigenous bank in the Kingdom. 
Within three months Prince Mahit was dead: he died of consumption on 13 April
1907, aged just 44193.
193- RStchasakunwong (Royal Genealogy) Bangkok 19&9* Bangkok Times, 16 April 
1907.
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CHAPTER V
The Ministry disunited and revived, 1906 - 1910
The King appears to have had little difficulty in finding a successor to 
Prince Mahit, and undoubtedly this contributed to his willingness to allow the 
Minister to resign. The new Minister of Finance was PhrayA SuriyS. His quali­
fications for the post were impressive. First he was widely credited with the 
successful negotiation of the 1905 European loan. In addition he had had some 
experience of financial administration, having in the 1890s worked in some of 
the northern treasuries as an official of the Ministry of the Interior^. He 
was also well acquainted with European financial and administrative methods, 
an increasingly important qualification for a Minister of Finance as the respon­
sibilities of the Ministry - for the exchange mechanism, for loans - brought 
it into greater contact with the world outside Siam. PhrayA SuriyA had been
educated in Penang and Calcutta and had spent many years in the Siamese Legations
2in Europe, finishing as Siamese Minister in Paris • He had had ministerial 
experience, at the Ministry of Public Works from mid-1905. Finally, in view 
of the impressive welcome he had received from the King and the Council of 
Ministers on his return from Paris in 1905^, it would appear that he was widely 
respected within the Government. There was every indication that his appoint­
ment as Minister of Finance from June 1906 would be a success.
In fact it was a dramatic failure. By January 1908 - a mere eighteen months 
after his appointment - all but one of his major policies was either in ruin or 
facing severe criticism in the Council of Ministers; he had greatly antagonized 
the King and Prince Damrong; his relations with the Financial Adviser, William­
son, had deteriorated to the point where the Adviser was no longer being consultec 
and perhaps most seriously, bjt 1908 PhrayA SuriyA had lost the confidence and 
co-operation of the officials in his own Ministry.
1. At Athawuthik^n Bukkhon samkhan kh^ng thai (Important Thai People)
Bangkok 1962.
2. ibid.
3* Chapter IV p.
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However, PhrayS SuriyS's record at the Ministry did contain one notable 
success, which it would be convenient to consider first: appropriately it in­
volved the scene of the Minister's previous major triumph - a European loan.
1. The European loan of 1907
When PhrayS SuriyS became Minister of Finance in June 1906, the Government
4wqs already committed to raising its second loan in Europe . By the beginning 
of the year 1906/0? only 3*713 m. baht was left of the 14*5 n* baht borrowed 
in 1905* yet in the 1906/07 budget inherited by PhrayS SuriyS from Prince Mahit; 
7*23 in* baht had been allocated to the railway construction programme, none of 
it from current revenue.
The actual raising of the second European loan was a relatively straight­
forward matter. At times there was some vagueness in the Government with regard 
to the size of the proposed loan and the specific uses to which it was to be 
put, but there was none of the debilitating hesitancy that had marked the 
Government's discussion over the first loan. The 190? negotiations were com­
plicated by just one factor - concern by the British Government that Siam would 
use the proceeds of the loan to finance the construction of the southern rail­
way into the Malay Peninsula. There was a fear in London and Singapore that 
the construction of that line would be entrusted to the German-dominated Siamese 
Railway Department, or that German banks would succeed in underwriting a major 
part of a loan devoted to the building of the southern line: in either case,
German influence in the Peninsula could be expected to grow and rival British 
interests in the area. The issue was confused by the fact that from mid-1906 
two Englishmen , R. W. Duff (who already had substantial investments in the 
Siamese Malay States) and L. T. Leonowens, the son of Anna Leonowens, placed 
before the Siamese Government a series of proposals for the survey, construction 
and financing of the peninsular railway3: both men were acting on behalf of
4. Prince Mahit to PhrayS SuriyS, 1 June 1906 N.A.Kh. 3/2.
5* Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 27 June 1906 Desp. 43 P.R.O. F.O. 371/182-
Memorandum on the proposal of the Siamese Government to construct a Railway 
in the Siamese Malay Peninsula, and the suggested publication of the Secret 
Convention with Siam of 1897. Foreign Office, London. 31 December 1906 
Printed. P.R.O. F.O. 371/385*
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London financiers. Though there was some doubt as to the extent of the finan­
cial resources of these groups^, the British Minister in Bangkok, Beckett,
appears to have favoured their proposals a* a means of excluding German involve-
7ment in the construction of the southern line .
8In mid-1906 Prince Damrong made a tour of the southern provinces and on 
his return to Bangkok argued at a meeting of the Council of Ministers that on 
political and economic grounds the Government should proceed as quickly as 
possible with the construction of the railway connecting the capital with the
9South . However, the Minister - remembering the Government’s experience with 
Murray Campbell over the building of the Korat line in tfce 1890s - was opposed 
to construction by concessionaires such as Duff and Leonowens and instead sug­
gested that the southern railway be constructed by means of a European loan. 
Though the Council accepted the recommendations of the Minister of the Interior, 
no details were settled: there was no decision as to whether any of the pro­
ceeds of the immediate European loan would be set aside for this particular 
line, nor was there any discussion of the inevitable British opposition to con­
struction of that line by the Railway Department.
In August 1906 PhrayS SuriyS wrote to Axel Johnson asking for his assistance
in the negotiation of the Government's second European loan, which was to be 
10for £2.0 m. When Beckett heard of the imminence of the loan, he saw Westengard 
- the acting General Adviser - and sought assurances that the construction of 
the peninsular line would be carried out either by Siamese or British officials. 
Westengard replied that the Siamese Government had as yet taken no decision 
contrary to the wishes of Britain^. Negotiations with the European banks 
began in October. On this occasion the Government was faced with a syndicate
6. Minutes attached to: Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 31 October 1906 Desp. 98 
P.R.O. F.O. 371/182.
7. Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 31 October 1906 Tele. 16 P.R.O. F.O. 371/182.
8. foreign Office Memorandum. 31 December 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 371/ 385.
9. Report of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 25 September 1906 
N.A.Kh. 25/6.
10. Phrayfc SuriyS. to Axel Johnson, 27 August 1906 F.F.A. 25/3-
11. Foreign Office Memorandum. 31 December 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 371/385.
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of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Banque de L’Indo-Chine and the Deutsche- 
Asiatische Bank: the London and Paris banks had earlier agreed to join forces
with the Berlin bank through fear that if they attempted to exclude the Germans, 
the Deutsche-Asiatische would offer very favourable terms to Siam and take the 
whole loan for itself^2. Preliminary enquiries - conducted principally by
Rivett-Carnac - produced an offer of 92£ (nett) at 4j per cent p.a. from the
13 14syndicate , but Phraya SuriyS preferred to wait until the market improved •
In the meantime it would appear that attempts were made to encourage the members
of the syndicate to make individual offers for the loan in competition with
15their partners, but with no success .
PhrayS Suriya reviewed the progress of the negotiations in a letter to the 
King on 7 December 19061 .^ The Minister argued that it was evident that European 
investors were as yet not prepared to take up a Siamese loan bearing only 4 per 
cent p.a., as he had at first hoped, unless the issue price was very low. There­
fore the Government would have to accept a loan at 4j per cent p.a., the same 
rate as applied to the 1905 loan. The only matter to be settled was whether the 
British-French-German syndicate could be induced to offer more than the 92/*(nett) 
they had proposed to the Government the previous month.
PhrayS SuriyS then dealt at length with the question of the financing of 
the peninsular railway and the proposals of Duff and Leonowens. Like Prince 
Damrong the previous September, PhrayS SuriyS was not prepared to consider either 
scheme: both Duff and Leonowens, he argued, had asked for many privileges
concessions (for example the right to supply all the materials and equipment for 
the line) and it was Government policy to avoid any unnecessary stipulations 
with regard to their European loans. Furthermore, both men represented unproven 
financial concerns: were the Government to come to an agreement with them its
standing with the established European banks could only siffer, making it
12. Memorandum. Interview kith Mr. Townsend of the H. S.B. Campbell, 19 October 
1906 P.R.O. F.O. 371/182.
13* Rivett-Carnac to PhrayS SuriyS,23 October 1906/2!November 1906 Tele.
F.F.A. 25/3.
14. PhrayS SuriyS to Rivett-Carnac, 8 November 1906 Tele. F.F.A. 25/5*
15« Rivett-Carnac to PhrayS SuriyS, 5 November 190b F.F.A. 25/3»
16. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 7 December I906 N.A.Kh. 25/9-
considerably more difficult to raise additional loans in the future. In fact 
in late November 1906 the Minister had already told Leonowens that the Govern­
ment could not consider contracting out the construction of the peninsular 
railway^, though both Duff and Leonowens continued to press their cases'^.
The Minister of Finance then informed the King that although he wished 
to wait until the money markets in Europe improved before the loan was finally 
negotiated, the Government could not delay for too long. By the end of the 
year - 31 March 1907 - not only would the proceeds of the 1905 loan be exhausted, 
but the Ministry would again be calling on the Treasury reserves to cover the 
allocation for railway construction. There was, PhrayR SuriyS continued, 
another important consideration. In late 1902 the Government had adopted a 
gold-exchange standard for the baht, but since that time it had been found 
necessary to repeatedly revalue the currency in response to rises in the world 
price of silver. The Minister suggested that by the establishment of a gold/ 
sterling exchange fund the Government would be able to control fluctuations 
in the baht/sterling rate. PhrayR SuriyR therefore proposed that a part of
19the proceeds of the forthcoming loan be set aside for such an exchange fund .
It is important to note that this proposal was made at a rather late stage in
the discussions: in fact, it would appear that it was at about this time
that the Government decided to increase the size of the loan from the original 
20£2.0 m. to £3*0 m. . However, according to Duff, PhrayR SuriyR's suggestion 
had little support in the Council of Ministers: indeed, he reported to
Beckett that Prince Damrong intended to oppose the use of the loan to support 
exchange on the grounds that it was Government policy not to raise loans for
17* Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 29 November 1906 Desp. 113 with enclosures. 
P.R.O. F.O. 371/385.
18. Correspondence between Leonowens and PhrayR SuriyR, December 1906 
F.F.A. 25/3.
19* This is a matter which must await discussion in Chapter VI. It is 
sufficient to note here that the primary purpose of an exchange fund would be 
to reduce short-term fluctuations in the market rate for the currency: it
could have no direct effect on the long-term official parity of the currency.
20. PhrayR SuriyR to King, 7 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 25/9.
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unproductive purposes . Finally in his letter to the King,PhrayS SuriyS re­
ported that K. A. Wallenberg, who had played an important part in the negotia­
tions for the 190S loan, had recently arrived in Bangkok and was willing to
22assist in the current negotiations • The King approved the Minister's proposals 
and actions2 .^
On S December Wallenberg, acting on the instructions of the Minister of
Finance, met the Bangkok managers of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the
Banque de L'Indo-Chine, who were representing all three banks in the syndicate,
2ifand put before them the Government's terms • The conditions that applied to 
the 1905 loan would also apply to the new contract, with one important addition: 
the Siamese Government would undertake to maintain the exchange value of the
baht at its current rate - 13 V3 baht : £. The banks were given three days in
25which to accept the terms . On hearing of these developments in Bangkok, the 
Foreign Office in London immediately contacted the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 
and explained that it was feared that the loan was to be tised in part to 
finance the construction of the peninsular railway by the German-dominated 
Hailway Department: the Bank was asked to delay the negotiations until some
26assurance had been obtained from the Siamese Government on that point • At 
the same time Beckett was instructed to discover whether any portion of the
21
21. Duff to Beckett, 6 December 1906: enclosed with: Beckett to Sir Edward
Grey, 19 December 1906 Desp* 118 P.R.O* F.O. 371/385* There is no evidence in
the National Archives to support Duff's assertion. However, since the debate
in 1903-1901* over the first loan had centred on the probable direct financial
return from the investment of the loan in railway construction, there were likely 
to be doubts about the use of a significant portion of this loan to establish
an exchange fund, where the return would be the indirect and intangible benefits 
to trade of a stable exchange.
22. Wallenberg was a member of a party accompanying Prince Waldemar of Denmark 
on a visit to Siam (Foreign Office Memorandum. 01 December 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 
371/385)* However, it is unlikely that Wallenberg's presence in Bangkok at 
this juncture was entirely coincidental.
23* King to PhrayS SuriyS, 8 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 25/9*
2*f. Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 19 December 1906 Desp. 119 with enclosures 
P.R.O. F.O. 371/385*
25* Townsend (London Office of H.S.B.) to Campbell, 11 December 1906 P.R.O.
F.O. 371A82.
26. Minutes attached to: Townsend to Campbell, 10 December 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 
371A82.
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loan w*s intended for the southern railway: if it were, he was to urge the
Siamese Government to raise a separate loan for that line, unless they would
27give an undertaking not to allow the Railway Department into the Peninsula . 
Beckett saw PhrayS SuriyS on 9 December and Prince Devawongse the following 
day • The Siamese Ministers were not sure whether any of the proceeds of the 
loan would be devoted to the southern line: Westengard, whom Beckett saw later,
doubted whether it would. Furthermore, the British Minister gained the impres­
sion that the Siamese Government would not insist on the construction of the
29line by their own Railway Department . Yet it was clearly impossible for 
Beckett to obtain firm assurances in the time available. Eventually the 
Foreign Office allowed the British Bank to comply with the Siamese conditions:
the fear that the Deutsche-Asiatische Bank could leave the syndicate at any
30time and make an individual bid for the whole of the loan was strong • The 
crucial point illustrated by these last minute negotiations w*s that the 
Siamese Government, though willing to intimate to Beckett that it would not 
act against the wishes of Britain with regard to the Peninsula, was not pre­
pared to give a written undertaking with regard to either the uses of the 
proposed loan or to departmental construction of the southern railway.
The negotiations were completed in the last days of December 1906. The 
terms were 93 l/*f (nett) at per cent p.a.^1 compared with 90j (nett) at 
IfJ per cent p.a. for the 1905 loan. Significantly, at the request of PhrayS 
SuriyS, the contract contained no reference to the use of part of the proceeds
of the loan to support exchange: instead the Minister was to give some assu-
32ranee on this point in a separate letter to the banks • The loan contract was
27- Sir Edward Grey to Beckett, 11 December 1906 Tele. 22 P.R.O. F.O. 371/182.
28. Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 12 December 1906 Tele. 22 P.R.O. F.O. 371A82.
Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 19 December 1906 Desp. 119 and enclosures P.R.O.
F.O. 371/385.
29- Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 19 December 1906 Desp. 119 P.R.O. F.O. 371/385.
30. Townsend to Campbell, 11 December 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 371A 82.
31. Bangkok manage* of the H.S.B./Banque de L'Indo Chine to PhrayS SuriyS,
31 December 1906 F.F.A. 25/3-
32. Bangkok manager of the H.S.B. to Williamson, 29 December 1906 F.F.A. 25/3.
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a loan contract and nothing more. In explaining the terms to the Council of 
Ministers on 31 December, PhrayS SuriyS emphasized that the Government was 
giving only a general undertaking to the banks that it would use a portion of 
the loan to support exchange: the Government was giving no indication of the
size of the proposed exchange fund nor of the rate at which the baht would be
33 34stabilized . The Council approved the term6 negotiated with the syndicate
wrote the £3*0 m. loan, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Banque de L'Indo 
Chine (£1.0 m. each), the Deutsche-Asiatische (£0.73 m.) and a Scandanavian
One final general point must be made about the raising of the 190? loan, 
and indeed the 1903 loan as well. Throughout the negotiations the Siamese 
Government attempted to minimize - indeed erase - the political implications 
of the loans. The most clear example of this was the refusal of the Govern­
ment to consider any loan which involved Siam offering specific security - the 
completed sections of the railway, or the customs revenue - or involved granting 
trade concessions - for example in the supply of railway materials/ Nor would 
Siam negotiate seriously with other th^n the most reputable European banks - 
not with Duff or Leonowens. But the same theme is evident elsewhere: the
employment of a Swedish financier, a neutral as far as Siam was concerned, to 
assist in the negotiations, rather than Rivett-Carnac who on first sight would 
appear to have been the most obvious choice as negotiator. The decision in 
1907 to give a separate, unofficial, and rather vague undertaking to the banks
33* Though on 8 December Wallenberg had informed the banks that the rate would 
be held at 13 V3 baht:£ (Bangkok manager H.S.B. to London Office, 10 December 
1906 Tele. P.R.O. F.O. 371/1§2) and PhrayS SuriyS had told Leonowens that the 
fund would be for £2.0 m. (Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 29 November 1906 Desp.
113 and enclosures P.R.O. F.O. 371/3&5)*
34. Report of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 31 December 1906
N.A.Kh. 25/8.
35* PhrayS Wisut to Prince Devawongse, 19 January 1907 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/9.
36. Townsend to Campbell, 31 December 1906 P.R.O. F.O. 371/182.
37* PhrayS Wisut to Prince Devawongse, 24 January 1907 Tele. N.A.Kh. 25/9.
and the contract was signed in London Four banks under­
syndicate (£0.25 m.)^ - the latter reflecting Wallenberg’s role in the nego-
37tiations. It was issued five days later, being over-subscribed four times .
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to use part of the loan to support exchange, rather than having a more specific 
agreement written into the loan contract. The refusal to give a written assu­
rance to the British Government that part of the 1907 loan would not be used 
to finance construction of the peninsular railway. Yet the loans remained very 
much political issues. The most clear indication of that was the reluctance 
of the Siamese Government in 190*f to negotiate with Britain alone whilst rela­
tions with France were strained. Given the political and commercial interests 
of the European Powers in Siam, such political ramifications were, of course, 
unavoidable. Therefore, in effect, there was a strong contradiction between 
the wish of the Siamese Government to make the raising of European loans a 
purely business transaction, and the inescapable intrusion of political con­
siderations. Indeed it was this conflict that was at the root of the deadlock 
in the Council of Ministers in 1903-190^1 as the Government debated the wisdom 
of employing European capital to further its reform programme.
The remaining policies pursued by Phrayfi Suriya were considerably less 
successful. Indeed within months of his appointment his measures began to 
attract criticism from both within and outside the Government: gradually the
criticism gathered momentum as opposition to one particular aspect of his poli­
cies encouraged disapprobation of other parts of his programme and it finally 
reached its climax in the first two months of 190S. Again, detailed considera­
tion of currency and exchange reform, and developments with regard to the major 
tax monopolies must be held over to Chapters VI and VII, though because of the 
considerable controversy generated by Phrayft Suriya's policy in those areas a 
brief reference to the principal points in dispute will be given when considering 
the Minister's resignation in February 1908. Here the concern will be with the 
development - the regression - of the Ministry of Finance under Phraya Suriya: 
this process will be traced with reference to the Ministry's budgetary work for 
it was in this aspect of his responsibilities that the Minister clearly demon­
strated two of the major characteristics which contributed to his failure - a 
tendency to antagonize his ministerial colleagues, and a tendency to panic when 
faced with difficult financial and administrative problems.
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2 . The budget and the attempt to extend financial control, 1906 - 1908.
The budget for 1906/07 “ which covered almost the whole of the first year 
of PhrayS SuriyS's term as Minister of Finance - was inherited by the new
Minister from Prince Mahit. Though Prince Mahit had been able to estimate for
a small revenue surplus in 1906/07* on closer inspection the Government's 
budget position was fair from satisfactory. In the first place the small revenue 
surplus for 1906/07 had been achieved only be charging the whole of the expen­
diture allocation for railway construction - some 7.25 m. baht - to the loan
account, despite the fact that at the beginning of the year the account held 
38only 3*713 m. baht . More importantly, whilst total revenue receipts had 
risen from k6.0k m. baht in 190V 05 to 51*65 m. baht in 1905/06, in compiling 
the estimates for 1906/07 the Ministry of Finance had allowed an increase of 
only 1 .7  m. baht in the revenue estimate as compared with the estimate for the
previous year^. There were more specific areas for concern with regard to
the revenue: 1906/07 was to see the disappearance of the last of the provincial
gambling dens, and 1907/08 the closure of the capital's dens, though in both 
cases alternative sources of revenue had been, or were going to be, prepared.
In addition, crises in the opium and spirit farms in 1905 had not only threa­
tened the Government's immediate revenue but had also made it clear that the 
tax farming syndicates could no longer be relied upon to provide such a large 
proportion of the Government's revenue as they had in the past. Yet whilst 
there were fears for the continued expansion and stability of the Kingdom's
revenue receipts, there were no indications that the Government's programme of
administrative reforms and public works projects would automatically adjust 
to the restriction in the availability of resources. The prospect of substantial 
budget deficits had, of course, been a salient feature of the early years of 
the decade, but PhrayS SuriyS was faced with a considerably more difficult situ­
ation than that which had confronted Prince Mahit. First, Prince Mahit had been
able, aa a first line of defence, to draw on the accumulated reserves built up
in the late 1890s to cover his deficits: by 1906 the reserves were considerably
38. R.F.A.B. 1906/07 P* 3/p* 9* 
39* R.F.A.B. 1906/07 pp. 1-3-
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below their minimum safe level. Second, and more fundamentally, Prince Mahit 
had enjoyed substantial increases in revenue receipts in almost every year he 
had to prepare a budgets for Phraya Suriya it was clear that the period of 
rapidly rising revenues had come to an end.
In the circumstances the first course for the Ministry was to examine 
whether the Treasury was receiving the full value of its revenues. In late 
March 1906 Rivett-Carnac wrote to Prince Chanthaburl, who was acting Minister 
of Finance during the illness of Prince Mahit, pointing out that there was no 
effective accounting check on the revenues received from the Kingdom's tax
ZfQfarmers . The following month a European accountant employed in the Ministry 
of Finance, Ramsay, was given responsibility for checking that area of the
2*1 2*2Government's receipts , and in October 1906 he submitted his first report 
Ramsay's investigations had uncovered a quite appalling state of affairs. At 
the end of August 1906 the total arrears of the tax farmers had been 7*66 m. 
baht: furthermore, out of a sum of 4.74 m. baht, which were the arrears still
owing for just 1905/06, no less than 3*36 m. baht - or approximately 70 per cent 
- was not covered by security deposited with the Ministry of Finance by the 
farmers. Ramsay also reported that only about 16 per cent of tax farm payments 
were paid to the Ministry on time: finally, it appeared that in recent years
there had been no check on the revenues received from the tax farmers in the 
provinces. Ramsay's report provides important, and rare, evidence that at 
least in this respect many of the audit and account procedures introduced by
the Ministry of Finance from the late 1890s had not taken root in the
2*3administration .
Some action was taken as a result of the report. First PhrayS SuriyS 
introduced several changes in the regulations under which the tax farms
40. Rivett-Carnac to Prince Chanthaburl, 31 March 1906 F.F.A. 1/2. At this 
point Rivett-Carnac was acting Financial Adviser whilst Williamson was on 
leave in Europe.
v
41. Prince Chanthaburl to Mqm Anuwongse, 5 April 1906 F.F.A. 1/2.
42. Memorandum. Inspection of the Chao Cham Nuan Accounts. Williamson,
31 October 1906 F.F.A. 1/2.
43- See Chapter VTII, pp. 3u- 3‘sr
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were auctioned, the main effect of which was to increase the security require-
44ments for the farmers from the equivalent of two months' instalments to three •
Second, steps were taken to charge farmers interest on their arrears in order
45to encourage more prompt payment in the future . But by themselves those two
measures could achieve little, and throughout the remainder of PhrayR SuriyR's
term as Minister the total arrears of the tax farmers grew steadily larger,
46rising to 10.37 m. baht in September 1907 • Over 90 per cent of the arrears
related to the years 1905/06 and 1906/07, and approximately 50 per cent were
47not covered by security • Williamson viewed this situation with increasing
dismay: in July 1907 he wanted the matter discussed by the Council of
43 49Ministers , and in November he urged that it be reported to the King , but
the Financial Adviser's complaints went unheeded. The immediate responsibility 
for receiving the instalments from the tax farmers rested with Mpm Anuwongse, 
the head of the Accounts Division of the Ministry of Finance, but it is diffi­
cult to see why PhrayR SuriyR failed to obtain more efficient administration 
from M9m Anuwongse in this matter. It is possible that the Minister was simply 
unable to bring effective pressure on his subordinate, for by mid-1907 PhrayR 
SuriyR had so antagonized the senior officials in his Ministry - including
Mqm Anuwongse - over the administration of the opium monopoly, that many were
50acting independently of him • The effects of the steady build-up of the 
farmers' arrears were clear: not only was the Treasury deprived of its right­
ful revenues, but the farmers increasingly ignored their contractual obligations 
to the Government and in so doing brought the Ministry of Finance into disrepute.
PhrayR SuriyR's principal policy for increasing the flow of revenue into 
the Treasury was considerably more controversial. At the end of the 1890s, by
44. PhrayR SuriyR to King, 27 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 14/27•
45* Memorandum. Revenue Farms. Williamson. 26 December 1906 F.F.A. 1/2.
46. Memorandum. Revenue Farms Arrears. Williamson. 30 November 1907 F.F.A. 1/2.
47. Memorandum. Arrears of Revenue Farms. Williamson. 6 July 1907 F.F.A. 1/2.
43. ibid.
49. Memorandum. Revenue Farms Arrears. Williamson. 30 November 1907 F.F.A. 1/2.
50. See Chapter VII. pp M ‘-3oa.
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the creation of the Bangkok Revenue Department under the Ministry of the Capital
and the Provincial Revenue Department under the Ministry of the Interior, the
Ministry of Finance had been absolved of direct responsibility for the actual
collection of almost all the taxes in the Kingdom which were collected by
51Government officials . PhrayS SuriyS did not want those functions returned 
to his Ministry, but he did want to extend the influence of the Ministry of 
Finance over the collection of those revenues. In December 1906 the Minister 
wrote to Prince Damrong enclosing a letter from the King to Prince Mahit
written in February 1897 concerning the functions and responsibilities of the
52Ministry of Finance . The King's letter had confirmed the sole responsibility 
of the Ministry of Finance for the Government's financial administration, and, 
of particular interest in 1906, had confirmed the right of the Ministry to 
investigate and examine without obstruction any work of the other Ministries 
and the provincial administration that in any way touched on finance. On the 
authority of that letter, PhrayS SuriyS informed Prince Damrong, the Krom 
Samruat (the Investigation Department) of the Ministry of finance would be
carrying out investigations of the financial work of the other Ministries.
53Prince Damrong complained to the King . Whilst he recognized the neces­
sity for officials from the Ministry of Finance to carry out an audit of the 
finances of the whole administration, and to overaee the internal audit and 
accounts procedures employed in other Ministries, the Minister of the Interior 
was opposed to any attempt by PhrayS SuriyS to extend the administrative control 
of the Ministry of Finance over the work of the rest of the Government. He 
argued that the 1897 instructions to Prince Mahit, quoted by PhrayS SuriyS, had 
been given at a time when the Government's administration was relatively un­
sophisticated, and he warned that if PhrayS SuriyS persisted with his policy 
there was certain to be friction between the Ministry of Finance and the other 
Ministries.
On 13 December Prince Damrong and PhrayS SuriyS met to discuss the issue
51. See Chapter III pp. qg-ioi^
52. Prince Damrong to King, 6 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 1/Mf.
53. ibid.
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but their discussions exacerbated rather than smoothed over the dispute .
PhrayS SuriyS explained that his aim was for officials from the Krom Samruat 
to undertake periodic investigations of the revenue-collecting departments of 
the Government - in effect principally the Provincial Revenue Department 
attached to the Ministry of the Interior. If the Krom Samruat discovered any 
irregularities or inefficiencies, it would report them to the Minister of 
Finance who would then bring them to the notice of the appropriate Minister. 
Prince Damrong replied that for relatively junior officials from the Ministry 
of Finance with no practical experience of administering revenue collections 
to investigate and criticize the work of more senior and experienced officials 
from the Ministry of the Interior could only lead to friction between the two 
Ministries, and a fall in the efficiency and enthusiasm of the revenue-collecting 
officials. If PhrayS SfcriyS was concerned about the effectiveness of the 
Government's revenue collections, Prince Damrong continued, then he would be 
better advised to bring his concern to the attention of the Ministers with 
direct responsibility for those collections.
Williamson gave his opinion on the matter at the end of December 1906^.
He took a middle line. On the one hand he emphasized the importance of an 
independent audit of the revenue collections, whereas Prince Damrong had tended 
to argue that internal audits of the provincial collections carried out by 
inspectors appointed by the Provincial Revenue Department itself were sufficient. 
The Financial Adviser also argued that such an audit could be carried out 
efficiently only by officials making an on-the-spot examination of the collec­
tions. On the other hand Williamson disagreed with his own Minister when he 
argued that in order to avoid friction between the Ministries of Finance and 
the Interior, the officials from the Krom Samruat would have to restrict them­
selves to carrying out an audit and make no attempt to actively interfere in 
the work of the other Ministry.
PhrayS SuriyS remained unmoved. On 7 February 1907 he wrote to the King 
to argue once again that the Krom Samruat had to have authority to undertake
54. Prince Damrong to Prince Sommot, 14 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 1/44.
55. Memorandum. Duties of the Samruat Department. Williamson, 29 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 1/44.
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more than an audit of the revenue collection accounts • He pointed out -
with some justification - that if a revenue-collecting official simply pocketed
a part of the receipts (leaving no reference in the accounts) then the Krom
Samruat, by merely looking at the accounts, would be unable to detect the fraud*
The dispute between Phraya Suriya and Prince Damrong eventually came before the
57Council of Ministers on 11 February 1907 • No compromise or solution was
found. At one point Prince Damrong suggested that the Provincial Revenue Depart 
ment be transferred to the Ministry of Finance, but it is impossible to say 
whether the proposal was a serious one or not: certaihly the King immediately 
rejected the idea. There was also a suggestion from PhrayS Sukhum Naiwinit, 
the Minister of Public Works, that an audit department, independent of all 
Ministries, be established* This PhrayS SuriyS firmly rejected for it implied 
his Ministry losing one of its major responsibilities. Finally the King sug­
gested that PhrayS SuriyS should prepare a more detailed outline of his 
proposals, and there the dispute was left to simmer for the remainder of the 
year.
There can be little doubt that the Minister of Finance's wish to extend 
his authority over the revenue-collecting agencies of the administration was 
prompted primarily by his concern over the Government's budget position. The 
depth of that concern was revealed when he presented his first - indeed his 
only - budget to the King in March 190758. In fact, it could even be said that 
the 1907/08 estimates betrayed an element of panic in the Minister's financial 
planning. After achieving an actual revenue collection of 51*65 m* baht in
1905/06, and budgeting for 5^*7 m* baht in 1906/07, the Ministry of Finance
estimated revenue for 1907/08 at 50.7 m. baht. For the first time since the 
Government had instituted westem-style budgets in the early 1890s the Ministry 
of Finance was expecting a drop in revenue. There were two main reagons for
this pessimistic outlook: first a poor monsoon in 1906 »nd consequently
56. Phraya Suriya to Prince Sommot, 7 February 1907 N.A.Kh. 1/kb ,
57* Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 11 February 1907 
N.A.Kh. 1/bk .
58. Phraya Suriya to King, March 1907 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/25*
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restricted rice exports in late 1906 and early 190? meant that the internal 
economy would be depressed during 1907/08, There were therefore significant 
cuts in the revenue estimates for the tax farms, for land and fishery taxes,
customs and railway traffic receipts, compared with the estimates for 1906/07 •
Second, PhrayS SuriyS argued that according to preliminary figures for the 
actual revenue receipts in 1906/07, Prince Mahit's estimates for that year had 
been dangerously optimistic, particularly with regard to the opium revenue. 
Furthermore, in January 1907 the Ministry of Finance had abolished the opium 
farm and placed the monopoly under Government control, and PhrayS SuriyS was 
unwilling to assume that the opium revenue would be particularly large in the 
first complete year of Government administration.
With regard to the expenditure side of the budget, the Ministries had 
originally submitted allocation requests totalling 65-76 m. baht to the Ministry 
of Finance, The Ministry had been able to reduce those original demands, but 
only to 56.26 ra. baht. As a result PhrayS SuriyS's budget estimates for 
1907/08 showed an estimated revenue deficit of 5*56 m. baht. On only one 
previous occasion had the Government's published budget shown an expected 
deficit: that was in 1901/02 when at the last moment the estimat4s had been
upset by the announcement that the Murray Campbell arbitration case had gone 
against the Siamese Government^. In submitting and explaining his estimates 
to the King, PhrayS SuriyS made two particular points. First, he suggested 
that the Government proceed with a proposal first made by Prince Mahit in 1905 
to collect the Chinese poll tax on an annual instead of triennial basis.
Second, PhrayS SuriyS returned to his proposal for expanding the authority of 
the Krom Samruat: he suggested that the Department, in conjunction with the
Accounts Department of the Ministry of Finance, undertake a detailed examination 
of the expenditure of each Ministry in an attempt to curb some of the adminis­
tration' • extravagances.
The estimates for 1907/08 and the two proposals made by PhrayS SuriyS to
59
59- R.F.A.B. 1907/08 pp. 4-8. 
60. See Chapter III pp. 4s
180
the King came before the Council of Ministers on 19 March 1907^. The Ministers 
accepted Phraya SuriyS's argument with regard to the Chinese poll tax, and it 
was proposed to collect the tax on an annual basis from 1908/09- They were 
less enthusiastic over PhrayS SuriyS's attempts to expand the influence of the 
Ministry of Finance over their expenditure budgets. Prince Damrong argued 
that inspections of expenditure along the lines suggested by the Minister of 
Finance would achieve little, and that reductions in the estimates could be 
made only by the heads of the Ministries attempting to make their administra­
tions more efficient. But PhrayS SuriyS pursued his point, at the same time 
making it clear that his main concern was the - in his view - high cost of 
collecting the Grovernment' s revenue - a clear reference to the work of Prince 
Damrong's Ministry, But Prince Damrong headed off the Minister of Finance by 
proposing the establishment of a small independent committee to examine the 
expenditure of the Government. At that point the King intervened, arguing 
that the only way in which Government extravagance could really be reduced was 
by the issue of clear instructions from the throne detailing each Ministry to 
be frugal. However, the King was on the point of leaving Siam on his second
62visit to Europe: it was decided to let the matter rest until after his return .
But during the King's absence Phraya Suriya kept alive the issue of the 
pre-eminence of the Ministry of Finance with regard to the Government's finances 
by reviving a matter which had caused Prince Mahit considerable difficulty in 
the late 1890s, but which in recent years had dropped from view - the inability 
of the Government to complete the budget by the beginning of the Siamese year 
in April. On 8 October 1907 Phraya Suriya wrote to the Crown Prince proposing 
that the Government's budget regulations - with some additional clauses - be 
re-issued^. The new regulations outlined in considerable detail the time-table 
for the compilation of the budget - preliminary expenditure estimates were to 
be submitted to the Ministry of Finance by 31 December, the budget discussions
61. Report ontthe meeting of the Council of Ministers, 19 March 1907 
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/25.
62. King to Phraya Suriya, 21 March 1907 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/25.
63. Phraya Suriya to the Crown Prince, 8 October 1907 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/25.
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between the Ministry of Finance and the other Ministries were to be completed
by 25 February, the completed budget was to g© to the King before 15 March.
With each clause PhrayS SuriyS added the threat that if a particular Ministry
failed to abide by the time-table the Ministry of Finance would have the
authority to reject its estimates and use its budget allocations for the previous
year instead. The Council of Ministers approved the issue of the new regulations 
6ifon 10 October .
The dispute between PhrayS SuriyS and Prince Damrong over the authority 
of the Ministry of Finance to interfere in the internal financial administration 
of the other Ministries came to a head after the King's return from Europe.
The final clash was sparked off by what was really the fundamental issue - 
increasing concern with regard to the Government's financial position. On 
7 December 1907 Williamson submitted a long memorandum to PhrayS SuriyS on the 
current state of the Kingdom'6 finances^. It was a disturbing document. The 
Financial Adviser pointed out that during the course of 1907/08 the Ministry 
of Finance intended to draw 9*5 baht from the Treasury reserves, of which 
5*5 m. baht would be to cover the budget deficit for tfete year: this would
leave only l*f.5 m. baht in the reserves at the beginning of 1908/09. Further­
more, there were indications that the Government was heading for another budget 
deficit in 1908/09 of approximately 3*5 m. baht, which would reduce the reserves 
to 11.0 m. baht. In November 1903 Rivett-Carnac had recommended a minimum cash 
reserve level of 22.0 m. baht, but since that time the exchange value of the 
baht had risen, so that in 1907 an equivalent reserve would contain 17*0 m. baht: 
in Williamson's view that remained the minimum safe level for the cash reserves. 
By March 1908 the Treasury reserves would be 2.5 baht below that figure.
The Adviser continued :
'Without wishihg to be at all alarmist, I feel it my duty to inform 
the Government that I regard the present position as one of consider­
able gravity, and unless a steady and combined effort is made for 
the next few years, the country may find itself in serious financial 
difficulties.' 66
6k. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 10 October 1907 
N.A.Kh. 5* 1/7.
65* Note by the Financial Adviser on the present financial position in Siam. 
Williamson. 7 December 1907 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/25 F.F.A. 30/8.
66. ibid.
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Williamson proposed that a committee be appointed to investigate possible
new sources of revenue, such as the introduction of a stamp duty: but as the
Adviser realized it would take time to impose additional taxes, particularly
if the consent of the Treaty Powers was required. The only alternative was
for the Government to impose much stricter control over its expenditure.
'As long as the revenue was expanding, we could afford to be more 
lenient to the demands of the departments, but the time has come, 
if we are to recover financial equilibrium without re-course to 
drastic measures, when the present rather extravagant tendencies 
must be firmJ^ • put a stop to.' 67
Williamson suggested that one immediate measure which the Government could 
take would be to end the practice whereby Ministries, having spent only a part 
of their expenditure allocations under one head transferred the excess funds 
to another of their projects which had not been sanctioned by the Ministry of 
Finance. In future all unspent allocations under ea£h separate head should be 
returned to the Treasury.
Finally, Williamson explained,
'My object in writing this Note has been to bring to the notice of 
His Majesty and the Cabinet, in as straightforward and simple a 
manner as possible, the urgent necessity which exists for a careful 
and prudent management of the finances of the Kingdom for the next 
few years.' 68
Williamson's memorandum was sent to the King by PhrayS SuriyS - who
69supported the Adviser1s proposals - and the matter was discussed by the Council
70of Ministers on 23 December 1907 • Surprisingly, PhrayS SuriyS did not
attend the meeting: no explanation was given for his absence. The debate
was monopolized by Prince Damrong. First he rejected virtually all the
Williamsoq/PhrayS Suriya suggestions: the Government could not increase the
rates on existing taxes since with regard to the most important of those taxes - 
the taxes on land - this had already been done. The Powers would oppose the 
imposition of new taxes. Finally attempts to cut the expenditure allocations 
of the Ministries would only lead to a deterioration in the efficiency of the
67• ibid.
68. ibid.
69. Phrayfi Suriya to King, 17 Decmmber 1907 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/25.
70. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 23 December 1907
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/25.
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administration: expenditure could be restrained only reorganizing and
rationalizing Government departments. Then Prince Damrong turned on the
Minister of Finance.
'Phraya Suriya has proposed that all the ministers be instructed 
to economize, to hold down expenditure: we hear this request
every year but it never works because the ministers have no faith 
in the Minister of Finance. The reason for that is whilst the 
Ministry of Finance inspects and cuts the expenditure of all the 
other ministries, it does not inspect its own. Whatever it wants 
to spend, it spends. The expenditure of the Ministry of Finance 
is grossly extravagant. If the Ministry shared in the sacrifices 
of the other ministries then Government expenditure could be 
held down.' 71
The King then intervened: since Phraya Suriya was not at the meeting
the dispute would have to be held back for another occasion.
But Prince Damrong maintained the pressure on the Minister of Finance.
On k January 1908 he wrote to the King requesting permission to appoint two
additional inspectors in the Provincial Revenue Department to check the col-
72lection of revenue in the provinces • By strengthening internal inspections 
by the Department's own officials it could be said that Prince Damrong was 
attempting to forestall PhrayS SuriyS's plan to expand the authority of the 
Ministry of Finance over the revenue-collecting departments of the administration
Prince Damrong's proposal was discussed by the Council of Ministers on 6
73January • As was to be expected, PhrayS SuriyS opposed the appointments, but 
in so doing he came under criticism from the King himself. The King suggested 
to PhrayS SuriyS that his Ministry was finding it difficult to carry out its 
existing responsibilities with regard to checking the expenditure estimates:
71- Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 23 December 1907
N.A.Kh. 5* 1/25- Unfortunately Prince Damrong gives no examples of the 'Sxtra-
vagance' of the Ministry of Finance. The budget figures do not support his claim 
The actual expenditure of the Ministry of Finance was 1.17 baht in 1900/01 
(3% of total Government expenditure), 1.^7 m- baht (2.8$) in 1905/o6. PhrayS 
SuriyS had estimated 1.8 m. baht (3«5#) in 1907/08• In the same years the 
Ministry of the Interior claimed 20#, 19# and 22# of the Government's resources. 
Of course, 'extravagance' can be determined only by comparing a Ministry's 
actual expenditure with the cost of it efficiently discharging its responsi­
bilities - clearly, a somewhat subjective proposition. Therefore there remains 
the possibility that Prince Damrong had firm evidence of PhrayS SuriyS's 
extravagance.
72. Prince Damrong to King, January 1908 N.A.Kh. Ik , 1/7•
73- Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 6 January 1908
N.A.Kh. 1A5.
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in particular, he noted, the Ministry found it impossible to examine in suffi­
cient detail all the requests from the Ministries for increases in salaries 
and positions. The implication was thgt the Ministry of Finance did not possess 
the administrative machinery or personnel to carry an expansion of its account­
ing and investigative responsibilities on the lines envisaged by PhrayS SuriyS. 
In addition, the King noted, the other Ministries were certain to oppose the 
intrusion of the Ministry of Finance into their work, particularly since it 
was widely suspected that the Ministry would not impose the same parsimonious 
standards on itself as it imposed on others.
At that point Prince Damrong advanced the proposal that a separate
Inspection Department be established, independent of all other departments in
the Government, with authority to investigate all suspected cases of Government
extravagance and to determine salary rates and appointments for the whole ad-
74ministration. The idea was developed by the King a few days later . He 
proposed that the Krom Samruat and the Krom Sarab&nchl (Accounts Department) 
be removed from the Ministry of Finance and established as a separate Govern­
ment Department. The new Department would have the authority to examine the 
work of any Ministry or department and to discuss with the head of that depart­
ment possible improvements in the administration under his control. It would 
be able to recommend that specific Government projects be commenced, or 
hurried along, or halted, depending on the availability of funds. It would 
have the right to cut the budget of any department where it was shown that the 
salary bill was excessive, or to increase the flow of funds to any department 
which had insufficient officials or resources. Any disputes between the new 
Inspection Department and the Minister of head of a department would be referred 
to the King.
If acted upon these proposals would have emagculated the Ministry of 
Finance: they implied the virtual removal from the Ministry of its prime
function - overall responsibility tot the administration of the Government's 
revenue and expenditure. In effect the Ministry of Finance would have reverted
74. Note by the King, January 1908 N.A.Kh. 1/44.
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to the position which it had held at the beginning of the reign - a storehouse 
for the Kingdom's treasure. Whether the King and Prince Damrong seriously 
intended to implement the proposals is doubtful: it is more likely that the
idea was put forward to counter Phraya Suriya's attempts to push the authority 
of the Ministry of Finance over the existing pragmatically determined lines 
dividing the responsibilities and functions of each of the Ministries. When 
Phraya Suriya resigned the proposals were dropped.
One further criticism of Phraya Suriya's budgetary policies should be
noted - the criticism that the Government's disturbing financial position, and
particularly the drop in the revenue estimates for 1907/08 and possibly 1908/09
as well, was due to a considerable extent to maladministration on the part of
the Ministry of Finance. The complaint was heard at several of the meetings
of the Council of Ministers in January and February 1908 when Phrayfc Suriy&'s
position as Minister of Finance was under attack from all sides. On 3 February
Prince Damrong argued that the bids for the tax farms for 1908/09 were depressed
75because of collusion amongst the farmers . Ten days later he suggested that 
the lottery monopoly was in difficulties because PhrayJL Suriya had failed to 
consult other, more experienced, people with regard to the administration of 
the farm: this state of affairs had arisen, Prince Damrong explained, because
Phraya Suriya had lost the goodwill and co-operation of his subordinate officios 
The King was more forthright still: the Government's revenue from the farms
was likely to fall because the Minister of Finance was lacking in ability.
At the centre of this criticism was PhrayS SuriyS's own pessimistic assess­
ment of the Government's financial position for 1907/08 and to a lesser extent 
for 1908/09. When the Minister produced the budget estimates for 1907/08 
showing an expected revenue deficit of 5*56 m. baht there were two immediate 
damaging consequences. First, he laid himself open to the charge that he was 
incapable of administering the Government's finances. Second, it encouraged 
him in his attempt to expand the authority of the Ministry of Finance, it
75- Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 3 February 1908 
N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/28.
76. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 February 1908,
N.A.Kh. 26/15.
encouraged his demand that his Ministry be allowed to investigate thoroughly - 
his critics would have said control - the administration of the revenue col­
lections throughout the Kingdom, and the expenditure allocations of each 
Ministry in the Government. As has been shown, inevitably this policy brought 
him into conflict with Prince Damrong whose Ministry was not only responsible 
for the collection of a significant proportion of the Government's revenue 
but which also claimed one of the largest expenditure allocations in the budget.
Yet ironically PhrayS SuriyS's 1907/08 estimates had exaggerated the 
Government's financial difficulties. When the accounts for that year were 
closed it was shown that instead of an expected revenue deficit of 5*56 m. baht 
the actual deficit was only 0.68 m. baht. Actual expenditure was virtually 
as it had been estimated, but the revenue receipts had been seriously under­
estimated. An expected revenue of 50*7 ®. baht had in fact turned out to be 
an actual collection of 55*82 m. baht. However, it must be pointed out that 
the revenue receipts for 1907/08 were still lower than those for the previous 
year, and that the Government had suffered its first fall in revenue since the 
establishment of the modern Ministry of Finance.
Responsibility for the budget miscalculations rested with Phraya Suriya.
It would appear that the poor monsoon rains of late 1906, the crises in the 
opium and spirit monopolism - including the transfer of the opium monopoly to 
Government control in January 1907 - coupled with the realization that the 
era of rapidly increasing revenue was near its close, frightened the Minister 
and his officials whilst they were engaged in compiling the estimates for 
1907/08. They acted hastily, and they over-reacted.
3* The resignation of Phraya SuriyS, February 1908.
In the final two or three months of his term as Minister of Finance,
PhrayS Suriya's position became increasingly embattled as he was forced to 
defend himself in the face of mounting criticism in the Council of Ministers. 
Between 23 December 1907 and 13 February 1908 Phraya Suriya attended no less 
than nine meetings of the Council at which he was heavily censured by either
the King or Prince Damrong. The extreme hostility of the criticism can be
judged by the following two quotations. First the King :
'The important point is not to pay attention to what PhrayS 
Suriya says. He does not lie, but he lacks intelligence and 
discrimination. It is apparent that [his abilities] are below 
normal. If the revenue falls it is due to the lack of stability 
of PhrayS SuriyS rather than to the fault of anyone else. People 
despise the Minister rather than wish him harm. Because of his 
lack of stability, the Chinese feel contempt for him, officials 
in his own Ministry despise him. He is laughed at. He only 
trusts people who are not trustworthy. As a result the Kingdom 
suffers a loss of revenue.' 77
and then Prince Damrong :
'From what I have seen of the Ministry of Finance no-one will 
co-operate with Phrayfi SuriyS: furthermore no-one has faith
in him, no-one right through from the tax farmers to the 
Europeans.' 78
In essence there were two criticisms of the Minister. First that he fre­
quently pursued policies with an almost fanatical determination, spurning the 
co-operation of colleagues and the assistance of subordinate officials and 
advisers; inevitably he antagonized both groups. For example, as was shown 
in the previous section, PhrayS SuriyS consistently pushed his proposals for 
an extension of the authority of his Ministry over the actual collection of 
the Government's revenue throughout the Kingdom, provoking the determined 
opposition of Prince Damrong. There are other instances. In mid-1906 the 
Minister, ignoring the advice of the Financial Adviser, Williamson, proceeded 
with a scheme to establish the baht as the principal currency in circulation 
in Puket, and thereby created a very severe, though brief, baht shortage in 
the capital. In January 1907 he abolished the opium farm without first really 
consulting the other Ministries involved - again principally the Ministry of 
the Interior - as to the details of the Government administration that was to 
replace it: he then proceeded to develop a pattern of Government administration
that attempted to minimize the responsibility of Prince Damrong's Ministry in 
the operation of the monopoly outside the capital, much to the annoyance of the
77* report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 3 February 1908 
N.A.Kh. lif. lkh/28.
78. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 February 1908 
N.A.Kh. 26/15.
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, 79Minister of the Interior •
However, the most damaging consequence of Phraya Suriya's determined 
insularity was not that he antagonized the other Ministers - and in turn the 
King - but that he provoked the opposition of his own officials* After a 
sharp exchange in October 1906 over the baht shortage, Williamson and the 
Minister appear to have maintained only a tenuous working relationship. More 
seriously, Phraya SuriySs policy with regard to Government administration of 
the opium monopoly differed in important respects from that adgocated by the
vMinistry's senior official specializing in the monopoly, M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl: 
in particular they disagreed over the rate at which the Chinese concessionaires 
and distributors who had played a substantial role in the operation of the 
monopoly whilst it had been farmed could be removed from the Government admini­
stration of the enterprise. In fact Phraya Suriya simply rode roughshod over 
the views of his official, whilst M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl retaliated by ignoring
his Minister's instructions. In short the internal unity of the Ministry of
80Finance began to break up .
The second basic criticism of the Minister was that he lacked stability 
and financial expertise. It was suggested that faced with a crisis he tended 
to panic, and this in turn caused him to make errors of financial management. 
Again some of these points were demonstrated in the previous section dealing 
with PhrayS SuriyS's response to the Government's budget problems: but again
the Minister's shortcomings also revealed themselves in other aspects of his 
work. For instance, his decision to abolish the opium farm in 1907 and his 
proposals for Government administration of the monopoly referred to above, were 
hastily arrived at without adequate preparation, and clumsily executed. Another 
example is provided by the fact that during his terra as Minister PhrayS SuriyS.
79* Again it must be emphasized that these incidents are raised at this point 
merely to demonstrate the criticisms that were levelled against PhrayS SuriyS: 
for a detailed analysis of these controversies see Chapters VI and VII.
80. In his autobiography EH'n khwSm lang (Reviving the Past: Bangkok 1967-1968, 
2 vols.) PhrayS Anaman Rajadhon refers to another incident in which PhrayS 
SuriyS apparently antagonized one of his senior officials. In this case it 
appears that PhrayS SuriyS ordered the dismissal of an official in the Customs 
Department without informing the Director of that Department, Prince Phr^m. As 
a result Prince Phrfyn eventually resigned. PhrayS Anuman records that he neit 
heard that PhrayS SuriyS himself had, with the King's approval, resigned his position (vol. 2 , p. 35k).________________________
pursued a policy of revaluing the baht (again against the advice of Williamson) 
which, taking place as it did during a trade depression, was almost certainly 
ill-timed. Furthermore, as will be argued in the following chapter, the 
Minister's exchange policy as a whole was frequently based on muddled and 
illogical premises, which suggested an imperfect grasp of the principles 
involved.
After the last of the Meetings of the Council in early 1908 at which
these and the other miscalculations and shortcomings of the Minister of Finance
were exposed, PhrayS SuriyS received a letter from the King.
'I can see that the Ministry of Finance is in considerable 
difficulties ... it is disunited and the Minister is making 
mistakes. Subordinate officials are doing no work. The Minister 
has no expertise in the work of his Ministry, so everything he 
does is really just an experiment - he works by trial and error.
Outsiders think that he does not have the authority to control 
the Ministry ... matters which should cause no difficulty, cause 
difficulty: problems which should not arise, arise. It is
apparent that the Minister is ignorant of his work and that his 
stability is doubted by everyone ... Because of these shortcomings 
[in the Minister] the Government's revenue has fallen greatly, 
and there have been considerable difficulties with the budget.* 8l
But the King also acknowledged that PhrayS SuriyS had achieved a great
deal in his earlier posts, principally as Siamese Minister in Paris: however,
there was now a danger that those earlier successes would be obliterated by
the current run of failures.
'Therefore I think that I must give you a confidential warning ... 
if you feel that you cannot bring unity [to the Ministry] and 
cannot correct your mistakes, then you would be advised to leave 
the Ministry and take up some other work ... I am giving you this 
advice with kindness and with the hope that I can help you in the 
future.' 82
The final paragraphs of the King's letter were almost consoling, but 
PhrayS SuriyS could not have mistaken the central point of the letter as a
8 "zwhole. The following day he left the Ministry of Finance .
The reasons for PhrayS SuriyS's failure as Minister of Finance are complex 
and not easy to unravel. First it must be acknowledged that he had to contend
81. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 14 February 1908 N.A.Kh. 3/2.
82. ibid.
83* PhrayS SuriyS to King, 15 February 1908 N.A.Kh. 3/2.
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with more than his share of ill-fortune. He arrived at the Ministry jmst at 
the time when the period of rapid expansion in the revenues was coming to a 
close: the immediate problems of the revenue were intensified by the poor
monsoons of 1906 and 1907* Within six months of his taking office the syndi­
cate administering the Government's major source of revenue - the opium 
monopoly - collapsed and the Minister was faced with the problem of taking 
over the huge operation on behalf of the Government. Furthermore, in the 
wake of the financial collapse of large numbers of syndicates over the previous 
two or three years, there were now few tax farmers to compete for the remaining 
tax farm contracts, and inevitably this had a depressing effect on the bids.
With regard to the exchange mechanism, it was Phraya Suriya's misfortune that 
he had to contend first with an almost unprecedented rise in the price of 
silver, then from early 1907 a dramatic drop in the price - and at a time when 
the rice trade was depressed. These were considerable difficulties.
Clearly they overwhelmed the Minister of Finance. In a letter written on 
the day he resigned Phraya Suriya explained to the King how he had virtually 
lost control of the problems facing the Ministry :
'I had been at the Ministry of Finance for only a few days when 
I could see what a tremendous amount of work there was to do.
There were numerous deficiencies in the administration which I 
had to try to rectify ... yet I was constantly having to deal
with trifling matters, so I had insufficient time to deal with
the more important problems facing the Ministry. It was then 
my misfortune that all the major problems came to a head at the 
same time and I Could not find time to consider each of them 
carefully.' 8*f
PhrayS Suriya then described in detail the difficulties he had had in
coping with each of the crises which had arisen - the baht shortage in late
1906, the collapse of the opium farm, the virtual impossibility of finding
sufficient farmers to bid for the tax farms :
'When these problems were arising I remained silent - hesitated 
to inform you - because I feared that you would be displeased and
would take it as a sign that I was disheartened with my work and
was about to give up.' 85
It would appear that this reluctance to confide his fears and difficulties
8Jf. ibid.
85. ibid.
to the King was a major factor behind PhrayS SuriyS's increasingly introverted
and insular administrative behaviour noted above. But there may have been
another factor. When PhrayS Suriya became Minister of Finance in 1906, eight
of the twelve ministerial positions were held by members of the royal family:
in addition, of the four non-royal Ministers all except PhrayS SuriyS occupied
relatively unimportant Ministries - Agriculture, Public Instruction and Public 
86Works • Furthermore, PhrayS SuriyS was a member of the Bunnag family. His 
father was PhrayS Montrlsuriyawong (Chum Bunnag) - who had been head of the 
Royal Pages Corps earlier in the reign - and his grandfather was Somdet Chao 
PhaayS BprommahSprayTlrawong (Dit Bunnag) - the head of the KalShPm from I83O 
to I85I and the head of the Phra Khlang from 1822 to 1851^. He was a nephew 
of the ex-Regent. There is no evidence to suggest that either consciously or 
subconsciously the King's brothers and sons worked for the removal of PhrayS 
SuriyS simply because he was a noble, and in particular a Bunnag. Indeed when 
the Government came to consider the appointment of PhrayS SuriyS's successor
the King was particularly anxious to appoint another Minister of Finance of
88non-royal blood . Furthermore, other members of the Bunnag family had held 
ministerial positions for long periods of time in the reformed administration, 
for example Chao PhrayS Phatsakqrawong (Phqn Bunnag) at the Ministry of Public 
Instruction from 1892 to 1902^: and of course PhrayS SuriyS himself had been
appointed Minister of Finance in the first place. Yet the fact remains that 
Phraya SuriyS held an important post in a Council of Ministers dominated by 
the royal family, and it is possible that this at least encouraged the 
Minister's insularity: once things began to go wrong for PhrayS SuriyS, he
possibly found it difficult to seek the assistance he so clearly needed from
86. D. K; Wyatt The Beginnings of Modem Education in Thailand, 1868-1910 Ph.D 
thesis, Cornell, 1966, Appendix A.
87. Lamdap rStchinlkun b&ng chSng (Genealogy of the Royal Maternal Line 'Bang 
Chang') 2nd ed. Bangkok 1919* D. K. Wyatt Family Politics in Nineteenth Century 
Thailand J.S.E.A.H. vol. 9 no. 2 September 1968 pp. 208-228. Akin RAhibhftdflna 
The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873* Cornell 
Date raper 74, Ithaca 1969» Appendix F and pp. 200-201.
88. See the following section.
89. D. K. Wyatt Ph.D. thesis Appendix A.
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the inner circles of the royal family and in particular from the King: the
last quotation above can be interpreted as an admission of that fact.
In any event whether driven by natural inclination or force of circum­
stances, as his term as Minister of Finance progressed Phraya SuriyS 
increasingly came to pursue his own policies, rejecting the suggestions of 
the Financial Adviser, avoiding discussions with other members of the Council 
of Ministers and even senior officials in his own Ministry. Yet PhrayS 
SuriyS's stubborn independence would not have had the damaging consequences 
which it did have if his policies had been viable and practical. As it was he 
was finally undermined by his own lack of financial expertise, and perhaps 
more importantly, by his lack of composure in dealing with the large number of 
major problems which crashed down on him.
V4. The appointment of the new Minister of Finance, Prince Chanthaburl, 
February, 190&.
The resignation of PhrayS Suriya left the Ministry of Finance in a most 
demoralized condition. Not since the mid-l890s - with first the resignation 
of Prince NarSthip and then the two lifeless ministries of Prince Narit and 
Prince Sirithat Sangkat - had it been so lacking in authority, both inside
and outside the Government. The Ministry even found its internal disunity a
90topic for discussion in the editorial columns of the Bangkok Times • The 
King and the Council of Ministers were therefore very anxious to appoint 
PhrayS SuriyS1s successor with the least possible delay, to install a new 
Minister with sufficient forcefulness and ability to enable him to restore 
unity to the Ministry of Finance, to regain the confidence of the merchant and 
banking community of Bangkok and the tax farmers in the Government's financial 
administration, and to deal with the most pressing problem facing the 
Ministry in early 1908 - that of the Governtaent's deteriorating budget position. 
It took the Council almost two hour* of intense discussion to reach a
. . .  91decision with . regard to the new appointment • It is significant that the
90. Bangkok Times, 27 February 1908.
91. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 17 February 1908 
N.A.Kh. 3/2.
King wanted the new Minister to be a member of a noble family, for, as he 
explained to the Council, if PhrayS SuriyS were to be succeeded by one of the 
King's brothers or sons it could well appear that the Minister of Finance had 
been driven from office by the royal family. However, when the Council came 
to draw up a list of the qualifications required of the new Minister - con­
siderable financial and fiscal expertise, knowledge of accountancy, the ability 
to speak European languages, coupled with the capacity to work harmoniously 
with his officials and the other Ministers - they could think of no official 
of noble birth who would fit those requirements. The King then suggested 
that Prince Devawongse be moved from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Ministry of Finance; but who would have taken over Prince Devawongse's old post?
Eventually the Council of Ministers was left with two candidates. First 
Prince Narit, who had been Minister of Finance on two previous occasions 
(from 1893 to 1894 and then as acting Minister during Prince Mahit's absence 
in Europe in 1897)i and was at that point Minister of the Palace. But Prince 
Narit, who was at the meeting, declined the position, arguing that he lacked 
the ability to deal with the Ministry's myriad problems and that he could not 
speak a European language: he was berated by Prince Damrong for his lack of
enterprise. The second candidate was one of the King's sons, Prince
Chanthaburl. Born in 1874 he had gone to Europe in 1885 as one of the first
92group of King Chulalongkorn's sons to be educated in the West . On his return
to Siam in 1895 he had been appointed Director-General of the Education
Department: in April 1902 he had become Controller-General in the Ministry
93of Finance , the position he held on the resignation of PhrayS SuriyS in 
February 1908. He had had one short spell as acting Minister of Finance - in
early 1906 when Prince Mahit had been forced by ill-health to take leave of
absence. However, the King was reluctant to promote his son to the position 
of Minister in his own right for he felt that Prince Chanthaburl lacked suf­
ficient authority to be able to hold his own in the rigours of intra-Government
94debate • Undoubtedly the King was influenced in this assessment by memories
92. D. K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand Yale 1969 p.1148/pp.180-181.
93* ibid p. 296.
94. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 17 February 1908 N.A.Kh
of Prince Chanthaburl* 6 fairly undistinguished record as head of the Education 
95Department .
vBut Prince Chanthaburl had the strong support of Prince Damrong. Gradually 
the Minister of the Interior led the Council to a compromise solution. Prince 
Chanthaburl would be appointed acting Minister of Finance so that if he proved 
incapable of holding the position it would be possible to remove him with much 
less disruption than if the appointment were to be a permanent one. During 
this trial period Prince Narit would be authorized to exercise a general super­
vision over the work of the Ministry and to offer advice to the acting Minister. 
The presence of Prince Narit was intended to restore the confidence of out­
siders in the effectiveness of the Ministry’s administration^. However, the 
dual leadership of the Ministry of Finance lasted for only a few weeks: by
the end of March 1908 Prince Chanthaburl had proved his ability to govern the
. . . 98Ministry on his own, and from 1 April he was confirmed as a full Minister *
the first of King Chulalongkorn's sons to reach a ministerial position.
As it turned out the King need not have been concerned about his son's 
administrative abilities. Prince Chanthaburl became one of the most distingu­
ished and perhaps the most powerful Minister of Finance of the period of the 
absolute monarchy. He remained at the Ministry until January 1923, a period 
of almost fifteen years, and during that time he proved to be a persistent,
though ultimately unsuccessful, critic of King Wachirawut's personal and
99governmental extravagance . However, here it is not intended to consider 
Prince Chanthaburl's ministry in any detail for th%t would take the study far 
beyond the early development of the Kingdom's financial administration, and 
beyond the early years of the history of the modem Ministry of Finance.
95. D. K. Wyatt op. cit. pp. 267-292/pp. 295-296.
96. Bangkok Times, 20/21 February 1908.
97• Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 17 February 1908 
N.A.Kh. 3/2.
98. King to Prince Chanthaburl, 2k March 1908 N.A.Kh. 3/2.
99* This conflict between King Wachirawut and Prince Chanthaburl is covered 
in some detail in Stephen L. W. Greene Thai Government and Administration in 
the Reign of Rama VI (1910-1925) Ph.D. thesis, London 1971-
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Instead it is intended to concentrate on just his first two years at the 
Ministry - which will take the study up to the end of the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn in 1910 - for those two years saw not only the virtual comple­
tion of two of the most important reforms initiated and developed by Prince 
Chanthaburl's two predecessors - the abolition of the tax farming system and 
the establishment of a gold exchange standard - but also the final emergence 
of the budgetary problems which were to be such a feature of the reigns of 
Rama VI and Rama VII. As usual discussion of the exchange and tax farm reforms 
will be reserved for Chapters VI and VII, though at this point it must be
v/
noted that in both those areas Prince Chanthaburl quickly brought order to 
the confusion left by Phrayfi Suriya. First the new Minister promoted a Gold 
Standard Act which finally fixed the exchange value of the baht in terms of 
gold. Second, Prince Chanthaburl settled the pattern of Government administra­
tion of the opium monopoly - along the lines suggested by Mqm Chao Piya Phakdl - 
and also proceeded with the abolition of the spirit farm. In all three reforms
V
Prince Chanthaburl brought stability and authority to the Ministry's work.
This present chapter, however, will concentrate on the budgetary problems 
faced by the new Minister in the opening years of his term at the Ministry 
of Finance.
5. Budget problems, 1908 - 1910.
Most of the groundwork on the budget for 1908/09 had been completed by 
Phraya Suriya before he resigned in mid-February 1908. The estimates as
vpresented to the King by Prince Chanthaburl the following month showed an
expected revenue of 58*70 m. baht with expenditure at 60.59 m* baht - an esti-
100mated deficit of I .89 m. baht . Furthermore, the whole allocation for 
railway construction - 6.0 m. baht - was to be met from the proceeds of the 
1907 loan. The figures for estimated revenue and expenditure showed substantial 
increases over the estimates for the previous year - 8.0 m. baht for revenue 
and Jf.33 m. baht for expenditure. However, a substantial portion of those
100. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 16 March 1908 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/26.
increases was attributed to the fact that in 1908/09 for the first time the 
Ministry of Finance was including a figure for the gross receipts from the 
opium monopoly to balance the Government's increased expenditure on the opium 
monopoly administration: when the monopoly had been farmed the Ministry had
inserted into the accounts - on the revenue side - merely the figure for the 
Government's net profit. Prince Chanthaburl estimated that after allowance 
had been made for that change in the compilation of the accounts the effective 
increase in the Government's revenue in 1908/09 over 1907/08 was only 
3*81 m. baht.
The Minister of Finance submitted the budget to the King on 16 March 19^8^. 
Though he described in detail the various increases and cuts made in the esti­
mates, Prince Chanthaburl attempted no general analysis of the Government's 
budgetary position: instead he simply drew attention to some three or four
particularly important points, points which were to be thoroughly analysed and 
diseussed over the following two years. First, he argued that the Army and 
Navy could be allowed no further increases in their budget allocations. In 
1901/02 those two departments had been responsible for 3»91 baht, or a 
little over 10 per cent of the Government's total expenditure. The expansion 
and modernization of the Kingdom's forces from that year meant that by 1907/08 
they had been allocated 13*9 baht, or some 23 per cent of the Government's 
total expenditure. Prince Chanthaburl wanted no further expansion in the 
allocations under those heads for at least five years: in fact he had already
secured the agreement of the Minister of War to restrict the Army and Navy 
estimate to 13»9 m. baht for 1908/09. Second, Prince Chanthaburl noted the 
reduction in the estimate for the Irrigation Department - from 1.26 m. baht 
in 1907/08 to 0.95 nu baht in 1908/09 - an allocation that would allow the 
Department merely to complete those limited projects which it had already begun. 
The sums involved were small, yet the cut showed that the Grovernment was 
moving towards the final rejection of van der Heide's large-scale irrigation 
programmes. Third, by early 1908 the northern railway was in operation as
10 1. ibid.
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f a r  a s  P h its a n u lo k  : h o w e ve r, t h e r e  w as i n c r e a s i n g  co n c e rn  t h a t  th e  s t r e t c h
o f  l i n e  to  th e  s o u th , from  P h its a n u lo k  to  Nakqn Saw an, w as p ro v in g  u n p r o f it a b le
103because the region through which the line passed was commercially underdeveloped.
Inevitably this raised tfce question as to whether the Government should not
halt construction of the line well south of Chiangmai, at least until the
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  Kingdom im p ro ved . A t th e  m e e tin g  o f  th e  C o u n c il  o f
Ministers on 23 March 1908 it was decided that the Minister of Public Works
would undertake an investigation of the profitability of the northern railway 
10kabove Nak9n Sawan
\/
However, the most important point made by Prince Chanthaburl in submitting 
the 1908/09 budget to the King concerned the allocation of the Government's 
revenue between three main classes of expenditure - ordinary expenditure 
(salaries, civil servants' expenses - the cost of keeping the administration
in operation), extraordinary expenditure (for example, funds for the purchase
105 vof materials for public works projedts , for the purchase of weapons), and
s p e c i a l  e x p e n d itu r e  ( f o r  e x a m p le , th e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  th e  P r i v y  P u rse  Department,
payments to the Lao chiefs, and the payments made in connection with the
European loans). In the 1908/09 estimates ordinary expenditure accounted for
71 per cent of total expenditure , extraordinary expenditure for 7 per cent
and special expenditure for 22 per cent. From these figures, the Minister
argued, it was clear that a disproportionate amount of the Government's revenue
was devoted to the salaries of officials and administrative expenses. This
was of course an old problem: in the late 1890s it had led to the creation
v iof the Committee on Establishments. Prince Chanthaburl drew attention to a 
further disturbing point: a comparison of the original expenditure requests
of the Ministries with the allocation actually sanctioned by the Ministry of 
Finance showed that it was much easier for the Ministry to cut the relatively
102. R.F.A.B. 1908/09 p. *f.
103* Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 23 March 1908 
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/26.
10k. ibid.
105* Except for materials for railway construction which were paid for from !
the proceeds of the European loans.
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small extraordinary expenditure than the overwhelmingly large ordinary expen­
diture. The Ministries had asked for 44.56 m. baht for ordinary expenditure: 
this was cut to 43-17 baht. Extraordinary expenditure requests had been 
squeezed from 8.07 nu baht to 4.41 m. baht. Whilst in 1908/09 the large allo­
cation for ordinary expenditure reflected in part the fact that the Government 
had had to appoint large numbers of new officials to take over the administra­
tion of the opium monopoly, the following two years were to show that cutting 
the high administrative costs of the Government was in fact a long-term, deep- 
seated problem for the Ministry of Finance.
The f o l lo w i n g  y e a r ,  I 909A O ,  ®«w  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  new f e a t u r e  i n  th e  way i n
w h ich  th e  b u d get w as p r e s e n t e d . I n  s u b m itt in g  th e  e s t i m a t e s  to  th e  K in g  on 
10617 March 1909 1 Prince Chanthaburl undertook a detailed analysis of the
Government's budgetary position and outlined a budget strategy for the follo­
wing five years: previously Ministers of Finance had almost exclusively
restricted themselves to a description of the budget problems of the current
y e a r .  The e s t im a t e d  re ve n u e  f o r  1 9 0 9 / 1 0  w as 6 3 - 0  m. b a h t ,  an  i n c r e a s e  o f
✓
4*3 baht over the estimate for 1908/09. However, Prince Chanthaburl argued
that a major part of that increase was accounted for by once-for-all increases
u n d er c e r t a i n  re v e n u e  h e a d s . F o r  exam p le , i n  1 9 0 9 / 1 0  th e  Governm ent was
s c h e d u le d  t o  c o l l e c t  th e t r i e n n i a l  C h in ese  p o l l  t a x :  i n  f a c t  i t  was t o  be th e
last year in which the tax would be collected for the Government felt that
i t  d i s c r im in a t e d  e x c e s s i v e l y  b etw een  th e C h in e se  and S iam e se i n  th e  Kingdom -
d i s c r im in a t e d  a g a i n s t  th e  S iam e se i n  t h a t  th e y  had t o  p a y  a  c a p i t a t i o n  t a x
e v e r y  y e a r ,  d i s c r im in a t e d  a g a i n s t  th e  C h in e se  i n  t h a t  u n le s s  th e y  p a id  an
additional fee they had to wear a prominent wrist-seal to show that they had 
107 .been taxed • From 1 9 1 0 / 1 1  all races in Siam were to pay an annual capitation
108tax of 6 baht per head • Further once-for-all increases in revenue in 
1909/10 could be found under the heads for the khSsuai (a form of capitation
1 0 6 .  P r in c e  C h a n th a b u rl to  K in g , 1 7  M arch 1 9 0 9  N .A .K h . 5 .  1 / 2 7 .
1 0 7 .  R . F . A . B .  1 9 0 9 A 0  p .  6 .
1 0 8 .  N o t i f i c a t i o n .  A b o lis h in g  th e  a f f i x i n g  o f  s e a le d  w r i s t l e t s  o f  tw in e  on 
C h in e s e . 2 6  M arch 1 9 0 9  F . F . A .  5 / 2 .
tax which for the first time was to be collected in five major provinces in
Central Siam), for the orchard tax (where the authorities were undertaking a
reassessment of the number of trees liable for the tax, the first such survey 
109for 27 years ) and for forest dues (because 1909/10 was expected to be a
vgood floating season). Prince Chanthaburl estimated that in the absence of 
those abnormal factors the revenue estimate for 1909/10 would have shown an 
increase of only 1.4 m. baht over 1908/09» and he took that figure as the 
expected annual increase in revenue for the following few years1^ .
Expenditure for 1909/10 was estimated at 62.92 m. baht. Again the largest 
allocation - 44.82 m. baht or 71 per cent - was attributed to ordinary expendi­
ture. Extraordinary expenditure received even less funds th^n it had in 
1908/09 - 3»75 baht in 1909/10 compared with 4.41 m. baht. Indeed, Prince
vChanthaburl admitted that the Ministry had been able to secure the small 
estimated revenue surplus of 0.07 m. baht in 1909/10 only because it had been 
prepared to cut the Ministries' original requests for extraordinary expenditure 
from 9*44 m. baht to the sanctioned 3»75 baht. Furthermore, by a series of 
detailed calculations the Minister showed clearly that there was a tendency 
for almost all the increases in the Government's revenue to be swallowed up 
by larger allocations for Government salaries and administrative expenses,
leaving a smaller and smaller proportion of the Kingdom's resources for special
>/
and extraordinary expenditure. At the same time, Prince Chanthaburl warned, 
there were certain to be unavoidable increases in at least special expenditure 
over the coming five years, since from 1909/10 the Government wou^^ have to 
begin repaying the capital on the 1905 sterling loan.
There was therefore an extremely strong case for restraint in Government
✓expenditure, particularly in ordinary expenditure. Prince Chanthaburl put 
forward a number of practical proposals. First, he repeated his call for a
109. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 23 July 1908, N.A.Kh. 
14. 1/7. R.F.A.B. 1909AO p. 5-
110 . The Minister ignored the possibility that the Government could enjoy such 
once-for-all increases in revenue every year. Indeed over the period 1910-1919 
the revenue increased not by the expected 14.0 m. baht but by 29.32 m. baht 
(James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 Appendix B). Even so 
Prince Chanthaburl was correct on the basic point - that by the late 1900s the 
Government had seen the end of the era of very rapid increases in its revenue.
restriction on military expenditure, suggesting that the Ministry of War be 
allocated only 25 per cent of the Government's resources for the coming five 
years. Even if that period saw a substantial increase in revenue, the Minister 
argued, he would want to see the additional funds used to expand the Govern­
ment's reserves rather than used to purchase additional military equipment
✓or increase the size of the armed forces. Second, Prince Chanthaburl announced 
that he was in the process of directing an amalgamation of the Government's 
survey divisions and a rationalization of the Survey Department itself: the
consequent reduction in the salary and expenses allocation of the Department 
would bring a saving of 0.3 m. baht p.a. Third, the Government had finally 
come to a decision with regard to van der Heide's irrigation schemes.
As was described in Chapter IV, van Aer Heide's 'General Report on 
Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam Valley' had aroused relatively 
little enthusiasm when it had been submitted to the Government in early 19031 
and when the Government debate over the European loan had broken down in 
August 1903 the report was put aside. When the loan debate was resumed the 
following year van der Heide's scheme was virtually ignored, largely because 
it was realized that the whole of the proceeds of the proposed loan would be 
required to finance railway construction. However, in 1904 a properly consti­
tuted Irrigation Department was established employing seven European irrigation 
engineers: a five-year programme of irrigation works was established involving
the dredging and improvement of existing canals, the carrying out of repair 
work on locks and dykes, and the survey of water levels throughout the Central 
Plain as a preparation for the possible implementation of van der Heide's 
proposals, then still officially being considered by the Government^^. The 
Department was to receive a budget allocation of 0.6 m. baht p.a. over the
five-year period, a pitiful sum compared with the 5«0 or 6.0 m. baht p.a. en-
112visaged by van der Heide for his twelve year programme •
111. R.F.A.B. 1904/05 p.11.
112. In fairness 0.6 m. baht p.a. compared favourably with the sums set aside 
for irrigation work in the preceding few years: 1901/02 - 0.04 m.: 1902/03 -
0.03 m.: 1903/04 — 0.13 n. Furthermore the Department's actual expenditure
consistently exceeded the original estimate : 1905/06 - 0*91 m. : 1906/07 -
1 .2 2 m.
Understandably van der Heide - now head of the Irrigation Department - 
resented a programme which merely allowed for the improvement of existing 
irrigation works. In March 1906 he submitted a further scheme to the Govern­
ment involving an expenditure of 24.1 m. baht spread over four years11 .^ The 
Council of Ministers refused to commit itself11**. Undeterred van der Heide 
submitted two still smaller schemes in 1908 which together were to cost only
6.0 m. baht. These too were rejected11'*. By early 1909 there was a strong 
feeling within the Government that van der Heide’s irrigation proposals should
be finally, conclusively, scrapped. Williamson was a notable exponent of this
1 1 6  v ^  view . In March 1909 at a meeting attended by Prince Chanthaburl, Chao PhrayS
ThSwBt (the Minister of Agriculture), Williamson and van der Heide, it was
decided not only to reject all plans for large-scale irrigation works, but
also in the interests of economy, in effect to disband the Irrigation Department
itself117. All survey work was to cease, and over the following ten years
irrigation officials would be restricted to completing the few minor schemes
already begun, and then maintaining the existing irrigation facilities. The
extraordinary expenditure of the Department would be cut from 0.5 m. baht p.a.
to 0.3 m. baht p.a., and Prince Chanthaburl expected commensurate savings in
ordinary expenditure once the staff of the Department had been reduced. In
April 1909 van der Heide carried out the reorganization of the Irrigation
Department's activities and arranged for the dismissal of most of the Depart-
lldment’s engineers: he then resigned and left Siam
It could hardly be aaid that Prince Chanthaburl's proposals with regard
to the Ministry of War, the Survey Department and the Irrigation Department
113* Note. In regard to the cost of the Irrigation scheme at reduced capacity, 
van der Heide. 12 March 1906 F.F.A. 18/5.
114. James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1830-1970 pp* 197-198.
115. Memorandum. Further proposed schemes of Irrigation Department. Williamson 
14 August 1908 F.F.A. 18/4.
116. Memorandum on the financial position created by the present and prospective 
public indebtedness of the Government. Williamson. 27 February 1909 F.F.A.16/1
117. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 17 March 1909 N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/27.
118. van der Heide to Chao PhrayS ThBwBt 3/19 April 1909 F.F.A. 18/5.
were likely to be very effective in restraining the growth of the Government's 
expenditure, and in particular, its ordinary expenditure. In fact the main 
practical effect of the proposals waste rule out the possibility of a large 
increase in expenditure on irrigation in the near future: the immediate cut6
were negligible. The Minister was to return to the problem the following year. 
Finally, in submitting the 1909/10 estimates to the King, Prince
VChanthaburl confirmed a decision already taken by the Government to halt con­
struction of the northern railway just north of Uttaradit - a point the 
Railway Department expected to reach by November 1910. Undoubtedly the decision 
was taken in the light of the Ministry of Public Works' investigation of the 
profitability of those sections of the line already in operation, and in view 
of the fact that in order to complete the line to Chiangmai the Government
v'would have to raise a further loan of £1.5 m. Prince Chanthaburl pointed out 
that as it was by 19 12 /13 the interest payments and capital repayments on the 
two existing loans would be almost 3*0 m. baht p.a.: for the Government to
take on another loan would mean that it would make a severe loss on the northern 
railway, particularly as the Uttaradit-Chiangmai stretch could not be expected 
to give a very good direct financial return. The 1909A0 budget was sanctioned 
by the King on 26 March 1909^^.
>/The following year, 1910/11, Prince Chanthaburl ran into some difficulty
whilst compiling the estimates, and on 13 March 1910 he wrote to the King for
120assistance • Prince Chanthaburl explained that the Ministry of Finance had 
completed its processing of the preliminary expenditure requests submitted by 
the Ministries, and yet the Government still appeared to be heading for a 
revenue deficit of almost 8.0 m. baht. The Minister argued that two factors 
in particular made it difficult for his Ministry to keep down Government expen­
diture. First, that the Government was having to find more and more funds in 
order to service its foreign debt. Second, that since the Ministries were now 
submitting their expenditure demands in a much more orderly fashion than they
119- King to Prince Chanthaburl, 26 March 1909 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/27.
120. Prince dhanthaburl to King, 13 March 1910 N.A.Kh. 5. 1/28.
had in the past, there was now very little room for the Ministry of Finance 
to make cuts without seriously affecting the programmes and policies of the 
administration.
Prince Chanthaburl was not able to submit the 1910/11 budget to the Council
1S1of Ministers until 6 May 1910 • Even then the Minister was able to present
122only an interim set of estimates . The meeting of the Council was opened 
by the King who gave a lengthy and detailed analysis of what was now clearly 
the crucial budgetary problem facing the Government - the fact that a very 
high proportion of the Kingdom's resources was absorbed by the allocations for 
official salaries and administrative expenses. According to the King the root 
of the problem lay with the unwillingness of the Siamese to make their living 
in commerce or business: the ambition of a large portion of the native popu­
lation was to find employment in the Government service. In the pre-reform 
bureaucracy the administration had been able to absorb large numbers of officials 
largely because no salaries were paid: instead officials had been expected to
make their living by kin mu'ang - by retaining a portion of the King's revenue 
which passed through their hands, and by prizing payments from non-officials 
for services rendered. With the reform of the bureaucracy from the late l880s 
those conditions had radically altered. By introducing a mass of regulations - 
particularly financial regulations - to govern the administrative behaviour 
of officials, the opportunities for kin mu'ang had been reduced: at the same
time, by paying officials salaries the need to kin mu'ang had been, in theory 
at least, obviated. It was clear, the King continued, that once the Government 
began to meet the costs of running the bureaucracy directly, it became increa­
singly difficult for it to absorb large numbers of new recruits without drasti­
cally reducing the allocation of resources to important Government projects.
The problem was accentuated by several other factors. First, in the pre- 
reform administration it was usual for each department to engage considerably 
more officials than the work of the division strictly required: this tendency
121. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 6 May 1910 
N.A.Kh. 5. 1/28.
122. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 3 May 1910 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/28.
had been carried over into the post-reform bureaucracy, with the result, the 
King argued, that in every Ministry there was a significant number of officials
with little or no work to do, yet who were still entitled to a Government
123salary . Second, the Government was faced with a very large salary bill not 
simply because there were too many officials, but also because the rates of 
pay in the Siamese service were higher than for corresponding positions in the 
bureaucracies of neighbouring countries. There were two reasons for this, the 
King explained: first Siam had been forced to employ a large number of
European officials who demanded to be paid well. The Government, not wishing 
to discriminate between European and Siamese officials in its employ, had 
therefore found it necessary to pay the latter more than otherwise it would 
have done. Second and more fundamentally, as the Siamese were reluctant to 
make their living from commerce, the majority of families whose men had Govern­
ment positions were almost totally dependent on the Government salary: there­
fore the Government had to be prepared to pay them adequately.
The Government was therefore faced with a difficult problem. When sub­
mitting the 1908/09 and 1909/10 budgets to the King, Prince Chanthaburl had 
clearly shown that unless the administration found a way to reduce the proportion 
of its resources allocated to salaries and administrative expenses - or at 
least foujjd a way to prevent the proportion from increasing - the Government’s 
important reform programme, and particularly its public works projects, could 
be severely harmed by being starved of funds. Yet there were considerable 
social and even political obstacles to reducing the level of ordinary expendi­
ture, to reducing the number of Government officials. As the King argued at 
tfce meeting of the Council of Ministers in May 19101 what was really needed 
was a change of attitudes: for the Siamese to begin to look upon commerce
and business as acceptable ways of making a living and to stop regarding 
government service as the only honourable, secure source of employment: for
the Government itself to cease appointing large numbers of lower-grade officials 
for whom frequently it had no particular work.
123« One explanatory point must be made. The King’s concern was with the large 
number of relatively untrained, low-grqde officials. The argument should not 
obscure the fact that the Government still suffered from a serious shortage of 
well-educated, capable officials in the higher levels of the administration.
The King then called on Prince Chanthaburl to present his provisionally
completed estimates for 1910/ll• Revenue for that year was estimated at
64.25 m. baht , an increase of only 1.25 m. baht over the estimate for 1909/10.
Estimated expenditure from revenue was put at 64.24 m. baht to produce a
negligible revenue surplus. Ordinary expenditure accounted for 74 per cent of
total expenditure from current revenue. (Originally the Ministries had
requested a total of 63«3 m. baht under this head, a sura which if sanctioned
would have absorbed virtually the whole of the revenue.) A further 6.86 m.
baht for a water-works project for Bangkok and the completion of the northern
railway as far as Uttaradit was to be met from the proceeds of the 1907 loan.
Finally, 2.56 m. baht was to be drawn from the reserves to begin construction
124of the peninsular railway • Total Government expenditure for 1910/11 was 
estimated at 73*67 m. baht.
The Council of Ministers then discussed and approved a three-stage scheme 
for cutting Government expenditure. First, each Minister would impose a 3 per 
cent cut in the ordinary expenditure of his Ministry, the cuts being secured 
mainly by Asmissing redundant staff. Second, each Minister would conduct a 
thorough examination of the functions and staff of his administration in an 
attempt to improve the efficienfcy of his Ministry. Finally, the Ministers as 
a whole would undertake an examination of the entire Government structure in 
order to decide which Government projects could be safely postponed and also
V
124. In March 1909 an agreement had been signed between the Government of the 
Federated Malay States and the Siamese Railway Department by which the former 
advanced Siam a loan of £4.0 m. for the construction of the peninsular railway. 
The agreement formed a part of a much wider agreement whereby four of the 
Siamese Malay States were transferred to Britain (See: Thamsook Numnonda Negoti­
ations Regarding the Cession of Siamese Malay States, 1907-1909 J.S.S. July 
1967 vol. 55 2 pp. 227-235)* The Railway Department Could take up portions
of the loan as required, and it is interesting to note that taking advantage 
of that arrangement the Department delayed using the loan for as long as pos­
sible - the first instalment not being called for until July 1911 (Prince 
Devawongse to Peel - British Minister in Bangkok, 6 March 1911 F.F.A. 25/7).
The point was that from 1910/11 the Government had to commence repaying the 
capital on the 1905 loan, and from 1912/13* that on the 1907 loan as well. From 
1912/13 the total debt payments of the Government would be 2.97 m. baht p.a. 
(Memorandum on the financial position created by the present and prospective 
public indebtedness of the Government. Williamson. 27 February 1909 F.F.A. 16/1) 
so clearly the Ministry of Finance wished to postpone having to pay interest on 
the 1909 loan for as long as possible. It was for this reason that in 1910/11 
the first allocations for the peninsular railway were covered from the reserves.
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in order to secure some amalgamation of departments in an attempt to reduce 
the number of officials. In discussing this three-stage scheme the King 
repeatedly emphasized that the objective was to reduce unnecessary expenditure: 
no cuts were to be made which would result in a deterioration in the effective­
ness or efficiency of the Government administration.
Two particular points of relevance for the future emerged from the 
Government's analysis of its budgetary problems in 1908-1910. First, that in 
the absence of the development of new sources of revenue - which waited upon 
the renegotiation of the commercial treaties with the Powers - the Government 
had to impose strict control over its own expenditure if its long-term financial 
stability was to be guaranteed. As the Bangkok Times noted in an editorial in 
February 1908:
• ... what is wanted now is a strictly conservative policy - four 
years' steady administration to let things adjust themselves ... 
and several years of conservative policy, free from heroic finance, 
with expenditure kept carefully below income, should end the present 
unsettled state of affairs.* 125
Yet just at the point when frugality was required King Chulalongkorn died
and was succeeded by his son, King Wachirawut, who by his unwillingness or
inability to be a strong head of the administration for any significant length
of time, and more particularly by his personal wastefulness, set the tone for
governmental extravagance. The first two years of his reign alone saw over
6.0 m. baht spent on the funeral of his father, and on the second . major coro-
126nation of the new King . On his death in November 1925 King Wachirawut had
personal debts totalling over 10.0 m. baht, almost half of which were owing to
127the Government Treasury . In fact King Wachirawut was saved from the most
serious consequences of his extravagance partly by a series of unexpectedly
12dgood revenue collections in the mid-1910s , and partly because Prince
v 129-Chanthaburl stood between the King and his more extreme expenditure demands • 
125« Bangkok Times, 27 February 1908.
126. Stephen L. W. Greene Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of 
Rama VI (1910-1925) Ph.D. thesis, London, 1971 p» 9**»
12 7. ibid, p. ifl6.
128. R.F.A.B. 1915A6 and 1916A7.
129. Stephen L. W. Greene op. cit. pp. 288-306/pp. 3M+-345.
^t was left to King Prachathipok to restore financial stability - at consider­
able political risk to his throne.
Second, the budget discussions of the last three years of the reign of 
King Chulalongkorn brought to the fore the considerable problem of the very 
high proportion of Government resources being devoted to salaries and adminis­
trative expenses. In 1908-1910 the Government was able to skirt round this 
problem and achieve a balanced budget by cutting extraordinary expenditure - 
by halting the construction of the northern railway at Uttaradit and by dis­
mantling the Irrigation Department. But for King Chulalongkorn's successors 
the problem grew more acute as the proportion of ordinary expenditure increased 
and as the demands for extraordinary expenditure became more insistent. A 
memorandum written by Williamson in March 1924 illustrates the point well.
'For a good many years past, there has been a tendency for the 
expenditures to consist more and more of salaries and contingen­
cies while the allotments for extraordinary expenditures i.e. 
administrative public works and the like, have now been curtailed 
to a minimum. The position, therefore, now is that it is almost 
impossible to economize expenditures in any way which was possible 
fifteen years ago, by making heavy cuts in the extraordinary grants 
in order to meet the necessity for economy which has arisen. The 
budget Consists now to so large an extent of kan pracam (i.e. 
ordinary or current) items, that there is practically no scope 
for reductions ... unless the tendency is checked there will be 
a danger of nearly the whole of the disbursements of the govern­
ment consisting of salaries and contingencies - leaving practically 
nothing for permanent works, whether of a developmental or 
administrative character.' 130
Again it was King Prachathipok who had to face up to the problem. In the 
late 1920s a large number of officials were dismissed as a part of the Govern­
ment's retrenchment measures following the reign of King Wachirawut, and then 
from early 1932, as the effect of the world depression was felt in Siam, a 
second round of dismisaals and salary reductions was imposed1^ .  By taking 
the action which he did King Prachathipok finally revealed the full extent of 
the problem originally raised by King Chulalongkorn in May 1910. For the 
majority of educated Siamese the Government service - including the armed 
forces - remained the only acceptable source of employment. By restricting
130. Memorandum. Williamson. 27 March 1924 F.F.A. 37/24. Quoted by Greene 
pp. 393-394.
131. Kong Syamananda A History of Thailand Bangkok 1971 pp. 171-172.
recruitment into the civil service and the army and navy, the Government, 
in effect, was asking increasing numbers of Siamese to find their livelihood 
from commerce and business, sectors traditionally dominated by the Chinese. 
In practice therefore, the Government's economy measures closed the door on 
the only major area of employment for educated Siamese, and in so doing 
provided much of the social and political disaffection which led to the 
1932 coup against the absolute monarchy.
CHAPTER VI 
Currency and exchange reform, 1885 - 1910
The currency and exchange reforms promoted by the Ministry of Finance in 
the period covered by this study divide into three basic categories - the 
introduction of a Government paper currency, the adoption of a gold-exchange 
standard for the baht, and attempts to make the baht the principal coin in 
circulation in the southern provinces of the Kingdom.
The issue of a Government paper currency from September 1902 can be dealt 
with briefly, though a few essential points about the scheme must be made\ 
First, the issue was a considerable success: the total value of Government
notes in circulation increased almost continuously from late 1902 until the 
end of the decade so that by 1910 it exceeded l?-0 ra. baht, though it would 
appear that the notes were in widespread use only in the central provinces of 
the Kingdom. Second, the notes greatly facilitated the actual conduct of trade 
and of Government financial business: the following description by Jacob Child,
the American Minister in Bangkok in the late 1880s, vividly underlined the 
difficulties experienced in carrying out those activities in Siam without 
currency notes.
'it was no novel sight to see eight or ten coolies on their way 
to the banks or mercantile houses carrying large sacks of silver 
coin, and frequently boat-loads of ticals are seen on their way 
up the river to pay for teak and rice; and cart-loads, escorted 
by soldiers on their way from the interior, taxes to be paid into 
the royal treasury, frequently from ten to fifteen in the train, 
all heavily loaded, each drawn by a couple of bullocks.' 2
Finally, it is significant that the Ministry of Finance insisted on a
high reserve for the Government note issue. The 1902 Act establishing the
Paper Currency Department stipulated that the reserve had to equal the full
value of notes in circulation, though at the discretion of the M i n i s t e r  of
Finance 25 per cent of the reserve could be invested: in 1906 this ratio was
increased to 50 per cent, but this still meant that at least half the note
1. I have considered this topic in some detail in an article in the J.S.S. 
(vol. 60, July 1972 pp. 23-Vf) 'Paper Currency: The Government Note Issues
in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn'• The following points are taken from 
that article.
2. Jacob T. Child The Pearl of Asia Chicago 1892 p. 328.
issue was backed with coin. These high reserve levels, particularly cash 
reserve levels, guaranteed the convertibility of the notes in all but the most 
disastrous circumstances, but it also tied up a significant proportion of the 
Government's resources, about 8.5 m. baht by 1910. This is a point which will 
be considered in some detail in the concluding chapter.
The major concern of this present chapter will be to examine the Ministry 
of Finance's exchange policy: on several occasions this area of the Ministry's
work became closely involved with the third category of reforms outlined above - 
the southern currency schemes - and therefore it will be practical to consider 
both subjects together.
1. The abandonment of the silver standard, November - December 1902.
The exchange system in operation in Siam from the opening of the Kingdom 
to foreign trade in the 1850s until late 1902 was in essence quite simple.
I>uring those parts of the year when the export trade was flourishing - princi­
pally between November and April when the rice crop was brought down to 
Bangkok to be milled and exported - there would be a strong demand from rice- 
millers and exporters for baht with which to pay the farmers for their crop.
The millers and merchants would obtain their baht from the Bangkok Treasury 
in exchange for imported silver, either in the form of bullion or Mexican and 
British dollars. The Treasury would use this stock of silver to mint baht 
coins, the baht being given to the merchants and millers when they next came 
to the Treasury with silver dollars or bullion. Conversely, when the export 
trade was relatively slack and the call was for dollars to pay for imports, 
merchants would come to the Treasury with baht and purchase dollars from the
stock which had not been reminted. Until the late 1880s the exchange of baht
C? )
and dollars was carried on directly with the merchants and millers, but with
the establishment of branches of the European banks in Bangkok at the end of
the century the exchange business passed into the hands of those specialized
agencies"^. As far as the authorities were concerned this exchange/monetary
3- Branches of 3 European banks were opened in Siam in this period: The
Hongkong and Shanghai (1888), The Chartered (1894) and the Banque de L'lndo- 
Chine (1897)• Paul Sithi-Aranuai Finance and Banking in Thailand. A Study of 
the Commercial System 1888-1963 Bangkok 19b4 p. 55.
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mechanism required little interference or adjustment. The principal responsi­
bility of the Treasury was a technical one - to ensure that it always had a 
sufficient stock of coins to meet the demands of the merchants and millers 
(later the banks).
The baht/dollar exchange rate was fixed from 1857 at 5 baht : 5 the rate
4being determined by the relative silver content of the two coins . -Similarly 
the exchange value of the baht in relation to non-silver currencies was also de­
termined by the intrinsic values of the coins, in the case of sterling by the 
relative value of the gold sovereign and the silver value of the baht measured 
in terms of gold. It followed that fluctuations in the world price of silver 
(measured in terms of gold) were reflected in fluctuations in the baht/sterling 
exchange rate, a fall in the price of silver causing a depreciation of the baht 
against sterling. In fact in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
price of silver fell rapidly, partly the result of sin increase in the supply of 
the metal following tne discovery of new deposits principally in Mexico ana 
Nevada, partly the result of a fall in the demand for silver as, following the 
example of Germany in 1871, virtually all the major trading countries in the 
world which were still on the silver standard adopted a gold standard^. The 
price of silver slumped from 60^d. per ounce in I87O to 28 1/^d. per ounce in 
1900b. Inevitably during this period the silver-based baht depreciated against 
sterling - from 8 baht : £ in I87O to 15.6 baht : £ in 1895^*
The virtually continuous and substantial depreciation of the baht had 
several important damaging consequences for the Kingdom. First, the fluctu­
ations in the exchange introduced an element of speculation into Siam's trade 
with gold-based countries: merchants' careful calculations of profit margins
were frequently thrown into confusion by changes in the baht/sterling rate. 
Second, with the exchange value of the baht falling, Siam found herself having
k. James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 p. 150.
5* See: R. G. Hawtrey The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice 5th ed.
London 19^7 Chapter 3-
8. Whitaker's Almanac (The tigures given are for the average yearly price of 
silver per standard Troy ounce in the London market).
7* James C. Ingram op. cit. Appendix D.
to pay increasingly more in terras of baht to secure the same sterling value 
of imports: this was a particularly important consideration once it was
realised that almost all the capital goods imports necessary for the Kingdom's 
public works projects - particularly the railway construction programme - came 
from the gold-standard powers of Western Europe. At the samfc time a signifi­
cant proportion of Siam's exports - particularly rice - went to Asian markets, 
and were therefore presumably paid for in dollars, with which the baht raain-
g
tained a fixed relationship . Therefore the Kingdom suffered an increase in 
the baht price of her imports without securing any advantage in the form of 
an improved competitive position for her exports. Finally, whilst Siam 
remained on the silver standard it was irresponsible for the Government to 
consider raising a loan in Europe: if the baht continued to depreciate rapidly
whilst the loan was being repaid, the burden of the Government's interest pay­
ments and debt repayments would increase enormously. Furthermore, European 
capitalists were discouraged from investing in Siam for fear of seeing their 
profits wiped out by a fall in exchange.
These considerations did not become really important until the 1890s. In 
the first place, until the early 1890s the rate of depreciation was quite slow: 
but then there was a sudden large fall in the price of silver (which forced
both India and Russia off the silver standard) and after that point the fall
9in the value of the baht was quite dramatic . Second, it was not until the 
1890s that the Government's reform programme and its public works schemes 
really got under wayl inevitably as the baht cost of imports rose there was 
increasing concern that the Government's ability to import essential goods 
would be restricted, and that these programmes and schemes would be threatened.
In August 1899 Rivett-Carnac wrote to Prince Mahit outlining the dangers 
of Siam remaining tied to the silver standard: |>e proposed that the baht be
8. James C. Ingram Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources, 
in: C. D. Cowan (ed.) The Economic Development of South-East Asia London 1964
pp. 102-12 6. p. 104/p. 10 7•
9. Until 1879 the rate was held at 8.0 baht:£. It dropped to 10.0 baht:£ 
by 1890 but then slumped to 17.1 baht:£ in l899» James C. Ingram Economic 
Change in Thailand 1850-1970 Appendix D.
placed on a gold basis, the opportunity also being taken to revalue the 
currency1 .^ Though the Minister of Finance accepted Rivett-Carnac's argu­
ments and suggestions'1’1, he was unable to secure the consent of the Council 
of Ministers to the implementation of the Adviser's proposals. The principal 
apponent of the measure was Prince Devawongse: it would appear that the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs feared that the Treasury would be unable to main­
tain the exchange value of the baht at the higher level proposed by Rivett- 
Carnac, and that in the confusion which would inevitably follow the collapse 
of the scheme the Government would be brought into dispute with the European 
banks, a dispute in which the banks would certainly be supported by their 
legations. The Council discussed the issue twice in September 1899 but 
Prince Devawongse's influential standing within the Ministers was sufficient 
to ensure that hfts caution prevailed over the forceful advocacy of Prince 
Mahit12.
Between late 1899 and early 1902 the fall in the price of silver, and 
consequently the depreciation in the exchange value of the baht came to a
13temporary halt: indeed in 1900 the baht actually appreciated against sterling
But then there was a further dramatic drop in the price of silver and by
14November 1902 the baht had fallen to 21.00 baht : £ from an average of
10. Memorandum. Closing of the Royal Mint to the free coinage of silver 
dollars. Proposals made by the Financial Adviser. Rivett-Carnac. 22 August 
1899 F.F.A. 23/1* Rivett-Carnac's proposals were continued in two further 
memoranda of 9 and 11 September 1899 F.F.A. 23/1*
11. Prince Mahit to King, 23 August 1899 N.A.Kh. 10/7.
12.Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac. 9 September 1899 N.A.Kh. 10/7. Unfortunately no 
record of these meetings of the Council exists in the National Archives: nor
do the available documents make clear the exact reasons for Prince Devawongse's 
opposition to the measure at this stage. However, it should be noted that at 
exactly this time - August-September 1899 - Prince Devawongse's influence was 
instrumental in securing the rejection of another of Rivett-Carnac's major pro­
posals - the raising of a European loan (Chapter IV pp.tf«->«). Prince Deva­
wongse's well-documented dislike of the Financial Adviser may have been a potent 
factor in both issues.
13- James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 Appendix D.
14. Ministry of Finance to banks, legations, newspapers informing them of the 
abandonment of the silver standard, November 1902 F.F.A. 23/1. At its lowest 
point in 1902, the baht was worth about 40% of its value in 1890 in terms of 
gold. James C. Ingram Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources 
p. 113 fn. 1 .
16.75 baht : £ in 1900. There were prospects of further falls. On 19 November 
1902 Rivett-Carnac again approached Prince Mahit with the proposal that Siam 
should abandon the silver standard and at the same time revalue the baht^.
In particular he emphasized the crucial point that if the Government failed 
to halt the depreciation of its currency, within a short time the baht cost 
of capital goods imports could become prohibitive and the essential public 
works projects begun in the 1890s could grind to a standstill. The following 
day Prince Mahit wrote to the King enclosing the Adviser's memorandum, and 
again recommending the immediate adoption of Rivett-Carnac's proposals^.
The Minister informed the King that on the abandonment of the silver standard 
the baht would be revalued to 17 baht : £. Later, as financial, commercial 
and political circumstances allowed, the baht would be gradually revalued.
When the exchange value of the baht had reached what was felt to be an approp­
riate level, then it would be finally fixed in relation to gold by the 
promulgation of further legislation.
On this occasion Prince Devawongse accepted the arguments put forward by
17Prince Mahit and Rivett-Carnac and supported the scheme . The necessary
18legislation was rapidly approved by the Council of Ministers , and the
19'Royal Mint Amendment Act' was promulgated on 25 November 1902 . With the
passing of this Act it was decreed that the Treasury would no longer accept 
silver dollars or silver bullion for coining into baht: the same day a noti­
fication was issued stating that in future the Treasury would sell baht only 
in exchange for sterling paid into the account of the Siamese Government with
15. Memorandum. A Gold Standard for Siam, Rivett-Carnac 19 November 1902 
F.F.A. 23/1.
16. Prince Mahit to King, 20 November 1902 N.A.Kh. 26/13 •
17. Prince Devawongse to King, 22 November 1902, N.A.Kh. 26/13. However it 
is perhaps significant that Prince Devawongse used this occasion to bring to 
the notice of the King a rather acrimonious dispute which he had lately been 
having with Rivett-Carnac over an unrelated issue - the treaty rights of the 
Bangkok Government to tax trade in the Siamese Malay States. Such references 
provide evidence of the ill-feeling that often blew up between the Minister 
and the Adviser.
18. Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, 22 November 1902 N.A.Kh. 26/1J.
19- Enclosed with Prince Mahit to King, 24 November 1902, N.A.Kh. 26/I3 .
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in London. The new exchange rate, the rate
at which the Treasury would sell baht for gold or gold-based currencies, was
20fixed at 1 ? baht : £, a revaluation of approximately 23 per cent
The Government's measures provoked a storm of protest from the three
European banks in Bangkok. Each bank held a significant proportion of its
funds in dollars in Hongkong and Singapore: consequently with the revaluation
of the baht they stood to lose heavily when they came to reimport those funds
21into the Kingdom and exchange them back into Siamese currency . The managers 
of the banks saw Rivett-Carnac on 27 November to ask whether the Government 
would compensate them for these losses: the Financial Adviser was adamant
that the Government would not. Immediately the disagreement flared up into 
a major dispute between the Government and the European banks. On the Govern­
ment side the principal participant was Rivett-Carnac: at his interview with
the managers on 27 November he responded to the banks' calls for compensation 
by arguing that the measure just effected was to be regarded as a normal 
fluctuation in the exchange rate and that the banks, as exchange banks, would 
have to accept their losses, just as they had enjoyed their profits when the 
rate had moved in their favour. Indeed, he argued, as the Ministry of Finance
had discussed the proposed with the banks when it had first been raised in
221899 , the Government had given every indication of its intentions: if the
banks had now been caught unawares by the Ministry's action, that was hardly 
the fault of the Siamese Government. Finally, the Adviser repeatedly reminded
the managers that when the Government of India had abandoned the silver standard
2 3in 1893 it had refused to pay compensation to the banks .
20. Prince Mahit to King, 29 November 1902 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
21. Memorandum. Interview between Managers of Local Banks and Financial 
Adviser regarding the closing of the Mints, Rivett-Carnac, 28 November 1902 
F.F.A. 23A-
22. Memorandum. Closing of the Royal Mint to the free coinage of silver 
dollars. Proposals made by the Financial Adviser, Rivett-Carnac, 22 August 
1899 F.F.A. 23/1.
23- In fact the Indian and Siamese cases were not strictly comparable: in
India the closing of the mints in 1893 had not been followed by an immediate 
revaluation of the currency. See, K. N. S. Nambudiripad A Short History of 
Indian Currency Poona 19551 p» 58.
Yet in this dispute the European banks were able to bring tremendous
2kpressure to bear on the Siamese Government . Most effectively the managers
threatened to refuse to purchase baht at the new rate fixed by the Government
25and so prevent the financing of the export of the rice crop : indeed it
appears that at one point the banks actually carried out that threat and
26refused all exchange business . Furthermore, in late November 1902 a meeting 
was held between the banks and the principal rice-millers at which, according
to Prince Mahit, the managers sought to have the export of the rice-crop held
27back in order to increase the pressure on the Government . It is doubtful
whether the banks could have successfully brought the foreign trade of Bangkok
to a halt for any significant length of time: yet it was within their power
to inflict considerable damage on trade - and hence on the Governments revenue -
for a short period. Second, both the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the
Chartered Bank despatched their more senior Singapore managers to Bangkok to
28confront the Siamese Government . Finally, on k December the manager of the
Chartered Bank refused to honour a baht cheque drawn by the Ministry of Finance
on the Government's deposits at the bank, even though the cheque could easily 
29be covered
The dispute between the Government and the European banks was finally 
settled on 19 December 1902. The terms were as follows :
24. In fact the dispute involved only the two British banks: the Banque de
L'Indo-Chine decided to settle separately through the French Minister in 
Bangkok.
25- Memorandum. Interview between Managers of Local Banks and Financial 
Adviser regarding the closing of the Mints. Rivett-Carnac, 28 November 1902 
F.F.A. 23A.
26. Rivett-Carnac to Frederick Vernay (Siamese Legation, London), 12 January 
1903 F.F.A. 23A.
27* Prince Mahit to King, 29 November 1902 N.A.Kh. 20; 1/22.
28 . Manager of H.S.B. (Bangkok) to Rivett-Carnac, 2 December 1902 F.F.A. 23A-
29* Prince Mahit to King, 6 December 1902 N.A.Kh. 20. 1/22. This was a rg.sh
move by the bank and Rivett-Carnac retaliated by threatening to withdraw the
Government's account. The incident was smoothed over only after the London 
managers of the bank sent a formal apology to the Government for the action 
of their local manager. A few months later the Financial Adviser succeeded 
in having the manager removed from Bangkok. Correspondence in F.F.A. 23A«
1. The Ministry of Finance agreed to fix the Treasury selling rate 
for the baht at 20 baht : £, instead of the 17 baht : £ originally
announced on 25 November. This rate would be maintained for at
least three months unless the price of silver rose to the extent
that the Singapore quotation for the dollar exceeded l/7d. In
30that case the baht would be revalued by a proportionate amount
The exchange value of the baht would not be affected by a fall in
the quotation of the dollar. Furthermore, the Ministry gave an 
assurance that any future revaluations of the baht would be gradual 
so as not to disturb unnecessarily the trade of the port^1.
2. The banks were to be allowed to import dollars and exchange them at 
the Treasury at the old rate of 5 baht : 3 / up to the limit of the 
total amount of Government deposits with them on 26 November 1902.
In addition dollars on their way to Bangkok when the mints were 
closed were also to be exchanged at the rate of 5 baht : 3
3. For their part the banks agreed to drop all claims against the 
Government for compensation.
On the basis of this last point Rivett-Carnac argued that the Government
had triumphed in its dispute with the European banks: writing to an official
in the Siamese Legation in London in early 1903 he asserted that the banks
'tried to bluff the Government out of their measure by putting 
enormous claims for compensation but when they saw that I was not 
to be frightened, they promptly came to amicable negotiations ... 
the Banks here caved in.' 32
33Few would have agreed with that assessment of the settlement reached .
30. The Singapore quotation for the dollar was used merely to indicate changes 
in the price of silver - the dollar remaining on the silver standard.
31. Memorandum. Gold Standard Scheme. Rivett-Carnac, 11 December 1902 
F.F.A. 23/1.
32. Rivett-Carnac to Frederick Vernay, 12 January 1903 F.F.A. 23/1*
33* Williamson did not agree. In his 'Outline of the Currency History of 
Siam 1902-1923* which appeared in instalments in 'The Record' between October 
1923 and January 1924, he wrote: ' ... it is evident that the Banks obtained 
complete satisfaction, and that the Ministry of Finance admitted at least a 
moral claim on their part to be saved any loss resulting from the action of 
the Government in altering the rate of exchange.'
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If the banks had agreed to drop all claims for compensation then this was
largely decause the Government's concessions had reduced their losses to such
3Z1an extent that there was hardly anything for which to claim compensation .
In effect the banks had been able to outmanoeuvre the Government, principally 
because they could threaten to bring the foreign trade of the Kingdom to a 
standstill.
In that case the Government - in effect Rivett-Carnac - was unwise not 
to have sought the co-operation of the European banks in the implementation 
of the measures designed to remove Siam from the silver standard in November 
1902^. The seriousness of the misjudgement was compounded by the fact that 
when, in August 1899» Rivett-Carnac had first raised the proposal to abandon 
the silver standard, he had discussed his scheme with the banks and even gone 
so far as to put to them exactly the same terms for the importation of dollars 
at the old rate as was agreed in December 1902^6 Furthermore, when Prince 
Mahit wrote to the King less than a week before the actual abandonment of the 
silver standard he acknowledged that the banks were liable to suffer as a 
result of the Government's measures, and again it was proposed that as soon 
as the change was effected the banks were to be informed that for a period of 
three months they were to be allowed to redeem the value of the Government's 
baht deposits with them at the rate of 5 baht : 3 ^ • It is very difficult
tQ
to explain this inconsistency in the attitude of the Ministry of Finance .
3*t. The banks «till stood to lose with regard to the baht deposits of their 
non-Government customers: these losses would have been relatively small since
after mid-December 1902 the revaluation of the baht was only approximately 
5%, not over 20/e as originally intended.
35* At the interview on 27 November between the banks and the Adviser, Rivett- 
Carnac did not even admit that the banks would suffer a financial loss as a 
result of the Government's measure. Memorandum. Rivett-Carnac, 28 November 
1902 F.F.A. 23/1-
36. Memorandum. Closing of the Royal Mint to the free coinage of silver 
dollars. Proposals made by the Financial Adviser. Rivett-Carnac, 22 August 
1899 F.F.A. 23/1.
37* Prince Mahit to King, 20 November 1902 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
38 . No documents were found in either the National Archives or the Ministry 
of Finance which throw light on this point: there is not even a reference to
the unmistakable similarity between the December 1902 agreement and the pro­
posals of August 1899. As a result this paragraph is based largely on 
conjecture.
It is possible that since the measure was introduced very rapidly in November 
1902 there was a breakdown of communication within the Ministry: that by the
time Prince Mahit was ready to confer with the banks, as was his apparent 
intention, he found himself committed to the uncompromising stand being 
adopted by the Financial Adviser in the face of the banks' demands for com­
pensation. It is also possible that between 1899 and 1902 Rivett-Carnac - 
perhaps after tidying the way in which the Government of India had carried 
through the abandonment of the silver standard in 1893 - changed his mind as 
to the attitude to be adopted towards the banks. But whatever the explanation, 
there can be little doubt that the handling of relations with the exchange
banks by the Ministry of Finance and Rivett-Carnac during this most crucial
39currency reform was sadly unsubtle .
2. The gold-exchange standard in operation, December 1902 - November 1905»
The new exchange mechanism which emerged from the 'Royal Mint Amendment 
Act' of 25 November 1902, the ministerial notification of the same date estab­
lishing the Treasury selling rate, and the agreement with the banks the
following month, was somewhat complicated. In essence Siam had adopted a 
gold-exchange standard: this meant that the Government had to maintain a large
reserve of foreign currencies whose exchange value was fixed in terms of gold,
principally sterling, and the Ministry of Finance had to undertake to buy and
*40sell baht against those currencies at a fixed rate . In this way Siam was 
able to fix - indirectly - the exchange value of the baht in terras of gold.
At the same time the Government could alter the exchange value of the baht, 
as trade conditions allowed, by announcing a new rate at which the Treasury 
would sell baht against foreign gold-based currencies. But there was one 
major complication. After November 1902 the principal coin in circulation 
in Siam remained the baht - a silver coin. Therefore it was possible that
39 • Though it must be admitted that once the dispute was at its height the 
banks were not averse to using the most forceful methods to get their way.
*40. A classic treatment of the gold standard is R. G. Hawtrey's The Gold 
Standard in Theory and Practice 5th ed. London 19*+7: see pp. 60-52 for his
theoretical outline of the gold-exchange standard.
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if the world price of silver were to rise substantially, in time the intrinsic 
value of the baht could exceed its exchange value. In those circumstances it 
would become profitable for merchants to buy baht with, say, sterling, melt them 
down and export them as silver bullion. If unchecked this operation would even­
tually drain the kingdom of its currency. The Government could prevent this only 
by ensuring that the exchange value of the baht remained above its intrinsic 
value: in turn this could be guaranteed either by reducing the silver content
of the coin or alternatively, and more simply, by increasing its exchange value. 
It was with this in mind that the Ministry of Finance had inserted into its agree­
ment with the banks in late 1902 the clause which stated that were the price of 
silver to rise to the point where the Singapore quotation for the dollar exceeded 
1/Vd. then the baht would be revalued by a proportionate amount. In short, under 
certain circumstances, the exchange value of the baht remained as firmly linked 
to increases in the price of silver as it had prior to November 1902. However, 
it should be noted that since a fall in the price of silver was no threat to 
the currency (indeed it reduced the danger of the intrinsic value of the baht 
exceeding its exchange value) after November 1902 the exchange value of the baht 
was no longer responsive to falls in the silver price.
It is therefore ironic that at about the time the Siamese Government aban­
doned the silver standard - a measure necessitated by an almost unbroken drop
in the world price of silver from 1870 - the price of silver should begin a
41pronounced, if temporary, rise • The increase in the silver price was immedi­
ately reflected in a rise in the Singapore quotation for the dollar to above 
l/7d. and hence in a revaluation of the baht. On 17 December 1902 - before the
banks had formally accepted the Government's terms - the Treasury selling rate
42for the baht was advanced to 19*75 baht : £ . Thereafter the baht was gradually
revalued in response to the increased quotation for the dollar, in response to 
the rise in the price of silver.
41. The average price per ounce in the London market rose from 24 l/8d. in 1902 
to 30 3/16 in 1907 (Whitaker's Alamanac). By 1902-1903 all the major trading 
powers (except China) had left the silver standard: it was then to be expected 
that some recovery from the dramatic price falls of the previous decades would 
occur.
42. Memorandum. Gold Standard Scheme. Rivett-Carnac 17 December 1902 F.F.A.23/1.
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Table 1. Treasury selling rate for the baht, December 1902 - February 1904. 
Date of Change Treasury rate (Baht per £)
17 December 1902 19-75
30 December 1902 19*50
2 March 1903 19.25
5 March 1903 19.00
11 March 1903 18.75
22 July 1903 18.25
5 August 1903 18.00
12 August 1903 17.75
22 August 1903 17.50
27 August 1903 17.25
25 September 1903 17-00
6 February 1904 16.67
Source : Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam 1902 - 1923, Williamson,
June 1923 F.F.A. 30/22
By fixing the value of the baht in February 1904 at the unusual figure
of 16.67 baht : £ the Ministry of Finance was in fact re-establishing the
traditional rate of 5 baht : 3 / with the dollar. In his Report on the budget
for 1904/05 Williamson suggested that this could be taken as an indication
that the baht had reached its pptimum level against sterling, unless, he
43added, 'unforeseen circumstances' arose , almost certainly a reference to a 
necessity for further revaluations if the world price of silver continued to 
rise. By this final revaluation the baht had returned to the value it had 
held against sterling in 1896 - l897» prior to the dramatic depreciations of 
1898/99 and 1902. Over the period December 1902 to February 1904 the baht had 
been revalued slightly over 20 per cent against sterling: some of the ground
lost in the 1890s hati been regained.
However, the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance with regard to 
the operation of the new exchange mechanism extended far beyond the relatively
43. R.F.A.B. 1904/05 p. 13.
simple matter of making the necessary adjustments in the Treasury selling 
rate for the baht. Most importantly the Ministry was also largely responsible 
for controlling the supply of baht to the banks in such a way as to minimize 
throughout the year the fluctuations in the market rate around the basic 
Treasury rate. For example, during the rice-export season when there was 
a very strong demand for baht, the Ministry was required to meet dLl the calls 
from the banks for Siamese coin: failure by the Ministry of Finance to meet
all those demands would almost certainly lead to a shortage of baht in the 
market, and hence to a rise in the baht’s market rate. In those circumstances 
it would become more expensive for merchants and millers to finance the 
export of the rice-crop: if there was a very tight restriction on the supply
of baht, the cost could become prohibitive and the export trade could come 
to a standstill. Conversely, when the banks held more baht than they could 
usefully employ - usually between April and November - it was expected that 
the Treasury would buy baht with sterling to hold up the market rate.
Both operations implied a substantial increase in the degree of financial 
and administrative management required of the Ministry of Finance. Prior 
to November 1902 responsibility for meeting a large demand from the market 
for baht had rested primarily with the European banks, who would import silver 
dollars and present them to the Treasury for recoining into baht. After 
November 1902 that responsibility shifted to the Ministry of Finance. From 
that time the Mint coined baht not from silver dollars but from silver bullion. 
The bullion was bought in Europe with the proceeds of the sterling paid into 
the account of the Government in London by the exchange banks, in exchange 
for baht in Bangkok. In other words, from late 1902 the Ministry was res­
ponsible first for ensuring an adequate supply of bar silver to the Mint, 
second for the efficiency of the Mint's coining operations, and overall res­
ponsible for ensuring that the Treasury maintained a sufficient reserve of 
baht coins, either from the supply provided by the Mint or from other sources 
such as the provincial treasuries or the revenue receipts.
In the first few months of the operation of the gold-exchange mechanism -
from December 1902 until March 1903 - the Ministry of Finance found it very
difficult to fulfill that responsibility. At the root of the Ministry's
difficulties was the inefficiency of the Royal Mint. This had been a
recurrent problem since at least the early 1890s. A new Mint, with modern
44machinery, was opened in February 1903 but, for reasons which are not al-
45together clear, the production of baht coins continued to be erratic .
Inevitably the poor performance of the Mint affected the size of the Treasury
reserves. The Treasury had over 13«3 m. baht coins in December 1901: this
dropped to 9*3 m. in June 1902 and by December of that year, immediately after
the establishment of the gold-exchange standard, the Treasury could muster
only 1.6 m. baht coins • But in late 1902 and early 1903 the Ministry's
basic problem with the Mint was compounded by the fact that the rice-exports
of that season were the largest (in terms of both volume and value) since
47the reopening of the Kingdom to trade in the 1850s : inevitably there was
an unprecedented demand for baht.
Under the new exchange mechanism the Ministry of Finance was obliged to 
cover all those demands. As Williamson - acting Financial Adviser during the 
absence of Rivett-Carnac in Europe - reminded Prince Mahit in early February 
1903,
' ... having closed the Mint and advertised that ticals will be 
sold against gold deposits in London, we are bound to accept all 
offers of this nature.' 48
The Ministry of Finance attempted to meet this situation as best it 
could. In February 1903 the Mint was instructed to increase its output of
44. R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 16.
45. King to Prince Mahit, 25 October 1903 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
46. Bi-annual reports from Prince Mahit to King regarding size of the Treasur 
reserves. N.A.Kh. 7/8.
47. James C. Ingram Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources, 
Appendix A, in C. D. Cowan (ed.) The Economic Development of South-East Asia 
London 1964.
48. Memorandum. Williamson. 13 February 1903 F.F.A. 23/1. My emphasis.
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baht as quickly as possible ; at the same time the provincial treasuries
50were asked to send all their excess baht to the Treasury in Bangkok . In 
both cases the response was poor. Therefore, unable to meet the demands of 
the market for baht immediately the Ministry was forced to come to agreements 
With the banks to sell them baht whenever they became available. The banks 
were willing to accept such forward contracts: it enabled them to use their
own reserves of baht confident that the Siamese authorities would replenish 
them in the near future. Moreover, as the banks would eventually receive the 
baht from the Treasury at the rate in force when the forward contracts were 
signed, and since there was every prospect of the baht being revalued between 
the time the contract was made and the time the baht were delivered, the banks 
stood to make substantial immediate profits from the arrangement. By the 
middle of March 1903 the banks had purchased over 21.4 m. baht in forward 
contracts (equivalent to £1.095 m.) and assured of a plentiful supply of baht 
at relatively cheap rates in the future made no more demands on the Treasury^1.
A number of points of particular interest arise from this episode. First, 
the forward contract arrangements enabled the banks to protect themselves 
against possible future losses as a result of the revaluation of the baht: 
in other words by agreeing to make such forward contracts with the banks, 
the Ministry of Finance accepted the responsibility, first promoted in Decembei 
1902,i to save the banks from any losses as a result of increases in the 
exchange value of the currency^2. However, it is clear that in making forward 
contracts to the value of over 21.4 m. baht the banks substantially overstated
their needs. As early as May 1903 Williamson was attempting to persuade the
53banks to cancel at least some of the contracts . The knowledge in the market
49- PhrayS Phiphit to Mqm Chao Piya Phakdl, 28 February 1903 F.F.A. 23/1.
50. yMemorandum. Ticals for the Banks. Williamson, 2 March 1903/memorandum. 
M<?m Chao Piya Phakdl, 24 February 1903 F.F.A. 23/1.
51. Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam 1902-1923, Williamson, June 
1923 F.F.A. 30/22.
5 2. ibid.
53. Williamson to H.S.B. (3angkok), 29 May 1903 F.F.A. 23/1.
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that the banks had agreed to accept such a large volume of baht in the near 
future had the effect of depressing the market rate: moreover, if when the
Treasury had sufficient baht to pay off the forward contracts it had attempted 
to pressurize the banks into taking delivery at that point, the market rate 
for the baht could have been pushed very low. In short, as long as the for­
ward contracts remained effective there was a considerable danger of the 
Ministry of Finance losing control of the exchange situation. Furthermore, 
since the exchange position could change rapidly there always remained the 
alternative danger that the banks would suddenly demand baht from the Treasury 
and that the Ministry, embarrassingly, would be unable to meet those demands. 
It would be unproductive to examine here the intricate details of the week-to- 
week administration of the exchange market for this period: it is sufficient
to note that it was not until June 1904 that the Ministry persuaded the banks
54to cancel their outstanding forward contracts , and not until April 1905 
that the depressing effect of those contracts was removed from the operation 
of the exchange. The essential point was that the difficulties resulting 
from the signing of the forward contracts ultimately derived from the failure 
of the Ministry of Finance to meet all the demands of the banks for baht 
immediately, during the 1902/03 rice-export season.
It is also worth noting at this point that the Ministry of Finance was 
faced with the problem of baht shortages only at infrequent intervals. Clearl 
it was a phenomenon which could arise only during the export season when there 
was a strong demand for baht, yet it was by no means an annual occurrence.
For example, the Ministry was able to survive the 1903/04 season (despite a 
relatively low level of baht reserves in the Treasury and despite the Mint 
being short of bar silver^) and cover all the demands for baht, principally 
because the 1903 rice harvest was on a considerably smaller scale than that 
of the previous year. Moreover, as will be shown later, the Ministry was
54. Memoranda: Cancellation of contracts with Banks, 15 June 1904/Further
cancellation of Banks' contracts, 8 July 1904, Williamson: with attached
notes. F.F.A. 23/1.
55• Memorandum. Liquidation by Government of Forward Purchases of Ticals by 
Banks. Williamson, 14 November 1903- F.F.A. 23/1-
faced with baht shortages particularly when its policies in other fields led 
to a dramatic reduction in the level of the Government's coin reserves.
From mid-1903 until mid-1905 the most important exchange problem con­
fronting the Ministry was that the market rate for the baht consistently
56lagged behind the advancing Treasury rate . In early 190k this encouraged 
some criticism of the Ministry of Finance from the business and trading com­
munity of Bangkok: it was suggested that the Ministry's failure to make its
Treasury rate effective implied the partial failure of the Government's
57November 1902 measures . The depression of the market rate was of course 
due in part to the existence of the forward contracts, but there was a more 
fundamental factor at work. In the Financial Adviser's Report for 190*4/05 
Williamson pointed out that for any country engaged in revaluation of its 
currency, a substantial length of time was required for a contraction of the
number of coins in circulation to take place, and for wages and prices to
58adjust to the new, higher exchange level . During the period of adjustment 
it was inevitable that on occasions there would be too many coins in circula­
tion, and that consequently there would be a tendency for the exchange value 
of the currency in the market to be depressed. Williamson noted that in the 
case of India the market rate for the rupee had actually fallen in the years 
immediately following the closing of the mints in June 1893 and that it had 
taken until early 1899 for the intended rate of 15 rupees : £ to become 
effective.
Significantly the Financial Adviser then proceeded to argue that not 
only was the initial depression of the market rate for the baht not a matter 
for immediate concern, but on the contrary that it was a development to be 
welcomed :
56. There are no figures available for the actual market rates over this 
period. However, in the year 1903/0*4- the average market rate was 18.28 baht 
£ (R.F.A.B. 190Jf/05 p. 15)i in the same period the Treasury rate rose from
18.75 baht : £ to 16.67 baht : £.
57. R.F.A.B. 190*f/05 pp. 1*4-15.
58. ibid.
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•Any considerable appreciation of the value of the tical, unless 
counteracted by an increased demand for rice, either for home or 
foreign consumption, must result in lower tical prices being paid 
to the producers [59] and it is of importance that the change should 
be gradual in order that the general lowering of prices all round 
may enable the cultivator to receive for his produce, the same 
value as formerly.' 60
In Williamson's view the relatively retarded rise in the market rate 
over 1902/03 and 1903/04 represented about as fast a revaluation as was 
desirable. In other words, the implication was that the large advance in 
the Treasury selling rate in the two years following the abandonment of the 
silver standard - a large advance necessitated by the rise in the price of 
silver - had been too dramatic for the economic and commercial circumstances 
of the Kingdom. Siam's rice producers had been shielded from too sudden a 
drop in their baht earnings by the fact that the market rate for the baht 
had consistently lagged behind the Treasury rate.
3» Further revaluation, November 1905*
Inevitably this raised an important question: what should be the final
parity of the baht under the gold-exchange system ? In February 1904 the 
Treasury rate had been fixed at 16.67  baht : £, corresponding to the old 
baht/dollar rate of 5 * 3* However, by late 1905 two factors had arisen which 
made a further revaluation likely. First at that time the Singapore Govern­
ment was engaged in abandoning the silver standard: the methods adopted
involved the introduction of a new gold-based coin - the Straits dollar - with 
a higher exchange value than the British and Mexican dollars, which were to 
be demonetized in the S. S. and F. M. S.^. In November 1905 the exchange 
value of the Straits dollar had as yet not been finally fixed, and with 
further revaluations of the dollar expected there was no longer any benefit 
in the Siamese Government maintaining the cumbersome rate of 16 .67 baht : £:
59- This is a theoretical point which will be considered in some detail in 
the next section.
60. R.F.A.B. 1904/05 pp. 14-15.
61. See Chai Hon-Chan The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909 2nd ed. 
London 1967» Chapter 2.
228
it was more sensible to move the rate to a more convenient figure for exchang
6 2calculations with sterling . Second, and more importantly, the world price
of silver was continuing to rise: as yet it had not reached the point where
it became profitable to melt down silver baht and export them as bullion, but
the trend was disturbing.
In November 1905 the Government was able to call on the advice of both
Williamson and Rivett-Carnac in Bangkok - Williamson as the Financial Adviser
though he was about to go to Europe on leave, Rivett-Carnac as Financial Agenl
but to be acting Financial Adviser during Williamson's absence. Williamson
was opposed to a revaluation of the currency at that pointprincipally
because, as he had stated in his budget report for 1904/05, he feared that toe
dramatic a revaluation of the baht would have adverse effects on the rice
trade. This point was to be developed by Rivett-Carnac. Moreover, Williamsor
felt that the price of silver had not yet reached danger levels.
However, the major contribution came from Rivett-Carnac. On 14 November
1905, in a long memorandum to Prince Mahit, the Financial Agent set out the
64arguments for and against further revaluations of the baht: his arguments
were not only of immediate concern but were also to have considerable relevanc 
in the coming three years. Rivett-Carnac began by pointing out that in 
December 1902 the Ministry had given an undertaking to the banks that future 
changes in the exchange rate would be of a gradual character so as to avoid 
any serious dislocation of trade. Therefore, at the most they were considerin 
only a small revaluation. The principal advantages of a revaluation were clea 
First, it would protect the currency against the rise in the price of silver: 
second, it would increase the sterling value of the Government’s revenues and 
baht reserves, and reduce the baht costs of imports from Europe and the baht 
value. * of the Government's interest payments on the 1905 loan. On the other
62. Memorandum. Government selling price of Ticals. Rivett-Carnac, 14 
November 1905 F.F.A. 23/2. N.A.Kh. 26A3-
63* Memorandum. Proposed Forward Purchases of Ticals by Banks. Williamson,
3 November 1905 F.F.A. 23/2.
64. Memorandum. Government selling price of Ticals. Rivett-Carnac, 14 
November 1905 F.F.A. 23/2. N.A.Kh. 26A3-
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hand any revaluation, however small, tended to disrupt existing trading agree­
ments and the Financial Agent suggested that it would be particularly unwise 
to risk a dislocation of trade at a time when the Kingdom was enjoying con­
siderable prosperity. But there was one particularly strong argument against 
a revaluation of the currency - the argument advanced by Williamson.
* ... the chief thing to look at is how the change would affect 
the paddy cultivator upon whom the whole prosperity of the Kingdom 
practically rests. If the value of the tical be raised the culti­
vator will obtain a less number of ticals for his crops while his 
expenses and his taxation will remain the same, calculated in 
ticals, as they axe now. Thus upon his shoulders would fall the 
burden of any change. Further, it must be remembered that by the 
recent amendment of the Land Revenue Acts the taxation upon land 
has been increased [65] while if the tical value be enhanced, the 
cultivator will pay a larger revenue for his land than he did before 
the new Act was passed while he will be actually receiving a smaller 
number of ticals for his crops. This is a very serious obstacle to 
any greatly enhanced valuation of the tical.' 66
Briefly stated, this was to be the major argument against further reva­
luations of the baht during PhrayS SuriyS's term as Minister of Finance from 
June 1906 until February 1908.
But in November 19051 on balance Rivett-Carnac was in favour of a small 
revaluation. The prospects for the rice harvest were good so the farmers were 
likely to be in a strong enough financial position to absorb some of the 
adverse effects of a revaluation: some protection against the advancing price
of silver was required: finally, it would be an opportunity to abandon the
65. A reference to the highefc rates of land tax introduced in 1905 to compensat 
for the loss of revenue caused by the closure of the provincial gambling dens. 
See Chapter IV.
66. Memorandum. Government selling price of Ticals. Rivett-Carnac, l*f Novembc 
1905 F.F.A. 23/2 N.A.Kh. 26/13- A brief reference to the theoretical aspects 
of this question must be made. The distribution of the burden of a revaluation 
is determined by the structure of the market, on both the demand and aupply 
sides. In the case of Siamese rice exports, Rivett-Carnac's analysis would 
appear to be broadly correct. Rice, a relatively homogeneous product, sold
in a very competitive market: it was therefore unlikely that the burden of
the revaluation could have been shifted to the foreign customer, in the form 
of higher foreign currency prices for Siamese rice. On the supply side it 
would seem that the relatively few well-organized rice-raillers in the Bangkok 
area would have been able to impose virtually the whole drop in the baht value 
of the crop onto the thousands of unorganized rice farmers in the Kingdom. 
However these market forces could have been upset by, for example, the develop­
ment by some foreign customers of an attachment to the particular strain of ric< 
produced in Siam, or by the growth of small up-country mills which broke the 
monopsonist position of the Bangkok millers. But in the absence of very refinec 
data it would be impossible to show the actual force of those factors, though 
it is unlikely that they would have had much influence in the present case.
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cumbersomerate of 16.67 baht : £. On 17 November 1905 the Treasury selling
67rate was advanced to 16.00 baht : £ . Rivett-Carnac1s memorandum was fully
68discussed within the Government during the following month . The Financial
Agent argued that the new rate should be regarded as the final one, unless
69the price of silver continued to rise . In addition the General Adviser,
Edward Strobel, took some trouble to underline Rivett-Carnac's warning that
the burden of revaluations would almost certainly be borne by the rice culti-
70vator . No one disagreed.
4. The exchange policy of PhrayS Suriya, 1906 - 1908.
It is extremely difficult to provide an adequate outline suid assessment 
of the exchange policy of Prince Mahit's successor as Minister of Finance,
PhrayS Suriya. Part of the difficulty derives from the fact that the new 
Minister had a tendency to omit important stages in his argument when writing
71to the King and his ministerial colleagues on the Kingdom's exchange position . 
It is possible that in such correspondence PhrayS SuriyS was merely summarizing 
arguments which he had dealt with at length in earlier, often casual, meetings, 
where no written record was kept. Yet the frequency of the non sequitur, the 
occasionally contradictory elements in his policies, and the frequent inade­
quacies of his arguments suggest as a more plausible explanation that by and 
large PhrayS SuriyS had an imperfect grasp of the principles of exchange policy.
67. Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam 1902-1923- Williamson, June 
1923. F.F.A. 30/22.
68. King to Prince Devawongse, 5 December 1905 N.A.Kh. 26/13- 
69- Prince Mahit to King, 2 December 1905 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
70. Strobel to Prince Devawongse, 12 December 1905 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
71. One small example must suffice. In writing to the King on 22 June 1906 
(N.A.Kh. 26/13) PhrayS SuriyS argued that the Government should fix the exchange 
value of the baht (by issuing a gold coin) as quickly as it tould because of the 
baht coin shortage in the Treasury. The Minister offered no explanation of the 
connection between the two points. It is possible to reach a more coherent 
view of PhrayS SuriyS's ideas by examining his official correspondence as a 
whole, and in particular by studying two letters on financial policy which he 
wrote to Prince Devawongse when he was Siamese Minister in Paris, 9 October 
1903/28 November 1904 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
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Either that or the Minister's grasp of the subject was confused by his 
tendency to act hastily and without adequate forethought when confronted 
with a major problem.
Within a few weeks of his appointment as Minister of Finance PhrayS.
SuriyS wrote to the King outlining his immediate policy with regard to the
72exchange . Most importantly he wanted a further revaluation of the baht, 
even though only six months previously there had been general acceptance 
within the Government of the current rate of 16 baht : £. Phraya SuriyS's 
first argument was by far the most compelling: by June 1906 the price of
silver had almost reached the point where the Kingdom's currency was in 
danger of being melted down and exported as bullion. Second, he argued that 
a revaluation would make it easier for the Government to build up its gold 
reserves, an objective of considerable importance to the Minister. However, 
PhrayS SuriyS's reasoning at this point was not altogether clear: on occasions
in this letter he appears to argue that a revaluation of the currency would 
increase the purchasing power of the baht by a substantial amount with regard 
to all goods, both imported and domestically produced. The impression is 
given that the Minister was carried away with the prospect of increasing the 
wealth of the Kingdom - both Government and cultivators - by simply changing 
the Treasury selling rate for the baht. This was brought out when PhrayS 
SuriyS argued that although the rice farmers would receive less baht for 
their crop as a result of the revaluation (the principal point emphasized 
by Rivett-Carnac in November 1905), in fact they would also benefit substantially 
from an increase in the purchasing power of the baht following the revaluation
72. PhrayS SuriyS to Kin&, 22 June 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
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73of the currency .
Second, PhrayS Suriya argued that the Government's gold-standard scheme
would require the issue of a gold coin: it was for this reason that the
Minister was eager to increase the size of the Government's gold reserves.
In PhrayS SuriyS's view the Siamese were reluctant to hold their wealth in
7 Z fthe form of silver, since its price was so unstable : therefore if a gold
coin were to be issued the people would exchange their holdings of silver
baht for the new coin, so increasing the volume of silver baht in circulation.
This would, accordingjfco the Minister, effectively solve the problem of baht
75shortages with which the Ministry was occasionally faced . But perhaps more
importantly, Phraya SuriyS regarded the issue of a gold coin, finally fixing
the exchange value of the baht, as the culminating point of the Government's
gold-standard scheme, the essential measure needed to consolidate the policy
76begun in November 1902 .
73- The theoretical background to this point requires some attention. It was 
argued above (footnote 66) that a revaluation of the baht would have almost 
certainly resulted in a fall in the baht income of the rice farmers. However, 
to some extent the fall in the farmers' baht income would have been partially 
off-set by price changes. For example, one effect of a revaluation of the 
baht would have been a fall in internal prices in Siam, principally because 
the major Siamese export - rice - was also a major item in internal production 
and consumption. Moreover, a revaluation would also have secured a reduction 
in the baht price of imports, though the effect of this on the real income of 
the rice cultivators would have depended, first on the extent to which the fall 
in the baht price was passed on to the consumers (rather than cornered by import 
merchants in the form of increased commission charges) and second, the propor­
tion of the rice farmers' income spent on imported goods. However, despite 
these considerations, there is no reason to doubt that the burden of the baht 
revaluations was borne - to a greater or lesser extent - by the cultivators: 
they received less baht for their crop whilst they were required to pay the 
same number of baht to the Government in taxes. (In effect, with regard to 
the interest and capital repayments on the European loans, the baht revaluations 
ensured a shift in the burden of debt payment from the Treasury to the rice
cultivators.) Though, on the whole, PhrayS SuriyS appears to have appreciated
that point, on the evidence available it would seem that he then misinterpreted 
the - admittedly complex - effects of the revaluation of the baht on internal 
prices and on the price of imports to the Siamese cultivator - the overall 
effect on the real income of the rice farmers.
74. PhrayS SuriyS to Prince Devawongse, 9 October 1903 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
7 5* This is a possible explanation of the connection between baht shortages 
and the issue of a gold coin noted in footnote 7 1 •
76. Of course the gold-standard mechanism adopted by a particular country could 
take several forms - a gold-specie standard, a gold-bullion standard, a gold- 
exchange standard - and need not necessarily have involved the issue of a gold 
coin. See: R. G. Hawtrey The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice London 
5th ed. 19^7 pp. 57-62.
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PhrayS SuriyS1s proposals were laid before the Council of Ministers on
7725 June 1906 and approved after very little discussion . The Minister was 
instructed to make preliminary enquiries to have gold coins produced at a
European Mint. A few days later the King approved the revaluation of the
78baht to 15 baht : £ and the new rate came into force on 1** August.
Two months later PhrayS Suriya was faced with his first serious exchange
crisis - one involving an acute shortage of baht in the Treasury. The crisis
had been gathering strength since mid-1906: as early as June the Minister had
informed the King that the Ministry of Finance could raise a mere 1.1 m. baht,
79yet the banks would require over the export season 5.0 m. The shortage 
had its immediate cause in two factors. In October 1904 the Ministry of 
Finance had issued a notification withdrawing from circulation the old form 
of baht coin, the bullet-shaped baht, and giving the public one year in which
80to exchange their holdings of the old coin for the modern flat baht . As a
8lresult the Treasury and the Mint were inundated with bullet-shaped baht .
This placed a considerable strain on the Ministry's reserves of modern baht 
coins, since flat baht or notes had to be found for every old baht brought in 
for exchange: moreover, whilst it was slowly recoining the old baht into flat
baht the Mint was not adding to the total volume of coins in circulation.
When the deadline for the receipt of bullet-shaped baht passed in October 1905
large volumes of the coin remained in the possession of the population and 
therefore in August 1906 PhrayS. SuriyS reppened the Treasury to the exchange
82of old baht for a further period . The second immediate factor was a decision 
taken by PhrayS SuriyS in June 1906 to proceed with a scheme to make the baht 
the principal coin in circulation in Puket, the Siamese island just off the
77• Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 25 June 1906 
N.A.Kh. 26/13.
78. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 29 June 1906 N.A.Kh, 26/13.
79* Phraya SuriyS to King, 22 June 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/13-
80. Prince Mahit to King, 5 October 1904 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
81. Prince Mahit to King, 27 April 1905 N.A.Kh. 26/13.
82. PhrayS Suriya to King, 28 August 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
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south-west coast of the Siamese portion of the Malay Peninsula. The background 
to this decision requires a little discussion.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the most common coins 
in circulation in the south of Siam were the British and Mentican dollars, re­
flecting the fact that most of the trade of the area was with Singapore and 
Penang rather than with Bangkok. In particular the important tin-mining areas 
of the south were wholly dependent for the processing of their tin on the 
Straits Trading Company's smelting works at Pulau Brani, off Singapore Island,
Q
and then after 1902 at Butterworth in Province Wellesiey . There were no 
tin-smelters in Siam itself. The Bangkok Government could hardly regard this 
domination of the colonial currency in the south with equanimity, if for no 
other reason than that it underlined the tenuous nature of the political 
control exercised by the Central Government over that part of the Kingdom.
On the other hand, prior to the financial and provincial administration reforms 
of the 1890s there was little possibility of the Bangkok Government success­
fully ousting the dollar from the south and replacing it with the baht. The 
issue came to a head in mid-1903 when the Singapore Government announced that 
it intended to abandon the silver standard and adopt a gold standard by 
issuing a new gold based coin, the Straits dollar: the British and Mexican
dollars were to be demonetized in the S. S. and F. M. S. and, at least v/hilst 
the new Straits dollar was being introduced, their importation into the colony
prohibited. Export of the Straits dollar was also to be prohibited during 
84the change . As a result the southern Siamese provinces found themselves in 
the position of having as their principal currency a coin which was shortly 
to be demonetized by their chief trading partners and yet which in the inter­
vening period could not be exchanged for the new coin intended for those 
85same states
83. Chai Hon-Chan The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909 2nd ed. London 
1967 p. 170.
84. ibid, p. 92.
85. .Villiamson to Paget, 2± March 1904. Enclosed with: Paget to Lord Lansdowne, 
22 harch 1904 Desp. 21 P.R.O. F.O. 69/254.
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Clearly the British and Mexican dollars had to be demonetized in the 
south at the same time as they were demonetized in the F. M. S. and S. S., but 
opinion in Bangkok was divided as to whether they should be replaced by the 
Straits dollar or the baht. There was strong opposition from, in particular,
Prince Mahit, PhrayS SuriyS and Rivett-Carnac to the continued use of the
86dollar in the southern provinces : yet there were cogent arguments against
their alternative proposals for the introduction of the baht. First, an out­
right prohibition on the use of the old dollars coupled with the introduction
87of the unfamiliar baht was certain to disrupt the trade of the area . Far 
more importantly, the Bangkok Government had insufficient reserves of baht 
coins to give such a scheme any chance of success. It was not simply a case 
of providing sufficient baht to replace dollars already in circulation in the 
south, for as long as the economic interests of the region were orientated 
towards Singapore and Penang there was certain to be a continuous and con­
siderable inflow of dollars. That the Government was in no position to flood 
the south with baht for several years was the point most strongly emphasized 
by Williamson. In January 19051 when Prince Mahit was momentarily tempted to 
proceed with the scheme, the Financial Adviser warned :
'If it is decided to proceed at once in the direction of intro­
ducing the tical ... we must be prepared to place some millions 
of ticals in the province named. This, I have no hesitation in 
saying, we are not in a position to do. We are at present in the 
throes of a conversion of round ticals [bullet-shaped baht] into 
flat ones, and at the rate at which the Mint is now working, the 
recoinage will take months if not years. In the meantime, the 
stock of flat ticals held by the [Paper] Currency [Department] 
and the Treasury is none too large for trade and Government re­
quirements in Bangkok and the tical-using provinces, and we have 
none to spare for a large currency operation in the Monthon of 
Puket. 1 88
Williamson favoured the introduction of the new Straits dollar into the
89south - at least Puket - as the only immediately practical alternative , and
86. Rivett-Carnac to F. C. Giles, 5 November 1903 F.F.A. 23/3-
87. Siamese Consul in Singapore to Williamson, 5 October 1903 F.F.A. 23/3-
88. Memorandum. Williamson, 16 January 1905* Quoted in: Memorandum. Shortage 
of ticals in the Treasury. Williamson, 18 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15
F.F.A. 23/2.
89. Beckett to Sir John Anderson, 12 October 1904. Enclosed in: Beckett to
Lord Lansdowne, 12 October 1904 Desp. 6l P.R.O. F.O. 69/255*
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it appears that the Financial Adviser’s caution was at first an effective res­
training influence. The British and Mexican dollars were demonetized in the
90F. M. S. and S. S. in September 190*f , and in early 1905 Williamson appears
to have persuaded Prince Mahit to allow the Straits Trading Company to exchange
91the old dollars in the southern provinces for the newly-issued Straits dollar , 
at least as a temporary measure until there were sufficient baht in the Bangkok
Treasury to proceed with a baht scheme.
92But in November 1905 Williamson left Siam for England on leave , and his 
position was temporarily filled by Rivett-Carnac. In May 1906 the acting 
Financial Adviser visited Puket - the major trading centre in the south - to 
prepare a report on the currency situation in that province. As was to be
expected he strongly advised th^t the Government take urgent steps to make the
93baht the principal coin in circulation in Puket : Rivett-Carnac's visit to
the province and the presentation of his report were carried out with consider- 
94able haste for he was almost certainly aware that Williamson would strongly
95oppose his recommendations . There is every indication that Rivett-Carnac 
wanted the Puket currency scheme well under way by the time Williamson returned 
to Siam.
PhrayS SuriyS's first letter to the King concerning exchange policy - in 
June 1906 - had concentrated on the difficulties faced by the Ministry as a 
result of the baht shortages in the Treasury: yet within one week PhrayS
SuriyS accepted Rivett-Carnac's principal recommendations with regard to the
96Puket currency scheme . It was decided that from 1 April 1907 all official
90. Chai Hon-Chan op. cit. p. 9^«
91. Prince Mahit to King, 21 January 1905 N.A.Kh. 26/l*f. Rivett-Carnac to 
Phraya EatsadS (High Commissioner in Puket) 10 March 1906 F.F.A. 23/3. The 
export of the Straits dollar from the S.S. and F.M.S. was permitted once suf­
ficient coins were in circulation in the colony.
92. Bangkok Times, 2 November 1905.
93- Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahit, 31 May 1906. Enclosed with: Beckett to
Sir Edward Grey, 29 August 1906 Desp. 70 P.R.O. F.O. 371/133.
9^- PhrayS SuriyS to King, 17 July 1906 N.A.Kh. 26A3-
95* Rivett-Carnac to PhrayS RatsadS, 10 March 1906 F.F.A. 23/3.
96. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 26 June 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/13-
financial transactions in Puket would be made in baht. The Council of Ministers
97accepted PhrayS SuriyS's proposals . It was clearly a disastrous policy. In
June 1906 the Bangkok Treasury held only 2.7 m. baht coins and of those 0.9 m.
98were demonetized bullet-shaped baht : inevitably the first consignment of
baht for the south contained less than half the amounts requested by Rivett-
99Carnac in his May report . Within a matter of weeks it was clear that PhrayS 
SuriyS, with the encouragement of Rivett-Carnac, had precipitated a severe 
currency shortage in the capital and that the Ministry of Finance would find
it extremely difficult to cover the demands of the banks for baht during the
100coming rice export season . It was at that point that Williamson returned 
from leave and resumed his position as Financial Adviser. He immediately 
suggested that the 1902 Paper Currency Act be amended so as to reduce the 
statutory reserve cash requirement from 75 per cent to 50 per cent of the total 
value of notes in circulation: it was hoped th^t this would release 3*0 m.
baht for Puket, leaving the Bangkok Treasury reserves to meet the demands of 
the banks in Bangkok'*'^, but an examination of the Paper Currency Department 
reserves revealed that half the reserve was in the form of demonetized bullet­
shaped baht. Instead of releasing 3-0 m. baht the amendment of the 1902 Act 
had secured only 1 . 5  m.
Faced with the prospect of a severe dislocation to the trade of the port,
102Williamson wrote to Phraya SuriyS on 18 October 1906 . The Financial Adviser
forcefully emphasized that despite the inadequacy of the Government's reserves - 
and he estimated that the Treasury had only 2.75 m. baht at its disposal to 
meet demands of 5-0 m. baht in the immediate months - the Ministry had to ensure
King to PhrayS SuriyS, 29 June 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/13*
98. Bi-annual reports from Ministry of Finance to King on the size of the
Treasury reserves. N.A.Kh. 7/8.
99* PhrayS SuriyS to King, 26 June 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/13-
100. Memorandum. Shortage of ticals in the Treasury, Williamson, 18 October 
1906 N.A.Kh. 26A5: F.F.A. 23/2.
101. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 17 July 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/13-
102. Memorandum. Shortagedof ticals in the Treasury, Williamson, l8 October 
1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15: F.F.A. 23/2.
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that the banks were freely supplied with baht.
’The Government, by closing the Mint to the free coinage of ticals 
has made itself responsible for the due supply of currency to the 
Banks ..• For the Government to fail in this important obligation 
simply means that the export trade is hampered, for the Banks, unless 
they are able to obtain currency freely (as they have a right to do) 
will, in order to protect their own stock of ticals put up rates
higher and higher i.e. offer fewer and fewer ticals to the merchants
who come to them to sell their bills for produce to be exported.
All this is simply the ABC of banking finance, but it requires to 
be stated in order to show what the effect on trade is, if the 
Government fails in its duty of supplying funds freely for the 
vitally important export business of the Country.' 103
The Financial Adviser was equally forceful in pin-pointing the immediate
cause of the impending crisis :
’ ... in my opinion the decision taken last May to proceed at once 
with the scheme for introducing a tical currency in Puket was un­
fortunate. This scheme had been on the tapis for years past, but 
I had invariably advised the Government to defer its adoption until 
such time as our tical balances in Bangkok admitted of its being
taken up without inconvenience. 1 104-
In order to extricate the Ministry from the impending crisis Williamson 
recommended that the Privy Purse Department be asked to exchange its reserves 
of flat baht for the bullet-shaped baht held in the Ministry. Unless this was 
done, he warned, the Ministry would have to restrict the supply of baht to the 
banks, which would be a ’confession of failure on the part of the Government 
in regard to one of its most important duties - the supply of currency.’10'
PhrayS SuriyS disagreed. On 19 October the banks were informed that the
106Treasury would be unable to cover any part of their demands for baht immediately.n
The same day the Minister saw Williamson and told him that he intended to revalue
107the baht once again, though as yet he was unwilling to specify the new rate .
On 22 October Williamson again wrote to PhrayS Suriya: for a usually detached,
unemotional man it was a letter of remarkable forcefulness :
10 3. ibid.
104. ibid.
10 5. ibid.
106. Note, 19 October 1906. Attached to Williamson’s 18 October 1906 memorandum 
F.F.A. 23/2 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
107. Williamson to PhrayS Suriya, 22 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
'If you have definitely made up your mind, contrary to my advice, 
to raise the exchange value of the tical still higher, then the 
proper course is to fix your rate, and say what it is, but what­
ever the rate may be from time to time, we must sell ticals freely 
at that rate. I am absolutely certain that this is the correct 
policy, and as the present rate is 15 tics:£, I hold that we are 
not justified in refusing to give the Banks any more ticals at 
that rate.* 108
If the Ministry failed to meet that obligation,
' ... This will spell disaster to the rice-millers and paddy merchants, 
and the Government will be directly responsible for any failures which 
may occur. I would, therefore, earnestly ask you to reconsider your 
recent decision, as I am sure that it will lead to trouble if persis­
ted in ... the good of the Government and the well-being of the Kingdom 
are ray only concerns.' 109
This bitter clash between the Minister and the Adviser could not be kept
from the King and on 22 October FhrayS SuriyS wrote to the Throne enclosing
his recent correspondence with Williamson'*’'^. In reply the King stated that
although he clearly understood the arguments put forward by the Minister and
the Financial Adviser, his knowledge of finance was not sufficient to enable
him to judge the merits of the opposing cases'*’'*'^. On the other hand, since
Phraya SuriyS was the official who had to carry responsibility for the actions
of the Ministry of Finance, the King was inclined to support the Minister:
however, he suggested that PhrayS SuriyS discuss the issue with Prince
112Devawongse, which the Minister of Finance did . Phraya SuriyS and Prince 
Devawongse were in agreement on every point. First, that in view of the con­
tinuing rise in the price of silver the baht would have to be revalued: they
suggested that the Treasury selling rate be advanced from 15 baht : £ to 
13 1/3 baht : £ - a substantial revaluation, but PhrayS SuriyS was reasonably 
confident that it would not damage the rice trade. Second, Phraya SuriyS and 
Prince Devawongse emphatically rejected Williamson's argument that the Ministry 
of Finance was under an obligation to satisfy immediately all the demands of
108. ibid. Williamson's emphasis.
109. ibid.
110. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 22 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
111. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 24 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
112. PhrayS Suriya to King, 31 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
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the banks for baht. If the banks needed baht to finance trade they would have 
to raise them from other sources, for example by encouraging people to deposit 
more baht with them by offering higher rates of interest on deposit accounts.
And yet the Ministers were not fully confident in their stand for they also 
suggested that the Ministry of Finance should be prepared to sell the banks 
sufficient baht to prevent dislocation of the export trade. PhrayS SuriyS 
proposed that in order to carry this out the Ministry would have to borrow from 
the stock of flat baht in the Privy Purse Department. Apart from one or two 
details this was precisely Williamson's advice which the Minister had ignored 
three days previously.
This apparent contradiction in Phraya SuriyS's exchange policy - on the
one hand f o r c e f u l l y  d e n y in g  W ill ia m s o n 's  c o n te n tio n  t h a t  th e  M i n i s t r y  was o b l i g e
to meet all the demands of the banks for baht immediately, yet then acknowledgin
that the financial viability of the port's merchant community and the continued
econom ic p r o g r e s s  o f  th e  Kingdom depended on th e banks r e c e i v i n g  an u n r e s t r i c t e d
supply of currency - was soon made clear. On 19 October the banks were informed
that no more baht would be sold by the Treasury until all the cash demands of
th e  G o v e rn m e n t's  own a d m in is t r a t io n  w ere f i r s t  raet1 1 ^ .  T h re e  d a y s  l a t e r  th e
Ministry made substantial forward contracts with the banks: the baht were
114delivered on 14 November . It is possible that PhrayS SuriyS and Williamson 
disagreed only over timing - that the Minister refused to accept that the banks' 
demands had to be met immediately, that the Ministry was at the beck and call of 
the European banks. Or perhaps PhrayS SuriyS was angered by Williamson's insis­
tence on the word 'obligation'. To the Financial Adviser it was a sacred tenet 
of banking finance that the Government freely supply the banks with currency: 
to the Minister it appeared to be merely a device to ensure the continued high 
profits of the banks^^. But whether an obligation or merely prudent policy 
113- PhrayS SuriyS to King, 22 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15-
114. Memorandum on the C u rre n c y  H is t o r y  of Siam  1902-1923- W illia m s o n , Ju n e  1923 
F.F.A. 30/22.
115- In his letters PhrayS SuriyS frequently implied a dislike of the domination 
of the foreign trade of 3angkok by the European banks, merchant houses and ship­
ping lines, particularly the fact that the profits of those concerns were sent 
out of the Kingdom.
241
the end result was the same - all the demands of the banks for baht had to be 
promptly satisfied. The King accepted the report of PhrayS SuriyS and Prince 
Devawongse^^ and on 2 November 1906 the Treasury selling rate was raised to
13 1/3 baht : £. It was officially stated that the revaluation was necessary
‘ , 117in view of the rise in the price of silver
It was at about this point - late 1906 - that PhrayS SuriyS's exchange 
policy began to run into serious difficulties. Though in October 1906 the 
Ministry of Finance had been faced with the threat of a critical shortage of 
baht - a situation largely of its own making - the crisis was short-lived. 
Indeed, within a matter of weeks the Ministry was faced with the opposite prob­
lem - an excess of baht in the market and consequently a depressed market rate 
ll8of exchange . So severe was the depression that for the remainder of PhrayS 
SuriyS1s term as Minister of Finance - from December 1906 tmtil February 1908 - 
the Ministry had to sell a substantial volume of sterling to the banks in order 
to support the exchange. For this the Ministry used part of the proceeds of 
the 1907 loan in accordance with the undertaking given to the British, French 
and German banks in this respect, at the time the loan had been signed. During 
the period April 1907 to March 1908 alone, some £536,000 was sold to support 
exchange11 .^
Several factors contributed to the emergence of this new problem. Most 
importantly the monsoon rains in 1906 and 1907 were poor: consequently the
value of rice exports in the 1906/07 and 1907/08 seasons was lower than that 
in the record seasons of 1904/05 and 1905/06. Inevitably there was a drop in 
116. King to Phraya SuriyS, 1 November 1906 N.A.Kh. 26/15-
117- Bangkok Times, 2 November 1906. This is a suitable point to make a brief 
reference to the fate of the currency scheme in Puket. In fact evidence on the 
outcome of the venture is very sparse but it would appear that at the end of the 
decade, although the baht was in greater use in the area, it was unable to chal­
lenge the dominance of the dollar - particularly in the market place. Subse­
quent currency schemes along the east coast of the Peninsula (Notifications 
in F.F.A. 23/10) achieved no more success. This is hardly surprising: whilst
there was a limit on the number of baht coins the Bangkok Treasury could spare 
for the south, and whilst the economy of the south remained orientated towards 
Singapore and Penang the dollar v/as virtually invincible.
118. Bangkok Times, 28 December 1906.
119. Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam 1902-1923, Williamson, June 1923 
F.F.A. 30/22.
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the demand for baht to finance the export of the rice crop. Furthermore, by-
raising the Treasury rate to 13 1/3 baht : £, the Ministry had ensured that
the same sterling value of trade could now be financed with less baht coins.
Second, the banks’ reserves of baht had been greatly increased as an indirect
result of the November 1906 revaluation: with the drop in the domestic price
of foreign goods there had been a sudden surge of imports, paid for in either
sterling or dollard. Bangkok's import merchants had obtained their supplies
of foreign currency from the banks in exchange for baht . Third, the merchant
community of Bangkok was convinced that in advancing the rate to the new level
the Ministry of Finance had seriously overvalued the currency, and that within
a short time the baht would have to be devalued: there was therefore a tendency
for traders to delay purchasing baht from the banks in anticipation of that
fall. This became a very potent factor in the exchange situation from about
mid-1907 when the world price of silver, which had been rising steadily from
121late 1902, began to drop dramatically . The fall in the silver price meant
that there was now no possibility of the Ministry of Finance being forced to
revalue the baht to protect the currency, as had been the case since December
1902: on the contrary, it meant that the Ministry could now safely devalue the
baht without exposing the currency to the risk of being melted down and exported
as bullion. Inevitably from mid-1907 the merchant community, convinced that
PhrayS SuriyS had made a serious error in revaluing the baht in late 1906, was
alive with rumours that the Minister would now reverse his policy: from that
122time the speculation against the baht was intense
The confusion in the exchange market was exacerbated by two factors. First 
PhrayS SuriyS, far from contemplating a devaluation of the baht was intent on 
further revaluations12 .^ In April 1907 he told the Council of Ministers that he
120. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 19 May 1907 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
121. After reaching a peak of 32d. per ounce in January 1907 the price of silver 
dropped to 25d. per ounce in December 1907- Bangkok Times, 1 February 1908.
122. Bangkok Times, 3 January 1908. Annual Diplomatic and Consular Report from
H.Mls Consuls in Siam 1909 (for 1907) XCVIII pp. 3 3 - ^
123. Bangkok Times, 2 November 1906.
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hoped to raise the rate to 12 baht : £ during the coming export season :
indeed in December 1907 a small step in that direction was taken when the rate
was advanced to 13 baht : £, though the immediate reason for the change was a 
125technical one . It was widely known - and feared - within the merchant
community that PhrayS SuriyS wished to revalue the baht to 12 baht : £, so
when the proposed change was first announced it was widely assumed that the
126rate was to go to that level  ^ . The Ministry of Finance was forced to issue 
denials and explanations in order to restore stability to the market.
Second, the difficulties in the exchange - or to put it another way, the 
difficulty experienced by the Ministry of Finance in making the Treasury rate 
effective in 1907 and early 1908 - were exacerbated by the frequent revaluations 
of the baht. After each change in the Treasury rate a period of time was re­
quired for the volume of coins in circulation and for prices and wages to adjust 
to the new rate: yet between November 1902 and December 1907 the Ministry of
Finance had revalued the baht no less than 16 times, principally in order to
127protect the currency against the rise in the price of silver . The market 
rate had never been given sufficient opportunity to adjust to a stable Treasury 
rate. In other words, by mid-1907 - with PhrayS SuriyS apparently intent on 
pursuing further revaluations of the currency, with the world price of silver 
falling rapidly, with the export trade depressed because of poor monsoons, and 
with the merchant community convinced that most of the difficulties of trade 
were due to mismanagement of the exchange by the Ministry of Finance - the 
exchange situation had all the uncertainty that had characterized it prior 
to November 1902.
Criticism of PhrayS SuriyS's exchange policy - in particular his deter­
mination to push the exchange value of the baht constantly higher - was first
124. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 29 April 1907 
N.A.Kh. 26/15.
125. Bangkok Times, 2 December 1907* The change was made in connection with the 
gold-standard legislation then being prepared by PhrayS SuriyS (and to be con­
sidered later). It was found that at the current rate of 13 1/3 baht:£ it was 
impossible to state in Siamese weights the exact amount of gold in a proposed
10 baht gold coin (Note, Williamson, 2 December 1907 F.F.A. 23/2).
126. Bangkok Times, 23 July 1907.
127. Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam 1902-1923, Williamson, June 1923 F.F.A. 30/22.
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voiced by Williamson during his clash with the Minister in October 1906. But
the Adviser got the worst of that dispute and it appears that his opinion on
exchange policy was never again sought by PhrayS Suriya. The complaint was
then taken up by the merchant community from late 1906 and by April 1907 had
123begun to find its way into the inner circles of the Government . In May
1907 PhrayS SuriyS came under pressure from the Council of Ministers - in
particular from Prince Damrong - to write to the King (who was then in Europe)
to explain his exchange policy, and in particular to answer criticism that
the advance in the Treasury rate was harming the competitive position of
Siamese exports and placing an intolerable burden on the rice farmer (by
129
e n s u r in g  t h a t  he r e c e iv e d  l e s s  b a h t f o r  h i s  c ro p )  . The M i n i s t e r  d e n ied
the accusations. He maintained that although certain sections of the port's
trade were depressed - particularly that concerned with rice sales to China -
overall the foreign trade of the Kingdom was buoyant: indeed the Minister
argued that the high level of export and import values, which he noted for the
previous few months, were due in the main to the recent revaluations of the
currency, though he offered no clear evidence or supporting argument to back
this statement. PhrayS SuriyS also implied that an improvement had been
secured in the position of the rice farmers as a result of the revaluation^ -
130through a fall in the baht price of imports .
Yet the very large sales of sterling to the banks from the Ministry of 
Finance from raid-1907 emphasized that the exchange and trade situation was not 
as healthy as the Minister had tried to suggest: the charge persisted that
PhrayS SuriyS had overvalued the currency. By the time the King returned to 
Bangkok in late 1907 there was a widespread lack of confidence in PhrayS SuriyS's 
exchange policy both inside and outside the Government. Clearly rapid action 
was needed but the King was in a difficult position. On the one hand his know­
ledge of finance was not great and so he was forced to rely on the advice of
128. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 29 April 1907 
N.A.Kh. 26/15.
129. P h ra y S  S u r i y S  to King, 19 May 1907 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
130. See pp*3»-A3ifor PhrayS SuriyS's earlier presentation of this argument.
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others. Yet to the King there appeared to be no one in the Council of Ministers 
with an adequate grasp of the principles involved in the administration of the 
exchange'*''^ ’. In addition the King could not turg. to the Financial Adviser for 
impartial guidance since Williamson had earlier taken a strong stand against 
his Minister's policy. In late 1904 the Government had been faced with a similar 
basic conflict of opinion within the Council - on that occasion with regard to 
the raising of a European loan. The deadlock had been broken by calling on the 
General Adviser to give his considered judgement: the same course was adopted
in January 1908. The King asked Strobel whether it would be advisable for the 
Government to carry out an investigation into the effects upon trade of the
recent revaluations of the baht, the object being to decide whether there was
132any case for a devaluation of the currency
In his reply to the King, Strobel argued that since too great an apprecia­
tion in the exchange value of the baht was almost certain to injure the export 
trade of the Kingdom, Williamson had been correct in mid-1906 in recommending 
that the Ministry consider carefully the probable effects on trade of an advance 
in the Treasury rate, before the baht had been actually revalued in August and 
in particular in November 1906. And yet, the General Adviser Admitted, because 
of the abnormal trade conditions of the previous eighteen months it was extre­
mely difficult to determine the extent to which the export trade had been 
actually affected by the revaluations of late 1906, or indeed whether it had 
been affected at all. There could be no doubt that the rice trade had suffered 
as a result of the poor monsoons of 1906 and 190?: in addition rice exports to
China had been severely inhibited by the recent confusion in the Hongkong
133exchange . It was possible, suggested Strobel, that once these temporary 
difficulties passed the export trade would adjust to the higher exchange value 
of the baht. But the General Adviser was in no doubt that having revalued the
131. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 11 January 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
132. Memorandum on Exchange, Strobel, 9 January 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/15.
133. At that time Hongkong was still on the silver standard. Therefore when the 
price of silver began to fall in 1907 the Hongkong quotation for the dollar 
dropped with it. The result was a sharfc revaluation of the baht against the 
dollar in Hongkong, pricing Siamese rice out of the China market.
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baht - even if the currency was now perhaps temporarily overvalued - the Govern­
ment was committed to maintaining the new rate :
'The system now existing in Siam is known as the Gold Exchange 
system. Under this system, the Government fixes the rate of value 
of the monetary unit and assures the public that it will do all in 
its power to keep the monetary unit at that rate of value and that 
it has provided the necessary reserves abroad for that purpose ...
Once a Government has done this, it has assumed towards the public 
a moral obligation. Trusting to the assurances of the Government, 
contracts are made and ordinary business is conducted on the belief 
that the monetary unit is to retain the value at which it has been 
publicly fixed by the Government. This is now the situation in 
Siam, and by an attempt to change the present value of the tical, 
or even by appointing a committee for the purpose of inquiring 
into the question, the Government would really be guilty of a 
deception towards the public.' 134
As soon as it became known that the Government was weakening in its resolve 
to maintain the value of the baht, then exporters would cease trading in anti­
cipation of the devaluation and investors would withdraw their capital from 
the Kingdom for fear of incurring losses through a drop in the rate. With 
money flowing out of Siam but none coming in the Government would be forced 
to devalue whether it wished to or not. There was no reason, barring an unfore­
seen misfortune such as successive crop failures, Strobel concluded, why the 
Government should not be able to maintain the rate at the current level. Through­
out 1907 the rate had been held in adverse circumstances by the Ministry of 
Finance seili sterling, and there were now indications that the trade situation
was improving. In short, even if the revaluations had been hasty and ill-
conceived, 'the Government should not even consider tfce possibility of reducing
135the value of the tical.'
Strobel had discussed the exchange situation with both Phraya SuriyS and 
Williamson whilst preparing his memorandum for the King^^, and all three had 
agreed that in view of the persistent rumours in the capital that the Goverm*«nt 
was on the point of devaluing the baht, the Ministry of Finance should issue a ^
;•* 137statement reaffirming its determination to maintain the parity of the currency
134. Memorandum on Exchange, Strobel, 9 January 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/15«
135* ibid. 1
13 6. ibid.
137- King to PhrayS SuriyS, 11 January 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/15*
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A notification over the signature of Phrayfi SuriyS to that effect appeared in
I38the Bangkok papers on 13 January 1908 . The uncertainty in the exchange
market subsided.
Strobel1s memorandum, whilst leaving open the question as to whether the 
revaluations of the baht in late 1906 had had any serious harmful effect on 
the export trade of the Kingdom, made it quite clear that the manner in which 
PhrayS. Suriya had pursued his revaluation policy was open to criticism. In 
his final days as Minister of Finance, PhrayS SuriyS felt it necessary to 
answer that point. On 8 February 1908 he wrote to the King explaining that in 
the past he had avoided becoming involved in any discussions with regard to 
his exchange policy for the simple reason that he believed that few people were 
able to understand fully the intricacies of the subject, and furthermore that
it was difficult to explain his policies adequately to people who were not
139experts in the field . This admission provides another example of PhrayS 
SuriyS's insularity which was noted in Chapter V, an insularity which, as sug­
gested earlier, played a significant part in PhrayS $ uriya's failure at the 
Ministry of Finance. The result of his silence, the Minister admitted, was 
that on the one hand the achievements of his policy - for example, the fact 
that the revaluations had secured a reduction in the baht value of the Govern­
ment's sterling payments in Europe in connection with the payment of interest 
on the 1905 and 190? loans - had not been fully recognized, and that on the 
other hand he had been unjustly accused of causing a trade depression. PhrayS
SuriyS emphasized that in his view the recent difficulties experienced by the
export trade of the Kingdom were due primarily to the poor rice harvests of 
1906 and 1907 and the depreciation of the dollar in Hongkong which made the 
export of Siamese rice to China difficult. But within a matter of days he 
was no longer Minister: the criticisms of his exchange policy fed the general
attack on the Minister in the Council and led to his removal from office.
138. Bangkok Times, 13 January 1908.
139* PhrayS SuriyS to King, 8 February 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/15*
5« A re-examination of PhrayS SuriyS's exchange policy.
Before leaving this complex subject it would be instructive to consider 
just two aspects of PhrayS Suriya's exchange policy in more detail. First, 
the crux of the criticism levelled against the Minister by the merchant com­
munity of Bangkok - that by advancing the Treasury selling rate from 
16 baht : £ in August 1906 to 13 baht : £ in December 1907 the Ministry of
1Finance seriously damaged the Kingdom s rice export trade.
There can be little doubt that during Phraya Suriya^s period as Minister 
of Finance there was a significant fall in the volume and baht value of rice 
exports - as the attendant table shows. However, the table also makes it clear
Rice Exports/Exchange Rate : 1900 - 19 10 /11
Rice Exports Exchange
Year Volume (tons 000s) Value (baht m.)
Change in Treasury selling 
rate for baht against sterling
1900 414.5 37.50 not available
1901 684.9 60.28 not available
1902 798.5 69.86 not available
1903 585.3 56.67 19.50 baht:£ to 17.00 baht:£
1904 845.1 8 1 .1 1 17.00 baht:£ to 16.67 baht:£
1905/06 865.1 83.13 16.67 baht:£ to 16.00 baht:£
1906/07 859.4 81.92 16.00 baht:£ to 13 -3 3 baht:£
1907/08 795.8 75.58 13 .3 3 baht:£ to 13.00 baht:£
1908/09 918.4 79.39 no change
1909A0 952.9 85.08 no change
1910A1 1,046.9 91.06 no change
Sources : James C. Ingram Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources 
in The Economic Development of South-East Asia C. D. Cowan (ed) London 
1964 pp. 102-126 Appendix A. Annual Diplomatic and Consular Reports 
from H. M.fs Consuls in Siam. Memorandum on the Currency History of 
Siam 1902 - 19231 Williamson, June 1923 F.F.A. 30/22.
that compared with the previous poor rice export season - 1903 - the fall in 
the volume and baht value of rice exports in 1906/07 and 1907/08 was relatively
slight. The relative mildness of the 1906/07 - 1907/08 depression is further 
emphasized when it is pointed out that in a trade depression which occurred
in 19 11/ 12 - 19 12/13 the figures for the volume and value of rice exports were 
some 50 per cent and 30 per cent respectively below the figures achieved in
1431910/11 . It is also evident from the table that there was little correlation
between the size of rice exports in a particular year and advances in the
Treasury rate. Whilst the exchange rate was being raised from 19*50 baht : £
to 16.00 baht : £ the Kingdom's rice trade experienced both the depression of
1903 and the record exports of 1904 and 1905/06. Moreover, with the rate
finally fixed at 13*00 baht : £ the rice trade experienced both the severe
depression of 19 11/ 12 - 19 12/13 referred to above, and a record export season 
141in 1913/14 . The poor volume of rice exports in 1911/12 - 1912/13 was due
142principally to a failure of the monsoon in those years and indeed there seems
little reason to doubt that significant fluctuations in the volume of rice
exports during this period as a whole were due in the main to the changing
fortunes of the mopsoon. Therefore Phraya Suriya1s claim that the difficulties
experienced by the rice trade during his period as Minister of Finance were
primarily the result of inadequate monsoon rains, and had relatively little
to do with the revaluations of the baht which were then taking place, had some
justification. In a sense the period 1908 - 1919 vindicated PhrayS Suriya.
Until the exchange mechanism was overwhelmed by a dramatic rise in the price
143of silver after the 1914 - 1918 War , the Ministry of Finance was able to 
maintain the Treasury rate at 13 baht : £ with relative ease. Indeed, through­
out most of the period - the exception of course being the depression years of
1911/12 - 1912/13 - the Treasury accumulated a large volume of sterling from
144its sales of baht to the banks
143. James C. Ingram Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources in 
The Economic Development of South-East Asia C.D.Cowan (ed) London I964 pp.102- 
126 Appendix A.
141. ibid. The baht value of rice exports was 91*06 m. baht in 1910/11, 65*84 m. 
in 19 11/1 2 , 65.32 m. in 19 12/13 and 98.70 m. in 1913/14.
14*. James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand I85O - 1970 p* 83.
143* See the following section.
144. The banks made their first purchases of baht since late 1906 in March 1910 
when they sold the Treasury £43,000 (R.F.A.B. 1910/11 p. 11). Between April 1914 
and November 1918 the Treasury issued 104.3 m* baht, equivalent to £8.02 m. 
(Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam 1902-1923» Williamson, June 1923 
F.F.A. 30/22).
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It should also be noted in PhrayS SuriyS's defence that Siam was not the
only Asian power faced with severe speculation against its currency in 1907
and 1908. For example, from October 1907 the Government of India was faced
with a substantial drop in the demand for rupees, partly the result of the
partial failure of Indian harvests earlier in the year, partly the result of
a sudden decline in foreign demand for Indian produce following a financial
145collapse in the United States . In one year the sterling reserves of the 
Government were reduced from £30.9 ro. to £11.15 nw but even the heavy sales 
of sterling could not prevent the exchange value of the rupee falling well 
below par. Furthermore, the Singapore Government, whose gold-standard scheme 
was being implemented at approximately the same time as that of Siam, had to 
contend with violent speculation in exchange between the time the new gold-based 
Straits dollar was introduced (September 1904) and when its exchange value was 
finally fixed (January 1906)
Yet these considerations - the relative mildness of the 1906 - 1907 
depression in Siam, and the fact that other Asian powers experienced exchange 
difficulties in this period - should not obscure the important point that 
during the export seasons of 1906/07 and 1907/08 the Siamese rice trade still 
had to contend with an adverse and confusing exchange situation. Furthermore, 
it can be argued that the difficulties in the exchange were to a considerable 
extent the result of the policies and measures pursued by PhrayS SuriyS.
First in October 1906, by refusing to accept that the Ministry of Finance had 
an obligation to meet all the demands of the banks for baht immediately - and 
by proceeding with a currency scheme in Puket which threatened to provoke a 
serious currency crisis in the capital - Phraya SuriyS undermined the confidence 
of the banks in their ability to finance the export of the Kingdom's rice crop. 
Second by revaluing the baht in August 1906 and then again in the November of 
the same year - the two revaluations increasing the exchange value of the 
currency by approximately 15 per cent - the Ministry gave paddy prices and
145. K. N . S. Nambudiripad A Short History of Indian Currency Poona 1955 PP* 93- 
95- Vera Anstey The Economic Development of India 4th ed. London 1952 p. 414.
146. Chai Hon-Chan The Development of British Malaya I896-I909 2nd ed. London 
1967 pp. 9V95.
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cultivators1 incomes insufficient time to adjust to those and earlier advances 
147in the rate . Finally by making it be known that he intended to raise the 
exchange value of the baht to 12 baht ; £ at a time when the merchant community 
of Bangkok felt that the existing rate of 13 1/3 baht : £ represented an over­
valuation of the currency, and at a time when the price of silver was fsilling, 
PhrayS Suriya undoubtedly contributed to the nervousness of the exchange. The 
confusion of the exchange in 1906/07 and 1907/08, coupled with the slight drop
in the volume of rice exports in those years was sufficient to push severed
148rice millers into financial difficulties - particularly those supplying the 
China market where the trade also had to contend with the fluctuations in the 
Hongkong exchange. In addition 1906/07 saw the introduction of the new rates 
of land tax under the law of 1905» and the imposition of this additional finan­
cial burden on the rice cultivators at that particular point - though clearly
no fault of Phraya SuriyS - had an undoubted depressing effect on the rice 
149trade . In other words, even if it is accepted that in the long run the 
rate of 13 baht : £ did not represent an overvaluation of the currency, the 
Ministry of Finance would have been better advised to have revalued the baht 
after 1908 when the export trade was flourishing and when there was a strong 
demand for the currency, rather than at a time when trade had still not fully 
adjusted to the earlier revaluations, when a poor monsoon had produced a drop 
in rice exports, and when the rice farmers were faced with the first increase 
in the rates of land tax for over 50 years.
To that argument Phraya Suriya would have replied that in the second half 
of 1906, faced with the continuing rise in the price of silver he had no choice 
but to revalue the baht in order to protect the currency. In fact there was 
an alternative - to debase the baht. The Governments of the Philippines and 
the Straits Settlements - which were also attempting to establish a gold standard
147. Annual Diplomatic and Consular Reports from H.M.'s Consuls in Siam 1908 
(for 1906) CXV pp. 705-734.
148. Annual Diplomatic and Consular Reports from H.M.'s Consuls in Siam 1909
(for 19077 CXVIII pp. 33-66V PhrayS Suriya to King, 8 February 1908 N.A.Kh.26/15*
149* Annual Diplomatic and Consular Reports from K.M.'s Consuls in, Siam 1908 
(for 1906) CXV pp. 705-734.
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with a silver coin - protected their currencies in 1906 by reducing their silver
150content rather than by revaluation , and the merchant community of Bangkok
151appear to have expected Siam to follow that example . But PhrayS SuriyS
rejected this alternative, principally because he believed that the Siamese
152population would lose faith in a baht which had become merely a token coin .
This was hardly a strong argument: the fact that the people had accepted the
introduction of a Government paper currency in 1902 and the demonetization of
the bullet-shaped baht in 190*f with relatively little difficulty and at the
end of the decade were to adjust to the introduction of an entirely unfamiliar
system of small denomination coins suggests that the debasement of the silver
baht could have been carried out with little serious opposition from the public.
However, as Williamson explained in his report on the budget for 1907/08, there
was a further argument against debasement: a reduction in either the fineness
or the weight of the silver content of the baht would have involved the
153Ministry of Finance in an extensive recoining operation , far beyond the 
existing capabilities of the Royal Mint. But the decision to retain the current 
specifications for the silver content of the baht - a decision confirmed by 
the Gold Standard Act of 1908 - was to have serious consequences for the future 
operation of the exchange mechanism, a point which will be considered in the 
following section.
6. The introduction of the Gold Standard Act, November 1908.
PhrayS SuriyS left one important legacy for his successor from his exchange
policy - a draft Gold Standard Act. The draft act had been prepared in early
1 1 5 5  1907 . Its most important points were as follows :
150. Bangkok Times, 28 December 1906. Chai Hon-Chan op. cit. p. 95-
151. Bangkok Times, 15 February 1907-
15 2. ibid.
153. R.F.A.3. 1907/08 p. 11.
15^. PhrayS SuriyS to Prince So^mot, 26 March 1907 N.A.Kh. 26/l5«
155* The following quotations are taken from an English version of the draft.
In March 1907 the Thai translation had not been completed (PhrayS SuriyS to 
Prince Sommot, 26 March 1907) which strongly suggests that the draft was 
prepared by Williamson.
1. ’The theoretical unit • of the Siamese Monetary System shall be 
the gold tical of 54 centigrammes of pure gold.' By introducing 
in theory - though not necessarily issuing - a gold coin con­
taining a specified amount of gold, the Government was fixing 
the exchange value of the currency in relation to other gold- 
based currencies, principally sterling.
2. 'The silver tical containing 13-5 grammes of pure silver shall, 
under this Act, have a value equal to the aforesaid 54 centi­
grammes of pure gold.' In other words, under Siamese law the 
exchange value of the silver baht would correspond exactly to 
that of the theoretical gold baht, whatever the intrinsic value 
of the silver coin.
3. Provision was made for the minting and issue of silver baht and 
gold coins by the Treasury only in exchange for gold, either 
coined or in bars or gold leaf, in the proportion of 5*f centi­
grammes of pure gold for one baht. The obligation to issue 
silver coins in exchange for gold was to cease when the value
of the silver in each baht coin exceeded the value of 54 centi-
156grammes of pure gold
4. Provision was made for the creation of a separate exchange fund
to maintain the market value of the currency near its official
parity.
5. A 1 baht and 10 baht gold coin were to be issued.
The draft act had been briefly discussed by the Council of Ministers in
157April 1907 1 but no decisions were taken, partly because the King was in
Europe and partly because the Council was clearly unwilling to approve such
an important piece of legislation whilst PhrayS Suriya's exchange policy as
a whole was a matter of controversy. However, the Minister was able to complete
much of the essential groundwork for the issue of the Act. He placed orders
156. A familiar problem - the danger of the intrinsic value of the silver baht 
exceeding its exchange value. This is an important point, and one which will 
be dealt with at the end of this section.
157. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 29 April 1907 N.A.Kh.
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for the production of the gold coins at the Paris Mint and for the minting of
158a new subsidiary decimal coinage in 3russels . In May 1907 he opened a 
Government account with the National Provincial Bank in London, an account 
that was intended solely for the Ministry's exchange transactions and was 
clearly the embryo of the exchange reserve fund envisaged in the gold standard
159legislation .
✓In April 190o Williamson proposed to the new Minister, Prince ChanthabuTi,
that the Ministry proceed with the promulgation of PhrayS Suriya's act1 0^ .
The Adviser argued that the existence of the draft act was common knowledge
among the Bangkok business community and if the Government were to drop the
measure now, this could be interpreted as a sign that the Ministry was
weakening in its resolve to support the exchange. Second, the passage of the
act would finally fix the exchange value of the baht in terms of gold, and
the uncertainty, rumour and speculation that had constantly threatened the
stability of the Treasury rate since 1906 would be removed. These were strong
arguments: since the close of the 1907/08 rice export season, the Ministry
of Finance had been hard pressed to support the exchange1^ .  In May 1908
Prince Chanthaburl was forced to set aside a further £500,000 from the proceeds
162of the 1907 loan to support the rate , which meant that of the £2.797 o.
raised in 1907» £1.452 m. had been ear-marked for the exchange reserve fund
and for the minting of the new coins to be introduced under the gold standard
scheme1^ .  In response to this measure the European banks had agreed not to
164-sell sterling drafts on London below a certain rate
158. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 15 October 1908 N.A.Kh. 10/9.
159. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 7 May 1907 N.A.Kh. 20. 1/22.
160. Memorandum, Gold Standard Act, Williamson, 17 April 1908 F.F.A. 25/8.
161. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 18 May 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/lb.
162. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers 18 May 1908 N.A.Kh.26/16
The transfer of an additional £0.5 m. to the exchange account was regarded as
merely a temporary measure: when the Treasury recommenced purchasing sterling
from the banks, the £0.5 m. was to be repaid to the railway construction fund.
I65. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 18 May 1908 N.A.Kh. 2o/l6.
164. 1 iemorandum, Arrangement with the Banks for support of Exchange, Williamson 
16 January 1911 F.F.A. 25/2.
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On k November 1908 Prince Chanthaburl submitted the Gold Standard Act to 
165the King . The Act was essentially the same as that drafted by PhrayS SuriyS
and Williamson in 1907* except that whereas PhrayS SuriyS had left provision
/
for raising the Treasury selling rate to 12 baht : £, Prince Chanthaburl decided 
to leave it unaltered at 13 baht : £. The legislation was approved by the 
King without amendment and was promulgated on 11 November 1908^^. Those 
clauses of the Act concerned with the issue of new coins did not come into 
force immediately, the reason being that in November 1908 the decimal satang
168coins and the gold coins being minted in Europe had still not arrived in Siam
However, by May 1909 the Government had received sufficient satang to be able
169to demonetize the old copper att and solot .
The adoption of a gold exchange standard for the baht, a measure completed 
by the passing of the Gold Standard Act in November 1908, was a major achieve­
ment of the Ministry of Finance in this period. Until the exchange mechanism
\was overwhelmed by a currency and trade crisis some 1 1 years later, it insured 
the trade of the Kingdom against sudden, arbitrary fluctuations in the Treasury 
selling rate, and it assured the Government that the baht value of its sterling
payments in Europe - principally those made in connection with the 1905 and
1907 European loans - would not increase. In fact it secured all the benefits 
of a stable exchange so clearly stated by Rivett-Carnac when he had initiated 
the measure by closing the Mint to the free coinage of silver almost six years 
previously. The 1908 Act set the seal on the Government's gold exchange stan­
dard policy in two important respects. First, obviously, it fixed the exchange 
value of the baht at 13 baht : £. Second, it gave the exchange reserve fund, 
which had been in existence in effect since early 1907, legal sanction: after
the passing of the Act the fund could not be regarded, either by the Ministry 
of Finance or the public, as merely a temporary expedient to maintain the
l65» Prince Chanthaburl to King, k November 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/16.
166 King to Prince Chanthaburl, 6 November 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/16.
167- Prince Chanthaburl to King, k November 1908 N.A.Kh. 26/16.
168. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 13 October 1908 N.A.Kh. 10/9.
169- Prince Chanthaburl to King, 3 May 1909 N.A.Kh. 26/16 .
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exchange value of the currency during a difficult period . It guaranteed 
the ability of the Government to maintain the parity of the baht at its declared 
level in all but the most abnormal trading conditions. On the day that the
exchange reserve fund was legally constituted it consisted of the baht equi­
valent of just over 1 2 . 1 m. baht, so 12.0 m. baht was taken as the statutory 
171size of the fund . The fund was to be kept completely separate from all
other Government accounts and reserves.
The ten-baht gold coin regarded by Phraya SuriyS as a very important
element in the scheme was never minted. However, this did not jeopardize the
successful operation of the gold standard mechanism: it was essential only
that the exchange value of the baht was expressed in terms of gold and that
the Ministry of Finance had adequate reserves to maintain that exchange value.
One last point with regard to the Siamese Government's gold standard scheme
needs to be made. The 1908 Gold Standard Act did not guarantee the Government
against being forced to revalue the currency in the future: the silver content
of the baht remained unaltered and as a result the currency remained vulnerable
to large rises in the price of silver. An exchange reserve fund, no matter
how large, was no protection in those circumstances. This point was dramatically
confirmed towards the end of the following decade. In 1916 the price of silver
began to rise and soon passed the point - 39<i« per ounce - at which it became
profitable to export the currency as bullion. The Government's first line of
defence was to prohibit the export of silver in 19171 but in 1919 the price
of the metal rose very rapidly - from k9%d. per ounce to 82jd. per ounce in 
172eight months - and between September and November 1919 the Government was 
forced to revalue the baht four times, from 13 baht : £ to 9*5^ baht : £. The
170. R.F.A.B. 1909/10 p. 9* Bangkok Times, 20 November 1908.
171. Note on the creation of the Gold Standard Reserve Fund, Williamson, 27 
February 1911 F.F.A. 23/1 Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam, 1902- 
1923» Williamson, June 1923 F.F.A. 30/22. The important question as to whether 
the Government was justified in establishing such a large fund to support ex­
change will be considered in the concluding chapter, as part of a wider 
discussion of the Government's allocation of its resources.
172. R.F.A.B. 1920/21 p. 10.
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rate would have gone still higher had not the Government decided to reduce
173the silver content of the coin in January 1920
At the same time the Ministry of Finance was faced with a very large
demand from the banks for sterling. In part this was a consequence of the
baht revaluations and the drop in the baht price of imports. More importantly 
in 1919 the Government was forced to prohibit the export of rice - principally
because of the failure of the rice crop - and the banks no longer requiring
baht to finance the export of the crop returned them to the Treasury by pur­
chasing sterling. From November 1919 the Treasury's sales of sterling were 
effected at the rate of 9*54 baht : £ yet most of the Government's sterling 
holdings had been originally secured when the rate had been 13 baht : £. To 
minimize its sales of sterling, the Ministry needed to devalue the baht by 
a substantial amount. This would also have had the effect of reducing the 
level of imports.
Therefore the Government was faced with the unenviable choice of revaluing 
the baht and protecting the currency, or devaluing and protecting the sterling 
reserves. In principle the Government decided for the former and in 1920/21 
alone the Treasury sold £5.0 m. to the banks: in practice the Ministry tried
to steer a middle path and in so doing failed to revalue the baht sufficiently 
to protect the currency and undoubtedly a considerable volume of coins left 
the Kingdom despite the ban on the export of silver. The Government lost much 
of its sterling reserves and its currency. There were other costs, not least 
of which was the fact that in 1922 and 1924 the Government raised two loans
174in Europe at high rates of interest in order to rebuild its sterling reserves
The dilemma which confronted the Government in 1919 - 1920 as to whether 
to revalue or devalue the currency would not have arisen if in 1908, or at 
some later date, the Ministry of Finance had significantly reduced the silver 
content of the baht. With the baht converted to a token coin the Ministry 
1 7 3- ibid.
174. For a fuller account of this crisis, based on the Files of the Financial 
Adviser , see James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1850-1970 pp- 155-161. 
Unless otherwise noted the account above is based on that of Professor Ingram 
and Williamson's Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam, 1902-1923 
F.F.A. 30/22.
could have met the trade crisis of 1919 - 1920 by devaluing the currency 
without having to concern itself with the rising price of silver. Indeed, 
it is extremely difficult to see why the Ministry of Finance did not debase 
the currency in the late 1900s: the fact that the Government had been forced
to revalue the baht repeatedly over the period from late 1902 to late 1906 
in response to increases in the price of silver had clearly shown the diffi­
culties which could arise in attempting to operate a gold exchange mechanism
175with a silver currency . The principal argument against reducing either
the fineness or the weight of the silver content of the baht was that apparently
such an operation would have placed a severe strain on the capabilities of 
176the Royal Mint . If this consideration weighed most heavily with Prince 
Chanthaburl and Williamson when they finally came to prepare the gold standard 
legislation in 1908 then, with hindsight, it was a serious misjudgement - 
a major flaw in one of the most important and complex financial reforms 
promoted during the reign of King Chulalongkorn.
175» The Bangkok Times, which supported the Government's gold standard policy 
during the difficult period 1906 - 1908, assumed that when the Gold Standard 
Act was finally issued the silver content of the baht would be reduced. Bangkok 
Times, 6 December 1906/15 February 1907.
176. R.F.A.B. 1907/08 p. 11.
CHAPTER VII
The collapse and abolition of the tax farm system, 1885 - 1910.
A system of tax farming - where the monopoly right to collect a parti­
cular tax or to sell a particular item or service is leased by the Government 
to a private individual for a specific period of time - was a comparatively 
recent innovation in Siam. It first appeared during the reign of Rama II 
(1809-1824) when the system was applied with respect to the manufacture and 
sale of spirits, the operation of certain types of gambling den, and the
collection of taxes on shops^; then in the 1830s and l8*40s it was extended
2to almost ^0 sources of revenue . The development of this form of revenue 
collection in Siam at this point was due to two main factors. Most importantly 
the reign of Rama III (1824-1851) saw a significant reduction in the King's 
monopsonist/monopolist control over the foreign trade of the Kingdom, a control 
which had provided the Crown with a major part of its cash income in the 
earlier reigns of the Bangkok period. The dismantling of this system of royal 
trading was partly the result of pressure from the 1820s from western merchants 
and diplomats to have all restrictions on the foreign trade of the Kingdom 
removed, and partly the result of a realization within Siam itself that, hid«” 
bound by royal monopolies, the Kingdom would be unable to compete with aggres­
sive western merchants - particularly in third markets. Indeed it was even 
feared that the trading enterprises undertaken in the name of the King would 
become an actual drain on the treasury^. With the reduction in royal trading 
alternative sources of cash income had to be found. Second, the reign of 
Rama III also saw a significant increase in the level of Chinese immigration
into Siam and undoubtedly among the immigrants were Chinese well versed in
the principles and administrative methods of tax farming, long familiar in
1. Walter F. Vella Siam under Rama III New York 1957 p« 23* G. William 
Skinner Chinese Society in Thailand Cornell 1957 P» 123. Neon Snidvongs The 
Development of Siamese Relations with Britain and France in the Reign of Maha 
Mongkut 1831-1868 Ph.D. thesis London 1961 p. 28.
2. Neon Snidvongs op. cit. p. 28.
3« ibid pp. 22-25/p- 12 8.
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China itself. Initially, the Chinese took over several of the royal trading 
I*monopolies , but increasingly they developed interests in what were to be the 
major tax farms of the fifth reign - the opium, spirit, gambling and lottery 
monopolies. Indeed the opium monopoly, which came into existence in 1851, 
was established following a petition from a group of prominent Chinese to
Ramd' IV asking the King to legalise the sale of opium in Siam and requesting
5the sole right to prepare and sell the drug in the Kingdom . It is possible 
that the creation of other tax farms was due, at least in part, to similar 
pressure from Chinese tax farmers and merchants.
In the second half of the nineteenth century two basic types of tax farm 
developed in Siam. First, that where the tax farmer collected a specific 
tax or duty - for example the tax on fishing implements - at rates laid down 
by the Government. The farmer undertook to pay the Government a stipulated 
sum agreed before the tax was actually collected: the amount of revenue
collected above that figure represented the farmer's profit. The second type 
of tax farm, and by the end of the century by far the more important, was 
that where the farmer was granted in return for an agreed payment to the 
Government, the monopoly right to perform a certain service or to sell a 
certain product in a specified area for a specified period of time. The 
most notable examples of this type of farm were the opium, spirit, gambling 
and lottery monopolies. All the tax farmers were appointed by public auction, 
the contract for the farm going to the highest bidder. It is important to 
note that virtually all the farms demanded extensive administration. Very 
few farmers were involved in simply collecting a specific tax: most farms,
and all the principal farms, could be operated only by an organization 
capable of, for example, administering gambling dens or the preparation and 
sale of opium throughout a major part of the Kingdom.
4. G. William Skinner op cit. p. 118.
5- Prince Damrong Tann&n ph5sl 5k$n bang y5ng (The History of some Taxes): 
in Latthi thamruarn. t5ng t£ng Bangkok 19^3 pp. 143-264. TamnSn ph&sl fin 
(History of the Opium Tax) pp. 233-243-
By the 1890s and 1900s almost half the Government's revenue was derived 
from the tax and monopoly farms, as the following table shows ;
Table 1. Contribution of tax and monopoly farms to Government revenue
1895/96 - 1905/06 (m. baht)
1895/96 1900/01 1905/06
Total Revenue 18.074 35.611 51.657
Opium Farms * 2.567 5.432 10.260
Spirit Farms 2.589 3.412 4.100
Gambling Farms 2.77S 5.244 5.732
Lottery Farms 1.219 1.524 2.391
Approximate % con­
tribution of 4 
monopolies to 
total revenue 50# 43# 43#
Miscellaneous Farms ** 0.803 0.966 0 .512
Sources : R.F.A.B. 1903/04 pp. 22-23: 1907/08 p. 19.
♦ These figures for the opium, spirit, gambling and lottery farms should be 
used with care. First, in some cases the figure quoted includes not only the 
rental from the farm but also income collected by the Government itself: for
example the figure for opium includes the Government's profit from the impor­
tation of raw opium by the Customs Department and its sale to the farmers. 
Neither does the figure given always include all the revenue from that source: 
for example, with regard to the gambling monopoly the revenue from betting 
licence fees (whether collected by officials or by the farmer, it is not clear) 
is frequently quoted separately or included with 'miscellaneous fees'. However, 
the importance of such statistical complexities should not be exaggerated: 
they simply mean that the figures above do not give an exact indication of the 
proportion of the Government's revenue actually collected by the farmers.
*• This includes such items as the Boats and Shops farm, the Chinese Cakes 
farm and the Bird's Nest farm. The 1895/96 and 1900/01 figures are almost 
certainly under-estimates: in those years some taxes - in particular land
and fishery taxes - were still partially farmed out, but since it is impossible 
to determine the proportion of such revenues collected by the farmers, no 
figure under this head can be included. By 1905/06 such taxes were either 
entrusted solely to officials (certainly the case with the land and fishery 
taxes), or had been abolished. The important point is that it is impossible 
to give an accurate figure for the proportion of the Government's total 
revenue collected by tax farmers.
The table also makes it clear that of the revenues derived from the tax 
farms, a very high proportion came from the opium, spirit, gambling and lottery 
monopolies. Indeed in the last of the years noted above, 1905/06, the revenue 
from the opium monopoly, at 10.26 m. baht, was by far and away the largest
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single source of income for the Government: for comparison the most important
non-farm source of revenue in 1905/06 was that derived from customs duties - 
5.56 m. baht. To make the same point another way, in 1905/06 the revenue 
derived from the opium monopoly was sufficient to cover the entire expenditure 
of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Capital, Finance, Justice, and 
Public Works, or alternatively the entire expenditure of the Ministry of the 
Interior including expenditure on the provincial administration. The Govern­
ment's heavy dependence on the major tax farmers in the 1890s and 1900s is 
clear, but it was a dependence heightened by the fact that it was precisely in 
those decades that the Government - committed to an extensive reform programme - 
particularly required an expanding yet secure flow of income.
However, it was the Government's misfortune that these decades also saw 
the tax farm structure in Siam become increasingly unstable. From the mid- 
1890s many of the principal tax farmers found it progressively more difficult 
to make sufficient profit from the major monopolies to enable them to cover 
their commitments to the Treasury, and inevitably the Ministry of Finance was 
forced to consider abolishing the farms and introducing revenue collections 
and administration of the monopolies by direct government agency in order to 
protect the administration's sources of income. It is these two related 
developments which are the principal concern of this chapter.
Because there were so many tax and monopoly farms, each with its own 
peculiar structure and problems of administration, it is clearly impossible to 
consider in detail the history of each of them in this period. Therefore it 
is proposed in the following section to give a general discussion of the defects 
and weaknesses of the tax farm system as a whole in Siam in the 1890s and 1900s: 
at the same time some attention will be paid to the general problems faced by 
the Ministry of Finance when it came to consider the abolition of the farms.
This general discussion will be based on a consideration of the opium, spirit, 
gambling and lottery monopolies - the principal farms. Then in the second 
and third sections these general points will be illustrated by a detailed 
examination of the collapse of the opium farm and the development of government
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administration of the monopoly over the period 1905 to 1910. In the final 
section a brief reference will be made to the abolition of the other principal 
farms in the 1900s and the final disappearance of the tax farm system in the 
sixth reign.
1. The defects and weaknesses of the tax farm system.
From the point of view of the Siamese Government, perhaps the major 
defect of the tax farm system at the end of the nineteenth century was that, 
as was noted earlier, the administration was so dependent upon it for such a 
large proportion of its revenue. In fact the degree of dependence was even 
greater than was suggested above. First, it was usual for the principal farms 
to be so auctioned that one tax farmer, or rather one syndicate of farmers, 
could gain control of a particular tax or monopoly for a large area of the 
Kingdom: moreover it was quite common for one syndicate to bid successfully
for a major contract of a particular monopoly and then by coming to agreements 
with the farmers controlling the other parts of the farm or by having its 
individual members themselves bid for the other sections of the farm, to gain 
effective control over the monopoly throughout virtually the whole Kingdom. 
This was particularly the case with the opium monopoly. Clearly in those 
circumstances there was always the danger that if the syndicate ran into 
financial difficulties, the whole or at least a major part of the Government's 
revenue from that source was immediately at risk. Furthermore, it was not 
unusual for one farmer or syndicate to have interests in a number of farms: 
for example one of the principal members of the syndicate which gained control 
of virtually all the opium sales in Siam in April 1905, Luang Maitrlw&nit, 
was also a major partner in the group which held the contract for the Bangkok 
spirit farm from April 1901 to March 1906^. Or again Phra Phiphit, who 
administered the Bangkok spirit farm prior to 1901, also had interests in 
several provincial spirit farms, a number of Bangkok gambling dens and owned
6. Prince Mahit to King, 2 February 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/24. Luang Maitrlw&nit
and PhrayS BoribSn KBsSWJn to King, 28 April 1906 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/28.
several rice mills • Again the danger was that if one section of a farmer’s 
business interests ran into difficulties his financial position as a whole, 
and consequently a whole series of Government revenues, were placed in 
jeopardy. In short, the Government was dependent for its major sources of 
revenue on a small number of extremely powerful syndicates - certainly less 
than ten, involving perhaps less than 30 tax farmers: furthermore, because
of their interlocking interests the syndicates were precariously interdependent.
The fact that relatively few powerful syndicates competed for a small 
number of highly profitable contracts was in turn one of the principal reasons 
for the increasing instability of the tax farm system in this period. In the 
first place, the considerable profits to be made from the farms and the pat­
ronage associated with the position of an important tax farmer encouraged 
intense rivalry between the syndicates competing for control of the major 
monopolies: indeed no stratagem, legal or illegal, was ignored in attempts
by incumbent farmers to retain their contracts, nor by rival groups in their 
attempts to ruin the current syndicate. Such rivalry reached its peak on 
almost every occasion a major contract came up for reauction. At such times 
a common ruse for a defeated opium or spirits syndicate was for it to sell off 
at very low prices its remaining stock of opium or spirits to the public, so 
ruining the monopoly for its successor. This was illegal. According to the 
regulations governing the administration of such monopolies, within 15 days of 
the auction of a contract the incoming farmer was expected to examine the 
stock of his predecessor, make an estimate of its size and reach an agreement 
with the retiring farmer as to the amount of compensation to be paid for the 
spirit or opium already in the retail market. In addition the retiring farmer 
was obliged to sell his remaining unsold stock to the incoming syndicate at 
prices fixed by the Government. But with so many retail outlets to be covered 
it was impossible for a new syndicate to complete its inspection of the 
retiring farmer's stock and sales in the time available: therefore it was the
usual practice for the size of the existing stocks and sales to be 'estimated'
7
7. Prince Mahit to King, 13 July 1900 N.A.Kh. l*f. lkh/20.
A
by a process of bargaining between the old and new farmers • Clearly the 
opportunities for a retiring syndicate to deceive its successor - to sell 
it only a fraction of its actual stock, or to pay it compensation for far 
less opium or spirit than already existed in the retail market - were con­
siderable: consequently there was always a possibility that an incoming
syndicate would find that, having been deceived by the old fanner, its own 
sales of opium or spirit were ruined in the opening months of the contract.
In short, even when a defeated syndicate did not ignore the law altogether 
and simply sell off its remaining stock to the public, the opportunities 
still existed for rival spirit and opium syndicates to inflict considerable 
financial damage on each other during the transfer of a contract. Indeed, 
as will be shown in the following section, the use of such tactics was a 
major factor in the collapse of the opium monopoly in 1905* However, it 
should be noted that comparable sharp practices developed with respect to 
other farms: for example in the case of the huai lottery - a lottery where
the public were required to foretell the particular character previously 
selected by the farmer for that day - a retiring farmer frequently ran the 
risk of his senior employees transferring their allegiance to the incoming 
farmer in the final days of his contract. In that event the old farmer
could lose heavily if his successor was informed of the selected characters
9for those last few days .
Second, the intense rivalry between the syndicates for control of the 
major farms eventually led the syndicates to enter exceptionally high bids 
for the contracts. On most occasions the Government was clearly pleased to 
see such a development since obviously it implied an increase in the revenue 
from that particular source. Yet in some cases, in its determination to 
secure a contract, a syndicate would bid more for a farm than the farm could 
actually bear: consequently within a matter of months the syndicate would
either default on its payments to the Government or run into serious financial
8, Prince Sirithat SangkSt to King, 25 April 1896 N.A.Kh. 14. Ikh/l2.
9» B. 0. Cartwright The Huey Lottery The Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative 
Publication of the Siam Society, Bangkok 1954, vol. 1 pp. 131-149, p. 135*
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difficulties. Again this point is demonstrated by the history of the opium 
monopoly in the mid-1900s.
The rivalry between the tax farming syndicates was given a particularly 
sinister and violent edge by the fact that each of the principal syndicates 
was closely associated with a particular Chinese secret society”^ . Each 
major syndicate was thereby supported by an organization well versed in the 
violent practices of gang-rule: rival syndicates were physically threatened
not to participate in the auctions for the farms, the operations of incumbent 
syndicates were disrupted and opposing farmers intimidated. At the same time 
a secret society would attempt to protect the interests of its own syndicate 
against the equally violent attacks of other groups. In return for such 
physical protection and support the Chinese secret societies received a propor­
tion of the profits from the administration of the farms: indeed it was one
of their major sources of income. In this period the Siamese authorities 
constantly feared that the violent rivalry between the Chinese secret societies 
could easily erupt into large-scale rioting which the police would find diffi­
cult to control: indeed such a riot occurred in June 1889^ .  It is therefore
likely that for the Government one of the attractions of the abolition of 
the tax farm system and the consequent disappearance of the farming syndicates 
was that it would remove one of the major economic props of the Chinese secret 
societies in Siam^.
The financial stability of the monopoly farms in this period was further 
undermined by the fact that each monopoly had to contend with strong competition 
from an illegal trade in its specific field of interest. This was notably the
10. G. William Skinner Chinese Society in Thailand, Cornell 19571 P- 1^0 • 
tm J ’ ratchasamai phrabSt
. J. 57.
11. PhonakHn Angkinan op. cit. p. 55-
12. The relationship between the farming syndicates and the Chinese secret 
societies was an important indication of the fact that almost invariably the 
tax farmers in Siam were of Chinese origin. However, it should be noted that 
the majority of farmers were given Siamese titles and took Siamese names - for 
example, PhrayS Thip KSsS, Luang SawSmi Phakdl. In the fifth reign the lottery 
and gambling farmers were automatically given the rank of luang. Skinner argues
that this was an attempt by the Government to secure the loyalty of the Chinese elite (Skinner op. cit. pp. 153-15*0.
Chinese in Siam during
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case with the opium and spirit monopolies. The legal sales of almost every 
opium syndicate were damaged by a continuous traffic in smuggled opium entering
the Kingdom either from French Indo-China over the Mekong river in the north,
13 14or through Chantabun in the east , or from Penang in the south . For the
spirit syndicates the main threat came from the output of numerous illicit 
stills scattered throughout the Kingdom: in particular the sales of the Bangkok
spirit farmer were frequently threatened by the illegal production of spirit 
by a community of Vietnamese in the Samsen district of the capital^, an enter­
prise which neither the police nor the forces of the syndicates themselves 
could successfully control^. The problems of illicit trade were exacerbated 
by the fact that in many instances the small concessionaires attached to the 
syndicates - such as the opium den managers and spirit retailers - were them­
selves the principal outlets for illegal opium and liquor. In most cases the 
concessionaires were liable to heavy fines by the syndicates if they failed to 
sell a stipulated amount of opium or spirits over a specific period. In fact 
because of the considerable illegal trade in opium and spirits these conces­
sionaires frequently failed to sell their stipulated quotas, and so were 
repeatedly fined. But in order to pay the fines the concessionaires were forced 
to become outlets for illegal opium or spirits, and this in turn aggravated 
the basic problem. Eventually a situation was reached where the concessionaires 
were making substantial profits from their illicit trade - certainly sufficient 
to cover the fines levied by the main syndicate - while the syndicate itself 
was pushed deeper into financial difficulties by the growth in the traffic in 
illegal opium or spirit. The important point was that because it was rela­
tively easy to smuggle opium into Siam, and relatively eaay to establish stills
13* Petition from Phraya Thip KBsB syndicate to King, 20 December 1906 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33.
14. Prince Devawongse to Prince Sommot, 30 November 1892 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/7.
15« Prince Mahit to King, 20 February 1901 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/20.
16. The Vietnamese community, determined to maintain its illegal, though highly 
profitable, industry, established a complejc network of barriers on the main 
bridges into the village which made a surprise entry by the police almost im­
possible: raids by boat were repulsed by fire-arms and stones. Eric St. John
Lawson (Bangkok Commissioner of Police) to Prince Naret, 27 July 1905/6 December 
1905 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/25.
in secluded parts of the Kingdom, the Siamese authorities could do compara­
tively little to protect the syndicates and maintain the monopolies against 
such illegal trade.
Therefore in the 1890s and 1900s the Ministry of Finance was faced with 
extremely powerful, yet increasingly unstable tax farming syndicates. However, 
the situation was made considerably worse by the fact that once a syndicate 
actually ran into financial difficulties and was unable to meet its commitments 
to the Treasury, the Ministry could do relatively little to protect its reve­
nue. According to the law, if a farmer failed to pay a certain number of 
monthly instalments for his fann (usually two consecutive months), the Ministry 
was obliged to confiscate the farm and reauction the contract. If the farm 
attaacted a lower bid on reauction - and usually it did since clearly the 
existing farmer had lost money on the enterprise - the retiring farmer was 
liable for the whole of the Government's loss. At first the Ministry of 
Finance would confiscate the security which each syndicate had to deposit with 
the Government on taking over a farm, but if necessary the Ministry was 
empowered to seize all the farmer's property in order to secure payment. The 
difficulty was that if a syndicate had been forced to abandon a contract 
because it was in financial difficulties, it was unlikely to be able to meet 
its debts in connection with the reauction of the farm. In short, there would 
be little benefit in applying the law. However, there were two complicating 
factors. First, since the syndicates rarely revealed the true picture of 
their financial operations, the Ministry of Finance was sceptical whenever a 
farmer declared himself unable to meet his commitments to the Government: 
there were sufficient examples of supposedly bankrupt syndicates successfully 
bidding for new contracts within months of abandoning their old one to feed 
the Ministry's scepticism, to arouse suspicion that the farmer was simply 
making less profit than he had originally hoped. Second, if the Ministry of 
Finance failed to enforce the law against defaulting farmers there was ilways 
the fear that other syndicates would be encouraged to abandon their contracts 
at the first sign of financial difficulty. As it was the farmers seemed little
concerned to pay their monthly instalments to the Treasury in full and on
time: in 1906 it was reported that only 16 per cent of all tax farm payments
17were paid to the Government by the stipulated date
These were the principal defects of the tax farming system in this period.
But for the Government the system had other important failings. First, there
was concern that the major monopoly farms involved the promotion of notable
social vices - gambling, liquor consumption and opium smoking: there was
particular concern with regard to gambling, partly because it was felt that
the gambling dens encouraged crime, partly because gambling was the only one
of the three vices which involved the Siamese population to a large extent.
It was obviously in the Syndicates' financial interest to employ every device
and subterfuge to encourage the population to gamble, drink and smoke more
l8opium than it would otherwise have done . Yet although the Government wel­
comed the expansion of its revenue consequent upon such increased consumption, 
unlike the farmers it was inevitably concerned about the social consequences 
of such a development. The fact that the Chinese secret societies were so 
closely involved with the administration of these monopolies only added to 
the authorities' disquiet. Second, with regard to those farms where the 
farmer was concerned with the collection of a specific tax or duty, again the 
financial interests of the syndicate and the welfare of the community as a 
whole were often in conflict. In order to make as much profit as possible 
from such a contract, a tax farmer needed to search out every individual liable 
for the particular tax in their district, and harass them for payment: oppres­
sion and injustice were in the nature of the system. The Government's fear 
was that such practices could easily provoke serious disturbances within the 
Kingdom, particularly as the tax farmers were almost invariably Chinese and 
were taxing a predominantly Siamese population.
This is a fairly imposing list of weaknesses, though it is important to 
remember that no tax or monopoly farm exhibited all these failings. Indeed 
most of the smaller farms caused the authorities few problems, and even such
17• Memorandum: Inspection of the Chao Cham Nuan Accounts. Williamson,
31 October 1906 F.F.A. 1/2.
18. G. William Skinner op. cit. p. 121.
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an important monopoly as the lottery farm provoked only minor administrative 
difficulties for the Ministry of Finance in this period. In fact the only 
farms to be seriously threatened by such problems as illegal trade and fierce 
rivalry between the syndicates were the opium and spirit farms - though of 
course they were also the most profitable farms for the Government. Moreover 
it is important to note that the tax farm system did secure several significant 
advantages for the authorities. First, it greatly simplified a part of the 
Government's budget procedures: as soo£ as the farms for a particular year
had been auctioned, the Ministry of Finance had a relatively accurate assessment 
of the revenue from those sources for the coming year. Of much greater impor­
tance, the tax farm system removed a considerable and wide-ranging administra­
tive burden from the Government for, as has been shown above, the tax farmers 
undertook such complex administrative operations as the preparation, distri­
bution and sale of opium throughout the whole Kingdom. When, in the late 1890s, 
the Ministry of Finance first seriously considered the abolition of the 
principal monopolies, the immediate question was whether the Government had 
the administrative machinery capable of taking over all those responsibilities.
Until the mid-1900s the concensus of opinion within the Government was 
19that it did not • In particular it was felt that the administration con­
tained insufficient numbers of qualified, suitable officials to administer 
the monopolies throughout Siam: there was in any event a shortage of officials
with a general administrative training, but in addition very few, if any, of 
those would have had a detailed knowledge of the operations of the principal 
monopolies. Moreover, there was a fear that since western-style concepts 
of financial propriety had only recently begun to be introduced into the 
bureaucracy, it was possible that the placing of control of such a lucrative 
enterprise as, say, the opium monopoly, into the hands* of comparatively unquali­
fied officials would lead to a dramatic increase in the embezzlement and 
mismanagement of the revenues. There was a danger that an inefficient and 
corrupt administration of the monopolies by officials would secure a lower
19« Prince Mahit to King, 11 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
and more unstable revenue than that produced by the financially ailing tax 
farm syndicates.
2. The collapse of the opium monopoly, 1903 ~ 1907»
Most of the defects and weaknesses of the tax farming system outlined in 
the preceding section were apparent in the operations of the opium monopoly, 
the single most important source of revenue for the Government. Not surpri­
singly therefore from as early as the late 1880s successive Ministers of 
Finance made determined efforts to amend the structure and operations of the 
monopoly to give it greater stability. The measures taken by Prince NarSthip
in 1889 - I89O and Prince Sirithat SangkSt in 1895 - 1896 in this respect
20have already been considered in Chapter II . Similar measures were promoted
by Prince Mahit: for example, for the auction for the 1902/03 - 1904/05
contracts the Minister reorganized the structure of the monopoly, creating
■even separate farms including one large farm covering the central portion of 
21the Kingdom . At the same time renewed efforts were made to regulate the 
supply of raw opium to the syndicates in order to prevent the farmers building 
up large stocks of the drug which they could then release onto the market at 
the end of their contracts in an attempt to damage rival syndicates. Yet it 
was clear that the problems which periodically threatened the stability of the 
opium syndicates could be neither removed nor seriously modified by legisla­
tion: the tax farm system had developed inherent weaknesses which by the
mid-1900s had inevitably led the syndicates to the point of collapse.
At the January 1902 auctions for the 1902/03 - 1904/05 opium monopoly
contracts, control of the major central farm was won by a syndicate led by
22Luang SawBmi Phakdl and PhrayS Thip KbsS . In addition, PhrayS Thip KOsS.
20. See pp. A.o-
21. Prince Mahit to King, 20 November 1901 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/23. The reorganiza­
tion had several specific objectives: for example the central area of the
Kingdom was auctioned as one contract because it had been found that with 
several individual farmers covering the area the Government's total return 
from the monopoly was substantially reduced.
22. Prince Mahit to King, 14 January 1902 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/24.
was also involved with a group which gained control of the Puket farm . In
March 1903 the central farm syndicate took over the Phrae and Nan farms in
2Xfthe north : moreover, in late 1903* at the suggestion of PhrayS Thip KOsS,
Prince Mahit agreed that when the opium farms came up for reauction in 1905
the central farm and the whole of the northern farms would be combined and
25auctioned as one contract . Inevitably as the contract period of the Luang 
SawSmi Phakdl/PhrayS Thip KSsS syndicate drew to a close, the situation sur­
rounding the opium monopoly became increasingly tense. The possible return 
from the proposed central/northern farm was now so huge that fierce rivalry 
between the incumbent syndicate and its rivals for the new contract was 
expected: indeed during its period of tenure the incumbent syndicate had
built up a considerable reserve stock of opium and was clearly prepared to 
use it against its competitors. When, in early 1905* Prince Mahit announced 
that in an attempt to increase the size of the opium revenue to meet the 
expansion in the Government's expenditure - particularly on the army and navy -
the Ministry of Finance would allow an increase in the retail price of opium 
26from 1 April 1905 , an even more aggressive conflict was guaranteed. The
Minister took the precaution of issuing a notification reiterating the 
essential points of the opium legislation governing the auction of the contract 
The auctions for the 1905/06 - 1907/08 contracts were held at the Ministry
28of Finance on 51 January 1905 . The contract for the amalgamated central/
northern farm went to a syndicate led by Luang Sunth?Jn KBsS, Luang Damrong
ThamasSn and Luang MaitrlwSnit: they bid 8.8 m. baht p.a., an increase of
practically 3«2 m. baht p.a. over the combined bid for the central and northern
farms in 1902. Even after allowance has been made for the fact that an
increase in the bid was expected as a result of the raising of the retail
23. PhrayS Thip KOsS to King, 7 May 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33-
24. Prince Mahit to King, 13 March 1903 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/25.
25. Prince Mahit to King, 19 December 1903/2 January 1904 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/25.
26. Prince Mahit to King, 5 January 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/23«
27. ibid.
28. Prince Mahit to King, 2 February 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/24.
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opium price, it was still a staggeringly high bid - a clear indication of 
the fierce rivalry between the syndicates for control of the farm. Luang 
Damrong Thamas&n was also involved with the syndicate that won control of 
the farms in ChumpQn and Nak9n Sritammarat, so that in effect members of one 
syndicate were responsible for the administration of the opium monopoly 
throughout the whole Kingdom with the exception of Puket, Ud9n and the 
north-east. The total bid for all the farms came to 9*67 m» baht p.a. (com­
pared with 5*8 m. baht p.a. in 1902) of which members of the main syndicate 
were responsible for 9*44 m. baht p.a. Inevitably there were doubts in
informed circles as to whether the syndicate, pledged to pay such a high
29rental, could make any profit from the monopoly .
On 2 February 1905 the new central farm syndicate wrote to Prince Mahit
30requesting protection against possible retaliation by the outgoing farmers .
In particular they sought assurances that officials from the Ministry of 
Finance would carry out a thorough inspection of the accounts and opium stock 
of the retiring farmers, and would take steps to ensure that that stock was 
disposed of in the correct legal manner. The Minister replied that as far
31as the law allowed those inspections and supervisions would be carried out •
On 30 March 1905» the penultimate day of the old contract, a letter was pub­
lished in a Bangkok paper, the 'Siam Observer', alluding to a small flaw in
32the opium regulations . The relevant clause in those regulations was 
as follows :
'The outgoing Opium Farmer shall, on the expiration of his term, 
deliver his opium to the official furnished with these regulations.
(If any person whosoever holds any quantity of opium) let him make 
a true statement of the quantity whether belonging to him or held 
in trust by him within 15 days ... '
The quotation above is a translation of the Siamese original. In the 
English translation of the regulation then in use in the British Consular Court,
39- Bangkok Times, 3 February 1905-
30. Syndicate to Prince Mahit, 2 February 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/27*
31* Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, February 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/2?.
32. The letter was signed 'Opium Holder': in fact it originated from the
retiring syndicate.
the section here placed in brackets had been accidentally omitted. The 
Siamese regulation made it clear that every person who held opium at the 
termination of a contract had to declare their holdings to the officials from 
the Ministry of Finance supervising the transfer of the farm. In this way 
an accurate estimate could be made of the value of the opium already in cir­
culation when the new farmer took over the contract and the new farmer would 
be recompensed by the retiring syndicate on the basis of that estimate. The 
effect of the omission in the British Consular Court version, as the letter 
to the 'Siam Observer' pointed out, was to remove from those opium smokers 
who were British subjects any legal obligation to declare their holdings of 
opium. In other words it was possible for the outgoing syndicate to sell 
their stocks of opium to persons enjoying British extraterritorial privileges 
and so flood the market with opium without contravening the law. The assuran­
ces given to the incoming syndicate by Prince Mahit in February 1905 were 
therefore valueless. In late March and early April the Luang SawBmi Phakdl/
PhrayS Thip KBsB syndicate put 600,000 taels of opium into circulation without
33compensating the new farmers : none of the old syndicate's stock was sold
34to the incoming group . The sales of the new syndicate were ruined.
The new opium syndicate contained two main groups - a Bangkok-based 
section, including Luang ThamasBn, Luang SunthIJn KBsS and Luang MaitrlwBnit, 
and a party of Penang farmers led by Chia Choo Yew. The syndicate was financed 
largely from Penang and indeed it was on account of this outside alliance that 
the Bangkok farmers had been in a position to bid so highly for the contract. 
With this disastrous beginning to its term the syndicate began to break up.
On 6 April Chia Choo Yew took over the actual management of the farm from the 
Bangkok farmers, though the farmers retained their interest in the enterprise"^. 
In May the rift became deeper. The Penang group refused to make any more of
33- Strobel to Prince Devawongse, 6 August 1905 F.F.A. 6/3. This was equi­
valent to 50,000 lbs of opium.
34. Case in the British Consular Court: Rex v Serang Ali. May 1905.
Enclosed with: Prince Mahit to King, 29 July 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
35* Bangkok-based farmers to Mqm Anuwongwar.ophan, 6 April 1905,
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
their capital available to the farm on the grounds that the Bangkok partners 
had not yet invested their agreed share in the concern. On the other side the 
Bangkok group was reluctant to put their limited capital in a farm managed 
by Chia Choo Yew36. As the time approached for the syndicate to make its 
second monthly payment to the Ministry of Finance it became increasingly clear 
that unless the farmers overcame their disunity they would be unable to meet 
their obligations to the Government.
On 15 and 16 May a minor member of the syndicate, Phra Phakdl and then
37Chia Choo Yew himself called on Prince Mahit to intervene . The Minister 
replied that he had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the 
syndicate, but that in view of the importance of the opium monopoly to the 
Government's revenue he was willing to call the members of the syndicate to
■7Q
a meeting at the Ministry of Finance . The meeting was held on 17 May under 
the chairmanship of M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl, a senior official of the Ministry 
with a particular responsibility for the opium monopoly3 .^ It was soon clear 
that no compromise between the two factions was possible and that in accor­
dance with the law the contract would have to be reauctioned. However at the 
request of the syndicate the Ministry of Finance agreed to restrict the reauction 
to the incumbent group. At the resale of the monopoly on 20 May control of 
the farm went to a group led by Phra Phakdl which bid 8.64 m. baht p.a., a 
drop of 6.16 m. baht p.a. compared with the bid for the central contract in 
January 1905* Phra Phakdl discarded some of the original Bangkok members of 
the syndicate, replacing them with two new Bangkok farmers: however, the
financial resources of the syndicate still came from the Penang group led by 
Chia Choo Yew. In effect the reauction of the farm merely achieved a small 
realignment of the factions within the original syndicate: the basic division
between the Bangkok and Penang groups remained.
36. Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, 25 May 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
37* Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, 17 May 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
38. King to Prince Mahit, 19 May 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
39- Prince Mahit to Prince Sommot, 25 May 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
Within a matter of weeks the divergent interests of the various factions
in the syndicate were again making themselves felt: in particular the Penang
group expected that their dominant financial interest in the concern would
iOgive them almost unhindered control of the farm . Clearly under those con­
ditions it was impossible for the syndicate to administer the monopoly
41.effectively and over the period April to June 1905 it lost 0.84 m. baht 
In part these losses were due to the fact that the syndicate was under contract 
to pay an extremely high rental on the farm and yet there could be little 
doubt that the basic cause of the syndicate's financial difficulties, and in 
turn its disunity, was that its opium sales had been severely damaged by the 
action of the retiring syndicate the previous April in flooding the market 
with cheap opium.
In late July 1905 the syndicate wrote to Prince Mahit requesting a reduc-
42tion in the rental on the farm • The Minister was unsympathetic. He argued 
that since all the members of the syndicate wer£ experienced fanners they had
been in a good position to judge the financial state of the monopoly before
they bid for it. Furthermore, the Minister suggested, they could not complain 
that the rental was too high for it was to be expected that as the Kingdom 
prospered so tha cost of the opium monopoly rights would increase. Prince 
Mahit argued that the substantial losses of the syndicate were principally a 
reflection of their own poor administrative skills and therefore not a just 
cause for complaint. As regards the crucial point that the syndicate's diffi­
culties really stemmed from the machinations of Luang Saw&mi Phakdl and PhrayS 
Thip KbsS, Prince Mahit, whilst accepting that the incoming syndicate's sales 
had indeed been ruined by the action of the retiring farmer in flooding the 
market with cheap opium, placed the blame on the current syndicate for failing 
to check thoroughly the size of the old farmer's stock. The Minister's argu­
ment showed a real, or feigned, ignorance of the full facts of the situation - 
a genuine, or contrived, unawareness of the Ministry's responsibilities in 
the matter. Finally, Prince Mahit pointed out that if the syndicate failed
40. Prince Mahit to King, 28 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
41. Prince Mahit to King, 29 July 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
42. ibid.
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to pay the full value of the instalments on the farm, then according to the 
law the Ministry of Finance would have no alternative but to reauction the 
monopoly, making the retiring farmers responsible for any losses incurred by 
the Government.
After paying only half the June instalment on the monopoly the syndicate
43could make no payment in July . Immediately the Minister recommended to the 
King that the contract be reauctioned and the date was set for 7 August. By 
this time the strains of the crisis were beginning to have an effect on the 
Minister's health and he urged the King to put Prince Narit in charge of the 
reauction. But Prince Mahit was allowed no respite. In early August the 
Bangkok group of the syndicate approached the Ministry with a new set of 
proposals: they were willing to pay the full contract price for the farm if
44the Ministry would extend their contract for a further year, until March 1909 •
Their hope was that the additional year would give them an opportunity to make 
good their current losses. Prince Mahit was willing to accept these revised 
terms. He acknowledged that by reauctioning the monopoly the Government would 
suffer immediately by a fall in the value of the farm: then, by attempting to
donfiscate the property of the retiring syndicate in order to cover the Govern­
ment's losses the Ministry would become entangled in endless litigation that 
would leave the syndicate bankrupt and the Government still without full com­
pensation. It made more sense simply to extend the contract of the current 
syndicate.
There was one stumbling block - the Penang group refused to support the
43terms proposed by their Bangkok partners , for they were intent on a far 
more advantageous settlement. In the first week of August Chia Choo Yew saw 
Ralph Paget, the British Minister, and informed him that his group were con­
sidering bringing legal action against the Siamese Government for breach of 
46contract • He argued that Siamese law clearly stated that on the transfer
43- Prince Mahit to King, 1 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
44. Prince Mahit to King, 5 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.✓
45* Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl to Hart (Assistant Financial Adviser), August 1905 
F.F.A. 6/3 .
46. Strobel to Prince Devawongse, 6 August 1905 F.F.A. 6/3 .
of the opium farm to a new syndicate, each person holding opium had to declare 
his opium to the incoming farmer, who was then compensated by the retiring 
syndicate for the amount of the drug already in circulation. Because of the 
discrepancy between the British Consular Court version of the law md the 
Siamese original, the Luang SawBmi Phakdl/PhrayS. Thip KSsS syndicate had been 
able to circumvent that stipulation and flood the market with opium without 
compensating their successors. As a result the Siamese Government had failed 
to maintain the monopoly position of the new syndicate - as their contract 
with the syndicate stated they would - and the farmers had been ruined. On
9 August Chia Choo Yew, accompanied by his lawyer, saw Strobel and put forward 
the terms of the Penang group for a renegotiation of the contract - principally
an extension of the syndicate's contract until March 1909 and the offer of a
473.0 m. baht interest free credit from the Government to the farmers . It was
clear that the Penang group were taking up a strong bargaining position.
48That same day Strobel saw Prince Mahit . The General Adviser was adamant
that they would have to avoid legal action at all costs. The Government was
indeed guilty of breach of contract. Moreover there was every likelihood that
legal action would result in the syndicate being awarded very high damages,
based not simply on their actual losses but also on inflated estimates of
future profits. Strobel's advice was that the Ministry attempt to have the
49Penang group bought out by a syndicate of Siamese farmers , and he told the
Minister that in fact it was rumoured that PhrayS Thip KBsS himself was willing
50to do this if the Government would meet half the cost • PhrayS Thip KBsS's 
strategy was becoming clear: after losing control of the farm at the January
1905 auctions he had used a hitherto unnoticed flaw in the British Consular 
Court version of the opium regulations to bring ruin on his successors. He
47* Memorandum. Strobel. 10 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
48. Memorandum. On the Possible Liability of the Siamese Government on a 
Claim presented by British Subjects interested in the Opium Farm. Strobel.
10 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28: F.F.A. 6/3-
49« Memorandum. Strobel. 10 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
50. Prince Mahit to King, 11 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28. Furthermore, on 
5 August 1905 the Bangkok Times reported that the old farmer was willing to re- 
assume control of the opium monopoly if the rental was reduced.
was now moving into position to reclaim the monopoly. Prince Mahit made 
no comment.
The Minister of Finance, already in poor health, was considerably shaken 
by the prospect of the Kingdom facing damaging legal action on account of a 
small flaw in the British Consular Court version of the opium regulations.
On 11 August he reviewed the recent developments in a letter to the King^.
The Minister argued that it was essential that the Government secure the 
withdrawal of the Penang group from the farm. First, were the Ministry to 
agree to a settlement on the terms put by Chia Choo Yew, an unwelcome prece­
dent would be created: if in the future the farmer ran into financial
difficulties the Ministry of Finance would inevitably come under considerable 
pressure to revise yet again the terms upon which he held his contract.
Second, the opinion within the Ministry was that Chia Choo Yew was incapable 
of administering the monopoly effectively: therefore it was inevitable that
in time the incompetence of the Penang management would lead to further 
financial difficulties. In those circumstances the syndicate would repeatedly 
petition the Ministry for still easier terras, supporting their petitions with 
the threat of legal action over the original breach of contract in early 1905•
Through Luang SophbnphStcharaton, a Bangkok member of the syndicate and also
52a business associate of the Minister of Finance himself , Prince Mahit had 
discovered the terms upon which the Penang group were willing to withdraw - 
935*800 baht. He suggested to the King that it would be impossible to find 
any individual farmer willing to meet that cost: even PhrayS Thip K©sS had
offered to take over the interest of the Penang group only if the Government 
covered half the cost of the shares. The alternative was for the Government 
to purchase the Penang shares itself and to appoint an official to represent 
its interest in the syndicate.
There was another consideration. As Prince Mahit argued in his letter 
to the King, the events of the previous six months had again emphasized that
5 1. Prince Mahit to King, 11 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
52. Luang SophOnphetcharaton was closely involved with the establishment of 
the 'Book Club'. See pp. ibo-tbi
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the only way for the Government to ensure the future stability of its opium 
revenue was for it to abolish the farm and to take over for itself the mono­
poly rights to sell opium in the Kingdom. The revenue from the monopoly was 
now so large that few syndicates had the capital resources to bid for the 
contract: indeed, principally because of the malevolent ploys of rival
syndicates it was clear that at that point no group had the resources to 
administer the whole of the opium monopoly alone. Of course one solution 
was to divide the monopoly into a number of smaller individual farms, each 
farm commensurate with the financial resources of the farmers, but as Prince 
Mahit argued, experience had shown that such division inevitably led to a 
considerable drop in the Government’s total revenue from the monopoly^. In 
short the system was on the verge of collapse.
There remained one difficulty - was the Government administration suf­
ficiently effective and efficient to take over the management of the monopoly 
Prince Mahit was confident that the administration - particularly the provincij 
administration - had now progressed to the^ point where the Government could at 
last consider taking over those responsibilities. The Minister's rfiajor fear 
was that the officials had had no direct experience of managing the monopoly, 
but it was this problem which he intended to solve by having the Government 
buy out the Penang group. By allowing the current syndicate to continue 
administering the opium farm for, say, a further four years, but with (Sovern- 
ment officials in place of Chia Choo Yew and his shareholders, the Ministry of 
Finance would have an opportunity to train officials and to prepare equipment 
and buildings for the time when complete control of the monopoly would pass
5Zfto the Government • Prince Mahit's long letter was discussed ahd approved
55by the King, Prince Damrong, Prince Devawongse and PhrayS SuriyS .
56Immediately Prince Mahit saw Luang SophSn . The farmer informed him tha|
53. This was largely a matter of economies of scale: the complex administra­
tive structure of the principal opium syndicates meant that they could operate 
economically only if they controlled a large part of the monopoly.
5*»4 Prince Mahit to King, 11 August 1905 N.A.Kh. l*f. Ik/28.
55- King to Prince Mahit, 12 August 1905 N.A.Kh. Ik. Ik/28.
56. Prince Mahit to King, 13 August 1905 N.A.Kh. Ik. Ik/28.
the Bangkok group were in no position to take an active part in any scheme to 
buy out their Penang partners: indeed each member of the group was so short
of capital that they were using the funds invested in their other business 
concerns to pay off their debts in connection with the opium farm. Neither • 
did any of them wish to become involved with PhrayS Thip KSsS. It was clear 
that all the capital required to buy out Chia Choo Yew and his colleagues 
would have to come from the Government. Prince Mahit proposed that the actual 
purchase of the Penang shares be carried out by Luang SophSn - with the 
Government's funds - and that some of the shares would be set aside for members 
of the Bangkok group. The remaining shares would be held in the names of the
v/officials appointed to the farm by the Ministry, principally Mqm Chao Plya 
Phakdl, who, Prince Mahit suggested, would administer the monopoly when the 
Government finally took it over completely.
On 15 August Strobel saw Paget and Chia Choo Yew's lawyer and informed 
them that the Government was willing to buy out the Penang shareholders for
cn752,800 baht - the sum they had actually invested in the farm . The following 
day Chia Choo Yew accepted these terms and in fceturn agreed to drop all claims
efl
for breach of contract . The Penang shareholders were paid immediately by
Luang SophBn who was then reimbursed by the Government: in effect the Govern-
59ment bought off the Penang farmers . But Chia Choo Yew was not to be denied 
his litigation: he sued Luagg SophSn and the remainder of the Bangkok partners
on the grounds that his three-year contract as manager of the opium farm had 
been prematurely terminated^. He won^.
But the withdrawal of the Penang group - though saving the immediate 
situation - still left the Ministry of Finance with some very considerable 
problems. By taking over the interests of the Penang farmers, the Ministry
57• Strobel to Prince Mahit, 15 August 1905 F.F.A. 6/3 .
58. Strobel to Prince Mahit, 16 August 1905 N.A.Kh. l*f. Ik/28.
59- Williamson to PhrayS SuriyS, 21 March 1907 F.F.A. 6/9.
60. Bangkok Times, 23 August 1905.
61. Banfckok Times 6 December 1905.
discovered that it had committed itself to spending almost 3»5 baht on the
62monopoly within the first three months alone . In addition there was little
prospect of the farm making a profit for at least several months. Furthermore,
the Ministry found it difficult to place much confidence in its partners: for
example Phra Phakdl was reputed to be bankrupt and Luang SophBn was engaged
in attempts to administer the northern farm as a separate, profitable concern
for himself. In fact the Bangkok farmers were understandably eager to retire.
At the end of August 1905 Luang Sunth^n KBsS and Phra Phakdl petitioned the
King for permission to leave the syndicate on the grounds that they were
financially ruined63. They argued that as the Penang shareholders - British
subjects - had been allowed to withdraw from the enterprise without financial
loss, it was unjust to expect them - Siamese subjects - to remain and bear the
whole cost of the syndicate’s failure. The King instructed Prince Mahit to
64treat their case sympathetically .
In the circumstances the Government's obvious course of action would have
been to assume complete responsibility for the administration of the opium
monopoly immediately, instead of waiting the three or four years originally
envisaged by Prince Mahit in his letter to the King on 11 August. There were
two arguments against that. First, as Prince Mahit had recognized in that
earlier letter, the Ministry of Finance required that period of three years
to prepare and train its officials and to organize the necessary buildings 
65and machinery . Second, since the Ministry was now reluctant to administer 
the monopoly for three years in partnership with the Bangkok farmers because
of the large sum of money it would have to invest in the farm, then it was
unlikely that the Government would consider accepting sole responsibility for 
the monopoly immediately. In short, a new syndicate had to be found to farm
the monopoly for at least three years - until the Government was prepared to
62. Prince Mahit to King, 28 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
63* Luang Sunth^n KBsS. to King, 2? August 1905/Phra Phakdl to King, 28 August
1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/31.
64. King to Prince Mahit, 30 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/31.
65. Prince Mahit to King, 28 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
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take it over. PhrayS Thip K3sS could now step forward: he had successfully
taken his revenge on those farmers who had defeated him at the January 1905 
auction.
In late August 1905 Prince Mahit, acting on his own initiative, invited 
PhrayS Thip ICosS to discuss the conditions upon which he would consider taking 
over the monopoly*^. After considerable bargaining, the terms were settled.
The rental would be 8.8 m. baht p.a., the sum bid by the original April 1905 
syndicate, and the contract would run for five years (April 1905 to March 1910) 
instead of the usual three. The Ministry would allow PhrayS Thip KSsS a credit 
of up to 2.0 m. baht to be used for the payment of the monthly rental on the 
farm, the Credit to be repaid in the final two years of the contract. PhrayS 
Thip KCsS was to be responsible for the Government's losses incurred in con­
nection with the previous syndicate - 1 .2  m. baht. This sum was to include 
the 752,800 baht paid to Luang SophOn in connection with the withdrawal of the
Penang farmers. Filially the Ministry insisted that the farm be administered
67solely by Siamese subjects .
In a letter to the King on 28 August, Prince Mahit defended his action
in privately inviting PhrayS Thip KOsS to take over the opium monopoly - rather
than publicly reauctioning the farm in accordance with the law - on the grounds
that, first, only PhrayS Thip KSsS had the capital resources to make a serious
bid for the contract, second, that 6ince the Government was losing 24,400 baht
a day in lost opium revenue the new syndicate had to be appointed quickly, and
finally, the private approach to PhrayS Thip KSsS allowed the Ministry to make
a complex agreement with the new syndicate that gave Luang Sunth^n and Phra
68Phakdl the opportunity to withdraw without losing too much money . However, 
the signing of the agreement was a considerable risk for both the Ministry of 
Finance and PhrayS Thip KOsS and his partners. On the syndicate's side there 
were two major dangers: first they had agreed to administer the monopoly on
66. Williamson to PhrayS SuriyS, 21 March 1907 F.F.A. 6/9. PhrayS Thip KSsS's 
partners in this group were drawn from the pre-April 1905 syndicate, including 
Luang SawSrai Phakdl and Phra Phiban.
67. Prince Mahit to King, 28 August 1905 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/28.
68. ibid.
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quite severe terms - in particular, at a very high rental - and second, there 
was no guarantee that the same combination of circumstances that had ruined 
the preceding syndicates would not also act against PhrayS Thip KBsS. On the 
other hand, in view of the fact that Prince Mahit had agreed to the withdrawal 
of the Penang farmers on easy terms and had approached PhrayS Thip KBsS to 
ask him to consider taking over the farm, the new opium syndicate was reasonably
c o n fid e n t  o f  th e  a s s i s t a n c e  and in d e e d  g e n e r o s i t y  o f  th e  M i n i s t e r  o f  F in a n c e
69if they were ever to run into financial difficulties . As far as the Govern­
ment was concerned the risk was whether PhrayS Thip KBsS could efficiently 
and profitably administer the opium monopoly long enough for the Ministry of
Finance to prepare itself for the eventual take-over of the farm by the
Government70.
The agreement failed. Almost from the first the PhrayS Thip KBsS syndi­
cate lost money. First, the opium farm was by now so huge that the farmers 
were forced to sub-let many provincial areas to local Chinese concessionaires - 
the ylkongsl - with the usual condition that if the ylkongsl failed to sell
a stipulated quantity of opium over a specific period they would be heavily 
71fined • But the ylkongsl soon found it more profitable to become outlets
72
f o r  i l l e g a l  opium and th e s a l e s  o f  th e  Bangkok s y n d ic a t e  i n e v i t a b l y  s u f f e r e d  •
69. P h ra y S  T h ip  KBsS to K in g , 7 May 1908 N .A .K h . 14. Ik/33.
70. This is a suitable point to draw attention to the fact that despite the
major crises in the opium monopoly in 1905» paradoxically the opium revenue 
for 1905/06, at 10.26 m. baht was considerably higher than it had been in any 
previous year. This apparent discrepancy can be explained by several factors. 
First, the Ministry of Finance did not allow any of the syndicates to fall 
seriously into arrears: though the syndicates may have been perpetually on
the verge of collapse, the revenue was protected by the reauction of the farm. 
Second, at the January 1905 auction of the opium farm, the successful bid was 
far in excess of any previous bid for the monopoly: therefore, though the
actual payments of the syndicates may have fallen below the amount they had 
bid, the Government's revenue still increased. However, from the Ministry
of Finance's point of view the more important figure was that for the bids, 
for it was that which was used in compiling the budget estimates: were the
rental actually received to fall a long way below the bid the Government could 
have been faced with a serious unplanned budget deficit. Lastly, it hardly 
requires emphasizing that though the revenue from the farms may have been 
increasing the Government was more concerned that the instability of the syndi­
cates was constantly threatening its principal sources of revenue.
71. Report on a meeting at the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 24 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39- In order to avoid confusion with the main Bangkok syndicate 
the Thdi word for these local farmers will be used - ylkongsl.
72. For an analysis of this development see p. H'i
Second, in late 1905 PhrayS Thip KbsS saw his own ruse employed against him
when Phra Phakdl and Luang Sunthijn, seeking revenge, put their remaining stock
73of opium onto the market . Third, the syndicate's sales were further damaged
by an increase in the trade in smuggled opium, much of it being conducted 
74through Chantabun . Finally, the farmers' business suffered as a result
of the closure of the remaining provincial gambling dens between 1905 and 
751907 , for the two vices tended to go hand in hand. It was clearly impossible
for PhrayS Thip KbsS to meet the very high instalment payments on the farm in
such adverse circumstances.
In October 1906, barely one year after taking possession of the farm,
the new syndicate informed the King that they were in financial difficulties
76and asked for a revision of the terms of their contract • The King forwarded
the petition to the new Minister of Finance, PhrayS SuriyS, and instructed
77him to deal very carefully with this latest crisis in the opium monopoly .
The Ministry of Finance made no immediate response so on 20 December 1906 the
78syndicate again petitioned the King . They proposed either that the Govern­
ment agree to a reduction in the rental to 7-2 m. baht p.a. or they would
retire from the farm. PhrayS SuriyS would not agree to a reduction in the 
79rental . Even with lower payments there was no guarantee that the syndicate 
would not continue to fall into arrears. Moreover, PhrayS Thip KbsS had no 
additional security to offer the Ministry and was in effect asking to be 
allowed to continue with the monopoly on the basis of good faith alone. Given
73- Report on a meeting at the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 23 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39-
74. Petition from PhrayS Thip KbsS syndicate to King, 20 December 1906 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33.
751 Petition from PhrayS Thip KbsS syndicate to King, 8 October 1906 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33.
76. ibid.
77. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 10 October 1906 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33.
78. Petition from PhrayS Thip KbsS syndicate to King, 20 December 1906 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33*
79- PhrayS SuriyS to King, 31 December 1906 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35.
the importance of the opium revenue and the notoriously precarious financial 
state of the syndicate, the Ministry demanded something more tangible than 
that. PhrayS SuriyS reported to the King that he had made discreet enquiries 
among the remaining tax farmers and learnt that on reauction the opium contract 
could fetch as little as 6.5 m. baht p.a., compared with the 8.8 m. baht p.a. 
which PhrayS Thip KSsS had agreed to pay in August 1905* The fact was that 
as a result of the debilitating crises of the previous 18 months no syndicate 
was in a position to take up the contract on terms acceptable to the Government. 
It was therefore out of the question to reauction the farm: in any case in 
the current state of the monopoly there was every likelihood that a new syndi­
cate would itself collapse within a matter of months. In short the point had 
been reached where the Ministry had no alternative but to abolish the farm.
In late December 1906 PhrayS SuriyS and Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl produced a
80set of proposals for Government administration of the farm . The essential 
point of their scheme was that in future all opium dens would receive their 
supplies of prepared opium solely from a Government-administered Opium Factory. 
The dens in Bangkok City would collect their opium directly from the Factory, 
those in Bangkok Province would be supplied by officials, whilst those in the
remainder of the Kingdom would be supplied either by officials or more frequent-
✓ly by local Chinese concessionaires. PhrayS SuriyS and M9m Chao Plya Phakdl
proposed that responsibility for suppressing opium smuggling be divided between
the Customs Department, which would cover the Bangkok area, and the Ministry
of the Interior which would be responsible for the remainder of the Kingdom.
However, these proposals were as yet incomplete - more a basis for further
discussion them a scheme capable of immediate implementation.
PhrayS SuriyS outlined his ideas to the Council of Ministers on 51
December 1906, but since Prince Damrong was absent in the north-east on an
inspection tour, nothing could be settled on a matter which was certain to
8linvolve the Ministry of the Interior . However, Prince Damrong was informed 
by telegraph of PhrayS SuriyS's proposals and immediately replied that he
80• ibid.
8l. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 31 December 1906 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/32.
supported the abolition of the opium farm . Therefore on 10 January 1907 
the Council of Ministers approved just the basic proposal put by PhrayS 
SuriyS - that in future the opium monopoly would be administered by the
O 7
Government . Two days later, the King writing from Ayudhya instructed
PhrayS SuriyS to discuss the matter with the other Ministries concerned and
produce a more detailed scheme showing, for example, the responsibilities
of the Ministry of the Interior under the new administration and how the
84Ministry of Finance proposed to deal with the arrears of the farmers .
However, it soon became apparent that the Minister of Finance intended 
to implement his proposals with the least possible delay. In replying to the
King on 16 January, PhrayS SuriyS pointed out that alaost 6.4 m. baht was
85still owing to the Government from the operations of the opium monopoly .
Unless the Government acted quickly and made an example of PhrayS Thip KbsS
other syndicates would be encouraged to be lax in their payments: with another
budget deficit in prospect for 1907/08 the Ministry could not allow these
arrears to build up. PhrayS SuriyS was not too concerned to settle the details
of the Government administration before the farm was abolished, arguing that
it would be sufficient to allow the pattern of administration to evolve after
responsibility for the operation of the opium monopoly had passed to the
86Government. The King's reply was immediate and forceful . Once again he 
insisted that before the opium farm could be abolished, regulations covering 
all the operations of the monopoly under Government administration had to be 
drawn up and issued to all relevant departments: the responsibilities of each
Ministry in the administration of the opium monopoly had first to be clearly 
defined. The King was adamant: the Minister should explain his proposals
83. PhrayS SI SahathSp to King, 3 January 190? N.A.Kh. 14. lk/35«
83. Memorandum. Crown Prince. 10 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35. It appears 
that the King was at the Bang-pa-in Palace and therefore that the Crown Prince 
was given the opportunity to chair this meeting of the Council of Ministers.
84. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 12 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/35»
85. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 16 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35.
86. King to PhrayS SmriyS, 18 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35.
fully to Prince Damrong (who had still not returned to Bangkok) and Prince
Naret. He concluded with a piece of advice :
' ... your urgent calls for action bring no benefit at all. You 
must use the recognized procedures of the administration - they 
will yield quicker results.* 87
It was against that background that on 19 January 1907 Mqm Chao Piya
Phakdl and M9ra Udom, accompanied by a large contingent of officials and police,
went to the Bangkok offices of the opium syndicate and took possession of the
88monopoly on behalf of the Government . The preparation of opium was tempora­
rily halted but sales were continued by clerks from the Ministry of Finance. 
PhrayS Thip KBsS and his colleagues, Luang SawSmi Phakdl and Phra Phi Win, were
instructed to transfer all their property and possessions to M9m Chao Piya
89Phakdl and M9* Udom . It was officially reported that the farm had been taken
90over by the Government at the request of the syndicate . That same day
PhrayS SuriyS telegraphed to almost every provincial governor instructing them
to confiscate all the opium, cash and property in their area which belonged to
the syndicate, and to make arrangements for the continued distribution of 
91opium to the dens • Then PhrayS SuriyS informed the Ministry of the Interior
of the measures he had taken and asked PhrayS Si SahathSp to despatch further
92instructions to the provinces in support of his original telegrams .
Not surprisingly PhrayS SI SahathSp was taken aback by this unilateral 
action on the part of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of the Interior 
had had no opportunity to consider the instructions outlined in PhrayS SuriyS's
87. ibid.
88. Bangkok Times, 21 January 1907* It should be noted that the Government 
took possession only of that part of the monopoly administered by the PhrayS 
Thip KBsS syndicate. The remaining farms in Puket, Udon and the north-east 
continued in operation.
89. Petition from PhrayS Thip KBsS syndicate to Kin£, 6 February 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33-
90. Bangkok Times, 21 January 1907* And so in a sense it had for in their 
October and December 1906 petitions to the King, the syndicate had stated their 
desire to abandon the farm if the Government would not renegotiate their contract
91. PhrayS SI SahathSp tp Prince Sommot, 20 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35.
92. PhrayS SuriyS to PhrayS SI SahathSp, 19 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35.
telegrams to the provincial governors before they were sent . Moreover it
had been understood by PhrayS SI SahathSp that the Council of Ministers would
make no final decisions with regard to the Government's administration of the
monopoly until Prince Damrong had had a chance to present his views on the 
94issue . The Deputy Minister was also concerned by the vagueness of PhrayS 
SuriyS1s instructions - were the provincial governors to confiscate just the 
opium and property of the syndicatest or were the instructions to apply to 
every individually owned opium den as well: was machinery and equipment to be
seized: could property belonging to foreign nationals be confiscated: were
the provincial authorities to be responsible for the sale of opium in the
95future ? The number and importance of each of these queries bore out the 
justice of the King's earlier warning to the Minister of Finance. Therefore
PhrayS Suriya was forced to send a further set of telegrams to the provincial
96governors, clearing up the earlier ambiguities . It was explained that all 
supplies of prepared opium were in future to come from the Government- 
administered Opium Factory in Bangkok and the governors were instructed to 
reach temporary agreements with their local ylkongsl for the distribution of 
that opium to the dens in their area, making the best terras and conditions 
they thought possible. In time officials from the Ministry of Finance would 
visit their area and explain the new methods to be employed under the Govern­
ment administration of the monopoly. Only after Phraya Suriya's second telegram
had been sent did Phraya SI SahathSp send his instructions to the provinces in
97support of the requests of the Ministry of Finance .
There is no evidence that the King gave his approval for the seizure of 
the opium farm on 19 January 1907: indeed, in view of his instructions to
Phraya Suriya the previous day it is unlikely that he in fact did so. It would
93* Phraya SI SahathSp to Prince Sommot, 20 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35*
94. King to Phraya SI SahathSp, 1 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14-lk/35*
95- Phraya SI SahathSp to PhrayS SuriyS, 19 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/35«
96. PhrayS SuriyS to PhrayS SI SahathSp, 20 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/35»
97• PhrayS SI SahathSp to Prince Sommot, 20 January 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35.
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seem that PhrayS SuriyS ordered the abolition of the opium farm at that point
98solely on his own initiative . It is difficult to explain the Minister's 
action. The King and the Council of Ministers, including Prince Damrong, had 
agreed that the opium farm should be abolished, and the King had merely 
insisted that adequate preparations be made before that measure was implemented. 
It is possible that PhrayS ^riyS wished to avoid detailed discussions of his 
proposals with Prince Damrong for fear that the Ministry of the Interior would 
demand overall responsibility for the administration of the opium monopoly 
outside Bangkok. This was certainly to be a major point of dispute in the 
coming year but could hardly have been important in January 190?, for PhrayS 
SuriyS placed immediate responsibility for the opium monopoly in the provinces 
in the hands of officials from the Ministry of the Interior, though admittedly 
this was only a temporary arrangement until the Ministry of Finance was pre­
pared to introduce new methods of administration. And then there was Phraya
SuriyS's argument that the financial disorganization of the PhrayS Thip KSsS
99syndicate demanded rapid action from the Grovernment : but the matter was not
so urgent that the Minister fould not have found time to discuss his instruc­
tions to the provincial governors with PhrayS SI SahathSp before the telegrams 
were actually sent, and could not have waited for Prince Damrong's return to 
Bangkok. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the incident provides yet 
another example of PhrayS SuriyS's tendency to act hastily when confronted with 
a major problem. However, the Minister's unwillingness to follow the instruc­
tions of the King in January 1907 was not a temporary aberration: within a
year he was to do virtually the same again.
qo It must be admitted that this conclusion is disturbed by one point. If 
PhrayS SuriyS acted in the manner described, he was guilty of ignoring the 
King's clear instructions - a serious offence. Yet there is no record of the 
King having censured the Minister. There are several possible explanations 
for this lack of supporting evidence. First that the King reproved his Minister 
verbally. Second that the King accepted the 'fait accompli'. Alternatively 
it is possible that the King did give his permission for the seizure of the 
farm on that day, but that it was given by word of mouth. But there is one 
further important consideration: writing to the King on his resignation (15
February 1 9 0 8  N.A.Kh. 3 / 2 )  PhrayS SuriyS virtually admitted that he had been 
in a great hurry to seize the farm and that therefore the Ministry had acted 
without adequate preparation.
99. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 16 January I907 N.A.Kh. l^ f. Ik/35.
3. Government administration of the opium monopoly, 1907 - 1910«
From January 1907 responsibility for the administration of the opium mono­
poly was vested in an Opium Department. The Department was ultimately under tue 
control of the Minister of Finance, though day-to-day administration was carried 
out by Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl, assisted by Mqm Udom and Mqm Anuwongse100. One of 
the first duties of the Department was to attempt to extract from the Phraya
Thip KBsS syndicate the 6.4 m. baht that it reportedly owed the Government. It
was an impossible task: when the farm had been seized on 19 January the farmers
had transferred all their possessions to the Ministry of Finance - they were 
bankrupt. Moreover, the fact that the syndicate had collapsed before the ter­
mination of their contract meant that many of the clauses of the August 1905 
agreement were thrown into dispute: what value was to be placed on the equip­
ment and opium seized by the Government in January 1907: what was the exact
status of the 2.0 m. baht credit advanced to the syndicate in August 1905101 ?
The arguments dragged on until May 1912 when a Royal Commission on Revenue and
102Expenditure considered the matter . At that point PhrayS Thip KBsS was said
to owe the Government 4.19 m. baht but after Williamson and Mqih Chao Phr?Jm had
103asked for clemency this was reduced to 0.35 m. baht .
The first six months of Government administration saw very few changes 
in the actual methods used to operate the monopoly. The processes for pre­
paring the opium, the system of accounts and checks - for example, the
practice of fining ylkongsl which failed to sell their agreed quota of opium -
104were essentially the same as those employed by the opium farmers . In the
100. Bangkok Times, 25 January 1908.
101. Petition from PhrayS Thip KBsS syndicate to King, 6 February 1907
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/33-
102. Report from Royal Commission on Revenue and Expenditure. May 1912 
F.F.A. 6/9.
103. Indeed W. A. Graham and PhrayS Ratsada urged that the debt be cancelled 
altogether on the grounds that the contract signed by PhrayS Thip KBsS and 
Prince Mahit in August 1905 represented a calculated attempt by the Ministry 
of Finance to maintain the farm just long enough for the Government to prepare 
itself for the administration of the monopoly. It was therefore unfair that
the whole cost of the failure of that attempt be borne solely by the syndicate.
By 1912 all the members of the syndicate were dead.
104. Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl/Mqm Udom to PhrayS SuriyS, 18 March 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/35-
circumstances this was inevitable for the Ministry had been largely unprepared
105for the decision to abolish the farm . In January 1907 there had been little
choice but to instruct the provincial governors to make the best arrangements
they could to maintain opium sales. Yet as far as the availability of
officials and funds allowed, some experiments were attempted. For example,
in Ayudhya, Nak<?n Sawan and Ratburi the distribution of opium to some dens
was administered by provincial officials from the Ministry of Finance, and
in the north the same responsibilities were entrusted to officials from the
Ministry of the Interior^0 .^
PhrayS SuriyS and Mpm Chao Piya Phakdl were agreed that this period of
relatively lax administration of the opium monopoly by the Ministry of Finance
would last only so long as it took the Ministry to prepare itself for the
reform of the monopoly. But they were in strong disagreement over the nature
and extent of the reforms to be introduced once this initial period had
passed: in particular there was a considerable dispute with regard to the
methods to be employed in distributing the opium to the dens in the provinces.
The dispute was a complex one, with both PhrayS SuriyS and M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl
occasionally slightly shifting their ground, but the central point at issue
was relatively clear. On the one side Phraya SuriyS was determined to see
the ylkongsl removed from the operations of the monopoly. It was his intention
that in October 1907 the temporary contracts made with the ytkongsl for the
distribution of opium to the provincial dens would be terminated and that from
that date Government officials would be directly responsible for the distri-
107bution of prepared opium to all the dens in the Kingdom . The Minister took
this strong line because he believed that the trade in illegal opium was
financed principally by the Chinese community in Siam, opium being smuggled
into the Kingdom by Chinese trading companies and then distributed to the dens
105. The Opium Department was unprepared to the extent that it did not fix 
salary rates for its officials until June 1907* No salaries were paid until 
then, though the arrears were later made up. M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl/tt^m Udom 
to PhrayS SuriyS, 25 October 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
106. Report on a meeting at the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 23 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
107. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 25 November 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
by the ylkongsl along with their supplies of legal opium. In other words
if the Government were to take effective measures against opium smuggling -
and the profitability of the monopoly depended to a considerable extent upon
the success of such measures - the Chinese had to be removed from every level
of the opium monopoly's operations and be replaced by salaried Siamese officials.
In late September 1907 PhrayS SuriyS informed the governor of Ratburi Province
that from 1 October the contracts of the ylkongsl in his area were to be
terminated and in future the sale of opium to the dens would be handled by 
10Sofficials . Officials were also to undertake the inspection of dens and the
registration of addicts. Copies of these instructions were sent to every
. i 109provincial governor .
VMpm Chao Flya Phakdl and Mpm Udom acknowledged that the first six months 
of Government administration had indeed shown that the continued employment 
of the ylkongsl was tending to harm the opium revenue, and they accepted that 
eventually the Chinese would have to be replaced by officials'*’*1'^ . But they 
were convinced that at that point the Ministry of Finance simply did not 
have sufficient numbers of trained officials to enable it to disenfranchise 
the ylkongsl immediately. Indeed they argued that in his haste to introduce 
his new methods in Ratburi Province PhrayS SuriyS had caused a 50 per cent
vdrop in the Province's opium sales. Mgrn Chao Plya Phakdl and Mpm Udom tenta­
tively suggested that Government officials could take over the distribution 
of opium at the provincial level during 1908/09, but that the distribution 
at the district level would remain in the hands of concessionaires for some 
time after that.
v'However, it soon became clear to M9111 Chao Plya Phakdl and Mpm Udom that 
they were having little influence on the Minister's thinking: as a result,
from mid-1907 they simply ignored his instructions. A long list of ministerial 
orders - most of them concerning the opium administration in Ratburi Province -
108. PhrayS SuriyS to PhwtyS PrasitsongkhrSra, 26 September 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
109. Phraya SuriyS to King, 10 December 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/39«
110. M9111 Chao Plya Phakdl/M^m Udom to PhrayS SuriyS, 25 October 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
were not implemented^^. For a time it was difficult for PhrayS SuriyS to
take any action against his subordinates since the King was in Europe, but
when the King returned to Siam in November 1907 the Minister of Finance asked
for permission to remove the two officials from their posts and to appoint
himself as Director of the Opium Department. The King, perhaps remembering
the way in which PhrayS SuriyS had engineered the seizure of the opium farm
the previous January, refused to be rushed into a decision: he asked for more
information on the experiments in Ratburi, Ayudhya and Nakqn Sawan which invol-
112ved the use of officials to distribute opium to the dens . In his reply to
the King, PhrayS SuriyS described the objectives behind his policy and the
operations in Ratburi, Ayudhya and Nakqn Sawan in great detail, but be failed
to provide the accounts and figures of the monopoly's operations that the
King had specifically requested and from which he could make an independent
113assessment of the Minister's policy .
In the latter half of December 1907 a series of six meetings was held at
the residence of PhrayS SuriyS to consider the recent history of the opium
monopoly, to determine the methods to be employed in administering the monopoly
in the future, and to draw up the necessary legislation governing the operations 
114of the monopoly . The meetings were initiated and organized by PhrayS 
SuriyS and were attended only by officials from the Ministry of Finance. 
Inevitably the discussions brought the dispute between PhrayS SuriyS and his 
senior officials in the Opium Department to a head.
PhrayS SuriyS's arguments were mainly theoretical. He had read widely 
and studied in detail the methods by which opium was sold in neighbouring 
countries: he quoted extensively from international opium reports which 
argued that on grounds of morality and efficiency, responsibility for the 
administration of opium sales should not be contracted out to private
111. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 25 November 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/39»
112. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 27 November 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
113 • PhrayS SuriyS to King, 10 December 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
114. Reports on meetings at the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 16, 23, 24, 26, 28,
30 December 1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
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individuals. In contrast, M9111 Chao Plya Phakdl was essentially pragmatic; 
he saw the problem as one of the availability of resources (principally of 
honest and capable officials) in relation to requirements, and he emphasized 
that there was virtually no difference between administering the opium mono­
poly through corrupt ylkongsl and having it inadequately administered by 
dishonest officials. And again, PhrayS SuriyS, quoting the experience of 
French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, argued that the responsibilities 
for selling opium and for searching out illicit opium had to be entrusted to 
two separate groups of officials: provincial officials from the Ministry of
Finance would distribute the opium to the dens and collect the opium revenue, 
whilst policing duties would fall to the Ministry of the Interior. M9111 Chao 
Plya Phakdl replied that since each branch of the administration was still 
relatively weak compared with the European administrations in Asia, to divide 
responsibility for the operation of such a large enterprise as that of the 
opium monopoly would cause major problems of co-ordination and would undoubtedly 
impair the Government's control11'*.
With each succeeding meeting the gap between PhrayS SuriyS and M9111 Chao 
Plya Phakdl widened. On the Minister's side apprehension with regard to the 
consequences of continued Chinese involvement in the operations of the mono­
poly became increasingly fanatical, and at one point he declared a determination 
to remove the Chinese even from the management of the individual opium dens11 *^. 
On the other side the Director, whilst admitting that PhrayS SuriyS's proposals 
were probably the only long-term solution to the problems of the monopoly,
insisted again and again that practical considerations ruled out their
117immediate implementation . Any chance there may have been for compromise
between these two views was lost as both men began to see the dispute increa-
11o
singly in personal terras: it became a matter of honour and face . However,
115- Report on a meeting at the house of Phraya SuriyS, 16 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
116. Report on a meeting at the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 24 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39*
117. Report on a meeting at the house of PhrayS Suriya, 26 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
118. This observation was made in an unsigned letter to the King, 23 December 
1907 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39-
in the short term Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl was in the minority: on 26 December
119the meeting agteed with the proposals of the Minister
The remaining two meetings of the series were devoted solely to the
preparation of regulations to govern the future administration of theopium 
120monopoly . On 1 January 1908 PhrayS SuriyS sent the regulations and reports
of the meetings at his residence to the King with the request that the regu-
121lations be sanctioned . He gave an assurance that there were sufficient
officials available to make the introduction of his proposals feasible.
Finally the Minister again stated his intention to remove Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl
from his post as Director of the Opium Department.
The King was extremely annoyed. 'I am just astonished 1 You have
122totally misunderstood what I wanted.* The King explained to his Minister
in the most elementary manner the procedure by which he expected Government
policy and legislation to he formulated, a procedure based on discussion at
every level of the administration, beginning from within the individual
Ministry and proceeding up to the Council of Ministers under the chairmanship
of the King. PhrayS SuriyS had ignored this: the Ministries of the Interior
and the Capital had not been consulted and the Council off Ministers had had
no opportunity to discuss the principles behind the policy being pursued by
the Ministry of Finance. As a result, in the King's view the opium regulations
produced by the Ministry were riddled with imperfections and ambiguities.
PhrayS SuriyS was instructed to abandon these regulations and to present a
set of general proposals for the administration of the opium monopoly to the
Council of Ministers. The King concluded :
' ... it is almost the end of the year and we are still wasting 
time. The whole exercise was a complete waste. Make your 
proposals quickly 1' 123
119. Report on a meeting at the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 26 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. Ht. Ik/39.
120. Report on a meeting st the house of PhrayS SuriyS, 28/30 December 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39-
121. PhrayS SuriyS to King, 1 January 1908 N.A.Kh. lit. Ik/39.
132. King to PhrayS SuriyS, 1 January 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
12 3. ibid.
The Minister tried to defend himself arguing that the discussions held
at his residence in December 190? represented merely the first stage in the
formulation of the Government’s policy, and he pointed out that the reports
124on those discussions had been sent to Prince Damrong . At the same time
the Minister was forced to admit that the draft regulations had not been
sent to the Ministry of the Interior because, he explained, he feared that
the preparation of that legislation was already taking up too much time.
These were hardly satisfactory explanations and it was difficult to avoid
the conclusion that, despite strong denials to the contrary from PhrayS
SuriyS, his intention had been to avoid any discussion of his proposals with
the other Ministries.
On 3 January 1908 the correspondence between the King and PhrayS SuriyS
and the reports of M911 Chao Piya Rhakdl and M9m Udom on the administration of
the opium monopoly since January 190? were presented to the Council of 
125Ministers . The meeting was dominated by the King. First he drew attention
✓to the conflict of opinion between PhrayS SuriyS and Mpm Chao Piya Phakdl 
over the employment of Chinese ylkongsl in the future administration of the 
opium monopoly. Second, the King argued that despite the instructions given 
to him in November 1907 PhrayS SuriyS had still failed to provide any figures 
showing the results of the experiments in Ratburi, Ayudhya and Nak9n Sawan 
involving the sale of opium to the dens by officials. There was therefore 
very little impartial evidence upon which the Council could decide between the 
rival arguments of PhrayS SuriyS and the Director of the Opium Department, 
and upon which they could approve or amend the Minister's draft regulations.
So PhrayS SuriyS was instructed by the King to reopen his discussions with 
M9m Chao Piya Phakdl on the methods to be employed in the future administration 
of the opium monopoly: on this occasion the Ministers of the Interior and
the Capital were to be allowed to contribute to the formulation of Government 
policy. In order to simplify PhrayS SuriyS's task as much as possible the 
Council even went to the length of drawing up a series of questions for him
124. PhrayS SuriyS to King, January 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
123* Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 3 January 1908N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/32.
to consider - how were the ylkongsl to be disbanded: what measures were to
be taken against opium smuggling: and perhaps most important of all, what
would be the responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior under the new 
opium monopoly administration ?
This meeting of the Council of Ministers must have been a humiliating 
experience for PhrayS SuriyS. The considerable amount of time and effort 
which he had devoted to the affairs of the opium monopoly over the previous
few months had been simply swept aside and he had been instructed to begin
✓again from first principles: moreover, he now had to consult with M9B Chao
Plya Phakdl, his subordinate and main critic. That meeting was the effective
end of PhrayS SuriyS as Minister of Finance, though in fact he was to remain
in office - under increasing attack - for a further six weeks.
On 9 January the Council of Ministers were discussing a report by the
Crown Prince on a visit he had made to Nak9n Sawan when PhrayS SuriyS took
the opportunity to emphasize that in the past the opium administration in that
Province had suffered because the distribution of opium to the dens had been
126contracted out to an extremely corrupt ylkongsl . The comment brought to
the surface a latent dispute between PhrayS SuriyS and Prince Damrong over
the functions and responsibilities of the Ministry of the Interior in the
future administration of the opium monopoly outside Bangkok. It was a dispute
which was fired partly by PhrayS SuriyS1s earlier poorly disguised endeavours
to exclude Prince Damrong from the formulation of the Government’s opium
administration policy, and partly by a parallel conflict - that concerning
PhrayS SuriyS's attempts to impose detailed investigations by the Ministry
127of Finance on the work of the Provincial Revenue Department . In this 
particular case Ph*ayS SuriyS's view was that the Ministry of Finance needed 
the assistance of the Ministry of the Interior to operate the monopoly in the 
provinces - particularly to suppress opium smuggling - even though overall 
responsibility for the administration of the monopoly would be entrusted to
126. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 9 January 1908 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/32.
127. See Chapter V pp. ns-- igs-
the Ministry of Finance . To Prince Damrong this proposal implied that the 
Ministry of Finance would simply use his officials for work for which it 
lacked sufficient resources. The Ministry of the Interior would carry res­
ponsibility for the administration of the monopoly in the provinces but would
129have none of the executive power. Prince Damrong could not accept that 
Phraya SuriyS found no support in the Council of Ministers. At one point it 
was argued that since the Ministry of the Interior already had sufficient 
officials in the provinces, it would be preferable to give the Ministry 
almost complete responsibility for the opium monopoly outside Bangkok rather 
than sanction the appointment of yet more civil servants to the Ministry of 
Finance. At the end of the meeting the King gave PhrayS SuriyS a simple 
choice: either give the Ministry of the Interior an active role in the ad­
ministration of the opium monopoly in the provinces or the Government would 
have to continue to use the ylkongsl. The Minister accepted the former.
The new proposals of the Ministry of Finance - based on the guidelines
set by the Council of Ministers on 3 January - were submitted to the King by
• — 130Phraya SuriyS on 11 January . The proposals had been compiled by Mpra Chao
Plya Phakdl^^: on almost every point his pragmatic approach was in evidence:
1. Beginning in mid-1908 a start would be made in terminating the
contracts of the ylkongsl for the sale of opium to the provincial dens,
their place being taken by trained Government officials. The pace at
which this would be carried out would be determined by the availability
of capable officials. The ylkongsl would be retained in those areas -
principally isolated districts - where the volume of opium sales was not
sufficient to justify the appointment of a Government official.
128. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 3 January 1908 
N.A.Kh. l*f. Ik/32.
129. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 9 January 1908 
N.A.Kh. Ik. Ik/32.
130. Programme for Government administration of the opium monopoly. Enclosed 
with: PhrayS SuriyS to King, 11 January 1908 N.A.Kh. Ik. Ik/39.
131. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 January 1908 
N.A.Kh. Ik. Ik/32.
2. Responsibility for reducing the level of opium smuggling would be 
divided between the Ministry of the Interior (for the provinces), the 
Customs Department (for the Gulf of Siam), and a special police force 
attached to the Opium Factory (for the dens in Bangkok City).
3- An attempt would be made to reduce the number of opium dens but 
only to the extent that Government sales of opium were not harmed. 
Ultimately the dens would be managed by Siamese officials. 
k. With regard to the delicate point as to the relative responsibili­
ties of the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance for 
the administration of the monopoly in the provinces, M9111 Chao Piya 
Phakdl seems to have aimed for a carefully balanced compromise. On the 
one hand PhrayS SuriyS's suggestion that the Opium Department would be 
responsible for the sale of opium to the dens at the province level, 
and that it «ould call for the assistance of the Ministry of the Interior 
in searching out smuggled opium, was accepted. At the same time it was 
recognized that the provincial governors held ultimate responsibility 
for the administration of their province and therefore that they had 
authority over officials froto the Ministry of Finance - and hence from 
the Opium Department - working in their area. As a result they were 
entitled to oversee the work of the Opium Department officials, and if 
they were dissatisfied could ask the Minister of Finance to remove them.
In short, the two Ministries would have to co-operate over the adminis­
tration of the provincial monopoly.
Before these basic proposals were submitted to the Council of Ministers
132the King saw PhrayS SuriyS privately to question him on this last point .
The Minister explained that his opposition to allowing the Ministry of the 
Interior more than minimal responsibilities with regard to the opium monopoly 
was based on the belief that responsibility for the Government's revenue should 
be the concern of only the Ministry of Finance. He referred to the days of 
the pre-refonned administration when responsibility for collecting the
132. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 January 1903 
N.A.Kh. Iff. Ik/32.
Kingdom's revenue had been divided among the various principal Ministries, 
when those Ministries had retained a portion of the revenues they collected, 
and when as a result the Treasury had been starved of cash. When asked by 
the King whether there were any reasons why the current Ministries should 
not forward sill their revenues immediately to the Treasury, PhrayS Suriya 
pointed out that the revenue from the land tax - which was collected by the 
Ministry of the Interior - was in serious arrears, though under pressure 
from the King he was forced to admit that the basic problem there lay with 
the failure of the rice farmers to pay the tax on time. The King then pointed 
out that in fact the Ministry of Finance itself had a very poor record in
this respect: the principal tax farms, for which PhrayS SuriyS was directly
133responsible, had been allowed to accumulate massive arrears .
Mqm Chao Plya Phakdl's proposals and the King's conversation with PhrayS 
SuriyS were reported in detail to the Council of Ministers on 13 January 190&^ 
The resulting discussions, though long, brought the Government no nearer a
decision and the meeting eventually broke up when the King suggested that
«/MQm Chao Plya Phakdl be invited to explain his proposals in person to the 
Council. The subsequent meeting of the Ministers on 20 January was the 
longest 4 1/4 hours - and certainly as far as PhrayS SuriyS was concerned the 
most bitter of the s e r i e s ^ H e  had no alternative but to watch his subor­
dinate outline the Ministry's proposals, proposals which he was unable to 
support. In fact the meeting added little to the debate. The Minister of 
Finance made it clear once again that he was unwilling to share executive 
control of the monopoly in the provinces with Prince Damrong, though he wished
to employ officials from the Ministry of the Interior mainly for policing 
136duties . He insisted that divided responsibility would lead to conflict. 
133« See Chapter V pp. iVA.-ing'
134. Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 13 January 1908 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/32.
135* Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 20 January 1908 
N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/32.
136. To that suggestion the King's reply was: 'Impossible I It would be the 
same as allowing you to administer the Ministry of Education. Impossible 1'
In contrast Prince Damrong emphasized that with co-operatio© between the 
provincial governors and the Opium Department under M9131 Chao Piya Phakdl the 
monopoly in the provinces could be effectively administered.
However, by the end of the meeting one basic point had been settled:
vthe King and Council of Ministers were agreed with M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl that 
until the administration could secure sufficient numbers of trained, honest 
officials, the Opium Department would have to employ the ylkongsl to distri­
bute opium to most of the provincial dens. PhrayS SuriyS*s plans to expel 
all Chinese from the operation of the monopoly immediately had been rejected. 
Moreover, it was apparent that the concensus of opinion within the Government
v'was in favour of M9m Chao Piya Phakdl and Prince Damrong*s rather vague pro­
posal that the opium monopoly outside Bangkok could be administered only 
through co-operation between the Ministries of Finance and the Interior: this
would be the case particularly when the sale of opium to the provincial dens 
was placed in the hands of Government officials. In short, in January 1908 
the major barrier to the development and definition of the Government's policy 
with regard to the future administration of the opium monopoly was the con­
tinued presence of PhrayS SuriyS as Minister of Finance.
In fact in late January 1908 PhrayS SuriyS was removed from the direct 
administration of the opium monopoly and the Opium Department came under the
sole authority of M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl assisted by M9m Anuwongse . The
following Mardh M9111 Chao Piya Phakdl was relieved of his duties as Under­
secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance so as to enable him to devote
l"z Q
all his time to the Opium Department, and M9111 Udom became Under-Secretary .
By this time PhrayS SuriyS had of course resigned.
It was left to Prince Chanthaburl to bring some stability and direction 
to the Ministry of Finance's administration of the opium monopoly. First he 
abolished the three remaining, relatively small opium farms - those in Puket, 
Udon and the north-east - the Puket farm coming under the control of the local
137- Bangkok Times, 25 January 1908* 
138. Bangkok Times, 5 March 1908.
governor assisted by an official from the Opium Department in April 1908,
the Udon and north-east farms passing to Government control in April 1909 at
139the termination of the farmers' contracts . So from 1 April 1909 every
opium den in the Kingdom received its supply of legal prepared opium either
directly or indirectly from the Government Opium Factory in Bangkok - the
opium farmer passed into history.
Second, the Ministry of Finance finally secured the immediate arrangements
for the distribution of opium from the Bangkok Opium Factory to the provincial
dens. On 25 February 1908 the monopoly right to distribute the Government-
prepared opium in the Provinces of Ayudhya, Nak?n Sawan, Prachinburi, Ratburi,
1^0NakQn Chaisi and Korat were auctioned at the Ministry of Finance • The 
contracts went to the ylkongsl which undertook to sell the most opium in a 
particular province during the coming year. Their supplies of opium were 
to be carefully regulated, with heavy fines imposed on any ylkongsl which 
sold less than it had contracted to sell. The distribution of opium remained 
the responsibility of Government officials only in those areas where the mono­
poly had in fact been administered by the Ministry of the Interior since 
January 190? - including Chump9n and Nak?n Sritammarat - and Phitsanulok where 
the ylkongsl were unwilling to bid for the contract on account of the larfce 
volume of illegal opium which constantly flowed into the area from the north. 
However, even in provinces where the distribution of opium was carried out by
l i i lofficials it was usual for small ylkongsl to supply the more remote dens
✓At the same time Prince Chanthaburl did not lose sight of the fact that 
the employment of the ylkongsl was to be regarded as only a temporary expedient. 
In September 1908 he suggested to Prince Damrong that they should be actively 
considering the abolition of the ylkongsl, and he proposed a scheme whereby 
the distribution of opium to the provincial dens would be entrusted to officials
139* Prince Chanthaburl to King, 29 December 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/39.
R.F.A.B. 1909A0 p. 7.
140. M9111 dhao Plya Phakdl to Brince Chanthaburl, 5 March 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. lk/4l.
141. It is perhaps worth repeating at this point that in Bangkok the dens 
collected their supplies of prepared opium directly from the Opium Department.
from the Ministry of the Interior working in co-operation with the Opium 
142Department . The proposal was discussed at a meeting between the Ministers
of Finance and the Interior in early 1909 and it was provisionally agreed to
I/4.3terminate all the ylkongsl contracts in the coming March . However, it was
then decided to abolish the Kingdom's spirit farms from the end of the year
1908/09, and it was felt that to impose responsibility for both reforms on
the provincial officials in the same year would create serious administrative
difficulties. Yet even without the intrusion of the abolition of the spirit
farms it is unlikely that the Ministry of Finance would have continued with
the proposal to terminate the ylkongsl contracts at that point: as it was
the Ministry was finding considerable difficulty in filling the existing posts
144in the Government opium administration . In March 1909 only in Prachinburi, 
where the spirit farm had already been abolished, was the ylkongsl contract 
terminated.
By 1910 the ylkongsl remained in operation in Ayudhya, Nakon Sawan,
145Phitsanulok, Korat, Nakon Chaisi and Ratburi Provinces . According to the 
reports of Mom 6hao Plya Phakdl there were considerable difficulties in con­
trolling the activities of the concessionaires, but the Government could still 
not guarantee a sufficient supply of capable, trained officials to contemplate 
their final disenfranchisement. In fact it was not until April 1918 that the 
last of the ylkongsl contracts was terminated and the distribution of opium
from the Opium Factory in Bangkok to all the Kingdom’s dens became the res-
146ponsibility of Government officials . The fact that it took 11 years to
142. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 5 September 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/43. Though 
the exact details of the various schemas put forward for the administration of 
the opium monopoly are difficult to determine, it does appear that Prince 
Chanthaburl1s proposal differed i$ one important respect from the earlier one 
of Mora Chao Plya Phakdl. Prince Chanthaburl was prepared to allow the Ministry 
of the Interior to distribute opium to the provincial dens: Mom Chao Plya
Phakdl had suggested that this would be carried out by the Opium Department 
working under the general supervision of the Ministry of the Interior.
143. Mom Chao Plya Phakdl to King, 16 February 1909 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/44.
144. R.F.A.B. 1910/11 p. 4.
145. Prince Chantteburl to King, 11 January 1910 N.A.Kh. 14. Ik/47.
146. Krom Phra 6hanthaburl (mu'a damrong tamri&eng sSriSbodl krasuang phrakhlang) 
Prinee Chanthaburl as Minister of Finance. By officials of the Ministry of 
Finance. Bangkok 1931 p. 306.
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find sufficient officials of adequate calibre to carry out the distribution
of opium to the provincial dens plus the fact that in 19 18, with the disap-
147pearance of the ylkongsl, the Kingdom’s opium sales dropped by 10 per cent
suggests that if PhrayS SuriyS’s plan to terminate all the ylkongsl contracts
at a stroke in late 1907 had been adopted, the Government's opium revenue
could well have been ruined. Later events had amply justified Mpm Chao Piya
Phakdl's opposition to his Minister's sweeping proposals. After 1918 the role
of the private Chinese individual or syndicate in the operation of the opium
monopoly was restricted to the management of the opium dens, but then from
1928 the Government began to install officials in the dens to take over the
148actual retail sales of the drug
With the abolition of the opium farm over the period 1907 to 1909 and
the imposition of direct Government control over the production of all legal
opium in the Kingdom, the Government increasingly turned its attention to the
moral and health aspects of opium smoking. Indeed, as early as September 1908
the King publicly declared that it was the Government's policy to work towards
149the complete abolition of opium smoking in Siam . However, the first impor­
tant step towards the implementation of this policy was not taken until 1918
when the authorities began to close a large number of the Kingdom's opium dens
150and impose a much tighter control over the remaining establishments • This 
was followed in 1921 by an Opium Law which required opium smokers to obtain a 
special licence if they wished to smoke outside an opium den and also contained 
provisions for the registration of all opium smokers^^.
However, the Government's restrictionist policy was not forcefully applied: 
indeed, several clauses of the 1921 Law - mainly those dealing with the regist­
ration of opium smokers - were not put into operation for several years and
147- R.F.A.B. 1918A9 p. 4.
148. R.F.A.B. 1928/29 p. 9.
149* Instructions to Delegates to Joint Opium Commission to be held at Shanghai, 
1909. F.F.A. 6/5.
150. R.F.A.B. 1923/24 pp. 14-15.
151. R.F.A.B. 1923/24 p. 15.
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some never came into force at all • The Government's caution was under­
standable. First, in the early 1920s opium sales were still providing the
153Government with over 20 per cent of its revenue . Second, any success
achieved by measures taken to discourage Chihese born in Siam from becoming
addicted to opium - measures such as the registration of all opium smokers -
was almost certain to be outweighed by the arrival of established addicts
154among the new immigrants from China • Finally, there was always a strong
possibility that in the absence of a very effective customs and police force
attempts to curb legal opium *moking would merely result in a burgeoning of
illegal dens and a massive growth in opium snuggling. From the late 1920s the
Government appears to have pursued the more limited objective of simply keeping
155the worst excesses of the opium trade under control . In fact opium continue*
to be a significant source of Government revenue right until the late 1950s
156when Field Marshal Sarit declared opium smoking once more illegal in Siam .
4. The abolition of the tax farm system
The dismantling of the remaining three monopoly farms can be dealt with 
quite briefly. Indeed, the abolition of the gambling and lottery farms - the 
provincial gambling dens being closed in 1905/06 and 1906/07, the last of the 
Bangkok dens disappearing in 1917 and the huai lottery being abolished in 1916 
has already been considered in some detail in Chapter IV1^ .  At this point 
it should merely be noted that whereas after the abolition of the opium and 
spirit farms, opium and rice spirit continued to be sold and taxed in Siam, 
with the abolition of the gambling and lottery farms the forms of gambling 
operated by those farms became illegal in the Kingdom. It would appear that
152. ibid/R.F.A.B. 1927/28 p. 11.
153. R.F.A.B. 1923/24 p. 2.
154. The period 1918-1931 saw the highest level of Chinese immigration into 
the Kingdom. G. William Skinner Chinese Society in Thailand Cornell 1957 
p. 172.
155. R.F.A.B. 1929/30 p. 9-
156. Frank C. Darling Thailand and the United States Washington 1965 p. 194.
157. See pp. 'So — ibo
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the Siamese authorities took this more severe attitude towards the gambling 
and lottery farms principally because, as has been noted earlier, the Siamese 
population were particularly addicted to gambling; opium smoking and rice 
spirit consumption were mainly Chinese vices.
The difficulties faced by the Kingdom's spirit farmers in the 1890s and 
1900s were essentially the same as those which confronted the opium syndicates - 
competition from an illegal trade in their product and rivalry between the 
farmers for control of the major contracts - though in general they troubled 
the spirit syndicatesless than the opium farmers. However, the spirit mono­
poly had its own particular problems. Most importantly, though the spirit 
farmers were merely expected to collect the duties on the production and sale
of liquor in the Kingdom and were forbidden by law to own distilleries, in
practice most spirit farmers were also rice spirit producers. This had two
consequences: first the farmers invariably failed to tax their own production
to the full and as a result the revenue suffered. Second, having control over 
stocks of liquor enabled the farmers to release spirit onto the market at low 
prices in order to secure thejruin of a rival - in much the same manner as that 
used by the opium syndicates.
Despite the various problems facing the spirit monopoly, the actual 
collapse of the spirit farm was considerably less dramatic than that of the 
opium farm. This was due mainly to the fact that, in contrast to the opium 
monopoly, the spirit monopoly was divided into a considerable number of indi­
vidual farms with no farmer controlling more than a relatively small part of 
the whole monopoly. Moreover, the institution of Government administration 
of the spirit monopoly was carried through with a degree of preparation and 
forethought that contrasts strongly with the precipitate manner in which the 
Government's administration of the opium monopoly was assembled.
There were two crises in the spirit monopoly, both involving the main
Bangkok fa rm . I n  J u l y  19 0 0  th e  Bangkok s p i r i t  fa rm e r  d e f a u lt e d  on h i s  paym ents  
158
t o  th e  T r e a s u r y  , and e v e n t u a l l y  i n  M arch 1 9 0 1  th e  M i n i s t r y  o f  F in a n c e  was
158. Prince Mahit to King, 13 July 1900 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/20.
forced to reauction the farm . Then in November 1905 the new syndicate
controlling the BanJskok farm (which included Luang Maitrlwanit, already greatly
in trouble over his interest in the opium farm) ran into financial difficul- 
160ties , and once again a solution could be found only in reauctioning the 
contract'*’^ '. The second failure of the Bangkok spirit farmer, coming on top 
of the collapse of the opium syndicates in 19051 encouraged the Ministry of 
Finance to prepare the way for the introduction of Government administration 
of the spirit revenue. In April 1907 an experiment was inaugurated in 
Prachinburi Province when Government officials began to supervise the distil­
lation of local spirits and the collection of the excise duty without the
162intervention of the farmer . The experience gained in Prachinburi proved to 
be invaluable when the Ministry of Finance came to deal with the abolition of 
the spirit farms throughout the Kingdom.
The detailed proposals for this major reform were presented bo the King 
by Prince Chanthaburl towards the end of December 1908 . The proposals had
been drawn up after a series of meetings between the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of the Interior, held during the 1908 meeting of the provincial 
governors in Bangkok; the contrast with Phraya Suriya*s attempted exclusion 
of the Ministry of the Interior from the determination of Government policy 
with regard to tfce opium monopoly needs no underlining. When the contracts 
for the principal spirit farms expired on 31 March 1909 the Government was 
well prepared to take over from the farmers responsibility for the collection 
of the excise duty on local spirits and the collection of license fees to 
distill and retail liquor. In each province an official from the Ministry of 
the Interior was made responsible for the collection of the spirit revenue;
159- Prince Mahit to King, 24 February 1901 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/20.
160. Phraya Boribtln and Luang Maitrlwanit to Prince Mahit, 13 November 1905 
N.A.Kh. 14. lkJj/28.
161. Prince Mahit to King, 24 January 1906 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/28.
162. R.F.A.B. 1907/08 p. 5» Phraya Suriya to King, 11 January 1907 
N.A.Kh. 14. lkfc/31.
163. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 29 December 1908 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/31»
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with regard to the excise duty in Bangkok, the collection was at first 
entrusted to an Opium and Spirit Department under the administration of 
M9m Chao Plya Phakdl (the Department also being responsible for the revenue
as a whole)^\ but from October 1909 those responsibilities were transferred
✓to the Customs Department, leaving M9m Chao Plya Phakdl concerned only with
165the opium administration . In April 1909 the Government did not assume
any responsibility for the production of spirit in the Kingdom^^: in effect
the authorities restored the separation of spirit distilling and spirit
taxation which had been lost under the farm system, with from April 1909
the disenfranchised spirit farmers concentrating their interests on distilling^
168However, the spirit farmer did not completely disappear in 1909 • In Udon,
the north-east and Petchabun the farms remained in operation until March 1910
and in isolated parts of the north the farm system was retained for a number
of years after that. Finally, it should be noted that with the disappearance
169of the principal spirit farms in 1909 the spirit revenue doubled , though
this was probably as much a comment on the inefficiency and corruptibility
of the farmers as on the improved administrative methods of the Government.
In the last year of the reign of King Chulalongkorn, 1910/11, 6.77 m. baht
or approximately 10 per cent of the Government's total revenue, was collected
by tax farmers: of that 6.77 m. baht, 6.5 m. came from the remaining gambling
170and lottery farms . A mere five years earlier, in 1905/06, the farmers had
164. Prince Chanthaburl to King, 29 December 1908/19 July 1909
N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/31.
165* Prince Chanthaburl to King, 25 October 1909 N.A.Kh. 14. lkh/31. Prince 
Chanthaburl as Minister of Finance p. 349- PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon TamnSn 
sunlakSk^n p. 12 2.
166. Whereas the Government did take over the actual preparation of opium 
in 1907.
16 7. PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon op cit. p. 120.
168. Prince Chanthaburl as Minister of Finance p. 343.
169. Spirit Revenue 1906/07-1911/12 (m. baht)
1906/07 3-9 1908/09 3-2 1910A1 6.1
1907/08 3.9 1909A0 5.9 1911/12 6.0 Source: R.F.A.B.
170. R.F.A.B. 1912A3.
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collected over kO per cent of the Government's total revenue. In the short 
period from the closure of the provincial gambling dens in 1906/07 to the 
abolition of all the principal spirit farms in 1909/10 , the tremendous power 
of the Chinese tax farming syndicates had been broken: with the disenfran­
chisement of the syndicates a major source of income for the Chinese secret
171societies was removed and after 1910 their power in Siam began to wane •
The remaining farms soon disappeared. The Chinese cakes tax was collected
172by officials from 1910/11 and the birds' nest tax came under Government 
control a few years later. The lottery and remaining gambling dens dis­
appeared in 1916 and 1917- By 1919 the whole of the Government's revenue
173was collected by salaried officials .
171• G. William Skinner Chinese Society in Thailand p. 166.
172. R.F.A.B. 1910A1 p. 7.
173• Note by the Ministry of Finance on the present fiscal position of Siam. 
Williamson, 9 August 1919 F.F.A. 30/17-
The Ministry of Finance and the early development of modem financial
administration in Siam
When King Chulalongkorn died in October 1910 the Ministry of Finance had 
been in existence for a mere two decades: it had been an effective component
of the administration for only a little over half that period. However, even 
in such a short lifetime the Ministry had carried through major changes in 
the financial administration of the Kingdom - a budgetary system whereby 
the Ministry compiled and then published an annual statement of the Govern­
ment' s revenue and expenditure had been instituted; the principal tax farms 
had been abolished and in some cases replaced with revenue collections by 
direct government agency; innumerable financial regulations had been issued 
in an attempt to enforce western concepts of financial propriety within the 
bureaucracy; the Government had raised loans in Europe in 1905 and 1907 to 
enable it to continue with its internal reform programme; a Government paper 
currency had been issued; and finally, by 1908 the exchange value of the 
baht had been fixed in relation to gold. Even such a brief reiteration of 
the major financial reforms which have been described and analysed in the 
preceding chapters serves to emphasize the achievement of the Ministry of 
Finance in its early years.
However, any considered judgement of the work of the Ministry of Finance 
in this period must go beyond a bald statement of the principal financial 
reforms promulgated by the Ministry, and attempt to assess the effectiveness 
of those reforms and the consequent influence of the Ministry on the early 
development of Siamese financial administration. This is the first concern 
of this concluding chapter. Three general points will be considered : first,
to what extent did the western-based concepts of financial propriety supposedly 
advocated by the Ministry of Finance become accepted within the Siamese 
bureaucracy ? Second, how effective was the Kinistry of Finance in this period
CHAPTER VIII
in controlling the finances of the whole administration - to what extent had 
the Government created a strong, centralized financial agency ? Finally, an 
examination will be made of the conservative financial and monetary policy 
developed by the Ministry of Finance over the two decades up to 1910.
1. The financial ethos of the bureaucracy.
To give a satisfactory judgement with regard to the first of the three 
points raised above is exceptionally difficult. From its establishment in 
1890 the Ministry of Finance prepared and issued an almost constant stream 
of financial regulations, instructions and manuals designed to regulate the 
attitudes of officials towards the Government's monies under their authority - 
to impose financial accountability on officials1. At the same time provision 
was made for the payment of salaries to officials in order to reduce or remove 
their reliance on the practices of kin mu'ang. Unfortunately the documentary 
material on which this study is principally based - being in the main the cor­
respondence between the King and his Ministers of Finance and not tne internal 
records of the Ministry itself2 - provide virtually no direct evidence as to 
the effect of those measures on the administrative behaviour of the main body 
of subordinate officials^: there merely exists some slight evidence at
ministerial level.
Of the five Ministers of Finance to resign in the period covered by this 
study, two left office attended by accusations or rumours of financial
1. Some examples of such regulations and instructions were given in 
Chapter II, see pp. *f£
2. The nature of the primary source material used for this study is dis­
cussed in the Bibliography, see p.
3 . There is a further, rather elementary, point. Even if it could be shown 
that western-based accounts and audit procedures were enforced throughout the 
Siamese administration in this period, this could not be taken to mean that 
all financial practices inimical to those procedures had been eliminated. For 
example, it is quite possible for the accounts to be correctly drawn up «nd 
audited, and yet for unofficial payments - which of course would never appear 
in the accounts - still to be made. On the other hand an effective accounts 
and audit system would clearly reduce the opportunities for the misuse of
official funds, and hence would impose a greater degree of financial accounta­
bility on officials.
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ijimpropriety - Prince Narathip in 189j> and Prince Mahit in 1906 . Moreover,
there were cases of other Ministers resigning in somewhat similar circum-
✓stances: for example, in 1902 the Minister of Public Instruction, Chao Phraya
Phatsakqrawong, resigned after it had been disclosed that he had spent some 
of his Ministry's funds on unauthorized official projects and on his own 
personal business . iet in each of these three cases the Minister's resig­
nation was prompted at least in part by other considerations. In the early 
1890s Prince Narathip had angered the King and the other Ministers by his 
uncompromising and clumsy treatment of the budget requests of his colleagues; 
Prince Mahit was in poor health and was exhausted after ten demanding years 
at the Ministry of Finance; and Chao Phraya Phatsakqrawong had failed to 
provide the effective leadership of his Ministry expected by the King^. In 
other words, the financial misdeeds (either alleged or proven) o£ these 
Ministers would appear to have been at most the occasion rather than the 
cause of their departure from office. Moreover, as Professor Wyatt points 
out, there were also instances of senior officials having engaged in financial
Virregularities - Chao Phraya Phatsak9rawong himself in the Customs Department
yin the early 1890s and the Minister of Agriculture, Chao Phraya Surasakmontrl
nin 1893 - and yet who continued to hold high position . In short, rigid
adherence to western-based standards of financial propriety was not demanded
at the highest levels of the administration; indeed, wide departures from
those standards was possibly quite common. It is unlikely that the subordinate
levels of the administration provided a significantly different picture.
Indeed it could hardly be expected that the pre-reform financial attitudes
and methods (as described in the opening chapter) would have been swept aside,
or perhaps even seriously modified within a matter of two decades.
There are two other important considerations. First, with the creation
f^. Ttie rumours surrounding the resignation of Prince Mahit were on a very 
small scale: indeed the only evidence on this point comes from the despatches
of the British Minister. See pp.
5* David K. Wyatt The Politics of Reform in Thailand p. 293.
6. ibid p. 297.
7 . ibid p. 296.
of the new government structure inaugurated in April 1892 and the subsequent 
evolution of a more effective administration of the Kingdom, the people were 
faced with a more intrusive and pervasive bureaucracy than they had ever 
previously experienced. In their daily lives they increasingly came into 
contact with various government officials - tax collectors, forestry experts, 
settlement officers, police and judicial officials, irrigation experts. As 
the official contacts between the administration and the people expanded, so 
the opportunities for officials to oppress the people, to force payments from 
the population for privileged treatment or favours granted, inevitably 
increased. Indeed, in British Burma a similar expansion in the western 
administrative machinery from about 1900 - an expansion that brought the 
authoritiem into touch with almost every aspect of the lives of the people - 
led to a burgeoning of oppression and corruption on the part of subordinate 
officials, a situation that was clearly exposed by a Bribery and Corruption
g
Inquiry Committee which reported in 1941 . Undoubtedly the high incidence 
of corruption and administrative irregularity in the administration in Burma 
was due in large part to the breakdown of traditional systems of authority 
and social order in the country following the annexation of Upper Burma in 
1886 and the subsequent imposition of an alien, and hence imperfectly under-
9stood, legal system : therefore the Burmese experience cannot be taken as a
10reliable guide to developments in Siam . Yet the original point remains: 
with the increasing involvement of the Government administration in the ordi­
nary affairs of the people, at least the opportunity was given for the system 
of kin mu'ang to maintain its vitality.
8. See: John F. Cady A History of Modern Burma Cornell 1958 pp. 409-412.
J; S. Furnivail Colonial Policy and Practice Cambridge 1948 pp. 170-178. The 
1941 Report noted: 'to put it plainly, if justice were done, a very large pro­
portion of all the public servants of the country would be in jail. 1 (Quoted 
by Furnivall op. cit. p. 174).
9. John F. Cady op. cit. pp. 125-1&2.
10. It is worth noting that there occurred a similar expansion in government 
administration in Java in this period, but, according to Furnivall, this did 
not lead to a growth of official corruption (Furnivall op. cit. pp. 269-271)* 
Moreover Furnivall notes that in Burma, the Irrigation Department appeared to 
be less corrupt than most other parts of the administration, principally becaue 
its functions and usefulness were appreciated by the people and because it was 
staffed mainly by Burmans (Furnivall op. cit. p. 177)*
This view is balanced by the second consideration. It is doubtful whether 
the very large expansion of the Government's revenue in the period 1892-1910 
could have been achieved if all officials had continued to claim a proportion 
of the Government monies passing through their hands as their own: it is
doubtful whether the authorities could have established Government administra­
tion of the opium and spirit monopolies, or ensured the relatively efficient 
administration of such departments as the Paper Currency Department, the 
Railway Department or the Bangkok Customs House unless they could have relied 
on the existence of at least a significant number of officials who had 
eschewed the financial practices of the pre-reform administration. However, 
as was noted earlier in this section, the existing materials provide no means 
of determining the proportion of officials and Ministers who could be said to 
have accepted the new western-based financial ethos, nor, perhaps more 
interestingly, the extent to which the subordinate levels of the bureaucracy, 
whilst maintaining an allegiance to kin mu'ang were influenced by the stream 
of financial regulations and manuals that issued from the Ministry of Finance. 
To that extent the question must remain an open one11.
2. The authority of the Ministry of Finance.
Over the period 1892-1910 there was a very considerable increase in the
control of the Ministry of Finance over the finances of the administration.
The point can be illustrated in a number of ways - by comparing the clumsy
and obdurate manner in which Prince Narathip compiled the budget estimates
in the early 1890s with the ordered and skilful manner in which they were
11. There is a considerable temptation when faced with such paucity of data 
to refer to studies of modern Thai administrative behaviour - Fred W. Riggs 
Thailand The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity Honolulu 1966/William 
J. Siffin The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development Honolulu 
1966/James N. Mosel Thai Administrative Behaviour in William J. Siffin Toward 
the Comparative Study of Public Administration Bloomington 1957* The tempta­
tion is perhaps best resisted, for there are clear dangers in attempting to 
apply such descriptions and analyses of the contemporary administration to an 
earlier period, particularly when that earlier period was one of considerable 
change in which the traditional Siamese administration first came into major 
contact with western financial methods and attitudes.
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drawn up by Prince Chanthaburl at the end of the reign; by comparing the
extremely detailed accounts of the Government's finances published in the
Budget Report of the financial Adviser for 1910/11 with the Ministry of
Finance's relative ignorance of the details of the Ministries' expenditure
during the terms of Prince Narit and Prince Sirthat Sangk&t in the mid-l890s;
and by tracing the increasing accuracy of the Ministry's budget procedures,
particularly during the first half of Prince Mahit*s period as Minister of 
12Finance . However, even in the late 1900s there were still serious inadequacies
in some areas of the Ministry's financial control.
First, the Ministry's audit procedures were weak: indeed the I89O Act
establishing the Ministry of Finance made no provision for the creation of a
department exclusively charged with carrying out an audit of the Government's
accounts1 .^ Even at the beginning of the Sixth Reign, the Government still
Iklacked a clearly defined audit department . As a result, although the 
Ministry of Finance could compile detailed accounts of the estimated future 
expenditure of the Ministries and had the administrative machinery to ensure 
that each Ministry drew just its permitted allocation from the Treasury, it 
could not check that those allocations were spent strictly in accordance with 
the sanctioned estimates. In other words, although the Ministry had authority 
over the broad allocation of funds to the Ministries and departments, it
15lacked control over the detailed distribution of the Government's resources •
Two illustrations will support the point. First, Williamson, in a memorandum
12. See Chapter III for the development of the Ministry's budget procedures 
under Prince Mahit. One possible way of demonstrating the increasing accuracy 
of those procedures is to compare budget estimates with budget actuals over a 
number of years (see pp.^ 1 tsOthough it must be admitted that since the 
Ministry's audit methods were relatively weak (a point to be considered below) 
there must be reservations concerning the accuracy of the Government's figures 
for actuals.
13* See Chapter II pp.kr-M> and also Wichai Prasangsit Prawatsanph5k$n (A
History of Taxation) Bangkok 1971 pp. 306-309. However, it appears that under
the I89O Act some audit responsibilities were entrusted to the Krom Truat.
Ik. Stephen L. W. Greene Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of 
Rama VI (1910-1923) Ph.D. thesis London 1971 p. 50.
15. ThereioiNi the possibility must be admitted that the Ministries were more
willing to accept the budget allocations set for them because they knew that 
those estimates could be at least partially circumvented: in short, a false
sense of authority would have attached to tne extremely detailed way in which 
the Ministry of Finance had prepared the estimates.
written in December 1907, drew attention to the fact that Government depart­
ments were in the habit of transferring any unspent funds which they had
accumulated (usually secured under the provisions for salaries and administra­
tive expenses) to those of their projects and schemes which had failed to 
attract budgetary allocations from the Ministry of Finance when the estimates 
were drawn up^. As a result, departments were able to finance projects which 
had not been fully considered and authorized by the Ministry of Finance (and 
subsequently by the Council of Ministers). Moreover, the practice implied 
that total Government expenditure was higher than it would have been if each
department had been compelled to return all unspent funds under each head to
the Treasury, Second, it would appear that ia the early 1910s most Ministries
17and departments maintained individual accounts with the Bangkok banks : the
l8practice had also been prevalent in the mid-l890s . The existence of such 
accounts implied that the Ministries were failing to use their budget allocatio 
immediately it was drawn from the Treasury, or failing to deposit with the 
Ministry of Finance all revenues collected under their auspices. By so deve­
loping concealed sources of funds - individual treasuries, in the manner of 
the pre-reform administration - the Ministries were able to avoid close scrutin; 
of their actual expenditure by the Ministry of Finance and to undermine the 
Ministry's control over the detailed allocation of resources. Clearly, the
existence of effective audit procedures would have done a great deal to curb 
19such practices . At the same time it must be acknowledged that the available 
records give little indication of the extent of such practices - the amount of
16. Memorandum. Note by the Financial Adviser on the present financial posi­
tion in Siam. Williamson, 7 December 1907» F.F.A. 30/8 N.A.Kh. 5* 1/25-
17. Memorandum. Williamson, 21 duly 1914 F.F.A. 29/G13.
18. See pp.
19* Unfortunately the available documents suggest no explanation for the 
absence of an audit department in this period, though undoubtedly one reason 
for the weakness of the audit was the acute shortage of trained officials - 
accountants and auditors - to check the cash flows throughout the administ­
ration. It is also possible that in the Fifth Reign the Ministers were 
unwilling to approve the establishment of a strong audit department simply 
because it would have enabled the Ministry of Finance to achieve stricter 
control over their expenditure. Certainly when PhrayS SuriyS. attempted to 
impose more effective external audit procedures on the revenue collections of 
the Ministry of the Interior he was strongly repulsed by Prince Damrong.
See pp. US'- ies'
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unspent funds transferred to unauthorized projects, the size of the individual 
bank accounts maintained by Ministries and departments. Therefore whilst 
recognizing those limitations to the authority of the Ministry of Finance over 
the expenditure of the administration, these should not be exaggerated: the
final emphasis must be on the undoubted strengthening of the Ministry's pro­
cedures for compiling the expenditure estimates in this period, a process 
described in detail in the opening section of Chapter III.
In any event, the limitations of the Ministry of Finance's control over 
the Government's revenue were considerably more serious. Bhe Ministry's weak­
ness in this respect was principally a consequence of the Government's decision 
taken in the mid-l890s to abandon the basic functional division of the
Ministries' responsibilities originally laid down at the beginning of the
20decade . In effect, an extremely powerful Ministry of the Interior was
created which took over many of the functional responsibilities of the rest
of the administration for the area of the Kingdom outside the capital. For
example, between 1896 and 1899, four functionally-based departments came under
the authority of the Ministry of the Interior - the Forestry Department, the
Mines Department, the Provincial Gendarmerie and, of particular significance
21in the present context, the Provincial Revenue Department • The establishment 
of the Provincial Revenue Department in 1899 had been foreshadowed by the 
creation of the Bangkok Revenue Department (under the Ministry of the Capital) 
the previous year. By the end of the Reign those two departments were directly
responsible for the collection of approximately one third of the Government's
22total revenue • Moreover, with the abolition of the opium and spirit farms 
in the late 1900s, the Ministry of the Interior assumed an important role in 
the collection of the opium and spirit revenues outside the capital.
20. However, it should be noted that the functional division of the Ministries 
responsibilities was not stricter applied in the early 1890s. For example until 
1894 provincial administration itself remained divided between the Mah&tthai 
and the Kal&hSm Tej Bunnag The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1&92 to 
1913 D.Phil. thesis Oxford 1968 pp. 125-126/p.144.
21. Tej Bunnag op. cit. p. 130*
✓22. Accounts of the Provincial Revenue Department r.s. 121-133* Chao Phrayfc 
YommarSt to King, 1 December 1909 N.A.Kh. 14. 1/7*
The establishment of the Provincial and Bangkok Revenue Departments under 
the Ministries of the Interior and the Capital in the late 1890s implied a 
partial return to the pre-reform structure of administration - where the 
finance divisions of the administration were scattered throughout the Govern­
ment - and a clear movement away from the creation of a strong, centralized 
financial agency as envisaged in the 1890 Ministry of Finance Act . Since 
the Ministry of Finance had virtually no control over the collection of a 
significant proportion of the Government's revenue, the authority of the 
Ministry over the administration's finances as a whole was inevitably weakened: 
not only was the Ministry unable to command directly all the resources raised 
in the Kingdom, but also, as a consequence, it could not completely control 
the use of those resources. The practice referred to earlier of the Ministries 
maintaining individual accounts with the Bangkok banks has some significance 
here. It would seem that the revenue-collecting departments of the administ­
ration not under the authority of the Ministry of Finance would occasionally
place a part of the revenue receipts in those accounts instead of paying them
2kdirectly, in full, into the Treasury . The practice would enable those
departments, or their parent Ministry, to finance projects for which the
Ministry of Finance had refused to sanction funds in the budget. The Ministry
of Finance, with incomplete control over the revenues, consequently had in-
25complete control over the expenditure of the administration .
A further, more general point can be made with regard to the emergence
23* It will be remembered that the opening clause of the I890 Act declared 
'The Ministry of Finance is responsible for receiving, disbursing and main­
taining the whole income and treasure of the Government,for maintaining accounts, 
and for collecting the taxes throughout the whole Kingdom.' (my emphasis)
2k. Regulation issued by the Minister of Finance regarding the keeping of 
Banking Accounts by Government Departments, May 1914 F.F.A. 29/G13*
25. Again it should be noted that the records give no indication of the 
importance of the Ministries' bank accounts, and no indication of the extent 
to which revenues were retained by the Ministries and not submitted directly 
to the Treasury. However, since the existence of the bank accounts is referred 
to on only one occasion in the records (in 1914J this would suggest that these 
practices occurred on a relatively small scale, in other words, it is possible 
that even though the Ministry of Finance had virtually no direct control over 
the collection of a significant proportion of the revenues, most of the tax 
income raised in the Kingdom was in fact forwarded promptly to the Treasury.
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of an extremely powerful Ministry of the Interior from the mid-18906. With 
the Government and administration dominated by Prince Damrong and his Ministry, 
it was very difficult for any Minister of Finance to attain sufficient political 
weight to develop his Ministry's control over the Government's finances, and 
in particular the revenue. Two examples will underline the point. First, it 
required the active intervention of the King in support of Prince Mahit in 
the late 1890s to ensure that the administration, including the Ministry of
the Interior, acknowledged the authority of the Ministry of Finance in com-
26piling the annual expenditure budget . Second, and more significantly, when
Prince Mahit's successor, PhrayS SuriyS, attempted to acquire greater control
over the revenues - by proposing that the Ministry of Finance be allowed to
examine and audit the revenue collections carried out by the Provincial Revenue
Department, and by demanding that, in the wake of the collapse of the opium
farm, the Ministry of Finance have full responsibility for the operation of
27the Government opium administration in the provinces - he was repulsed, 
principally by the determined opposition of Prince Damrong. Moreover, it is 
significant that Prince Chanthaburl, acknowledging the balance of political 
power within the Government at the end of the Fifth Reign, made little attempt 
to impose any audit on thework of the Provincial Revenue Department and also 
allowed the Ministry of the Interior to assume a major part of the responsibili­
ties for the administration of the opium revenue outside the capital.
It is therefore clear that the development of the Ministry of Finance as 
a strong, centralized financial agency, with equal authority over the expen­
diture and revenue of the whole administration, waited in the first instant 
upon the weakening of the Ministry of the Interior. This shift in the balance 
of power between the two Ministries occurred in the opening years of the Sixth 
Reign. First, the weakness of the Ministry of Finance's authority with regard 
to the collection of the revenues was revealed by a special committee appointed
26. See pp. 2a-#3
27. See pp. n r - 1 8 3oi
in March 1912 to investigate the Kingdom's revenue and expenditure • As a 
result of the committee's report, a Budget Administration Law was promulgated 
in 1913 which gave the force of law to the procedures and time-table for the 
preparation, submission, amendment and sanction of the annual revenue and ex­
penditure estimates - until that point the procedures merely having the force 
of departmental regulations - and also made provision for the Ministry of
Finance to sanction additional funds, or approve the transfer of funds from
29one head to another, during a financial year . But the most dramatic increase 
in the authority of the Ministry of Finance occurred as a result of the re­
organization of the Government structure in 1915 following the resignation of 
Prince Damrong as Minister of the Interior. The major part of that reorgani­
zation involved tiie transier of the Provincial Revenue Department from the 
Ministry of the Interior, and the Bangkok Revenue Department from the Ministry
of the Capital to the Ministry of Finance: there the two departments were
30combined and renamed simply the Krom SanphSk^n (the Revenue Department) .
Henceforth the collection of virtually all the Kingdom's revenue came under
the direct authority of the Ministry of Finance. That same year also saw the
establishment of a properly constituted Audit Department (Krom Truat Ngoen
Phaen Din) within the Ministry^", and a strengthening of the Ministry's
accounts departments by the amalgamation of the Krom S5rab5nchl and Krom Truat
into a Krom j&nchlkiang^2.
With the resignation of Prince Damrong and the dismantling of his Ministry,
the structure of the administration moved back towards the basic functional
differentiation that had been the original objective in the early 1890s. In
1915 the Ministry of Finance, at least in theory, achieved full responsibility
28. Stephen L. W. Greene Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of 
Rama VI (1910-1925) Ph.D. thesis London 1971 pp. 160-16*+.
29• Krom Phra chanthaburl mu'a damrong tamnaeng sghSbpdl krasuang phrakhlang
(Prince fchanthaburl as Minister of Finance) Bangkok 1931 p. 71. R.F.A.B. 
1 9 U A 5  p. 6.
30. Wichai Prasangsit PrawatsanphBkbn (A History of Taxation) Bangkok 1971 
pp. 338-339.
31. Wichai Prasangsit, ibid. pp. 332-336. Stephen L. W. Greene Thai Government
and Administration in the Reign of Rama VI (1910-1923) p. 239.
32. Wichai Prasangsit PrawatsanphBk$n pp. 336-338
322
for the administration of the Government's revenue and expenditure: moreover,
the promulgation of the 1913 Budget Administration Law and the creation of the 
Krom Truat Ngoen Phaen Lin and the Krom d&nchlkl5ng in 1915 undoubtedly im­
plied a considerable strengthening of the Ministry's control over the 
administration's finances, compared with the situation which had held at the 
end of the Fifth Reign. As a result, in the late 1910s and early 1920s the
vMinistry, and the Minister, Prince Chanthaburl, moved to a position of pre­
eminence in the Government. However, it is important to note that at 
precisely that point the authority of the Ministry was undermined by the
personal and official extravagance of King Wachirawut; whilst Prince
✓Chanthaburl attempted to hold a rough balance between the revenue and expendi­
ture of the Government, he was pressurized by the King for more funds for the 
construction and upkeep of new royal residences and for the maintenance of 
the King's various associations such as the 'Wild Tigers'^. Moreover, 
though the Minister of Finance opposed high military expenditure, the Ministry
of War and the Wavy, departments close to the King's heart, continued to
3kreceive large budget allocations, and to spend above them • In the words 
of a recent study of the reign of King Wachirawut, to the King Prince 
Chanthaburl 'was not a capable minister seeking to maintain the nation's
financial stability, but a culpable minister seeking to undermine the King's
'35puissance. Prince Chanthaburl left the Ministry of Finance in January 1923 
having ultimately failed to restrain the extravagance of the Kixag^ 0.
The essential point to be drawn from this very brief reference to the 
development of the Ministry of Finance in the Sixth Reign is that even after 
1915 when the Ministry had achieved control over the collection of the Govern­
ment 's revenue and had strengthened its audit and accounts procedures, its 
authority as the sole agency ultimately responsible for the Government's
33* Stephen L. W. Greene Thai Government and Administration in the Reign of 
Rama VI (1910-1925) pp. 288-297/342-346/399-401.
3*+. ibid. pp. 165-169/391.
3 5. ibid. p. 422.
36. ibid. p. 331.
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finances remained incomplete. Its ability to control the detailed distribu­
tion of the Kingdom's resources and its ability to act as the final arbiter 
as to the level of Government expenditure could always be undermined - before 
1915 by the relative weakness of the Ministry within the Government compared 
with, in particular, the Ministry of the Interior, and after 1915 by King 
Wachirawut. In short, in this period, effective, centralized financial 
control was not fully achieved in the Siamese administration.
In this context it is interesting to note the views of a foreign economic 
adviser to the Thai Government on the influence of the Ministry of Finance 
in compiling the annual budget estimates in a much later period - the 1950s.
'The Finance Ministry for its part does not have, in practice, the 
authority to rule out some projects altogether in order to permit 
other more important projects to be done adequately and at an ade­
quate developmental pace. Hence the Finance Ministry's Budget 
Committee is necessarily reduced to "nibbling" at the requests 
for funds emanating from other Ministries. No executive officer 
has antecedently made the more drastic decisions to accept or 
reject certain projects in toto. The Finance Ministry has no 
authority to do so.' 37
In his Thailand: the Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, Fred W. Riggs 
explains this weakness of the Ministry of Finance's budgetary authority in 
the 1950b in terms of his analysis of the modern Thai political-bureaucratic 
system. He argues that when, sis in modern Thailand, politics is centred on 
intra-bureaucratic competition and conflict, it is almost inevitable that a 
strong finance agency - whether embodied in the Ministry of Finance or in such 
institutions as the Prime Minister's Office - will fail to emerge. Indeed 
such an agency - capable of determining the allocation of the Government's 
resources - woulu not be alxowed to emerge, for that would give that component 
of the administration a dominating advantage in any intra-bureaucratic
7O
dispute . The same basic analysis could perhaps be applied, with reserva­
tions, to the earlier period. It is possible to view the internal politics 
of the latter half of the reign of King Chulalongkorn essentially in terms 
of inter-ministerial competition »nd conflict. In that case, the outcome of
37* Quoted in: Fred W. Riggs Thailand: the Modernization of a Bureaucratic 
Polity Honolulu 1966 p. 332.
38. Fred W. Riggs op. cit. especially pp. 329-338*
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major political questions such as the allocation of scarce resources would be 
determined principally by the relative political and administrative weight of 
the Ministers and Ministries themselves! the Ministry of Finance, competing 
with all the other Ministries for resources, was not allowed to achieve a 
permanent, dominating authority in financial matters in the Government.
In any event, it is clear that the relatively weak centralized financial 
control characteristic of Thai government in the 1950s was not a recent 
phenomenon. It is a feature of Thai government that can be traced back to 
the early development of modem Siamese financial administration in the Fifth
Reign, and ultimately to the pre-reform administration with its dispersal of
finance departments throughout the Government.
3» A conservative financial and monetary policy.
The majority of important financial measures promoted by the Ministry of
Finance during the period covered by this study were prepared with substantial
39care and introduced only after considerable debate and consideration . This
was particularly true of those measures which involved Siam's relations with
the European powers - the abandonment of the silver standard (a measure first 
proposed in 1899 though not acted upon until November 1902) and the raising 
of the first sterling loan in 1905 (a step preceded by a detailed, intense 
two-year debate in the Council of Ministers). However, the same cautious, 
conservative approach was also evident in the Government's allocation of its 
resources among its various projects, schemes and reserves. It is this order 
of priorities which is the primary concern of this present section.
The period 1892 to 1910 saw a very considerable expansion in the resources 
available to the Government; not only did the annual revenue receipts rise 
from 1 5 »578^baht in 1892/93 to 63-509 m. baht in 1910/11, but the Government 
also succeeded in borrowing £8.63 in. (or almost 120.0 m. baht at current rates
39- Though not all: for example, PhrayS SuriyS's abolition of the opium 
farm in January 1907 was pushed through with undue haste and lack of 
preparation.
325
of exchange) from abroad • However, in his now standard book oh the modern 
economic history of Thailand, Economic Change in Thailand l8>0 - 19701 
Professor James Ingram criticizes the Siamese Government for being too 
cautious and conservative in its deployment of the increased resources at 
its command. Basically his criticism has two complementary aspects. First, 
Professor Ingram draws attention to the Siamese Government's policy of main­
taining high cash reserve levels. For example, when the Government began to 
issue a paper currency in 1902, the full value of notes in circulation was 
backed in coin. Later, the Minister of finance was permitted t° invest
25 per cent and then 50 per cent of the reserve in first-class foreign
41securities . In 1910 the value of notes in circulation exceeded l?m. baht; 
this meant that the Ministry had to maintain a coin reserve of at least 
8 .5 m. baht - or slightly over £600,000 at the current rate of exchange - to
safeguard the note issue. Furthermore, in 190? the Government created a
gold standard reserve fund to maintain the exchange value of the baht: this
additional reserve was established from the proceeds - at first one-third,
*42and then a half - of the £5.0 m. 1907 loan • When the exchange reserve fund
was legally constituted in November 1908 its statutory size was fixed at
L‘5
12 .0 m. baht, or a little under £1.0 m.
This leads to the second aspect of Professor Ingram's criticism. He 
argues that by tying up such a large proportion of its resources in these two 
reserve funds, inevitably the Siamese Government was forced to limit its 
expenditure on programmes and projects which would have contributed greatly 
to the economic development of the Kingdom. In particular the Government was 
unable, or unwilling, to devote more than a very small percentage of its
40. This figure includes the £Jf.63 m. loan from the F.M.S. to Siam in 1909 
for the construction of the Bangkok-Malaya border railway.
41. James C. Ingram Economic Cnange in Thailand 1850-1970 Stanford 1971 p. 154/ 
171* See also my article in the jTs.S. (July 1972 pp. 23-44) Paper Currency:
The Government Note Issues in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn.
42. James C. Ingram op. cit. p. 171. The transfer of an additional £500,000 to 
the exchange fund was only a temporary measure: this additional sum was returned
to the railway construction fund as soon as the Treasury found itself buying 
rather than selling sterling: see pp. ^  ibi.
43• See pp. Art.
326
r e s o u r c e s  to  th e  v a r io u s  i r r i g a t i o n  p r o j e c t s  p r e s e n te d  t o  i t  b y th e  D utch
44-
i r r i g a t i o n  e x p e r t ,  v a n  d e r  H eide . When th e  C o u n c il  d id  a l l o c a t e  fu n d s to  
p r o j e c t s  o f  a  d e v e lo p m e n ta l c h a r a c t e r ,  i t  i n v a r i a b l y  p r e f e r r e d  t o  f in a n c e  th e  
c o n s t r u c t io n  o f  a  r a i l w a y  n etw ork  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  
f a c i l i t i e s .
The e s s e n c e  o f  P r o f e s s o r  In g r a m 's  c r i t i c i s m s  i s  c o n ta in e d  i n  h i s  a n a l y s i s
o f  th e  G o v e rn m e n t's  deploym ent of i t s  1907 sterling loan :
'Of the net proceeds of £2,797>500, £932,500 was earmarked for the 
exchange-stabilization fund, and another £500,000 was temporarily 
pledged to that fund. This left only £1,565,000 ior capxtal invest­
ment, and £930,000 had already been used for railway construction.
The re m a in d e r w as a l s o  a l l o c a t e d  to  th e  r a i l w a y s .  I n  s h o r t ,
i r r i g a t i o n  co u ld  not be f in a n c e d  b e ca u se  o v e r  h a l f  o f  th e  1 9 0 7  lo a n
w as u sed  t o  su p p o rt th e  e x c h a n g e . The i r r i g a t i o n  schem es w ere  
r e j e c t e d . '  45
I n  o th e r  w o rd s, th e  Siam ese Government g a ve  a  h ig h e r  p r i o r i t y  t o  th e
s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  th e  exch an ge r a t e  th a n  i t  d id  t o  th e  co m m ercial developm ent
o f  th e  Kingdom th ro u g h  th e im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  sch em es. I n  P r o f e s s o r
In g r a m 's  own w ord s :
•The interests of foreign banks and foreign bondholders were thus 
placed above national interests such as development and utilization 
of resources. The consistent policy of maintaining high liquid 
reserves reflects the determination of the government to meet 
international obligations and to maintain the international posi­
tion of the currency in spite of domestic economic needs. To this
end the wealth of the nation was devoted.' 46
A lth o u g h  t h e r e  ca n  be no s e r i o u s  d isa g re e m e n t w it h  P r o f e s s o r  In g r a m 's  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  c o n s e r v a t iv e  f i n a n c i a l  and m on etary p o l i c y  p u rsu ed  b y th e  
Siam ese Government i n  th e  p e r io d  c o v e re d  b y t h i s  s t u d y , n o r w ith  th e  i l l u s t r a ­
t i o n s  he u s e s  t o  d e m o n strate  t h a t  p o l i c y ,  h i s  c r i t i c i s m s  o f  th e G o ve rn m e n t's  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  i t s  r e s o u r c e s  can n o t be f u l l y  s u s t a in e d .  I n  g e n e r a l  h i s  a n a l y s i s  
p a y s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  f a c t o r s  w hich c o n t r ib u t e d  to  th e  e s t a b l i s h ­
ment and developm ent o f  t h a t  p o l i c y  i n  th e  f i n a l  two d e c a d e s  o f  th e  r e i g n  o f
44. The rejection of van der Heide's schemes, the dismantling of the Irri­
gation Department and the resignation of van der Heide from the Siamese service 
in 1909 have been considered in Chapter V . See pp. Aoo-a.o*
45* James C. Ingram op. cit. p. 198. My emphasis. He also outlines this 
analysis on pp. 173-174.
46. ibid. p. 173*
King Chulalongkorn. The shortcomings of Professor Ingram's criticisms can be 
shown first by reference to the two major demands on the Government's resources 
dealt with above - the exchange reserve fund and van der Heide's irrigation 
programme•
The creation of the exchange reserve fund in early 1907 and its legal 
establishment in November 190b through the promulgation of the Gold Standard 
Act, have been considered in detail in Chapter VI. A few points from that 
description are worth re-emphasising. First, the exchange reserve fund as 
originally constituted contained £0.932 m., one-third of the proceeds of the 
1907 loan. Throughout 1907 and the beginning of 190b the fund was used to 
purchase baht in order to support the exchange value of the currency during 
a trade depression and a period of severe speculation in the exchange markets.
vIn May 190b Prince Chanthaburl added a further £500,000 to the reserve fund 
to support the baht. When the Gold Standard Act was passed the following 
November, the fund stood at the equivalent of 12.0 m. baht and this figure 
was taken for the statutory size of the Gold Standard Exchange Fund. Therefore 
in those initial years, the size of the exchange reserves was determined by 
the requirements of trade, based on the practical experience of supporting 
the exchange during a period of depression. In short, the volume of resources 
devoted to the exchange fund was no more than was required for the fund to 
discharge its function, at least in the late 1900s. However, as Professor 
Ingram points out, the Exchange Heserve Fund was an additional reserve, over 
and above the existing paper currency reserve, and it was difficult to envisage 
a combination of circumstances where the Government would require the full 
resources of both funds - of baht, foreign currencies and foreign securities -
to meet either a run on the paper currency or heavy speculation in the
kf?exchange. Yet there may have been good administrative reasons for maintaining 
separate exchange and paper currency reserve funds. If the reserves of the 
Government had been held in a single, general Treasury fund, there could be
no guarantee tlu|t the foreign exchange reserves would not be used for such
W?. James C. Ingram op. cit. p. 171/173*
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items as the purchase of imported capital goods, or the upkeep of Siamese 
missions abroad. Perhaps the only effective way to ensure that the Government 
constantly maintained sufficient reserves of foreign currency to support the
43baht was to establish a distinct exchange fund for that purpose .
Finally, it must be emphasized that the establishment of an adequate
exchange reserve fund was essential to the smooth operation of the gold-exchange
standard adopted by Siam. In turn the maintenance of the exchange value of
the baht at a stable parity with gold secured a number of important benefits
for the Kingdom - it encouraged the development of foreign trade, it enabled
the Government to raise sterling loans without fear that the baht value of
it6 interest and debt repayment would be increased by a drop in exchange and
it maintained the Government's ability to import capital goods essential for
its important public works projects. In brief, the adoption of the gold-
exchange standard - the establishment of the exchange reserve fund - were
almost essential for the continued development and prosperity of the Kingdom
and for the financing of the Government's various reform programmes. It is
possible that by investing a considerable proportion of its loan proceeds in
the exchange reserve fund, the Government gave as muc£ encouragement to the
development of the Kingdom's resources - at least in the short run - as it
49would have done if those funds had been devoted to irrigation works .
With regard to the various irrigation schemes proposed by van der Heide
and rejected by the Government in this period, there is space for only a few
essential points. Most importantly, van der Heide's proposals appear to have
43. This point is raised because in 1910 Williamson wrote a memorandum to 
Prince Chanthaburl (Memorandum, Gold standard fund, 19 necember 1910, F.F.A. 
23/14) pointing out that £150,000 had been illegally withdrawn from the exchange 
reserve fund at the National Provincial Bank in London to cover payments in con-? 
nection with the railway construction programme. The sum was repaid. Without 
the strict legal provisions surrounding the use of the exchange reserve fund 
and the maintenance of a separate reserve, it is possible that the foreign 
currency holdings of the Government would have been continually raided in 
this manner.
49* Therefore when Professor Ingram argues that by giving higher priority to 
the stabilization of the exchange rate than to irrigation 'The interests of 
foreign banks and foreign bondholders were ... placed above national interests 
such as development and utilization of resources* (p. 173) he fails to acknow­
ledge the considerable commercial benefits the Kingdom derived from the fixing 
of the exchange value of the baht in relation to gold.
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been far too ambitious for the Siamese Government. At about the time he sub­
mitted his original report to the Minister of Agriculture in 1903» the 
Government was just entering a period of financial difficulty: its policy
of financing public works projects solely from current revenue had collapsed 
in 1902 and the construction of the northern railway was being partially 
financed from the Treasury reserves. The Ministry of Finance was forecasting 
a deficit in the estimates: the Government's debate over the raising of a
European loan was just getting under way. Clearly under those circumstances 
it would have been unreasonable to expect the Ministers to have been receptive 
to an-irrigation programme costing 47*0 m. baht at full capacity. Moreover, 
it is probable that the Government's first impression of van der Heide's
ideas created a resistance to his later schemes. Even his 1906 proposals
50would have cost 24.1 m. baht , though his fihal schemes in 1908 were 
budgeted for just 6.0 m. baht^. Yet even those reduced schemes were presen­
ted by van der heide as short-term projects, capable of being incorporated 
into the full scheme which, he believed, the Government would ultimately 
sanction. It is possible that a small, self-contained scheme to demonstrate 
the effectiveness of irrigation works in Siam would have done much to over­
come the opposition which had undoubtedly built up in the Council of Ministers
52to the report as a whole • Second, though van der Heide expected his schemes 
eventually to pay for themselves through the imposition of lock fees, the sale 
of newly-irrigated land and the sale of irrigation water, it is very doubtful 
whether his projects could have financed themselves directly in this way^. 
in a country where traditionally land was free to anyone with the energy to 
clear it and where irrigation water from existing canals was available to any
50. Note, van der Heide, 12 March 1906 F.F.A. I8/5 .
51• Memorandum. Further proposed schemes of irrigation Department. Williamson, 
14 August 1908 F.A.A. 18/4.
£2. In a letter to the King on 17 March 1909 (N.A.Kh. 5 . 1/27) Prince 
Chanthaburl complained that van der Heide almost invariably submitted a number 
of irrigation schemes to the Ministry of Finance for consideration all at one 
time - all the schemes being relatively large-scale and all being interdependent, 
having an important role in his full irrigation programme for Siam.
53* Barnes C. Ingram op. cit. p. 199 fn. 11.
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fanner who wanted it, there were clear objections to the Government charging
5kthe people ior those commodities • In short, the direct return from the
irrigation schemes was almost certain to be much less than van der ^eide
55anticipated . Finally, it was feared that the implementation of any large-
scale irrigation project would produce a number of undesirable side-effects:
for example, it was suggested that such a project would make the Chao Phraya
River less navigable from Ayudhya to the Gulf and would also make the river
salty for up to six months of the year"^. It is possible that the Government's
rejection of van der Heide's proposals was based on an exaggerated fear of
the practical difficulties involved in their implementation, an underestimate
of the direct financial returns they would secure, or even a misunderstanding
of their objectives, but the Government's opposition was no less real for that.
Enough has been said to show that in the 1900s the case in favour of the
immediate implementation of a major irrigation scheme was far less clear cut
57than in retrospect it can be made to appear •
There remain three more general points to be made with regard to tne 
Siamese Government's allocation of its resources in this period. First, des­
pite the four-fold increase in revenue receipts between 1892 and 19 10, and 
despite the raising of foreign loans in 1905» 1907 and 1909, it is clear that 
from the early 1900s the Government was very short of resources to cover its 
proposed reform programme. The occasional budget deficits from 1901/02, the 
recurrent problem of falling reserve levels, and, at the end of the 1900s, the
emerging problem of an increasing proportion of the Government's expenditure
58being absorbed by allocations for salaries and administrative expenses ,
5k. In the Dutch East Indies irrigation water was supplied free of charge: 
however, in British India a water-rate was levied. J. S. Fumivall Netherlands 
India Cambridge 1939 p« 323•
55- Even if the schemes could be made to pay for themselves within a few years, 
this still left the Government with the problem of finding 5 m. to 6 m. baht 
p.a. to finance the projects in the first place.
56. Note in regard to the various particulars of the irrigation scheme at 
reduced capacity, r.s. 125 F.F.A. 18/5•
57• See Ingram op. cit. pp. 199-200 for an analysis of some of the factors that
may have contributed to the rejectiou of van der Heide's proposals. Also Leslie
E. Small Historical Development of the Greater Chao Phya Water Control Project:
an Economic Perspective. J.S.S. vol. bl pt. i oanuary ±9'^ pp. 1-24.
58. See pp. <<n- log
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provide firm evidence of that. The Siamese Government was faced with the 
basic economic problem - how to allocate scarce productive resources between 
numerous important competing projects. This leads to the second point: 
throughout the whole of this period, the overriding objective of the Siamese 
Government was to maintain the independence of the Kingdom in the face of the 
threat from the European powers. Virtually all Government policies, measures 
and decisions have to be seen in the light of that consideration. Therefore 
in the allocation of its resources the Government gave priority to those 
projects which would contribute most to the protection of the Kingdom's 
sovereignty. Priority was given to the maintenance of high reserve levels in 
order to secure the Government against insolvency in all but the most disastrous 
circumstances. The Ministers were determined that neither Britain nor France 
would feel it necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of Siam because 
of financial irresponsibility on the part of the Government: the converti­
bility of the paper currency, the stability of the exchange mechanism and the 
ability of Siam to cover its foreign debt obligations were therefore given 
the highest priority. Moreover, as was argued earlier, the adoption of the 
gold-exchange standard - and the consequent establishment of an exchange 
reserve fund - was almost essential if Siam were to raise the foreign loans 
and import the capital goods that were required for the continuation of her 
reform programmes. Priority was also given to the construction of railways 
linking Bangkok with the more distant regions of Siam in order to secure the 
more effective government of the whole Kingdom from the capital; the railways 
promised a clear strategical and administrative benefit. In comparison, 
though large-scale irrigation schemes would have undoubtedly encouraged the 
general economic development of the Kingdom, it could not be said that they 
would have directly contributed as much to the maintenance of Siamese 
independence. Therefore in the 1890s and 1900s the order of priorities adopted 
by the Siamese Government in the allocation of its resources can be explained 
with reference to the Kingdom's external political position, faced as it was
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by powerful colonial administrations on all sides . However, when after
the 1914-1918 War, the threat to Siam from the neighbouring British and
French regimes began to ebb, so the factors which had contributed most to
the early development of Siam's conservative financial and monetary policy
began to lose their potency. Therefore Professor Ingram's criticisms of
60that policy - and its development from the 1920s - may have more validity 
for that later period.
There is one final, rather fundamental point: any analysis of the early
development of Siam's conservative financial and monetary policy must take 
into account the accepted economic ideas of the time, particularly those 
prevalent in the other, predominantly colonial, administrations of Asia.
For example, it is worth noting that the policy of maintaining very high 
currency reserve levels was pursued in this period not only by Siam but also 
by the Straits Settlements. In 1900 the Straits Settlements authorities 
established a Currency Board system unaer which the Board was legally obliged 
to redeem any amount of Straits Settlements currency notes with sterling: in 
practice, every unit of Straits Settlements money was backed by an equivalent 
amount of British currency, though up to one half of those reserves could be 
invested in British or Commonwealth (not Straits Settlements) securities^.
By these provisions fixity of exchange between the Straits dollar and sterling - 
and hence the rest of the world's gold-based currencies - was guaranteed, and 
this exchange stability was essential for an economy like tnat of the Straits
59* Professor Ingram acknowledges that the Siamese Government's policy of 
maintaining high reserve levels was determined principally by the very real 
fear of foreign intervention.(p. 170) but he fails to give this consideration
sufficient weight in his overall analysis. If in retrospect it is said that
the Government was too cautious - devoted too high a proportion of its re­
sources to reserves - then undoubtedly the Government would have argued that 
it had erred on the right side. Almost any price wan worth paying to protect 
the independence of the Kingdom.
60. James C. Ingram op. cit. p. l'/l/pp, 161-182. It need only be noted here
tnat Siam raised loans totalling £5 m. in 1922 and 1924 at high rates of in­
terest, primarily to restore the Treasury reserves to the high levels maintained 
prior to the 1919-1921 exchange crisis.
61. Lim Chong-Yah Economic Development of Modern Malaya Kuala Lumpur 1967 
pp. 222-22 V230. In fact a commission reporting in the 1930s recommended a 
115# reserve ratio, (p. 224 fn. 1 ).
59
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Settlements so dependent on external trade and investment . On the other 
hand the Currency Board system had a number of disadvantages: perhaps most
importantly it tied up a considerable proportion of the colony's funds in 
liquid assets and securities (most of which were purchased on the London 
market), funds which, it could be argued, would perhaps have found better 
economic and social uses by being invested in the colony itself. The 
parallel with Siam's decision to place a higher priority for the use of its 
resources on maintaining the exchange value of the baht than on the development 
of irrigation works, requires no emphasis.
It is also significant that in British Malaya - indeed in all the colonial 
regimes in the region - in this period, a central axiom of financial policy 
was to budget for a small revenue surplus on ordinary account each year. In 
fact it was also an established principle of financial policy in the metro­
politan economies themselves - balanced budgets, a frugal attitude towards 
expenditure, the maintenance of substantial reserves. It was exactly this
financial orthodoxy that Siam, attended by British Financial Advisers brought
63up in this tradition, pursued . Yet underlying much of Professor Ingram's 
analysis of Siam's financial policy in this period seems to be a basic adher­
ence to the economic tenets of a more recent period - an acceptance of the
development aims and strategies for the Third World that have emerged since 
641945 . In particular his analysis appears to be based on an acceptance of
the overriding importance of economic growth for the 'developing nations' and
62. It was not until 193$ that the Malay States actually participated in the 
Currency Board scheme: however, since the Straits Settlements currency also
circulated in the Peninsula, the Malay States clearly benefited from the sta­
bility of exchange achieved by the system in this earlier period. Lim Chong-Yah 
p. 224.
63. Both Rivett-Carnac and Williamson had, of course, been in the Indian Service 
before their appointment to Siam, and it is interesting to note that a strong 
emphasis on balanced budgets, an avoidance of unnecessary public debt, the main­
tenance of large reserves and a constant determination to restrain government 
expenditure were outstanding features of Indian financial administration in the 
period following the abolition of the East India Company in 1858 and the insti­
tution of the post of Secretary of State for India. See S. Bhattacharyya 
Financial Foundations of the British Raj Simla 1971 esp. chapter 3 and R. J.
Moore Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy 1853-66 Manchester 1966 esp. chapters 7&H*
64. Professor Ingram makes just one brief reference to the fact that Siam's 
financial policy at the beginning of the twentieth century merely reflected 
the economic orthodoxies of the time (p. 174).
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a belief that all resources - foreign loans, export earnings, reserves - be 
fully utilized to promote that growth. Siam's financial and monetary policy 
in the early twentieth century cannot be judged by those criteria: economic
growth was not of sole, overriding importance to the Kingdom, and the devotion
of resources to development projects to the detriment of the maintenance of
65high reserves and balanced budgets was financial heresy .
*f. The British Financial Advisers.
In his analysis of Siam's conservative financial and monetary policy and
of the influences which contributed to the evolution of that policy, Professor
Ingram places considerable emphasis on what he sees as the power and authority
of the British Financial Advisers within the Siamese Government. For example,
he points out that Williamson was a strong critic of van der Heide's irrigation
schemes and quotes from a memorandum written by the Adviser in August 1908 :
'To my mind it has not yet been satisfactorily shown that new 
irrigation works are required in Siam, except as feeders to
already existing systems, owing to the want of sufficiently
dense population, and I have consequently always been opposed 
to the Government committing itself to any of Mr. van der Heide's 
ambitious projects.' 66
Furthermore, Professor Ingram argues that the 'British financial Advisers
67largely decided whether additional foreign loans were wise or not.' He 
emphasises that the Advisers constantly urged the Government to maintain a
high level of reserves and insisted on the importance of framing the budget
68so as to make certain that a surplus was achieved • Finally, in considering
65- One exception to tnis orthodoxy should be noted. In the Philippines from
1911 up to 50*> of the Gold Standard Fund could be made available to provincial
and municipal governments for public works programmes: but it is also perhaps
significant that in the 1920s the Filipino exchange reserves were almost entirely 
lost as a result of a substantial portion of them being deposited with the 
Philippine National Bank, from where they were used for agricultural and indus­
trial loans (W. Cameron Forbes The Philippine Islands Boston 1928 vol. 1. p.276, 
vol. 2 p. 272/536-536). It should also be emphasised that the generally accepted 
restriction on the use of reserves for public works projects did not prevent 
heavy investment in such projects by some colonial regimes. For example the 
British administration in Malaya was able to develop an extensive infra-structure 
from the late nineteenth century, and madntain a high level of reserves, princi­
pally as a result of a very rapidly expanding revenue from tin and rubber exports
66. James C. Ingram Economic Change in Thailand 1650-197G p« 196.
67* ibid. p. 800.
b8. ibid. p. 19 7*
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the various limitations imposed on Government expenditure, Professor Ingram 
refers to
'the restraining influence of the Financial Adviser, who was one 
of the most powerful figures in the government until about 1930.
Without his approval a foreign loan could probably not have been 
marketed successfully, and the government could scarcely have 
carried out any financial measures to which he had strong 
objections.1 59
Moreover he sees the conservative influence of the British Financial
Advisers in Siam as assisting, consciously or not, the policy of the British
Government in the region :
'The principal aim of British policy was to maintain order and 
stability, and to prevent anything from disturbing or endangering 
her trade or investments. Maintenance of the status quo in 
Thailand also meant that she would remain a buffer between French 
and British possessions in Southeast Asia, thus eliminating the 
need for military expenditures to protect Burma on the east and 
Malaya on the Morth. A conservative financial policy in ilhailand 
was a safe, simple, and unimaginative means to this end.' 70
However, on several occasions Professor Ingram modifies this basic view
of the influence of the British Financial Advisers. Again referring to
Williamson's role in the rejection of van der Heide's irrigation projects,
he argues that
'We cannot put the blame for the postponement of irrigation works 
from 1903 to 1916 on Williamson alone. No doubt there were many 
otner officials who disapproved of the scheme ... All we wish to 
assert here is that the Financial Adviser did exert a conserva­
tive influence in the determination of capital expenditures.
However, because of his position, the influence was probably a 
powerful one ... Since about 1930 the government has of its own 
volition followed rather conservative polices. Probably it has 
preferred such policies.' 7 1
And, pushing the qualification a little further :
'the conservative policy was not forced on an unwilling govern­
ment. The government itself desired the policy, although the 
particular forms it sometimes took may have been inspired by 
the Financial Adviser or, through him, the British government.' 72
In these qualifications and reservations to his basic argument, Professor
Ingram almost certainly gets nearer to an accurate assessment of the influence
69. ibid. p. 196. My emphasis.
70. ibid. p. 1 7 3.
71. ibid. p. 202. My emphasis.
7 2. ibid. pp. 172-173.
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of the British Financial Advisers in Siam in the period up to 1910 . First
there are a number of points of detail. With regard to van der Heide's irri­
gation schemes, it is clear that when the Dutch expert submitted his original 
report to the Siamese Government in early 1903$ the Ministers read it with
relatively little enthusiasm: Prince Devawongse in particular was not
7bimpressed with van der Heide's proposals . The first adverse comment on
the report from the Financial Adviser appeared towards the end of 1903
75when the Government's basic attitude on the issue had already formed . There 
is no evidence that Williamson's later opposition to large-scale irrigation 
works in 1906 and 1908 marked a new departure in Government thinking. It i6 
also clear that although both Rivett-Carnac and Williamson were strong pro­
ponents of the raising of a European loan in the early 1900s, neither of them 
played an important part in forcing the Government to come to its final
decision on the loan in late 1904. If any Adviser could have been said to
76have had a crucial influence on that final decision, it was Strobel • Further­
more, neither Rivett-Carnac nor Williamson took any significant part in the 
actual negotiation of the 1905 loan (nor of the 190? loan): nor is there any
evidence that the 'approval' of the Advisers was necessary to ensure that the
77sterling loans were 'marketed successfully' . Lastly, the actual decision 
to use part of the proceeds of the 1907 loan to support the exchange was 
almost certainly taken by PhrayS SuriyS and the Council of Ministers without 
the active involvement of Williamson. Indeed since Phraya SuriyS and 
Williamson had strongly disagreed over the Ministry's exchange policy in 
October 1906, it is possible that the Adviser was not even consulted. In
73* It is worth noting at this point that for his study Professor Ingram had 
access only to the Files of the Financial Advisers and not to the Thai docu­
ments now held in the National Archives. Therefore his basic view of the 
influence of the Financial Advisers is derived almost solely from an examina­
tion of the Advisers' own papers.
7b. See pp. 13*.- i3r
75* Memorandum by the Financial Adviser upon the cash balances of the 
Government. Rivett-Carnac, 25 November 1903 F.F.A. 30/6.
76. See pp. iho-\*43
77* See James C. Ingram Economic uhange in Thailand 1550-1970 p. 19b.
73
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short, the Thai documents make it clear that on these issues at least, the 
Financial Advisers did not have the influence on specific decisions that 
Professor Ingram suggests.
This leads to a more general point. It was argued in section 3 above 
that the evolution of Siam's conservative financial and monetary policy in t  
this period can be explained, first by reference to the principal political 
objective of the Siamese Government up to the outbreak of war in Europe in 
191 - the preservation of the Kingdom's sovereignty - and second, in terms
of the financial and monetary orthodoxies of the time. In brief there is no 
need to explain those policies and measures principally in terms of the power­
ful influence of cautious, unimaginative Financial Advisers. Undoubtedly 
the Financial Advisers were conservative in outlook, but in this they merely 
supported the conservative, cautious inclinations of the Siamese Ministers.
If they had consistently opposed the basid policies favoured by the Ministers - 
for example, had fully supported van der Heide's projects - then undoubtedly 
the sovereign Siamese Government would have found a way to dispense with 
their services.
The view that the British Financial Advisers enjoyed limited influence 
in the determination of Government policy in Siam, at least up to 1910, can 
be supported by two further points. First, by and large the Financial Advisers 
did not enjoy the full confidence of either the Siamese Government or the 
British Ministers in Bangkok, a confidence that was essential if they were to 
have developed a powerful position in Siam. This was certainly true of 
Rivett-Carnac. His eagerness to pronounce on Siam's external political 
problems - as for example in early 1902 - earned him the hostility of both 
the Siamese and British foreign ministries^. In addition the Siamese Govern­
ment never lost sight of the fact that Rivett-Carnac was British; they 
therefore expected that in the last analysis he would defend British rather 
than Siamese interests. This was certainly one of the major reasons why 
Rivett-Carnac was allowed to play no significant role in the negotiations for
78. See pp. us- 110
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the 1905 and 1907 loans. Yet paradoxically it was believed on the British
side that the Adviser occasionally showed more concern for Siamese rather
79-than British interests • In addition it was felt by some British Ministers
in Bangkok that Rivett-Saraac was too impetuous to be brought fully into
80their confidence
Second, there was at least one occasion in this period when the Minister
of Finance and the Financial Adviser disagreed over a major policy; that was
in October 1906 when Williamson opposed PhrayS. Suriya's proposals to revalue
the baht and severely criticized the decision taken earlier in the year to
81proceed with the Puket currency scheme . It is significant tuat in mis 
coniiict the Minister of Finance received the support of the King and the 
Council of Ministers, and Williamson had to withdraw - though later his 
opposition appears to have been vindicated. Moreover there were several 
occasions when the Financial Adviser's recommendations, though accepted 
promptly by the Minister of Finance, took a considerable time to gain the 
approval of the Government as a whole. This was the case with both the 
abandonment of the silver standard and the raising of the first loan in Europe. 
Therefore in the period up to 1910 the Financial Advisers' effective
influence on the determination of Siamese financial and monetary policy was
82limited, and their executive power non-existent . Nevertheless they ful­
filled two important functions in the Siamese Government. First, they were 
the originators of ideas and proposals; the proposal to abandon the silver 
standard and adopt the gold standard, and the proposal to raise a European
79• Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 29 August 1906, Desp. 70 and attached minutes. 
P.R.O. F.O. 371/133.
80. This was the view of, in particular, Tower, the British Minister in Bangkok 
in early 1902; see pp. ut>- in
81. See pp. 3.-3T- 2 m
82. On this point the views of another British adviser to the Siamese Govern­
ment, J. G. D. Campbell (the Adviser to the Education Department 1899-1901) 
are of interest: 'In Siam ... an adviser is an adviser, and nothing else.
He may have a certain amount of executive and constructive work to do, but 
any new scheme or proposal he suggests has to be approved at any rate by his 
Minister, and if it is a matter of importance, may even require the sanction 
of the Cabinet Council or of his Majesty himself.' J. G. D. Campbell Siam in 
the Twentieth Century: Being the Experiences and Impressions of a British
Official London 1902 p. 169.
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loan both originated from the Advisers. Yet whether their ideas were taken 
up, or when and how, was purely a matter for the Siamese Ministers in whose 
hands alone rested the executive power. The Financial Advisers could recom­
mend or even demand a particular course of action, but in the last analysis 
they remained merely advisers. Second, the Financial Advisers were the 
Siamese Government's principal source of western financial expertise. Not 
only did Rivett-Carnac and Williamson advise the Government on the technical 
aspects of, for example, raising capital in the European money markets, the 
operation of a gold-exchange standard mechanism and the issue of a Government 
paper currency, but they were also instrumental in drafting many of the finan­
cial regulations, acts, instructions and notifications issued by the Ministry 
of Finance in this period. In such work the Financial Advisers' long 
experience in the financial administrations of British India and British
Q*7
Burma was of particular value to the Siamese Government •
5. Siam's financial reforms and administration 1665 - 1910 in an Asian setting.
An attempt was made above to pfece the evolution of Siam's financial and 
monetary policy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the 
context of the financial and monetary orthodoxies prevalent in other Asian 
administrations at that time. The aim of this final section is to place the 
early development of the Siamese financial administration as a whole and the 
promotion of specific financial and monetary reforms by the Siamese Government 
in this period, in that wider Asian setting.
The first point to note is that many of the principal financial and mone­
tary reforms introduced by the Siamese Government in this period were at the 
same time being promoted by the majority of colonial regimes in South-East 
Asia and indeed by governments, independent and colonial, throughout Asia.
For example, Siam abandoned the silver standard in November 1902: in this
85* The western budget, audit and accounts procedures which Rivett-Carnac 
and Williamson were instrumental in introducing in Siam had been developed 
in British India from the l860s. See S. Bhattacharyya Financial Foundations 
of the British Raj Simla 1971 chap. 2.
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she was preceded by India, and of course Burma in l893^\ and Japan in 1897^, 
and followed by the Philippines and the straits Settlements in 1903* The
Dutch administration in the East Indies adopted a gold-standard basis for the
88currency at about the same time • Indeed in this period China and French
89Indo-China were the only Asian states to remain on the silver standard .
Such a concerted move from silver to gold was hardly surprising. In the 
second half of the nineteenth century, these states had been thrust into the 
rapidly expanding international economy - most of them through the imposition 
or consolidation of colonial rule, Siam and Japan by the advent of Sir John 
Bowring and Commodore Perry respectively and the subsequent development of 
political and economic contact with the west. Consequently as the gold price 
of silver dropped rapidly at the end of the century, so the foreign trade of 
those states was hampered to the extent that they traded with gold standard 
powers in the west, and then in Asia itself. The same commercial and economic
factors which forced Siam off the silver standard in November 1902 also forced
90most of her neighbours to take the same action .
Similarly, the Siamese Government•s decision to abolish the opium farm 
in 1907 and to institute direct Government administration of the monopoly - 
with, it was hoped, a much tighter control over the consumption of the drug 
in the Kingdom - can be seen as part of a much wider anti-opium movement 
throughout the region. In the Philippines, the American administration 
abolished the opium farm in the early 1900s, 'as repugnant to American practice
84. V. Anstey The Economic Development of India 4th ed. London 1952 p. 410/ 
Alleyne Ireland The rrovxnce of Burma Boston 190? vol. 2 chap. 11 esp.pp.527-528.
85. G. C. Allen A Short Economic History of Modern Japan revised ed. London 
1972 p. 52.
86. W. Cameron Forbes The Philippine Islands Boston 1928 vol. 1 p. 274
87. E. W. Kemmerer A Gold Standard for the Straits Settlements Political
Science Quarterly vol. 19 no. 4 December 1904 pp. 636-649.
88. Forbes op. cit. vol. 1 p. 275.
89. C. Robequain The Economic Development of French Indo-China London 1944
p. 145. French Indo-China remained tied to silver until 1930.
90. However it is interesting to note that whereas in the Straits Settlements 
much of the pressure for the abandonment of the silver standard came from 
European commercial groups - principally the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
(Kemmerer op. cit. esp. pp. 638-6*0 ) - in Siam the decision to abandon silver 
in 1902 appears to have been taken by the Government alone, uninfluenced by 
commercial opinion.
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and theory of government* and from March 1908 the sale and use of the drug
91and its derivatives were made illegal except for medicinal purposes . In 
or about 1900 the Dutch authorities in the East Indies took over the opium 
farms from the Chinese farmers partly because, almost inevitably, the farmers
had been attempting to spread the opium habit among the population, and partly
92in order to curb the economic power of the Chinese community in the Indies .
In Malaya, the opium import duty farms were abolished in Perak in 18951
95Selangor in 1900 and Negri Sembilan in 1901 : the monopoly of importing,
preparing and selling opium came under government control in the Straits
94Settlements in 1910 and in the F.M.S. in 1911 • A further manifestation of
the anti-opium movement in this period was the fact that in 1907 British 
India - a major supplier of opium - came to an agreement with China whereby
the export of opium to the latter was to be annually curtailed and eventually
95abolished • In fact in this period there were also recurrent campaigns
96against opium smoking in China itself .
The anti-opium movement in Asia from the late nineteenth century derived 
much of its momentum from agitation within political and public circles in 
Europe. In the Bestminster Parliament in the early 1890s there was strong
criticism of the Britisn Government's policy of allowing opium to be consumed
97in the colonies and of the farming out of the opium revenue : then in every
year between 1906 and 1915 questions were raised in the House concerning
QMgovernment policy with respect to opium (and also gambling) in Malaya .
International co-operation in the control of the opium trade began with a
conference at Shanghai in 1909 which in turn cleared the way for the first
91• W. Cameron Forbes The Philippine Islands vol. 1 p. 248 and fn. 5 .
92. J. S. Furnivall Netherlands India Cambridge 1959 p- 265/412-415-
95- Wong Lin Ken The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914 Tucson 1965 pp- 192-195.
Lim Chong-Yah Economic Development of Modern Malaya Kuala Lumpur I967 p. 257.
94. Wong Ein Ken op. cit. p. 226.
95- V. Anstey The Economic Development of India p. 20.
96. Wong Lin Ken op. cit. p. 221.
97. ibid. p. 1 9 1.
98. ibid. p. 221 fn. 17 4.
international opium convention held at The Hague in 1912 . There can be
little doubt that the traditional Siamese dislike of opium smoking was 
strengthened by this anti-opium movement. One of the most important aims 
of the Siamese Government in this period was to persuade the treaty powers 
to relinquish the extra-territorial privileges of their subjects in the 
Kingdom. The powers were likely to agree to such a concession only when 
they were convinced that Siam had modernized her administration - and in 
particular her judicial administration - sufficiently for her to be accepted 
within the community of 'civilized1 nations. For the Siamese Government to 
bring opium sales under its direct administration and to announce its long­
term aim to suppress the consumption of the drug in the Kingdom, was a clear 
sign to the powers of Siam's good intentions. Similarly the decision in 1905
to close the Kingdom's gambling dens wqs due to a considerable extent to a
100desire on the part of the Government to shed its 'backward' image
Yet in abolishing the opium farm in 1907 the Siamese Government was 
clearly not acting solely in response to anti-opium agitation in the west.
Direct government administration of the opium monopoly was instituted in the 
first instance simply because the farms had ceased to be financially viable; 
as a more general consideration, the Siamese Government wished to abolish 
its tax and monopoly farms because by the end of the nineteenth century it 
regarded the faro system as an inefficient and, for the people, oppressive 
way of collecting the Kingdom's revenue. Again similar considerations were 
also evident in some of the colonial regimes in South-East Asia in that period. 
For example, in the Dutch East Indies the Government took over the pawnshop 
farms at the turn of the century, partly because it was felt that under private 
Chinese control the pawnshops were not allowing the local population just terms^
99» Siam sent delegates to both conferences; correspondence in F.F.A. 6/5.
100. It is interesting to note that according to the British Minister in Bangkok, 
Greville (Private letter to Bertie, 28 September 1899, PRO F.O. 69/197) the 
King was reluctant to nave the budget published in the late 1890s partly becmaae 
he disliked advertising the fact that the Government obtained a sizeable pro­
portion of its revenue from gambling, liquor and opium.
101. J. S. Furnivall Netherlands India p. 265/412.
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In the F. M. S. and Straits Settlements the system of revenue farming had 
been defended in the early lo90s as being the least expensive and most 
practical way of collecting revenue from the Chinese population, but by the
end of the decade official opinion was beginning to accept that the system
102did not raise as much revenue as in theory could be expected . In January
1909 the pawnshop and spirit farms were abolished; in December 1912 the
103gambling farm disappeared and gambling was declared illegal . In other
words in the modern, western-based administrations developed in Siam, British
Malaya and the Dutch East Indies in this period, it was accepted that the
collection of revenue by direct Government agency was the most effective,
efficient and least oppressive method of securing the Government's tax 
104income •
This general theme can be developed a little further* In the period from
about 1870 the colonial administrations in South-East Asia expanded, both
geographically and functionally. For example, British territorial authority
was extended to Upper Burma from 1886; then from about 1900 the functional
responsibilities of the British administration in Burma were expanded by the
creation of agricultural, veterinary, justice, police, health and other
105specialist departments . Similarly, Dutch rule was extended further into
Sumatra and the outer islands in the last quarter of the nineteenth century;
then, under the impetus of the 'Ethical Policy', specialist Government agencies,
106similar to those being established in British Burma, were created . The 
same expansion of government administration occurred in Siam in this period;
first a territorial expansion as the more distant regions of the Kingdom were
107brought under the effective control of Bangkok and then a functional expansion
102* Wong Lin Ken The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914 p* 192.
10 3* ibid. p. 222.
104 It is interesting to note that when Kedah was transferred from Siamese to 
British sovereignty in 1909 the British administration dismantled all the revenue 
farms in the state and instituted revenue collection by officials. Rupert 
Qnerson Malaysia New York 1937 pp« 243-244.
105• J. S. Furnivall Colonial Policy and Practice Cambridge 1948 pp. 72-73-
106. J. S. Furnivall Netherlands India Cambridge 1939 pp« 265-266/344-345.
107. See Nigel J. Brailey The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement in Western 
Laos 1850-92 Ph.D. thesis London 1968. Tej Bunnag The Provincial narnxnistration 
of Siam from 1892 to 1915 D.Phil. thesis Oxford 19657
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with the creation of specialist Ministries and departments in the 1890s.
Clearly the development of a linanciax administration and the introduction
of specific financial and monetary reforms along the lines considered in the
main body of this study were an integral part of the establishment of such
relatively powerful and sophisticated Government structures. For example,
these complex administrative systems could be operated efficiently only by
incorporating within them effective budget, accounts and audit procedures.
It was also in the interests of efficiency that officials be paid salaries
108rather than be remunerated on an ill-defined commission basis • Moreover,
these administrations could achieve stability only if their major sources of
revenue were under direct Government authority instead of being farmed out
to private individuals. At the most elementary level such sophisticated
Government structures could operate only if there were a uniform coinage and
109currency note issue in circulation . The development of these financial 
techniques and the introduction of such reforms were equally important in the 
expansion of the Siamese and colonial administrations of South-East Asia from 
the end of the nineteenth century'1^ .  The fact that the geographical and 
functional extension of the Government structure was undertaken in Siam 
primarily in order to protect the sovereignty of the Kingdom and in Malaya, 
Burma and the East Indies primarily, though not solely, in the interests of
commercial and economic development, has no bearing on the issue.
However, it is important to note that in the creation of a complex
108. The payment of salaries to local officials was a feature of most colonial 
regimes in Asia in this periods Rupert Emerson Malaysia p. 457} J. S.
Furnivall Netherlands India p. 193} W. Cameron Forbes The Philippine Islands 
vol. 1 p. 266. Indeed in the 1860s King Mindon of Burma attempted to introduce 
the payment of regular salaries to princes and officials: John F. Cady
A History of Modern Burma Cornell 1958 p. 101.
109* In most South-East Asian colonial regimes in this period the authorities 
assumed the sole monopoly right to issue a paper currency; for example Malaya 
in 1900 (Lim Chong-Yah Economic Development of Modem Malaya pp. 222-223).
In India arrangements were made to place control of the currency circulation 
in the hands of the Government in the l860s (R. J. Moore Sir Charles Wood's 
Indian Policy 1853-66 Manchester 196b pp. 230-238.).
110. The development of western budget, accounts and audit procedures in India 
from the 1860s has already been noted (fn. 63)- There is also evidence of their 
institution in the Philippines (Forbes op. cit. vol. 1 p.127/248) and the Dutch 
East Indies (Emerson op. cit. pp. 392-593) n few decades later.
345
western-based administrative structure and the promotion of attendant reforms 
and projects, Siam had considerably less resources at her disposal than did 
the neighbouring colonial regimes. First the Kingdom could command less 
capital resources. In part this was due to the fact that the Siamese Govern­
ment placed less emphasis on commercial and economic development than did the 
colonial administrations. More importantly, the fiscal restrictions placed 
on Siam by the commercial treaties signed with the western powers from the 
1650s prevented the Siamese Government from raising more than a relatively 
small income from trade and from the land1^.  Even so the Siamese Government's 
revenue rose four-fold between 1892 and 1910, but this was still far from 
sufficient to cover all the administration's pressing needs. The clearest 
indication of the Siamese Government's capital shortage in this period was, 
of course, the fact that the Kingdom had to raise capital abroad in order to 
continue with its programme of railway construction: in contrast, in the
F. M. S. in the 1890s and 1900s the British administration was able to under­
take a large-scale railway construction programme, financed to a considerable 
extent with the income from the export duty on tin^^. Moreover, despite 
enormous increases in expenditure the F. M. S. authorities were able to secure 
significant revenue surpluses throughout most of this period1^  and even, in 
1909i advance the Siamese Government over £4.0 m. for the construction of the
111. Two brief examples will illustrate the point. First, in 1900/01 the 
revenue from customs duties accounted for approximately 105* of total Government 
revenue in Siam (R.F.A.B. 1903/04 p. 23): in the F.M.S. in 1900 the income 
from the export tax on tin alone contributed about 45% of total revenue (Lim 
Chong-Yah Economic Development of Modern Malaya pp. 47-**$)• Second, according 
to Rivett-Carnac (Memorandum, 31 August 1899* N.A.Kh. 14/21), the revenue 
derived from the land in Burma was some 13 times greater than that raised
from the land in Siam. This was in the late 1890s, before the raising of 
the rat4s of land tax in Siam in 1905* However, even in 1910/11 the land 
and fishery taxes in Siam still contributed only 12% of total revenue 
(R.F.A.B. 1912/13).
112. Lim Chong-Yah op. cit. pp. 47-49/272-276. Over the period 1884-1937 the 
F.M.S. Government spent ^228 m. on railway construction; over 75% of that 
sum came from ordinary revenue, the balance from loans and working profits.
113. Lim Chong-Yah op. cit. p. 48.
Peninsula railway south from Bangkok . One further important consequence 
of the Siamese Government's shortage of resources was that it imposed an 
additional strain on the administration's embryo budget procedures; it 
tested to the full the Ministers' ability to work together.
The second and more serious shortage facing the Siamese Government in 
this period was the shortage of competent officials, trained in western 
financial and administrative methods. The colonial regimes could call on 
experienced, expert personnel of their own to establish budget, accounts 
and audit procedures and to implement basic financial reforms; the Siamese 
Government on the other hand had to attempt to evolve those financial tech­
niques with officials heavily imbued with the traditional Siamese attitudes 
of kin mu'ang and with, at least initially, little knowledge of western 
financial methods. In Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies, western-based 
financial administrations were developed with European officials throughout 
the senior grades and with Indian and sometimes Chinese clerks familiar with 
European audit and accounts systems occupying many of the subordinate 
positions^"''’. Siam had at her disposal few European finance officers, the 
majority British officials recruited from the Indian Service. That the Siamese 
Government, and in particular the Ministry of Finance and its principal 
Minister in this period, Prince Mahit, managed to achieve as much as they 
did in the creation of a western-based financial administration and in the 
introduction of specific financial reforms with such shortages of personnel 
and capital, should stand as the final measure of their achievement.
114. The construction of the Burmese railway network was financed by allocations 
from the Indian budget (John F. Cady A History of Modern Burma pp. 162-163), 
the French Indo-China system largely by means of loans raised in France (C. 
Robequain The Economic Development of French Indo-China p. 90).
115* Rupert finerson Malaysia p. 239; F. S. V. Donnison Public Administration 
in Burma London 1953 p* 66.
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STATISTICAL APPENDICES
TABLE I - Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1892/93 - 1910/11.
TABLE II - Government Revenue from Spirits and Opium - farms and 
government administration, 1892/93 - 1910/11.
TABLE III - Government Revenue from the Gambling and Lottery Farms, 
1892/93 - 1910/11.
TABLE IV - Government Revenue from Eand and Fishery Taxes, Customs, 
and Chinese Poll Tax, 1892/93 - 1910/11.
TABLE V - Government Expenditure on Railway Construction and 
Irrigation, 1892/93 - 1910/11-
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TABLE I
Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1692/93 - 1910/11 (in baht*)
Year Revenue
Expenditure 
from 
Revenue **
Expenditure 
from 
Loan Account
Total
Expenditure
1892/93 15,378,114 1 4 ,918,977 - 1 4 ,918,977
1893/94 17,389,673 18,174,504 - 1 8 ,174,504
1894/95 17,534,469 12,487,165 - 1 2 ,487,165
1895/96 18,074,690 1 2 ,665,698 - 1 2 ,685,698
1896/97 20,644,501 18,482,716 - 1 8 ,482,716
1897/98 24,808,002 23,996,626 - 23,996,626
1898/99 28,496,030 23,787,582 - 23,767,582
1899/1900 29,902,366 2 7,052,718 - 2 7,052,718
1900/01 35,611,307 31,641,258 - 31,641,256
1901/02 56,157,963 36,646,558 - 36,646,558
1902/03 39,152,125 39,028,040 - 39,028,040
1903/04 43,458,817 43,908,902 - 43,908,902
1904/05 46,0*i6,4D4 46,634,654 4,986,970 51,621,630
1905/06 51,657,539 50,035,524 4,216,765 54,252,289
1906/07 57,014,806 56,857,461 5,580,604 62,418,065
1907/08 55,826,532 56,503,204 6,432,287 02,935,491
1908/09 60,659,509 58,378,548 4,294,892 62,673,440
1909/10 62,679,402 58,844,619 not available not available
1910A1 63,509,181 61,482,491 3,713,012 65,195,503
Source : Reports of the Financial Advisefe on the Budget, 19U1/Q2 - 1912/13.
* rounded to the nearest baht.
*• This is not necessarily a figure for expenditure from current revenue. 
In most years the figure would include expenditure from the reserves - 
from the accumulated revenue surpluses of previous years.
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TABLE II
Government Revenue from Spirits and Opium - farms and government administration
1892/93 - 1910/11 (in baht*)
Spirits Opium
Revenue Government Revenue Government
Year from Farms Administration from Farms Administration
1692/93 2,303.173 - 2 ,477,563 -
1893/94 2,158,447 - 2 ,480,072 -
1894/95 2 ,298,508 - 2,443,044 -
1895/96 2,589,974 - 2,567,284 -
1896/97 2,773,735 - 2,513,860 -
1897/98 3,128,429 - 2,871,510 -
1898/99 3,680,057 - 2,935,243 -
1899A900 3,730,060 - 4,568,623 -
1900/01 3,412,734 - 5,452,230 -
1901/02 4,353,108 - 5,072,705 -
1902/03 3,859,394 - 7,080,637 -
1903/04 4,142,889 - 6,972,780 -
1904/05 4,499,640 - 6,403,003 -
1905/06 4,100,099 64,397 10 ,260,961 -
1906/07 3,818,342 129,417 7,693,670 1,173,38?
1907/08 3,216,623 744,389 1,705,708 7 ,9*46,824
1908/09 2 ,191,822 1 ,018,510 363,333 14,151,120
1909A 0 not available not available not available not available
1910A1 130,016 6,130,570 - 11,517,213
Source : Reports of the Financial Adviser on the Budget, 1901/02 - 1912/13
* rounded to the nearest baht.
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Government Revenue
TABLE III 
from the Gambling and Lottery Farms, 1892/93 - 1910A1
Year
(in baht*) 
Gambling Farms Lottery Farms
1892/93 1 ,832,261 901,761
1893/94 1,976,431 937,019
1894/95 2 ,283,306 1 ,036,868
1895/96 2 ,778,000 1 ,219,360
1896/9? 2 ,9118,903 1,221,520
1897/98 4,224,268 1,192,061
1898/99 4,676,977 1,400,779
1899A900 4,678,174 1,621,082
1900/01 5,244,522 1,524,747
1901/02 5,460,546 1,909,933
1902/03 4,566,225 1,997,530
1903/04 5,546,012 2,077,472
1904/05 6,879,526 2,291,109
1905/06 5,732,517 2,391,489
1906/07 3,604,538 2,697,947
1907/08 3,506,815 2,889,948
1908/09 3,076,542 3,184,870
1909A0 not available not available
1910A1 3,431,197 3 ,069,759
Source : Reports of the Financial Adviser on the Budget, 1901/02 - 1912/13 
* rounded to the nearest baht.
TABLE IV
Government Revenue from Land and Fishery Taxes, Customs, and Chinese Poll Tax,
1892/93 ~ 1910/11 (in baht*)
Year
Land and 
Fishery Taxes** Customs
Chinese 
Poll Tax***
1892/93 1 ,179,415 1 ,743,092 109,537
1893/94 1 ,884,811 2 ,555,952 36,258
1894/95 1 ,679,293 2 ,276,723 342,703
1895/96 1 ,293,026 2,141,048 122,843
1896/97 1 ,815,716 2,302,433 -
1897/98 1 ,730,194 2,646,679 437,180
1898/99 3 ,067,984 2,638,099 91,271
1899A 900 3,001,146 2,909,188 14,846
1900/01 3,433,814 3,059,789 785,387
1901/02 3,613,532 4,725,962 5,141
1902/03 3,674,767 4,684,985 1,030
1903/04 3,533,670 4,535,194 837,058
1904/05 4,537,425 5,521,090 1,812
1905/06 4,728,964 5,565,335 “
1906/07 8,370,108 5,974,495 896,400
1907/08 8,569,799 5,634,025 149
1908/09 8,149,283 6,074,563 -
1909/10 not available not available not available
1910/Ll 8,337,475 6,373,834 -
Source : Reports of the Financial Adviser on the Budget, 1901/02 - 1912/13
* rounded to the nearest baht.
*• From 1892/93 to 1900/01 the figure for land and fishery taxes is derived 
from three separate revenue heads in the reports of the Financial Adviser 
on the Budget - 'Paddy Land Tax', 'Taxes on Orchards, Gardens and Planta­
tions' , and 'Fisheries'. From 1901/02 a single figure for 'Land and 
Fisnery Taxes', covering the three heads above, is quoted in the Financial 
Adviser's Report.
*** The large annual variation in the revenue under this head is due to the 
fact that until and including 1909/10 the tax was collected on a triennial 
basis. From 1910/11 the tax was abolished and replaced by a uniform 
capitation tax imposed on both Chinese and Siamese in the Kingdom.
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TABLE V
government Expenditure on railway Construction and Irrigation,
Year
1892/95 - 1910/11 (in baht*)
Railway
Construction Irrigation**
1892/93 2 ,119 ,852 —
1893/94 1 ,127,547 -
1894/95 1,431,374 -
1895/96 1,530,924 -
1896/97 1,592,623 -
1897/98 3,185,736 -
1898/99 3,416,726 -
1899/1900 2,920,736 -
1900/01 3 ,501,892 -
1901/02 4,361,076 -
1902/03 2,787,996 18,007
1903/04 3,069,952 138,863
1904/05 4,980,976 607,823
1905/06 4,216,765 873,744
1906/07 5,580,604 1,195,690
1907/08 6,432,287 1,147,664
1908/09 4,293,867 952,460
1909A0 not available not available
1910/11 3,220,924 604,045
Source : Reports of the Financial Adviser on the Budget, 1901/02 - 1912/13*
* rounded to the nearest baht *
** Until the establishment of a properly constituted Irrigation Department 
in 1905 no separate figures are available for government expenditure on 
irrigation. For the period 1892/93 to 1901/02 expenditure under this 
head was included in a single figure for tne total expenditure of the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
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Note on Statistical Appendices.
The absence of figures for 1909/10 in the majority of tables above is 
due to the following reasons. The 'Report of the Financial Adviser on the 
Budget for 1911/12* (which would be the source for actuals for the year in 
question) is missing from the series of Reports held in the National Library 
in Bangkok. The public Record Office in London also holds copies of the 
Reports (enclosed with despatches from the British Minister in Bangkok to 
the Foreign Secretary) but unfortunately whilst the above Tables were being 
compiled, the relevant file was on loan to a government department. However, 
some of the figures for 1909/10 have been secured from other Reports in the 
series.
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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Manuscript Sources
1. National Archives, Bangkok.
The major source of research material used for this study was the National 
Archives in Bangkok, a division of Thailand's Department of Fine Arts. When 
the research for this study was carried out, in 1971 and 1972, the National 
Archives was situated in a part of the old National Library, in the grounds 
of Wat Mahathat, close to the Grand Palace. The archives consist almost 
entirely of the administrative correspondence and official records accumulated 
in the Royal Secretariat from the mid-l880s (from the creation of the modern 
government administration) until the end of the absolute monarchy in 19 32.
After the Revolution of 1932 these records were transferred to the Cabinet 
Secretariat and over the period 1936 to 1956 passed into the custody of the 
Department of Fine Arts.
The documents in the National Archives relevant for this study consist 
primarily of the correspondence between King Chulalongkorn and his successive 
Ministers of Finance over the period 1885 - 1910, and records of the meetings 
of the Council of Ministers when financial subjects were under discussion, in 
thi6 case for the period 1892 - 1910. In essence the records of the corres­
pondence between the King and his Minister of finance consisted of letters or 
reports from the Minister to the King (almost invariably in type-written form 
from the mid-l890s) and the King's reply, either as a pencilled draft or as a 
copy of the original. However, in the majority of cases these letters ana 
reports nad enclosed with them communications with other parts of the administ­
ration - for example, correspondence between the Ministry of Finance and another 
Ministry; internal memoranda prepared within the Ministry of Finance by offi­
cials or the Financial Adviser; or letters between other Ministers and the King.
In other words, this study is not based on the internal records of the 
Ministry of Finance for this period; such records are at present not open to
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scholars - indeed it is not certain whether they are still in existence. As 
a result it is possible to examine the interned administration of the Ministry 
of Finance in this period only to the extent that that administration is revealed 
in the communications between the King and the Minister and the accompanying 
enclosures (as, for example, was the case during the term of PhrayS SuriyS 
when the Minister's disputes with his senior officials and the Financial 
Adviser were eventually brought to the notice of the King). The nature of 
the source material available in the National Archives implies that the study 
must be concerned primarily with the position of the Ministry of Finance 
within the Siamese administration, the changing relation of the Ministry of 
Finance to the other Ministries, during the second half of the reign of 
King Chulalongkorn.
In citing documents from the Thai National Archives I have followed the 
National Archives classification scheme introduced in the late 1960s, pre­
facing each citation with the initials 'N.A.'. The materials for the second 
half of the reign of King Chulalongkorn have been organized by the Archives, 
first according to Ministry and then by subject within each Ministry. Hence 
the initials 'Kh' denote a series of files concerning the Ministry of Finance 
(the Phra Khlang). The number immediately following indicates a series of 
files concerned with a particular general subject (for example N.A. Kh. 26/ 
'Currency and Exchange'), and the final number denotes the file within that 
series (for example, N.A. Kh. 26/14 'Introducing the baht into the Malayan 
Provinces').
The list that follows contains only those files cited in the main body of 
the study. The total number of files in each series, and this would virtually 
correspond with the number of files examined in that particular collection 
during research, is shown immediately after the main heading of the series.
The two dates which appear after the reference to each individual file denote 
the dates of the earliest and latest documents in that file, as stated in the 
Natioaal Archives index.
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Ministry of Finance
Kh. 1/ Ministry of Finance, Miscellaneous. (48 files)
1/5 Concerning the administration of the Ministry of Finance.
20 November 1890 - 24 February I093.
1/9 Prince Narathip's opinion on the administration of the Army. 
26 April - 14 May 1892.
1/16 Mr. Mitchell-Innes' employment in the Ministry of Finance.
15 August 1896 - 9 May 1698.
1/18 Organizing the departments of the Ministry of Finance.
10 November 1896 - 29 April l897«
1/37 Mr. Carnac's opinion on the Koyal Treasury.
[The position of Financial Agent in Furope.J 
7 December - 24 December 1903*
1/44 Concerning the establishment of a Krom Samruat or Krom Truat, 
6 December 1906 - 8 January 1908.
1/45 Concerning officials inspecting the collection of revenue.
6 January 1908.
Kh. 2/ Notifications and Laws. (8 files)
2/1 Additional legislation concerning taxation.
1 April 1890.
2/2 Act concerning the Krom hep; coins, paper currency, gold and 
silver ornaments, precious stones.
13 December 1890.
Kh. 3/ Appointment of Ministers and Officials. (2 files)
3/1 Prince NarSthip resigns from the Ministry of Finance and Prince
Narit is appointed Minister. Prince Sanphasit becomes Minister 
of Public Works and Prince Sommot becomes Director of the Privy 
Purse Department.
17 March - 21 March 1893-
Note : Committee investigates the budget of the Ministry of Finance.
3/2 The position of Minister of Finance; the resignation of PhrayS 
SuriySnuwat•
29 May 1906 - 28 March 1908.
Kh. 5» 1/ The Central Office of the Ministry of Finance.
The General Budget of the Government-! (28 files)
5« 1/2 The Budget - Miscellaneous.
8 February 1893 - 15 December 1896.
5-1/3 The Budget for r.s. 111.
28 June 1892.
5.1/4 The Budgets for the Kingdom for r.s. 112, 113* 114.
22 January - 6 October 1895-
5-1/5 ^he Budgets for the Kingdom for r.s. 1151 116.
24 January 1896 - 2 February 1898.
5-1/7 The Budget - Miscellaneous.
50 January 1898 - 9 May 1899-
5-1/8 The Budget for the Kingdom for r.s. 117•
10 March - 5 May 1898.
5.1/10 The opinion of Mr. Mitchell-Innes on the form of the Budget, r.s. 117
9 September 1898 - 31 March 1899-
5-1/11 The Budgets for the Kingdom for r.s. 118, 119*
11 April 1899 - 3 November 1900.
5.1 A 3  Changes in the form of the Budget.
19 October 1900 - 11 April 1901.
Note : includes regulations concerning the disbursement of funds
from the Ministry of Finance, Bangkok.
5-1A4 Government revenue and expenditure, r.s. 120.
31 March - 31 August 1901.
Note : includes the Report of the Financial Adviser upon the Budget
of the Kingdom of Siam, r.s. 120; various accounts, r.s. 120
3.1/15 The suagei; ior t,ne Kingdom - Genereil.
10 April 1901 - 21 August 1902.
5.1/16 Request for permission to forward the report on the Budget to the 
newspapers for publication.
1 May - 4 May 1901.
5.1A8 The Budget for r.s. 122.
4 May - 9 May 1903-
5-1A9 Prince Devawongse draws attention to incorrect budget accounts.
11 August - 24 August 1903.
5.1/21 The level of Government expenditure outside the Budget.
19 December 1903 - 22 January 1904.
5.1/22 The Budget for the Kingdom for r.s. 123.
9 May - 27 October 1904.
5-1/24 The Budget for r.s. 124.
17 January 1906.
5.1/25 The Budgets for the Kingdom for r.s. 125, 126 - General.
18 April 1906 - 23 December 1907.
Note : includes various reports and accounts on the Budgets.
5.1/26 The Budget for r.s. 127.
16 March - 7 October 1908.
358
5.1/27 The Budget for r.s. 128.
17 March - 16 October 1909-
Note : includes various reports and accounts on the Budget.
5.1/28 ilhe Budget for the Kingdom for r.s. 129.
15 March - 7 May 1910.
Kh. 5-2/ Budgets of the various Ministries. (9 files)
5.2/1 The Budgets of the Krom SanphJLsl and Krom SanphSk^n.
11 March 1893-
5-2/2 Committee investigates the Budget of the Ministry of Finance. 
17 March 1893-
Kh. 7/ Investigation Department. (10 files)
7/1 Committee examines the administration in various Departments.
16 October 1896 - 17 January 1900.
7/4 Report of the Committee on Establishments on the Ministry of
the Interior.
1 February - 6 February 1900.
7/5 Report of the Committee op Establishments on the Ministry of
Finance•
7 March - 11 March 1900.
7/7 Committee on Establishments examines the salary structure of
the various Ministries.
5 April 1901 - 16 March 1902.
7/8 Reports on the size of the Treasury reserves.
6 May 1902 - 30 June 1910.
7/9 Committee on Establishments examines the salary structure of
the various Ministries.
9 December 1902 - 19 March 1905-
Kh. 9-1/ Privy Purse Department, Legislation. (1 file)
9-1/1 Privy Purse Department Act.
20 October 1890 - 7 November 1893-
Kh. 10/ The Mint Department. (9 files)
10/1 Concerning copper coins and foreign coins (The Mint) 
4 March 1891 - 29 August 1892.
10/2 The Mint - Miscellaneous.
26 April 1893 - 21 April 1899-
10/3 PhrayS Norat RStchamSnit resigns from the Mint and is succeeded 
by PhrayS PhSkhaisawan.
19 December 1894 - 6 December 1895 •
10/7 The adoption of the Gold Standard; concerning the seizure of 
counterfeit coins.
17 August 1899 - 1 November 1900.
10/9 Copper atts, nickel atts, gold coins.
21 June 1906 - 3 February 1909-
Kh. 10.1/ ‘The Mint, Notifications and Legislation. (2 files)
10.1/1 The Mint Act r.s. 111.
6 January - 8 March 1893-
Kh. 11/ Paper Currency Department. (12 files)
11/1 Concerning paper currency.
6 June - 13 June 1898.
11/2 Ordering new currency notes and destroying old notes.
7 August 1901 - 20 October 1910.
11/3 Concerning the King's speech on the inauguration of the Government' 
paper currency scheme.
6 Geptemoer - 19 Septeraoer 1902.
il/4 Monthly reports of the Paper Currency Department.
October 1902 - September 1910.
11/6 Paper Currency Department - Miscellaneous.
7 August 1903 - 10 July 1909-
11/7 The arrest of people who made counterfeit currency notes; rewards
for those who carried out the arrest; destruction of the counter­
feit notes.
19 November 1903 - 5 August 1910.
11/6 Prince PhongsS. and NSi Ph5ng make counterfeit currency notes.
20 November 1903 - 15 June 1908.
11/9 Concerning the annual reports of the Paper Currency Department.
21 June 1904 - 18 December 1908.
Note : includes the annual reports for r.s. 122, 123.
11/10 Purchasing stock and consols.
20 December 1905 - 3 September 1907*
11/11 Persons in Java are making counterfeit Siamese currency notes.
12 October - 21 October 1909»
Kh. 11.1/ Paper Currency Department, Notifications and Legislation. (4 files)
11.1/1 Government paper currency, notifications and legislation.
22 January 1890 - 19 January 1893*
11.1/3 Concerning the Paper Currency Act and ministerial notifications. 
24 June - 7 September 1902.
Kh. 13-1/ Poll-tax Department; Chinese poll-tax. (9 files)
13.1/1 Concerning the Chinese poll-tax.
25 April - 9 October 1891.
13*1/5 Concerning the Chinese poll-tax, r.s. lib.
4 June 1894 - 17 May 1898.
13*1/6 Concerning the Chinese poll-tax and wristseals in various provinces. 
9 February - 17 May 1900.
Kh. 14/ Taxation. (31 files)
14/3 The Treasury; concerning revenue collected under the authority
of the Kal&hPm.
July 1886 - 26 November 1892.
14/21 Memorandum concerning a request to abolish the taxation schedule 
attached to the Treaty of 1856.
29 September - 3 October 1899*
14/27 Additional [taxation] legislation.
10 January - 28 December 1906.
Kh. 14.1/ Revenue Departments. (7 files)
14.1/2 The transfer of the Krom Sanphak^n n$k [Provincial Revenue
Department] to the Ministry of the Interior.
29 June - 28 July 1899*
14.1/3 Published reports on the revenue collections undertaken by the 
Bangkok Revenue Department in the Ministry of the Capital.
13 July 1899 - 16 March 1901.
Note : includes copies of the various reports of the Department.
14.1/4 The Department of Agriculture and the Krom SanphcLk^n; concerning 
their relationships with the Ministry of the Interior. (Transfer 
of the Krom Sanph5k$n to the Ministry of the Interior.)
9 September - 10 September 1899
14.1/7 The Krom SanphSk^n, Bangkok Province.
18 December 1902 - 1 December 1909*
Note : includes the Report of the Bangkok Revenue Department,
r.s. 126.
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Kh. 14.1k/ Opium. (49 files)
I4.1k/1 Opium tax.
8 March - 28 March 1890.
14.1k/4 Opium tax.
1890/91 - 1892/93.
l4.1k/7 Administration of the opium tax in the Western Coastal
Provinces.
12 January 1892 - 26 January 1893*
I4.1k/l0 Concerning the opium revenue in the capital and the
provinces.
20 March 1893 - 3 September 1897-
I4.1k/ll Concerning the opium revenue in the capital and the
provinces.
17 June 1893 - 13 January 1896.
14.1k/23 Notification concerning the auction of the opium farms;
arrangements for the support of the opium farms.
20 November 1901 - 8 January 1905-
14.1k/24 The issue of official documents appointing the opium farmers.
14 January 1902 - 28 May 1905.
l4.1k/25 PhrayS Thip will purchase opium from the lord of Chiang Tung
and inspect the measures taken to curb opium smuggling in 
the Western Lao Provinces.
13 March 1903 - 2 January 1904.
14.1k/27 The opium farmers request protection when they take over
the farm.
2 February - 8 February 1905•
l4.1k/28 The involvement of Chia Choo Yew with the opium farm; the
collapse of the Penang group; later plans are made for 
government administration of the opium monopoly, r.s. 124.
17 May - 26 September 1905*
14.1k/31 Phra Phakdl and Luang Sunth^n KBsS request permission to
leave the opium farm; request that they be allowed not 
to lose any money by such action.
27 August - 30 August 1905.
l4.1k/32 Reports on the meetings of the Council of Ministers when
the opium farm was discussed; includes discussion of the 
requests from opium farmers for leniency.
2 September 1905 - 18 February 1908.
14.1k/33 Opium tax.
8 October 1906 - 7 May 1908.
l4.1k/35 Programme for government administration of the opium
monopoly, r.s. 12 5.
31 December 1906 - 30 March 1907.
14.1k/39 Programme for government administration of the opium
monopoly.
27 November 1907 - 29 December 1908.
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I4.1k/4l Reports on the administration of the Government Opium Factory.
9 March 1908 - 22 July 1909.
14.1k/43 Measures taken to curb opium smoking.
5 September - 15 September I908.
14.Ik/44 Opium revenue in Prachinburi Province.
7 October 1908 - 10 July 1909-
l4.1k/47 Allowing officials to take over the work of the opium
jflkongsi at the provincial level.
11 January - 12 January 1910.
Kh. I4.1kh/ 
l4.1kh/2
I4.1kh/12
l4.1kh/20
l4.1kh/25
l4.1kh/28
I4.1kh/51
Spirit. (39 files)
Official documents concerning illicit spirits.
January 1889 - 21 August 1891.
Phra PhibUn complains that the Ministry of Finance failed 
to issue a receipt for a payment made in respect with the 
spirit farm.
7 April - 25 April 1896.
Phra Phiphit is in debt to the Government in connection 
with payments on the spirit farm.
13 July 1900 - 17 August 1903*
The seizure of illicit spirit in the Vietnamese community 
in Samsen.
18 May 1903 - 10 January 1906.
Phrayft Boribhn and Luang MaitrlwSnit, the spirit farmers 
in Bangkok for r.s. 123 - 125 ask permission to return the 
farm; request a reduction in their arrears.
24 May 1905 - 29 June 1909.
Arrangements for government administration of the spirit 
revenue.
11 January 1907 - 13 August 1910.
Kh. I4.1kh/ (g) Gambling. (21 files)
As was explained on p . f n .  19, the suffix (g) has been 
added to this series of files to differentiate it from the 
series concerned with the spirit revenue.
I4.1kh/l(g) Concerning the gamoling dens in Bangkok Province.
31 October I889 - 15 November 1891.
l*f.lkh/8(g) Notification concerning the reduction in the number of 
gambling dens in the provinces, r.s. 1 1 7 *
11 May - 18 May 1898.
14.1kh/12(g) Concerning requests to close the gambling dens in various 
provinces; involves 29 districts.
21 December - 27 December 1899*
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I4.1kh/15(g) Concerning requests to close gambling dens, r.s. 120. 
12 December - 16 December 1900.
I4.1kh/18(g) The closure of gambling dens; other taxes Lto replace 
revenue lost through the closure of the dens].
24 September lyOl - 21 January 1910.
One further file is included in this series though it 
has been incorrectly indexed in the National Archives.
I4.2kh/10 [Concerns the closure of gambling dens in Bangkok in 
1909 and 19 10.]
Kh. 14.2/ Krom SanphSsI (revenue Department). (3 files)
14.2/2 The Krom Sanph5st; abolition of the system of tax farming and
the introduction of revenue collection by officials.
23 January 1894 - 17 December 1898.
14.2/3 Mr. Graham presents a memorandum on the collection of taxes
by the Ministry of the Capital, r.s. 117*
14 May - 21 July 1898.
Kh. 14.2k/ Krom SanphSsI; various taxes. (50 files)
14.2k/8 Concerning the boats, shops and house tax.
27 November 1893 - 16 December 1895*
I4.2k/19 Concerning taxes on sugar [includes the Inland Transit 
Duties Act of r.s. Ill]
28 August 1897 - 10 July 1900.
Kh. 17*3/ Customs Department; Taxation and the Foreign Powers. (6 files)
17*3/1 Concerning the amendment of the schedule of taxes attached
to the British Treaty; including the opinion of Mr. Innes.
24 November - 27 November 1896.
17*3/2 Request to amend the British Treaty with respect to the
limitations on the collection of taxes.
31 May - 17 July 1898.
17*3/6 Concerning taxes which involve the Foreign Powers.
10 December 1901 - 2 March 1910.
Kh. 20/ The Banks. (9 files)
20/2 The Chartered Bank (requests permission to issue its own
currency notes).
12 March - 15 May 1898.
20/3 Indo-China Bank.
14 April - 23 April 1899*
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Kh. 20.1/ The Banks: the deposit and withdrawal of Government funds.
(22 files)
20.1/12 Concerning the depositing of funds in the banks.
28 January - 8 May 1893•
20.1/21 (Employing funds in the Treasury to earn interest);
depositing Government funds in banks abroad.
10 December 1898 - 27 December 1899*
20.1/22 The deposit and withdrawal of funds from the banks.
12 June 1901 - 30 October 1908.
Kh.25/ The Government raises foreign loans. (9 files)
25/1 Borrowing funds for raixway construction.
18 December 1902 - January 1903*
25/3 Borrowing funds for the construction of the northern railway.
1$ December 1902 - 5 August 1903*
25/5 Raising a foreign loan for the construction of the northern
railway.
17 July 1903 - 3 September 1905*
25/6 Rad sing a loam within the Kingdom.
28 April 1904 - 21 April 1906.
25/7 Raising a foreign loan for the construction of the northern
railway.
8 June - 24 June 1904.
25/8 Reports on the meetings of the Council of Ministers; discussions
on the raising of foreign loans, r.s. 123 - 12 5-
18 November 1904 - 31 December 1906.
25/9 Radsing of the later £3 m. loan.
7 December 1906 - 28 January 1907•
Kh.26/ Currency and Exchange. (16 files)
26/13 The exchange rate and gold.
18 April 1901 - 10 August 1906.
26/14 Introducing the baht into the Malayam Provinces.
8 March 1904 - 1 January 1908.
26/15 The exchange rate and gold.
18 August 1906 - 19 February 1908.
26/16 The exchange rate and gold.
18 May 1908 - 24 January 1910.
Ministry of Agriculture (K.S.; KasSt)
K.S. 1/3 Concerning the transfer of the Ministry of Agriculture to
the Ministry of Finance.
March - April 1897•
Fifth Reign; Miscellaneous.
Foreigners.
b. 2kh/39 Rivett-Carnac. 
February 1902.
b. 2kh/40 Rivett-Carnac. 
1901 - 1903.
b. 2kh/424 Mitchell-Innes.
I898 - 1902.
b. 2kh.l/35 The appointment of Rivett-Carnac.
1898 - 1899-
2. Files of the Financial Adviser, Ministry of Finance, Bangkok.
The documents contained in the Files of the Financial Adviser consist 
of the official correspondence, memoranda and general records of the British 
Financial Advisers in Siam, covering the period from 1896 to 1950 - from the 
appointment of the first Adviser, Mitchell-Innes, to the resignation of the 
last, W. M. A. Doll. When the research for this study was carried out these 
documents were held in the Library of the Ministry of Finance, just within the 
main south gate of the Grand Palace. In citing documents from the Files of 
the Financial Adviser I have followed the Library's classification scheme, 
prefacing each citation with the initials 'F.F.A.'. The number immediately 
following indicates a series of files concerned with a particular general 
subject (for example, F.F.A. 6/ 'Opium') and the final number denotes the 
file within that series (for example, F.F.A. 6/3 'Difficulty with Opium 
Fammers, 1905').
The list that follows contains only those files cited in the main body 
of the study.
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F.F.A. V Kevenue and Taxation - General.
V 2 Arrears in collection of farms' revenue, 1906 - 19^9-
F.F.A. 2/ Land, House and Fishery Taxes.
2/2 Increase of Paddy Land Tax, 1905*
F.F.A. w Capitation and Poll Taxes.
5/1 Notes on 'Suey' and 'Lek' and the old systems of compulsory 
service, or money payments in lieu thereof. (F. H. Giles, 
W. A. Graham) 1899*
5/2 Laws relating to the Chinese Poll Tax (merged with the 
Capitation Tax from r.s. 129).
F.F.A. V Opium.
6/1 Translation of Laws relating to the Opium Monopoly, up to 
r.s. 125 (1906) .
6/2 Method of Opium Purdhases by Government, 1902.
6/5 difficulty with Upiura Farmers, 190p.
6/5 International Opium Commission Shanghai, 1909-
6/9 Settlement of Accounts with the late Opium Farm, I908 - 1912
F.F.A. 9/ Inland Transit Duties.
9/1 inland Transit Duties (phasi Phai Nai) Act r.s. Ill (1692).
F.F.A. 16/ Railways and Highways.
16A Southern or Peninsular Line, I9O8 - 191^ f.
F.F.A. 18/ Irrigation and Waterworks.
18 /1 J. van der Heide's Report on Irrigation and Drainage in 
the Lower Menam Valley, 1903.
18/if Mr. J. Homan van der Heide's proposal for construction of 
Pasak Canal on Last bank and new irrigation canals on 
West bank, 1908.
18/5 Mr. van der Heide's Irrigation Projects, 1908 - 1909.
23/ Currency and Exchary;e.
23/1 Gold Exchange standard Scheme, 11 September 1899 - 18 April 1905• 
Privy Purse Accounts with Banks, 26 December 1902 - 26 January 
1903. (4 files)
23/2 Exchange arrangements with Banks, May 1905 - August 1919- 
(2 files)
23/3 Currency in Monthon Puket, from 1903•
23/8 Notes on proposed gold currency, 1906 - I908.
23/10 Prohibition on importation of certain kinds of dollars into 
Monthons Patani, Srithamaraj and Chumpon, 1909*
23/14 Gold Standard Reserve Fund, from 1909 - 1910.
24/ Paper Currency.
24/8 Circulation of Bank Notes in Siam, 1910.
25/ Loans.
25/2 4J# Sterling Loan of £1 m., 1905«
25/3 4J# Sterling Loan of £3m., 1907-
25/7 *#> Sterling Loan of £4,630,000 (originally £4,000,000) for
construction of the Southern Railway, 1909*
25/21 Some remarks by Mr. Mitchell-Innes on borrowing by Oriental 
Countries (with note by Sir Edward Cooke 19 August 1925).
29/ Financial Laws and Regulations.
29/G13 Prohibition of keeping Banking accounts by Government 
Departments, 1914.
30/ Special Reports, Articles and Memoranda.
30/6 Cash Balances of the Government, (Mr. Rivett-Carnac) 1903-
30/8 Note by Financial Adviser on the Present Financial Position 
in Siam, 1907*
30/17 Note by Ministry of Finance on the present fiscal position 
of Siam, 1919-
30/22 Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam, 1902 - 1923*
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F.F.A. 38/ Government Departments' Annual Reports.
38/C Reports of Paper Currency Department, r.s. 121 (1902-1903)
to r.s. 129 (1910-1911).
3» Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, Bangkok Branch.
The records of the ricngkong and Shanghai Bank in Bangkok consulted in 
the course of research consisted of a number of letter books dating from the 
earliest years of the Bank's operations in Siam - from 1888 until the early 
1890s. The correspondence recorded in the xetter booKs concerns primarily 
tne arrangements for the establishment of the branch in 1888 and the granting 
of permission by the Siamese Government for the bank to issue its own paper 
currency the following year. These records have not been classified or 
indexed by the bank.
4. Library of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
One file in the Library's archives was consulted :
M.F.A. Section 15; Treaties.
Attempt to renegotiate the treaties with the Powers; with reference 
to the schedule of taxes, 1905*
5. National Library, Bangkok.
The National Library in Bangkok has custody of the records of the first 
half of the reign of King Chulalongkorn, the period, from 1868 until the raid- 
1880s. The records consist principally of accordian-folded black books. Of 
the documents consulted those from the following two series were of greatest 
relevance to the present study :
chotm&ihSt r. 5 (National Library, Fifth Reign)
163/2 Concerning the sending of money to the Treasury.
35/39 Regulations for officials in the Finance Office.
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b. Public Record Office, London.
Documents from the following series were consulted during research and 
have been cited in the main body of the study :
F.O. 17 China, General Correspondence.
F.O. 69 Siam, General Correspondence.
F.O. 371 General Correspondence, Political.
F.O. 628 Embassy and Consular Archives, Siam, Correspondence.
F.O. b33 Private Collections : Cromer Papers.
F.O. 800 Private Collections ; Ministers and Officials. 
Private Papers of Lord Lansdowne.
Bibliographies.
Bernath, Frances A. (comp.) - Catalogue of Thai Language Holdings in the 
Gornell University Libraries Through 1964, Cornell Data Paper No. 5k. 
Ithaca 19o^ f.
Chulalongkorn University (comp.) - Bibliography of Material About Thailand 
in Western ijanguages, Bangkok 19^0.
Ishii Yoneo, Toshiharu Yoshikawa and Osamu Akagi (comp.) - A Selected Thai 
Bibliography on the Reign of King Chulalongkorn, Thai Section, Osaka 
University of Foreign Studies, 1972.
Thrombley, Woodworth G., rtilliam J. Siffin and Pensri Vayavananda, Thgi 
Government and its Setting. A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 
Bangkok, 1967.
Newspapers and Periodicals.
Bangkok Times, Semi-weekly, 1891 - 1894-; thrice weekly, 1894 - 1895; 
daily, I896 -
RfctchalcitdhanubSksa (Royal Thai Government Gazette), Bangkok, weekly 
1856 - 1859, 1874 - 1879, 1888 -
Siam Observer, Bangkok, daily.
Siam Repository, Bangkok, ed. Samuel J. Smith, 1868 - 15?Jf, quarterly. 
The Times, London, daily.
Unpublished Theses.
Brailey, Nigel J. - The Origins of the Siamese Forward Movement in 
Western Laos 1850 - 92, Ph.D. thesis, London 1968.
Ghandran Mohandas Jeshurun - Anglo-French Tensions on the Upper Mekong 
River 1892 - 1902, Ph.D. thesis, London 1967•
Greene, Stephen L. W. - Thai Government and Administration in the Reign
of Rama VI (1910 - 1925), Ph.D. thesis, London 1971*
Murti, B. S. N. - Anglo-French Relations with Siam 1876 - 1904, Ph.D.
thesis, London 1952.
Neon Saidvongs - The Development of Siamese Relations with Britain and 
France in the Reign of Maha Mongkut 1851 - 1868, Ph.D. thesis,
London 1961.
Tej Bunnag - The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915!
A Study of the Creation, the Growth, the Achievements and the 
Implications for Modern Siam of the Ministry of the Interior under 
Prince Damrong Rachanuphap, D.Phil. thesis, Oxford 1968.
Tharasook Numnonda - The Anglo-Siamese Negotiations 1900 - 1909, Ph.D. 
thesis, London 1966.
Wyatt, David K. - The Beginnings of Modern Education in Thailand, 1868 -
1910, Ph.D. thesis, Cornell 1966.
Xuto S. - British Foreign Policy towards Siam 1890 - 1900, Ph.D. thesis, 
London 1958.
Books and Articles in Thai.
Anuman Rajadhon, PhrayS - FU'n khwSm lang (Reviving the Past : an 
autobiography), 2 vols., Bangkok 1967 - 1968.
TamnSn sunlakSk^n (History of the Customs Department), includes 
Phraprawat phraworawongthoe phra ong chao phrfrmphong athirSt 
(Biography of Prince Phr^m), Bangkok 1939-
At AthawuthikJJn - Bukkhon samkhan kh$ng thai (Important Thai People) 
Bangkok, 1962.
Chaloem Yongbunkoet - KrasSpthai (Thai Currency), Bangkok 1963* 
NgoenkU khrangrSek kh^ng prathStthai (Thailand's First Loan) 
WSrasSn krombanchlklSng, May 19^1, pp. 43-51•
Thonabatthai (Thai currency notes), Bangkok 1961.
JChamlJJng Toth^ng - S5thakit thai samai somdet phraphutachaoluang (The 
Thai Economy during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn) SanphSk^nsSn 
September 1961 pp. 31 - 40.
Chulalongkorn, King - PhrarStchadamrat nai phrabSt somdet phrachunlach$mklao 
chaoyUhua (tangtSe p. s. 2417 thu!ng p. s. 2453) (Speeches of King 
Chulalongkorn, 1 B74 - 1910), Bangkok 1967*
PhrarStchahatlSkhS phrabSt somdet phra chunlach^mklao Ehaoytlhua song 
thalSeng phraborommarS chathibSi kSekhai kSnpokkhr^ng phSendiri (King 
Chulalongkorn1s Speech Fxplaining the Changes in the Government),
Bangkok 1927-
Damrong Rajanuphap, Prince - Phraprawat somdet phrachao boromawongthoe 
kromphrayS thgwawong warOpakSn(Biography of Prince Devawongse)
Bangkok 1923*
Prawat bukkhon samhhan, chabap somblln (Biographies of Important People, 
Complete Edition), Bangkok 19o2.
Ru'ang laksana kSnpokkhr^ng prathStsayam tSe bPrSn (The Old System 
of Government in Siam), Bangkok 1963-
Ru'ang tamnSn kSnloekb^nbia lae loekhuai (The Abolition of Gambling 
Dens and the Huai Lottery), Prachum PhongsSwadfin No. 17, Bangkok i960. 
TamnSn phSslSkftn bSngyang (The History of Some Taxes) Latthi thamniam t5ng 
(Various Customs) pp. 143 - 2.6k, Bangkok 1963* tang
ThEsaphibSn (Provincial Administration), Bangkok 1967-
Lamdap rStchinlkun bang ch5ng (Genealogy of the Royal Maternal Line 'Bang
Chang'), 2nd ed. Bangkok 1919-
NaritsarSnuwattiwong, Prince - Banthu'k ru'ang khwSmrP t5.ngt5.ng (Notes 
on miscellaneous knowledge: correspondence between Prince Narit
PhrayS Anuman Rajadhon, 1936 - 1943) 5 vols., Bangkok 1963. Vol. 2., 
pp. 1 - 39i Phraprawat somdet chaofa kromphrayS naritsarSnuwattiwong 
(Biography of Prince Narit).
PhonakSn Angkinan - Botbat chSochln nai prathBtthai nai ratchasamai phrabSt 
somdet phra chunlatfd^mKlao 6haoyTlhua (The Role of the Chinese in Siam 
during the Reign of King Chulalongkorn), Bangkok 1972.
Ratchasakunwong (soyal Genealogy), Bangkok 1969-
Siam Commercial Bank - Thtralu'k wanpoet samnakngSnyai thanakngn-hha-i - 
phanitchamkat (A Commemorative Volume on the Opening of a New Head
Office for the Siam Commercial Bank), Bangkok 1971.
Si SahathBp, PhrayS - Raya thSng sadet phraratchadamnoen praphat prathat 
yurSp r. s. 116 (The King's Visit to Europe in Id97), Bangkok n.d.
Tej Bunnag - Khabot ngiao mu'ang phrSe r. s. 121 (The 1902 Shan Rebellion 
at Phrae) SangkhomsSt parithat vol. 6. no. 2., (September 196b)
pp. 67 - 80.
Thailand, Ministry of Finance - Krom phra chanthaburl mu'a damrong tamnSeng 
sBnSbpdi krasuang phrakhlang (Prince Chanthaour! as Minister of Finance) 
Bangkok 1931
Thailand, Privy Purse Department - Prawat SamnakngSn phrakhlang khangthl 
(History of the Privy Purse Department), Bangkok 1967.
Thammasat University - NangsP' ahprak^p khambanySi wichS phS'nthSn 
Srayathamthai (Handbook on Basic Thai Culture), Bangkok 1971-
Wichai Prasangsit - PrawatsanphSkSn (A History of Taxation), Bangkok 1971.
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Books and Articles in English.
Adams, T. F. M. - A Financial History of Modern Japan, Tokyo 1964.
Akin Rabibhadana - The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok 
Period, 1782 - 1873, Cornell Data Paper No. 74, Ithaca I969.
Allen, G. C. - A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, revised ed.,
London 1972.
Anstey, Vera - The Economic Development of India, 4th ed., London 1952.
Bhattacharyya, S., - Financial Foundations of the British Raj, Simla 1971-
Bowring, Sir John - The Kingdom and People of Siam, 2 vols., London 1857-
Brown, Ian G. - Paper Currency : The Government Note Issues in the Reign
of King Chulalongkorn, J.S.S. vol. 60, pt. 2., July 1972, pp. 23 - 4t.
Cady, John F. - A History of Modern Burma, Cornell 1958.
Campbell, J. G. D. - Siam in the Twentieth Century : Being the Experiences
and Impressions of a British Official. London 1902.
Carter, A. Cecil (ed.) - The Kingdom of Siam, New York 1904.
Cartwright, B. 0. - The Huey Lottery, The Siam Society, Fiftieth Anni­
versary Commemorative Publication, Bangkok 1954, vol. 1., pp. 131 - 149.
Chai Hon-Chan - The Development of British Malaya 1896 - 1909. 2nd ed..
London 1967-
Child, Jacob T. - The Pearl of Asia, Chicago 1892.
Collis, Maurice - Wayfoong, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
London 1965-
Darling, Frank C. - Thailand and the United States, Washington 1965-
Dhani Nivat, Prince - The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy, J.S.S. 
vol. 36, pt. 2., December 1947, pp- 91 - 106.
Donnison, F. S. V. - Public Administration in Burma, London 1953-
Emerson, Rupert - Malaysia A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, New York 1937.
Fairbank, John K., Edwin 0. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig - East Asia 
The Modern Transformation, London 1965-
Forbes, W. Cameron - The Philippine Islands, 2 vols., New York 1928.
Foreign Office List, 1951.
Furnivall, J. S • - Colonial Policy and Practice A Comparative Study of
Burma and Netherlands India, Cambridge 1948.
Netherlands India A Study of Plural Economy. Cambridge 1939.
Gordon, Robert - The Economic Development of Siam, Journal of the Society 
of Arts, March I89I, pp. 283 - 299.
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Graham, W. A. - Siam : A Handbook of Practical, Commercial and Political
Information, 2 vols., 3rd ed., London 1924.
Great Britain, Foreign Office - Annual Diplomatic and Consular Reports on
Trade and Finance from H. M.'s Consuls in Siam. 1#64~(Composite title).
Hall, D. G. E. - A History of South-East Asia, 3rd. ed., London 1968.
Hawtrey, R. G. - The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice, 5th ed., London 
1947.
The India List and the India Office List, 1905, 1928.
Ingram, dames C. - Economic Change in Thailand 1850 - 1970, Stanford 1971- 
Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources, in The Economic 
Development of South-East Asia C. D. Cowan (ed) London 1964, pp. 102 - 126.
Ireland, Alleyne - The Province of Burma, 2 vols., Boston 1907-
Kemmerer, E. W. - A Gold Standard for the Straits Settlements, Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 4., December 1904, pp. 656 - 649-
Le May, R. S. - The Coinage of Siam, Bangkok 1932.
Lim Chong-Yah - Economic Development of Modern Malaya, Kuala Lumpur 1967*
Manich Jumsai - King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring, Bangkok 1970.
Moore, R. J. - Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy 1853 - 66, Manchester 1966.
Mosel, James N. - Thai Administrative Behaviour in Toward the Comparative 
Study of Public Administration, William J. Siffin (ed.), Bloomington 
Indiana 1959*
Nambudiripad, K. N. S. - A Short History of Indian Currency, Poona 1955.
Norman, Sir Henry - The Peoples and Politics of the Far East, London 1895.
Urgency in Siam Contemporary Review LXIV (1693) pp. 737 - 748.
Owen, Norman G. - The Rice Industry of Mainland South East Asia 1850 - 1914
J.S.S. vol. 59, pt. 2., July 1971 pp. 75 - 143.
Prachoom Chomchai (ed. and trans.) - Chulalongkorn the Great, Tokyo 1965.
The Record, Bangkok - The Currency History of Siam 1902 - 1923, The Record 
III (October 1923), IV (January 1924).
Reeve, W. D. - Public Administration in Siam, London 1951*
Riggs, Fred W. - Thailand The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity 
Honolulu 1966.
Robequain, Charles - The Economic Development of French Indo-China,
London 1944.
Rong Syamananda - A History of Thailand, Bangkok 1971*
Saint-Hubert, Christian de - Rolin-Jacquemyns (Chao Phya Aphay Raja)
the Belgian Legal Advisers in Siam at the turfa of the Century, J.S.S. 
vol. 53, pt. 2., July 1965, pp. 181 - 190.
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Siffin, William J. - The Thai Bureaucracy : Institutional Change and 
Development, Honolulu 1966.
Sithi-Amnuai, Paul - Finance and Banking in Thailand. A Study of the 
Commercial System 1888 - 1963, Bangkok 1964.
Skinner, G. William - Chinese Society in Thailand : An Analytical History
Cornell 1957*
Small, Leslie E. - Historical Development of the Greater Chao Phya Water 
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Ian G. Brown
Towards the end of 1888, a branch of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation was estabished in Bangkok,1 At about the same 
time, the Bank received permission from the Siamese Government to is­
sue its own Bank Notes in Siam, and in early 1889 Government Offices 
were instructed to receive the Bank’s Notes in payment for taxes and 
duties.2 These Notes were not the first Paper Currency to be issued in 
the Kingdom. Paper Money, issued by the Government, had first appeared 
in Siam as early as 1853 and there had been three separate Issues in the 
Fourth Reign alone.3 In the Fifth Reign there had been only one pre­
vious Issue, in the 1870’s. For many years prior to that, the trade of 
the Kingdom had been disturbed by the appearance of large numbers of 
counterfeit 1 att tin coins.' In 1874, the King decided to replace these 
tin coins with coins minted from copper but there was some delay whilst 
the machinery for the production of the new coins was assembled. 
During this period, 1 att paper notes were issued but they were with­
drawn from circulation in 1876 when the new copper atts appeared,4 
Therefore the Note Issue of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank at the end 
of the 1880’s was the first major Issue of the Fifth Reign.
1) Maurice Collis, W ayfoong The Hongkong and Sha?ighai Banking Corporation 
(London, 1965). pp. 90-93.
2) Prince Devawongse to J.R.M. Smith (Manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank, Bangkok). 31st December 1888. Records of the Bangkok Branch of the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank held in the Bank in Bangkok. (At first only the 
Customs House was instructed to receive the new Notes but this was later 
extended to the other Government Departments.)
3) R.S. Le May, The Coinage o f Siam  (Siam Society, 2nd Ed.f 1961), pp. 100-104.
4) Ibid, pp. 117-119, '
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The appearance of the Bank’s Notes in Bangkok soon proved to be 
of considerable benefit to trade.5 The value of Siam’s Foreign Trade 
had risen from approximately 20 million baht a year at the beginning of 
the Fifth Reign to over 40 million baht in the early 1890’s.6 With the 
value of trade growing at that rate, marchants and traders had found it 
increasingly inconvenient to convey large Volumes of baht coins in the 
course of their business. By 1910, the annual value of Siam’s Foreign 
Trade was to have risen to over 170 million baht.7 Such a rapid growth 
in the Commerce of the Kingdom would have been practically impossible 
without the existence of a Paper Currency.
Prince Narathip’s Scheme 1890-1893
Within two years of the appearance of the Notes issued by the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, the Government began to consider issuing 
its own Paper Currency. Almost certainly the Government had been 
encouraged by the success of the Bank’s Issue. During October 1890 
the matter was discussed between the King and Prince Narathip Pra- 
phanphong, the acting Minister of Finance, and as a result of the discus­
sions, an order was placed with a German printer, Giesecke and Devrient 
of Leipzig for some notes.8 Almost four million notes were ordered 
with a face value of 19.2 million baht. Some two years were spent dis­
cussing technical points with the German printers and it was not until 
January 1893 that the first consignment of notes reached Bangkok. On 
the arrival of the notes, Prince Narathip proposed to the King that the 
scheme be inaugurated on the 1st April 1893.9 The Acting Minister’s 
idea was that at first the Notes would be issued only in Bangkok, at the 
Bangkok Treasury and at the Bangkok Customs House. He foresaw 
considerable difficulty in introducing the scheme outside the Capital
5) Sir Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics o f  the Far East (London, 1895), 
p. 429.
6) James C. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand Since 1850  (Stanford, 1955). 
Appendix C. Statistics of Foreign Trade.
7) Ibid.
8) Prince Naradhip to King. 1st November 1890. National Archives, Bangkok 
(henceforth N.A.) Files of the Ministry of Finance for the Fifth Reign (hence­
forth Kh.) 11.1/1.
9) Prince Naradhip to King 16th January 1893 N.A. Kh, 1 l . l / l ,
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because at that time, the Provincial Administration of the Government 
was insufficiently established to ensure a constant supply of Notes, and 
the convertibility of those Notes, in the Provinces. However, if the 
Notes issued in Bangkok were to find their way into the Provinces, they 
were to be accepted as legal tender by the Tax Farmers. As the Provin­
cial Administration improved, so the scheme would gradually be extended 
outside the Capital. The speed at which the Notes became accepted as 
a medium of exchange by the people was to depend solely on the willing­
ness of the public to exchange their coins for notes at the Bangkok 
Treasury and Bangkok Customs House. As regards the existing Note 
issue of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, Prince Narathip was adamant 
that on the appearance of the Government’s Notes, the Bank’s right to 
continue issuing Notes had to be withdrawn. If the Bank were to con­
tinue to issue its own Notes after the inauguration of the Government 
scheme, then it would be difficult for the Ministry of Finance to deter­
mine the total value of Paper Money in circulation. However, the Hong­
kong and Shanghai Bank had issued a large volume of Notes since its 
establishment in Siam and to suddenly force the Bank to withdraw its 
Notes could involve the Bank in a substantial loss. Therefore Prince 
Narathip proposed to the King that there be a transitional period from 
the date of the inauguration of the Government’s scheme and that in 
that period, the two types of Notes would remain in circulation but that 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank’s Notes would gradually be with­
drawn.
Prince Narathip drafted the necessary Act, Notifications and 
Regulations and the whole scheme was presented to the Cabinet on 19th 
January 1893.10 Prince Damrong immediately expressed concern over 
the existing Note issue of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. Fie feared 
that once the Government issued its own Paper Currency, the Notes of 
the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank would be returned to the Bank in such 
large numbers that it would perhaps be difficult for the Bank to redeem 
all the Notes in cash immediately. In that case, replied Prince Narathip, 
the Government could come to the assistance of the Bank by lending it 
cash for a period of six months at l?s. The Cabinet had no other amend­
ments to make to Prince Narathip’s scheme so the Act was approved.
10) Meeting of the Cabinet : Report. 19th January 1893 N.A. Kh. 11.1/1.
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On 6th March 1893, the King wrote to Prince Narathip proposing a few 
changes in the Legislation as approved by the Cabinet,11 but by that 
time the Cabinet was in the middle of a serious crisis.12 At the end of 
March, Prince Narathip was replaced by Prince Naritsaranuwattiwong.13 
With the appointment of a new Minister of Finance and with a conti­
nuing crisis that was to make Cabinet Government ineffective for almost 
two years, Prince Narathip’s scheme was forgotten.
Prince MahiPs Scheme 1898-1902
In March 1898, the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, 
which had established a branch in Bangkok soon after the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank, received permission from the Government to issue Bank 
Notes in Siam, and the Notes first appeared later that year.14 The third 
European Bank to be established in Bangkok, the Banque de LTndo 
Chine, began issuing its own Notes in April 1899.15 Meanwhile the idea 
of a Paper Currency Issue by the Government had been revived in 1898 
by Prince Mahit Ratchaharithai who had become Minister of Finance 
two years previously.16 At the request of the Minister, the British Fi­
nancial Advisor, Alfred Mitchell-Innes, submitted a long memorandum 
on the subject,1? but whilst not rejecting the idea of a Paper Currency 
issue by the Government, he was much less enthusiastic for the scheme 
than was Prince Mahit. Before his appointment as Financial Advisor in 
Siam, Mitchell-Innes had worked in the British Administration in Egypt 
and the notoriously bad history of financial mis-management in Egypt at 
that time clearly influenced Mitchell-Innes’ thinking on the subject. In 
his memorandum, he stressed how important it was that the Government 
maintain an adequate cash reserve for the Paper Currency, so that at any 
time, the Government would be able to meet any demands from the 
public that their Notes be exchanged back into cash. If the Government
11) King to Prince Naradhip : 6th March 1893 N.A. Kh. 11,1/1.
12) David K. Wyatt, The Politics o f  Reform in Thailand (Yale, 1970), pp. 94-101.
13) Bangkok Times, 22nd March 1893.
14) Meeting of the Cabinet: Report 3rd March 1898 N.A. Kh. 20/2 .
15) Prince Devawongse to King 22nd April 1899 N.A. Kh. 20/3.
16) Prince Mahit to King 6th June 1898 N.A. Kh, 11/1.
17) Memorandum on the issue of a Government Paper Currency. Mitchell-Innes. 
Undated. N.A. Kh. l l / l t
were to find itself in a position where it was unable to exchange the 
public’s holdings of Notes into cash— that is, if ever the Government were 
forced to declare its Notes ‘inconvertible’— then the faith of the public 
in the value of the Notes would be shaken and this could eventually lead 
to the collapse of the Paper Currency Scheme. Mitchell-Innes pointed 
out that the collapse of the Currency System in Egypt had contributed 
to the reasons which had led to British intervention. In England, the 
Paper Currency had been declared inconvertible by Parliament in 1797 
and this had led to 24 years of currency problems before convertibility 
had been re-established in 1821. In France, Austria and Russia, the in­
convertibility of the Paper Currency had in each case caused considera­
ble financial difficulty. In Mitchell-Innes’ view, based on the experience 
of England, France and Germany, an adequate cash reserve would be 60% 
of the value of Notes in circulation.
Mitchell-Innes was not entirely convinced of the benefit to be gained 
by the Government issuing its own Paper Currency either. In the first 
place, the Government Notes would have to compete against the Note 
issues of the European Banks in Bangkok. Furthermore, the experience 
of the Banks had suggested that a Paper Currency was not very popular 
with the public. According to the Manager of the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Bank, the Notes of his Bank were used exclusively in Bangkok: 
the total value of Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Notes in circulation was 
only slightly more than one million baht, and the Bank felt that it would 
be difficult for it to expand its issue above that level. Mitchell-Innes 
considered whether it would be possible for the Government to promote 
the use of its Notes by paying the salaries of Civil Servants in the new 
Paper Currency instead of in coins. He doubted, however, whether this 
would be successful. With the smallest denomination of the proposed 
Notes being 1 baht, the Civil Servants would find it much easier to use 
small copper atts for their daily expenditure. If Civil Servants were to 
be paid in Notes in an attempt to promote the Government’s Paper Cur­
rency Issue, them the Notes would be immediately exchanged for coins at 
the nearest Government exchange post and the Notes would come 
rapidly flowing back into the Treasury. Mitchell-Innes believed that the 
Government’s Notes would make slow progress in Bangkok and could 
perhaps, in time, spread out into the Provinces: however, he considered
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that the Government would be able to maintain only some 2-3 million 
baht of its Notes in circulation. If this were so, then it meant that the 
Government would be unable to use its Note issue to finance any of its 
expenditure. To a limited extent, a Government could pay for some 
items of expenditure— particularly Public Works Programmes— with its 
own Notes. However if this method of financing expenditure be resorted 
to on a large scale, the result is rapid inflation. However, Mitchell-Innes 
felt that in the case of Siam, the limitation on the use of this method was 
not so much the danger of generating an inflation, but rather the fact that 
not a sufficient volume of Notes could be maintained in circulation. In­
deed, with the current cost of the Railway Construction Programme for 
the Kingdom estimated at 50.0-60.0 million baht, it was difficult to see 
how any significant part of the Government’s Public Works Programme 
could be financed by this cheap method.
Mitchell-Innes’ Memorandum was sent to the King by Prince 
Mahit18 but the King, feeling that he lacked sufficient knowledge of the 
subject to be able to discuss it in detail, suggested to the Minister that 
a decision be delayed until the Cabinet had time to consider the 
proposal.19 However, the following year, 1899, it was decided to pro­
ceed with the scheme. An officer in the Financial Department of the 
Indian Civil Service, W.J.F. Williamson, was engaged to work in the 
Comptroller-General’s Office and to assist in the setting up of a Paper 
Currency Department within the Ministry of Finance. Williamson ar­
rived in Bangkok in May 1900 and immediately began work preparing a 
suitable office, framing a code of rules and arranging for the printing and 
supply of the Notes.20 At one stage it was suggested that some old 
Paper Notes of the Government be used in the new scheme.21 Unfor­
18) Prince Mahit to King 6th June 1898 N.A. Kh. 11/1.
19) King to Prince Mahit 13th June 1898 N.A. Kh. 11/1.
There is no indication in the National Archives’ Documents o f whether the 
Cabinet discussed Prince Mahit’s scheme at this stage or not. Nor is there 
any account of the discussions which took place the following year and which 
led to the decision to establish a Paper Currency Department.
20) Report of the Financial Advisor on the operations of the Department of Paper 
Currency R.S. 121 (1902-03). Files of the Financial Advisor (henceforth 
F.F.A.), Ministry of Finance, Bangkok. 38/C.
21) Prince Mahit to King 7tli August 1901. N.A. Kh. 11/2.
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tunately it is not made clear to which ‘old notes’ this refers. It is pos­
sible that it included the notes ordered by Prince Narathip some ten 
years earlier and which had been stored in the Ministry of Finance fol­
lowing the abandonment of the earlier scheme.22 But the description of 
the old Notes does not always fit that of the Notes ordered by Prince 
Narathip so that it is probable that it was considered using Notes dating 
back to the Fourth Reign. (It is even conceivable that the notes refer­
red to belong to an earlier scheme about which nothing else is known.) 
But, whatever the identity of the old Notes, Williamson decided that 
they could not be used as in many cases the printing on the Notes had 
faded, and the notes were not uniform in design or lettering (which con­
firms the impression that it was contemplated using old Notes from 
various previous Issues.)23 Once it was decided to order new notes, 
Prince Mahit instructed that all the old Notes held by the Ministry of 
Finance be burnt.24 (When this was carried out in July 1902 under the 
supervision of Williamson, it was discovered that the Ministry held many 
more old Notes than were accounted for in its records: it was as well 
that the idea to use the old Notes in the new scheme was discarded). 
The new Notes were ordered from Thomas de La Rue, the first order 
being for 8.0 million baht’s worth of Notes. It was hoped at first that 
enough Notes would arrive to inaugurate the scheme in January 190225 
but proofs had to be called for from the printers several times so suf­
ficient Notes did not reach Bangkok until August 1902.
Meanwhile in the previous June, Prince Mahit had submitted a 
draft of the Paper Currency Act to the Cabinet.26 As with Prince 
Narathip’s abortive scheme of almost ten years before, the main problem 
concerned the existing Note issues of the European Banks in Bangkok. 
In the first draft of the Act, the Banks were given a period of time fol­
lowing the promulgation of the Act during which they had to withdraw 
their Notes from circulation. They were also forbidden to issue new
22) Sir Henry Norman, The Peoples and Politics o f  the Far Bast (London, 1895), 
p. 429.
23) Prince Mahit to King 7th August 3 901 N.A. Kh. 11/2.
24) Prince Mahit to King 25th July 1902. N.A. Kh. 11/2.
25) Report of the Financial Advisor on the operations of the Department of Paper 
Currency. R.S. 121 (1902-03) F.F.A. 38/C.
26) Meeting o f the Cabinet: Report. 16th June 1902. N.A, Kh. 11.1/3.
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Notes. But in framing a clause in the Act which would effectively pre­
vent the Banks from maintaining their Notes in circulation, it was found 
difficult to avoid infringing on the Bank’s right to use Bills of Exchange, 
Drafts, and Promissary Notes which are close substitutes of Bank Notes. 
At the suggestion of Prince Devawongse, the clause was omitted from 
the final version of the Act. Instead, in answer to a request by the 
Government, the Banks voluntarily agreed to withdraw their Notes from 
circulation once the Government Notes were issued.27 Prince Mahit re­
submitted the Act to the Cabinet on 23rd June 190228 and the Paper 
Currency Act was approved by the King the following day.29
The Act established the Paper Currency Department as a division 
of the Ministry of Finance with the Director of the Department directly 
responsible to the Minister of Finance. The function of the Department 
was to administer the exchange of Notes and coins and to maintain the 
Paper Currency Reserve. This Reserve had to equal the Total value of 
Notes in circulation although at the discretion of the Minister of Finance 
25% of the reserve could be invested. (In other words, the amount of 
coins held as a Reserve for the Paper Currency had to be at least 75# of 
the value of Notes in circulation). It was also stated in the Act that 
any profit made by the Department from the Note Issue or from its in­
vestments was to be handed over to the Treasury.
The Opening of the Paper Currency Department-September 1902
By August 1902, sufficient notes had been received from the printers 
to inaugurate the scheme. Prince Mahit decided that in order to pub­
licise the event as much as possible, the opening of the Department 
should be marked by a special ceremony attended by the King3<> and Ri­
vett-Carnac, the new Financial Adviser was entrusted with the task of 
drafting the King’s speech. This speech was to cause some temporary 
confusion. In his first draft, the Financial Adviser had required the King 
to read out the whole Paper Currency Act, together with the Ministerial
27) man tNntuina : mtyiilmlnu (Bangkok, 2506). p. 196.
28) Meeting of the Cabinet: Report 23rd June 1902. N.A. Kh. 11.1/3.
29) King to Prince Mahit. 24th June 1902 N.A. Kh. 11.1/3.
30) Prince Mahit to King 6th September 1902 N.A. Kh, 11/3.
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Notifications and Regulations. But, he had also added a point that was 
not contained in any of the Legislation— that all Government Departments 
had been instructed to receive the new Notes as payment for taxes and 
duties. This involved an important point for Prince Mahit. The 
Minister felt that it would be preferable to avoid giving the impression 
that the Government Notes were being forced on the public; he had de­
cided that it would be better if the public were allowed to exchange their 
coins for Notes as and when they wished to do so. In that way the note 
issue would perhaps expand more slowly but more safely— there would be 
less chance of the value of notes in circulation growing so fast that the 
Government would find it difficult to maintain the required Reserve 
levej. So even though the relevant Government Departments had indeed 
been instructed to accept the new Notes,31 Prince Mahit did not want 
/the fact publicized. Rivett-Carnac’s final version of the King’s speech 
was much shorter and contained no references to the Legislation.32 As 
it turned out, when the Department was opened 01119th September 1902, 
the King was indisposed and his place was taken by Prince Phanuphundu- 
wongse.33 The guests present at the opening ceremony took the oppor­
tunity to exchange their coins for the new Notes and almost 4,000 baht 
of the new Notes were issued. The Department was opened for ordinary 
business on 23rd September 1902 and on that day alone, the public ex­
changed 62,410 baht for Notes.34 At first four denominations of Notes 
were issued, 5, 10, 20 and 100 baht. It was felt that notes with a value 
above 100 baht would not be taken up by the public35 though later 1,000 
baht notes were issued. 1 baht Notes were not issued because of the 
large number of baht coins in circulation at the time.36
Paper Currency Department 1902-1903
By the end of October 1902, the value of Government Notes in cir­
culation was 1,014,040 baht. By the end of March 1903, 6 months after
31) Prince Mahit to King : undated-but early September 1902. N.A. Kh. 11/3.
32) Prince Mahit to King 18th September 1902. N.A. Kh. 11/3.
33) Bangkok Times, 22nd September 1902.
34) Report of the Financial Advisor on the operations of the Department of Paper 
Currenco. R.S. 121 (1902-03) F.F.A. 38/C.
35) Meeting of the Cabinet: Report. 16th June 1902 N.A. Kh. 11,1/3.
36) man tmitymfl : mzmiJmlfiu (Bangkok, 2506). p. 197,
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the opening of the Department, the figure had risen to 3,479,105 baht 
and after a full year’s operation, the value of Government Notes in cir­
culation was 6,349,600 baht.37 These figures had been achieved despite 
the fact that Mitchell-Innes had earlier estimated that at first the Govern­
ment would be able to maintain only 2.0-3.0 million baht in circulation. 
Furthermore, the Note issue of the Government exceeded that of the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank as early as December 1902, and in the 
following month, the Government issue exceeded the total issue of all 
three European Banks combined.38 In addition, as was made clear when 
Prince Mahit objected to the first draft of the King’s speech prepared by 
Rivett-Carnac, the Government was making no attempt to force its Notes 
into circulation. As Williamson noted in the first report of the Paper 
Currency Department “Even officials, who draw salaries and allowances 
at the Treasury, have been, and continue to be, at perfect liberty to\ 
‘ receive either notes or coins at their pleasure”.39 There may even have 
been a restriction on the rate of expansion of the Government Note issue 
since even the Treasury could only obtain its Notes by purchase in cash 
from the Currency Office. Undoubtedly one reason for the rapid rise in 
the value of Government Notes in circulation was the voluntary agree­
ment by the European Banks to withdraw their own Notes. But as Wil­
liamson pointed out in his Report, the Banks, in one way, benefited by 
the replacement of their own Notes with the Government Issue.
“At times when money is plentiful, Banks and other 
large holders of coin are glad to keep a portion of their cash 
balances in notes, representing as they do, considerable value 
in small bulk and economy of storage room, while in seasons 
of monetary scarcity all notes not actually required for busi­
ness purposes can be immediately converted into coin by pre­
sentation at the Currency office. This is a convenience which 
the Banks could not obtain by the exclusive employment of 
their own paper.”40
37) Monthly Reports o f the Paper Currency Department to the Minister of 
Finance. N.A. Kh. U /4 . (See Table 1.).
38) Memorandum. Circulations of Bank Notes in Siam. Williamson 2nd April 
1910 F.F.A. 24/8.
39) Report o f the Financial Advisor on the operations of the Department of Paper 
Currency R.S. 121 (1902-03) F.F.A. 38/C.
40) Ibid.
By December 1909, the total value of outstanding notes of the 
European Banks had fallen to 62,103 baht and most of these notes were 
those issued by the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank.41
It March 1903 Williamson left the Department to become Financial 
Adviser, replacing Rivett-Carnac who was leaving Siam. Prince Rajani 
assumed the post of Director of the Paper Currency Department but in 
September 1903 he was transferred to another post within the Ministry 
of Finance, though he remained nominally the head of the Department. 
Phra Suwan Phakdi became Acting Director.42
Forged Notes : November 1903
Within three months, the Department was faced with its first 
serious crisis. On 18th November 1903, the Hongkong and Shanghai 
Bank informed Williamson that forged Government Notes had been 
handed in at the Bank. Immediately Williamson and Eric St. J. Lawson, 
the Commissioner of Police for Bangkok went to the Bank.43 The Notes 
were good forgeries but once the differences were known, they were 
easily detectable. (The most noticeable fault of the forgery was that the 
word ‘Limited’ in ‘Thomas de La Rue Limited’ was printed ‘Limitep’). 
The other two European Banks, the Gambling and Lottery Farmers, the 
Customs Department and the Railway Department were all immediately 
informed of the existence of the forgeries by Lawson. Meanwhile Prince 
Mahit had been told and had made arrangements to inform the Provinces 
and to have a Notification placed in the Newspapers announcing the 
existence of the forgeries and describing how the forged notes could be 
recognised.44 The forgers were rapidly traced. Six men were involved, 
four Japanese, all of whom had already been involved in counterfeiting 
Notes for release in China, and two Siamese, one of w h o m  had been in­
strumental in passing the forged Notes, the other having financed the 
scheme. The first arrests were made within three days of the discovery
41) Memorandum. Circulation of Bank Notes in Siam. Williamson 2nd April 
1910 F.F.A. 24/8.
42) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 122 (1903-04) F.F.A. 38/C.
43) Eric St. J. Lawson, to Prince Nares Votariddhi 24th November 1903. N.A. Kh. 
11/8 .
44) Prince Mahit to King 19th November 1903. N.A. Kh. 11/7,
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of the forgeries and within a week all six were apprehended.45 It was 
estimated by Lawson that they had printed 1.2 million baht’s worth of 
Notes though most of them were still in Japan where they had been pro­
duced.46
The quick arrest of the forgers, the fact that relatively few Notes 
were released (and were quickly traced and withdrawn) and the fact that 
the forged Notes were comparatively easy to detect, meant that Public 
confidence in the Paper Currency was hardly affected. The total value 
of Government Notes in Circulation, which had stood at 6,471,715 baht 
at the end of October had by the end of November fallen to 6,337,385 
baht but by the end of January 1904, the figure had risen to 6,487,800 
baht.47 (It is quite probable that this slight decline in the value of Notes 
in circulation during November— December 1903 was due to seasonal 
factors rather than the forgery episode since similar phenomena are 
noticeable at the end of 1904 and 1905— see the section below on the 
Paper Currency Amendment Act 1906). The two Siamese were heavily 
punished; one, a junior member of an important Siamese family was 
temporarily banished from Bangkok and stripped of all rank whilst the 
other was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. The four Japanese 
however escaped lightly; under the 1898 Siam-Japan Treaty they were 
tried in Japan. Tlve leaders were fined the equivalent of about 100 baht 
each, the others being fined about 50 baht each. Lawson was dismayed 
at the lightness of the sentences and wrote to Prince Nares48 “Comment 
on this peculiar form of ‘Justice’ is needless. I do not think it will be 
very long before some more Japanese start this very safe and profitable 
business again”.49 The Police Commissioner’s fears were unfounded.
45) Bangkok Times, 21st November 1903.
46) Plira Suwan Phakdi in his Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 
122 (1903-04) put the figures of forged notes much lower. He said that only 
100,000 baht had been printed and 25,000 baht released.
47) Monthly Reports of the Paper Currency Department to the Minister of Finance 
N.A. Kh. 11/4.
48) Eric St. J. Lawson to Prince Nares 9th May 1904 N.A, Kh. 11/8.
49) Prince Devawongse, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made enquiries into the 
punishment received by the Japanese. On 28th June 1904, the Japanese 
Government introduced an ordinance making forgery punishable by 9-11 years 
hard labour. N.A. Kh. 11/8.
111 1906 there were two minor incidents involving attempts to pass 
crudely forged Notes in Gambling Houses50 and in 1909, the Acting 
Siamese Consul in Singapore reported that it was rumoured that Siamese 
Notes had been printed in Java and were on their way to Bangkok; but 
nothing was ever seen of the Notes in Siam.51 None of these cases com­
pared with the November 1903 episode, and none of them seriously af­
fected the public’s confidence in the Government issue.
Paper Currency Department 1904-1905
At the end of 1904, the value of Government Notes in circulation, 
which had been increasing steadily since the inauguration of the Paper 
Currency Department in September 1902, increased substantially. In 
October 1904, the Ministry of Finance issued a Notification demonetizing 
the bullet-shaped baht coins, which had not been minted since the Fourth 
Reign. Under the Notification, the Public were allowed a period of 
time in which to exchange their holdings of the old coins either for flat 
baht at the Treasury, or for Notes or the Paper Currency Department. 
Between November 1904 and March 1905 the value of Notes in circula­
tion increased by 2,089,860 baht. During the same period, the Depart­
ment received 1,606,648 bullet-shaped baht which were exchanged for 
an equivalent value of Notes.52 Over the whole period October 1904 to 
October 1905, the total value of bullet-shaped baht exchanged at the De­
partment was 2,726,906 baht. These coins were then exchanged for flat 
baht at the Treasury and were added to the cash Reserve of the Paper 
Currency Department.53
In his Report on the operation of the Department in R.S. 123 
(April 1904-March 1905), the Acting Director, Phra Suwan Phakdi con­
cluded, that the “Note issue is now in a flourishing condition” and that 
the Scheme was now well enough established for it to be safe to invest 
a portion of the Cash Reserve as allowed under the 1902 Act. It had 
been intended to do so in 1903 but the forgery case in November of that
50) Prince Chantaburi to King 6th March 1906;
Prince Nares to King 28th June 1906 N.A. Kh. 11/7,
51) Prince Devawongse to Prince Sommot 12th October 1909 N.A. Kh. 11/11.
52) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 123 (1904-05) F.F.A. 38/C.
53) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 124 (1905-06) F.F.A. 38/C.
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year had upset the arrangements.54 Throughout 1904, the market rate 
of exchange of the baht was low. As a result it was not found possible 
to remit money out of the country at a satisfactory rate of exchange in 
order to purchase investments.55 The incentive to invest part of the 
Cash Reserve was very strong. By 1905, the total value of Notes in cir­
culation exceeded 11.0 million baht and the whole of this amount was 
backed by holdings of cash in the Paper Currency Department. If a 
portion of the Reserve were invested, then the earnings on those invest­
ments could contribute to the cost of administering the Department: no 
income was being earned on the Reserve whilst it remained totally in the 
form of coin. At the end of 1905, with the Exchange rate favourable 
for the remittance of money out of the country, almost exactly 25# of 
the Reserve was invested in British Consols and Indian Gold 
Stock.56 The annual earmings on the investment was expected to be 
about 70,000 baht or more than twice the cost of administering the De­
partment.57
Paper Currency Amendment Act. 1906
Within a year of making these investments, the new Minister of 
Finance, Phraya Suriyanuwat proposed to the King that the 1902 Paper 
Currency Act be amended so that up to 50# of the Reserve could be in­
vested.58 The Minister had examined the accounts of the Department 
and estimated that the maximum value of coins which the Department 
had to pay out at any one time in exchange for returned Currency Notes, 
was only approximately 10# of the total value of Notes in circulation. 
It was normal that in October to December of each year, substantial 
amounts of Notes would be returned to the Department and exchanged 
for baht coins, the reason being that in those months, the rice crop was 
harvested and rice-millers found that the Provincial rice-farmers prefer­
red to be paid in coins rather than in Notes. On the other hand, the 
Paper Currency Department was, since December 1905, holding in coins,
54) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 122 (1903-04) F.F.A. 38/C.
55) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 123 (1904-05) F.F.A. 38/C,
56) Prince Mahit to King 20th December 1905. N.A. Kh. 11/10.
57) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 124 (1905-06) F.F.A. 38/C.
58) Phraya Suriyanuwat to King 2nd October 1906 N.A. Khi 11/10,
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75# of the value of Notes in circulation. Furthermore, since the early 
1900’s, the Ministry of Finance had been finding it increasingly difficult 
to meet the rapidly rising expenditure of the Government out of current 
Revenue. In those circumstances, it was unwise to maintain too large a 
non-interest-earning Cash Reserve for the Paper Currency. If the Mi­
nister of Finance could invest up to 50# of the Reserve, that would allow 
the Minister to invest 6.0 million baht which at 2£# p.a., would yield 
interest at the rate of 150,000 baht a year.59 After paying the admis- 
trative expenses of the Department, any profit was, under the 1902 Act, 
handed over to the Treasury and became part of the General Revenue 
Fund. There was a further, more pressing reason why Phraya Suriya- 
nuwat proposed amending the 1902 Act to allow up to 50# of the Paper 
Currency Reserve to be invested. There was at the time an acute 
shortage of baht coins in the Treasury, so acute that the Banks were 
unable to find enough coins to finance trade satisfactorily. The shortage 
was caused first of all by the poor output of coins from the Mint; in 
particular, the Mint was unable to remint the demonetized bullet-shaped 
baht into flat coins at anything like the required rate. Secondly, the 
Government was trying to introduce the baht into its Southern Provinces 
where for many years the Straits Dollar, and before that, the Mexican 
Dollar, had been the main currency in use. This necessitated sending 
large amounts of baht coins into the Peninsula, principally to Puket. 
The Minister argued that if he were allowed to invest an additional 25# 
of the Paper Currency Reserve, this would release approximately 3 mil­
lion baht which could be sent to Puket leaving enough coins in the 
Bangkok Treasury to satisfy the demands of the European Banks,60
Phraya Suriyanuwat also proposed to the King that every year the 
investments held' by the Paper Currency Department be re-valued to 
determine their current market value. It was probable that after the 
investments were made, their market value, in terms o f  baht could alter 
either as a result of a change in the market value of the shares, or as a 
result of a change in the exchange rate, or as a result of both. If the 
Department were ever forced to sell some of its investments, it was pos­
sible, therefore that the amount of baht the Department would receive
59) Phraya Suriyanuwat to King 2nd October 1906 N.A. Kh. 11/10.
60) Phraya Suriyanuwat to King 17th July 1906 N.A. Kh. 26/13.
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could be less than the amount it had originally paid out to purchase the 
stocks. In that case, the value of the Reserve would be less than the 
value of Notes in circulation. At a time when the Minister of Finance 
was authorized to invest only up to 25% of the Reserve, such changes in 
the baht value of the investment of the Department were not that im­
portant. But now that it was proposed that up to 50# of the Reserve be 
invested, it was possible that substantial falls in the baht value of the 
Reserve could occur. Phraya Suriyanuwat suggested that in those cases 
where the baht value of the investments had fallen, the Treasury would 
make good the loss to the Paper Currency Department. Alternatively, 
if the baht value of the investment increased, the Department was obliged 
to transfer the balance to the Treasury. The King approved of Phraya 
Suriyanuwat’s suggestions and the Paper Currency Amendment Act came 
into force on 9th October 1906.61
Later in the month, whilst the three million baht ear-marked for 
Puket was being transferred from the Paper Currency Department to the 
Treasury, Williamson discovered that almost half the coin Reserve of the 
Department was held in bullet-shaped baht which had been demonetized 
two years previously.62 Not only did this discovery have serious impli­
cations for the Puket Currency Scheme, in that only half the coins could 
be used in the Province, but it also meant that if the Paper Currency 
Department were ever faced with a large public demand for its Notes to 
be converted back into coin, the Department would be severely hampered 
by the fact that half its coin Reserve consisted of demonetized coins 
which were absolutely useless as money.63 However, since Phraya Suri­
yanuwat had earlier shown that in normal circumstances, the Department 
required only about 10# of its Reserve, there was not too much cause 
for alarm. Meanwhile, in November 1906, some more British Consul 
Stock was added to the investments of the Department and in January 
1907, German Imperial Stock and Siamese Stock were purchased. This 
brought the total value of the investments to 5,310,378 baht or just over 
40# of the value of Notes in circulation. Further purchases of these
61) King to Phraya Suriyanuwat. 9th October 1906. N.A. Kh. 11/10.
62) Memorandum. Shortage of ticals in the Treasury 18th October 1906 N.A. Kh.
26/15.
63) Ibid,
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stocks were made in the following years to bring the proportion of in­
vested Reserve lip to 50#. The earnings on these investments were sub­
stantial. In the year April 1907 to March 1908 (R.S. 126) they yielded 
183,326 baht; the costs of running the Paper Currency Department in 
the same year was 29,232 baht. The balance was transferred to the 
Treasury.64
In August 1907 Williamson carried out the first valuation of the 
investments of the Department in accordance with the 1906 Amendment 
Act. He estimated that the baht value of the investments had fallen 
from their original market value by 707,016 baht. Of this fall, 255,234 
baht was due to falls in the value of the stocks and the rest was due to a 
rise in the exchange value of the baht.65 (That a rise in the exchange 
value of the baht could lead to a fall in the baht value of the investments 
can perhaps be best explained in the following manner: at the end of 
1905, the exchange value of the baht in terms of Pounds Sterling was a 
little over 17 baht to the Pound. If the Government had purchased 
£1,000 worth of stock in London at that rate, the equivalent baht value 
of the investment would have been just over 17,000 baht. By 1908, the 
baht had been revalued several times and stood at 13 baht to the Pound. 
If the Government were then to have sold that stock— and assuming that 
there had been no change in the market value of the stock,— then the 
Government would have received only 13,000 baht in return.) Accor­
dingly, on 10th October 1907, the Treasury paid the Paper Currency 
Department 707,016 baht.66 A  further revaluation took place in July 
1909 as a result of which a further 154,232 baht were transferred from 
the Treasury to the Department.67
Transfer of the Paper Currency Department to the Comptroller General’s 
Office 1909
The existence of the Paper Currency Department as a separate 
division within the Ministry of Finance came to and end in May 1909
64) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S* 126 (1907-08) F.F.A, 38/C.
65) Memorandum. Depreciation of Currency Investment. Williamson. 19th 
August 1907 N.A. Kh. 11/10.
66) Report on the Paper Currency Department for R.S. 126 (1907-08) F.F.A. 38/C.
67) Prince Chantaburi to King 8th July 1909. N.A. Kh. 11/6.
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when the Department was transferred to the Comptroller-General’s 
Office. The Minister of Finance, who by that time was Prince Chanta­
buri Norinat, explained to the King that under the old system, it was 
found that even quite small matters, which should have been dealt with 
within the Department, were being referred all the way up to the Minis­
ter. By transferring the Department to the Comptroller-General’s Office, 
these matters would in future be dealt with by the Comptroller-General, 
though the Minister of Finance would of course still have ultimate res­
ponsibility for the operations of the Department. In addition, the 
merger would provide an opportunity to reduce the staff of the Paper 
Currency Department and in this way a small reduction in the salary bill 
of the Ministry could be made. Prince Chantaburi added that the new 
system was the one in force in India.68
There was, however, a more compelling reason for the. abolition of 
the Department as a separate division of the Ministry of Finance. Prince 
Chantaburi, writing privately to the King69 informed him that the Direc­
tor of the Paper Currency Department Phra Suwan Phakdi had over the 
years borrowed a substantial sum of money, much of it from people who 
also were employed in the Ministry of Finance. There was no doubt 
that Phra Suwan Phakdi could meet these debts but that to do so he 
would have to sell some of his holdings of land. This would take time 
and meanwhile the Director’s creditors were becoming impatient. Both 
the Minister and the Director felt that any scandel, however unjustified, 
could seriously damage the credibility of the Paper Currency Scheme. 
Therefore Phra Suwan Phakdi had asked Prince Chantaburi for permis­
sion to resign in order to arrange for the settlement of his debts. The 
Minister had agreed to this and had made arrangements for an allowance 
to be paid to him until another position, preferably in the Ministry of 
Finance, could be found. Prince Chantaburi felt that in the circum­
stances, less of a disturbance would be apparent to the Public— and hence 
less of a risk of Public disquiet— if the Paper Currency Department were 
transferred to the Comptroller-General’s Office than if there were a 
change of Director. The transfer took place on 19th May 1909.70
68) Prince Chantaburi to King 17th May 1909 N.A. Kh. 11/6.
69) Prince Chantaburi to King 17th May 1909. Private Letter N.A. Kh. 11/6,
70) King to Prince Chantaburi 18th May 1909 N.A. Kh. 11/6,
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Conclusion
In conclusion I want to consider just two aspects of the Govern­
ment’s Paper Currency Schemes in this period. Firstly, to consider why 
Prince Narathip in 1890 and more particularly Prince Mahit in 1898-99 
felt it necessary for the Government to issue its own Paper Currency 
since Notes issued by the Banks were already in circulation and were 
greatly assisting trade : and secondly to consider some of the reasons for 
the success of the Paper Currency Department from 1902.
(i) There are perhaps three reasons why the Government would 
have wished to replace the Notes issued by the European Banks with its 
own Issue. In the first place, it may simply have felt that it was unde­
sirable that the Paper Money in circulation in Siam should bear anything 
other than the name of the Siamese Treasury. Secondly, the Notes in 
circulation before 1902 were used almost solely in Bangkok. To a large 
extent this was due to the fact that the daily expenditure of the Provin­
cial rice-farmer was so small that it was found more convenient to use 
the small copper coin then in circulation, the att. This preference for 
the att would also have acted against the spread of the Government 
Notes into the Provinces after 1902, particularly in view of the fact that 
the lowest denomination Note issued by the Government was five baht. 
But in the long run, as the Provincial Administration grew stronger 
under Prince Damrong’s Ministry of the Interior, as the authority of the 
Central Government in Bangkok over the Provinces became tighter, so it 
was probable that a Government-issued Paper Currency would have a 
greater chance of success outside the Capital than Notes issued by the 
foreign Banks in Bangkok which lacked a net-work of offices in the Pro­
vinces. Indeed there are indications that even in the short-run, within 
three or four years of the inauguration of the Government scheme, 
Government Notes were used to a far greater extent outside Bangkok, 
than ever the issues of the European Banks had been.71 Finally, the is­
suing of a Paper Currency can be, as the Banks were well aware when 
they asked the Government’s permission to issue Notes, a highly profita­
ble commercial undertaking.
71) Paper Curreucy Notes were sent to Pattani in 1907 as part of the Ministry of 
Finance’s scheme to replace the use of the Straits Dollar in those Provinces 
with the baht. It is unlikely that the Notes would have been sent if it were 
suspected that they were unacceptable to the local population.
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(ii) Throughout most of the period 1902-1909, the total value of 
Government Notes in use— and by December 1909, the figure had risen 
to 16,776,930 baht72 was far in excess of what was originally believed 
could be achieved. Just prior to the introduction of the Government 
Note Issue in September 1902, the three European Banks had just over 
three million baht in circulation.73 Mitchell-Innes’s estimate had been 
that at first the Government would be able to maintain only 2-3 million 
baht in circulation though his calculation was based on the assumption 
that the Notes of the Banks would not be withdrawn. Prince Mahit had 
originally ordered only 8.0 million baht’s worth of Notes from Thomas 
de La Rue so further orders had to be placed in January 190574 and 
October 1906.75 This success of the Government’s Paper Currency 
Scheme was due to a considerable extent to the fact that the Notes were 
introduced at a time when the Commerce of the Kingdom was rapidly 
expanding though there was a brief trade depression in 1907-08; as the 
value of trade increased, so the demand for Paper Notes, together with 
the demand for other kinds of money, grew. Also, the existence of Paper 
Money in circulation in Bangkok for many years prior to 1902, undoub­
tedly helped familiarize the Public with Paper Notes before the establish­
ment of the Paper Currency Department. In addition, since the Notes 
of the European Banks were gradually withdrawn after 1902, the Govern­
ment’s Notes once they appeared faced very little direct competition.
Finally in the establishment of the Paper Currency Department in 
1902 and in the operation of the Department in the years that followed, 
the Government proceeded with a great deal of caution. Firstly, the 
cash reserve level stipulated in the 1902 Act— 75# of the total value of 
Notes in circulation— was higher than that recommended by even Mit- 
chell-Innes in 1898. The figure was brought down to 50% only after 
Phraya Suriyanuwat had shown that in its normal operations, the 
Department did not need to maintain such a large volume of coins in
72) Monthly Reports of the Paper Currency Department to the Minister of Finance.
N.A. Kh. 11/4.
73) Memorandum. Circulation of Bank Notes in Siam. Williamson. 2nd April
1910 F.F.A. 24/8.
74) Prince Mahit to King 3rd January 1905 N.A. Kh, 11/2.
75) Phraya Suriyanuwat to King 8th October 1906 N.A. Kh. 11/2.
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reserve; and when the Treasury had become desperately short of baht 
coins. The total reserve— coins plus investments— was maintained at 
100# of the value of Notes in circulation throughout this period. (Indeed 
the clause in the 1906 Amendment Act providing for the periodic reva­
luation of the Department’s investments illustrates how much care the 
Government was taking to maintain the total Reserve at 100#). On the 
other hand, as Williamson discovered in 1906, approximately half the 
coin held in Reserve were in the form of demonetized bullet-shaped baht, 
and even though this was mainly due to the failure of the Mint to re­
mint the old coins at a satisfactory rate, the fact remains that in an ex­
treme crisis, the Department would have been short of coins. But for 
the; normal, day to day work of the Department, the coin Reserve was 
rhore than adequate. Secondly, the Government made no attempt to 
force its Notes into use; the value of notes in circulation was determined 
solely by the Public’s willingness to exchange it’s coins for Notes at the 
Paper Currency Department. These two features of the scheme— the 
high Reserve level and the fact that the Government’s Notes were not 
forced into circulation— explain to a large extent the confidence of the 
Public in the Government’s Notes— and hence the success of the Issue.
T A B L E  1
Value o f  Government Notes in Circulation : 
October 1 9 0 2 —October 1909
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Date : "(figure is for last 
day of each month)
Value of Government Notes 
in Circulation in baht.
October 1902 1,014,040
January 1903 3,355,995
April 1903 N.A.
July 1903 5,569,490
October 1903 6,471,715
January 1904 6,487,800 '
April 1904 6,983,060
July 1904 7,850,930
October 1904 8,533,260
January 1905 9,753,540
April 1905 10,893,095
July 1905 11,339,140
October 1905 10,825,035
January 1906 10,856,915
April 1906 12,116,075
July 1906 12,858,245
October 1906 11,497,275
January 1907 13,245,660
April 1907 16,057,820
July 1907 15,520,375
October 1907 15,617,530
January 1908* 14,289,505
April 1908 14,982,165
July 1908 13,480,905
October 1908 15,572,985
January 1909 16,156,270
April 1909 17,590,690
July 1909 17,506,315
October 1909 17,171,560
Source : Monthly Reports of the Paper Currency Department to the Minister of 
Finance. N.A. Kh. 11/4.
*The fall in the value of Notes in circulation in 1908 was a result of the trade 
depression in Siam in 1907-08.
